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“Men in uniform watched us fill out tests”: How Russia “re-educates” Ukrainian schoolchildren in the occupied territories

While Ukrainian men and women living in their country’s Russian-occupied territories face abductions, arrests, and torture, the Russian state is working to “re-educate” Ukrainian children in schools and so-called integration camps, where they receive military training and are encouraged to “take revenge on Ukraine for their parents.” In 2025, the Kremlin allocated nearly $840 million for the indoctrination of children in the occupied regions. The new “patriotic educators” are drawn from among local officials, teachers, and Russian soldiers “on tour.” Some Ukrainian teenagers inspired by pro-Russian movements enlist with the army and die on the front lines, while those who dare resist the Kremlin’s propaganda are subjected to forced psychiatric treatment.

Content
  • From textbooks to trenches

  • Downed drones and dictation at gunpoint

  • Youth theater

  • A new generation of patriots

  • Born, grew up, gave his life

  • Summer camps for Ukrainians: despair, integration, prayers

  • Young propagandists' school

  • “Look at all those Russkies coming here”

  • Always ready to stand up for God and Russia

  • Forced treatment and guidelines on “terrorism detection”

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From textbooks to trenches

“Good day. I’m your new teacher, call sign — ‘Sarmat.’ Today in our Fatherland Security and Defense class, we’ll study the structure of firearms and learn how to disassemble and reassemble a Kalashnikov rifle and a Makarov pistol,” a man in camouflage and a balaclava greets students at School No. 15 in the Russian-occupied Ukrainian city of Melitopol.

Russia institutionalized the militarization of classrooms and “patriotic education” via a presidential decree that declared 2025 to be “Defender of the Fatherland Year.” In the occupied territories, 901 general education institutions are now operating under a unified federal program that was approved by Russia’s Ministry of Education earlier this year. As a result, according to estimates by the Almenda Center for Civic Education, 1.6 million Ukrainian children — 615,000 of whom already go to school — are at risk of growing up as “defenders of Russia.” The authorities in Moscow are doing this despite the fact that Article 50 of the 1949 Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War prohibits an occupying power from interfering with the educational system in the territories it temporarily controls.

Like everywhere in Russia, the school week in the occupied territories begins with the raising of the Russian flag, the singing of the national anthem, and a session called “Important Conversations.” Starting in the sixth grade, students attend career guidance classes titled “Russia: My Horizons,” and since 2024, all students in grades eight through eleven have been obliged to take part in a course titled “Fatherland Security and Defense.”

The subject itself is an expanded version of the traditional Basics of Life Safety course — one enhanced with two modules of basic military training. The textbook for this discipline is still under development. However, the old curriculum has already been significantly revised: under the new program, students will be taught tactical medicine, undergo firearms and drill training, and receive instruction on UAVs and weapons of mass destruction. Half of the curriculum is dedicated to ideological conditioning: students are expected to develop an “anti-extremist and anti-terrorist stance,” understand “Russia’s role in the modern world,” “feel pride in their Motherland,” and “be ready to defend the Fatherland.”

Schools in the occupied territories are opening specialized classes affiliated with security agencies. In Melitopol’s School No. 15, the Russian National Guard has “taken patronage” over several classes. Photos on the school’s social media account show students attending classes dressed in camouflage uniforms. Their Fatherland Security and Defense teacher — a former special forces operative — aims to “prepare the boys and girls for defending our Fatherland.”

A school in Melitopol
A school in Melitopol

As a 14-year-old student from a school in Crimea told The Insider, teachers working under the new curriculum openly incite hatred towards “the enemy”:

“They always set us against Ukraine and all Ukrainians. Our homeroom teacher teaches history, social studies, and the basics of the spiritual and moral cultures of peoples. She often says that all Ukrainians are fascists and terrible people, and that feminists and homosexuals are deranged. She constantly repeats that Crimea is Russia. Over the past year, boys have been more frequently told things like, ‘You are a future defender of the Motherland, so you must study well.’”

Some students are expected not only to demonstrate loyalty and patriotism, but also to contribute manual labor. For instance, students at School No. 5 in Simferopol have been put to work manufacturing parts for the needs of the “special military operation”, sending over 2,500 3D-printed items to the front since September 2024 — including devices for the rapid loading of Kalashnikov rifle magazines.

The school’s social media states that supporting servicemen in the “special military operation zone” is a “key focus in raising the younger generation.” In photos from the production site, students are dressed in military uniforms, with a man in camouflage standing nearby.

The school’s social media states that supporting servicemen in the “special military operation zone” is a “key focus in raising the younger generation”

Starting from Sept. 1, 2024, a pilot educational program called “Luhansk Character,” modeled after the Soviet Pioneer movement and the modern-day pro-Kremlin Movement of the First, was introduced in all schools of the occupied Luhansk Region. The core of the curriculum is based on textbooks that will be distributed beginning Sept. 1, 2025: for tenth graders, History of the Great Patriotic War; and for grades six through nine, an updated version of the History of the Fatherland series — including one called History of Our Land: The Luhansk People’s Republic and Outstanding Figures of Luhansk Region.

The Luhansk Character program is expected to cover 100% of students. Every year on Sept. 30 — the “Day of the Luhansk People’s Republic’s accession to the Russian Federation” — first-grade students will be inducted into the ranks of the “Eaglets of September” and will “work on concepts such as patriotism, Fatherland, homeland, memory, heroism, and civic responsibility.”

Students in grades five through nine will be given the title of “Pioneer” and will enroll in the Luhansk Character program. Once they have mastered the 12 qualities of the Luhansk Character and completed the mentorship duties assigned to 11th graders, they will receive the title of “Worker.”

Another tactic of “de-Ukrainizing” education involves the complete removal of the Ukrainian language from the curriculum. According to human rights activist Maria Sulyalina, currently only 0.5% of Crimea's children study Ukrainian. Starting Sept. 1, 2025, this option will disappear entirely.

Downed drones and dictation at gunpoint

Festivities celebrating the anniversary of the Soviet Union’s victory in World War II have been scheduled to last the entire year all throughout the occupied territories. The so-called “Donetsk People's Republic” announced grand plans, spanning more than 25,000 “patriotic events,” 15,000 educational initiatives, and over 2,000 recorded lectures and screenings of “patriotic films.” Occupation authorities used many of these events to once again equate modern-day Russian troops with those of the Soviet army — and Ukrainians with Nazi Germany. At the Savur-Mohyla memorial in Donetsk Region, children laid a wreath at the grave of a Donbas militia commander before proceeding to the Eternal Flame to honor World War II veterans.

As part of the Unconquered campaign, young residents of Donetsk helped Russian soldiers and “DPR” head Denis Pushilin unfurl “the largest replica of the Victory Banner in the world.” For the sake of Pushilin's security, the military closed off access to the monument, forcing families to stand in line for hours, only allowing passage to those bearing a special permit.

At Donetsk School No. 29, staff from the Center for Tourism and Local History congratulated the winners of the Memorial Watch campaign: two students who created a display about Soviet pilot Nadezhda Popova. Afterward, the director of the Great Patriotic War Museum led a tour of the Dome of Donbas exhibition, which features downed Ukrainian drones.

Another opportunity to draw parallels between the two wars came with the nationwide history test “Victory Dictation.” United Russia party chair Dmitry Medvedev ordered that questions about the war in Ukraine be added to the World War II section in order to emphasize the supposed similarity between the two conflicts. Some 18,000 children and adults from the so-called “historic regions” took part in the dictation: over 5,000 in Zaporizhzhia Region, nearly 4,000 in Kherson Region, and around 9,000 residents in the “LPR” and “DPR.” Denis Miroshnichenko, head of the “LPR People’s Council,” said that schoolchildren and students in Luhansk see special meaning in the test: “We know about the heroism of our fathers and grandfathers not just from their stories — we’ve had to face fascism ourselves.”

A 17-year-old student who participated in the dictation in Luhansk told The Insider that he attended the event in an effort “to avoid getting hassled with extra questions” at school. According to him, the atmosphere was oppressive:

“There were people in uniform at the entrance and exit, and some sat next to us — they were given the test too. Supposedly they were there to protect us from shelling, but it felt like having a gun to your head. We’d have been safer from shelling if we’d just stayed home.”

The event did not spark much enthusiasm among his peers:

“No one prepared — we just picked answers at random. There was a question about the ‘SMO,’ about someone who got killed in 2022 — like I’m supposed to know that. And to those who haven’t been killed yet, I’m supposed to write another thank-you note ‘for liberation and peaceful skies.’”

When asked whether participants felt at ease during the dictation, he replied: “How could we — with Comrade Major sitting at the next desk?”

Another United Russia initiative, the Hero's Desk, is gaining similar momentum. By January 2025, a total of 1,087 memorial desks had been installed across the occupied regions to honor “fallen heroes,” with more than 600 added in 2024 alone. In Kherson Region, a desk dedicated to serviceman Sergei Kabanov was installed in February 2025 at the school he graduated from — and where his three children are now enrolled.

It’s not only locals who are being immortalized in the “new territories” but residents of other Russian regions as well. In Mariupol, a student desk was installed in memory of “Hero of Russia” Pavel Kochanzhy — from St. Petersburg. In May 2025, the project expanded to include living “heroes” along with dead ones: a school in Donetsk bestowed this honor on Konstantin Kuzmin, chair of the “DPR People’s Council.”

Youth theater

In June, an “educational documentary” was reportedly in production in Melitopol. Its subject was Pavel Sudoplatov — an NKVD agent and saboteur known as “Stalin’s assassin.” Among Sudoplatov’s victims was Yevhen Konovalets, the founder of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists and a key figure in the struggle for Ukrainian independence. His murder is portrayed as the main heroic act of the “intelligence genius from Melitopol.” The New Regions Center for Patriotic Education initiated the production as part of the Heroes’ Names: Novorossiya project. The filmmakers use Sudoplatov as a poster child for modern Russian propaganda, showcasing his fight against Ukrainian nationalists in the postwar years as “an example for the younger generation.”

The ambitious project has already won a Presidential Grants Foundation competition, receiving 6.8 billion rubles ($83.8 million) in funding. That budget won’t be spent on fees for Russian film stars, as the cast are students from Melitopol Gymnasium No. 19, which was renamed in honor of Sudoplatov on May 9, 2025.

The lead actor, 14-year-old Nikita Podshivаlov, said it was “a great honor to portray a real hero.” The film’s target audience is also young — it is intended for viewers aged 14 to 20, with screenings planned in educational institutions. A mother from Melitopol shared her opinion on the effectiveness of this propaganda tactic:

“Before the war, our children were taught in history class that Sudoplatov was the man who killed our Ukrainian leaders. But in 2022, they named a street after him here and put up a bust. Everyone just learned to pretend they’ve forgotten — the kids and the teachers alike. This film won’t brainwash anyone. No one here takes this show seriously, least of all the younger generation.”

A new generation of patriots

For over a year now, Russia has been operating a network of VOIN (“WARRIOR”) military-patriotic centers in the occupied territories — an organization whose stated goal is to raise “a new generation of patriots.” These centers employ more than 400 instructors, and over half of them are active-duty military personnel — including combatants in the Russian-Ukrainian war.

The instructors train teenagers and men aged 14 to 35 in firearms handling, engineering and tactical skills, the basics of Russian national security, UAV piloting, and other combat-related disciplines. Teenagers aged 14 to 18 can choose between two modalities: a three-month athletic and military course and a series of military-patriotic summer games called Time of Young Heroes, with sessions lasting between 14 and 21 days.

In 2024, the VOIN network trained around 11,000 cadets, and in the first two months of the current year alone, that number surpassed 15,000. In the “DPR,” VOIN operates in four schools and has already trained 865 cadets, with plans to reach 2,000 by the end of the year. The largest branch is set to open in Mariupol, where 15 hectares have already been cleared for the new “educational institution,” which will include residential facilities for 300 children and a military-sports training ground.

Petro Andriushchenko, head of the Center for the Study of Occupation, describes VOIN as Russia's largest “recruitment and training center for future soldiers.” Child participants “undergo full-scale military drilling” and are being openly prepared for combat.

Born, grew up, gave his life

“Oleg dreamed of defending his Motherland since childhood and knew that his path was military service and protection against the neo-Banderite threat,” reads part of the obituary for Oleg Zotov, who signed a contract with the Russian Armed Forces on his eighteenth birthday and was sent to the frontline, where he was killed a week later. The young native of Donetsk may have been inspired to enlist by the Yunarmiya ( “Young Army”) youth patriotic movement, of which he was an active member.

“Born, grew up, gave his life for the Motherland” — another line from the obituary that sounds like a slogan for youth patriotic programs, which are tightening their grasp on the occupied Ukrainian territories. The Russian authorities have made support for Young Army a priority, allocating a record 1 billion rubles ($12.3 million) to the organization in 2025. Its leader, Vladislav Golovin, who took part in the Russian assault on Mariupol, promised that the movement would continue encouraging youth to enlist. To date, some 120,000 Young Army “alumni” are serving in the Russian Armed Forces and security services.

Maria Sulyalina from the Almenda Center notes that Oleg Zotov’s death is not an isolated case: Young Army routinely recruits children from the occupied regions, and once they reach the age of legal adulthood, they go to fight against their own country — often losing their lives. Young Army already has over 35,000 Ukrainian children in its ranks — receiving reconnaissance and firearms training, learning from servicemen involved in the Special Military Operation, and even teaching primary school students the basics of shooting and assembling and disassembling rifles.

Vladislav Chichkan, a member of the Young Army squad named after “DPR hero” Olga Kachura in Horlivka, describes his experience: “The club’s first meeting left a lasting impression on me. We had a packed program: practical lessons in first aid, drill training, and lectures on the Great Patriotic War and modern military conflicts.” The young man says he “understood the meaning of patriotism,” “learned a lot about the country,” and is now “ready to give his all to serving the Motherland.”

The Movement of the First, which claims to revive pioneer traditions, also runs a military-patriotic program. According to an EU report, the movement “is re-educating Ukrainian children, including those deported to Russia illegally.” The organization participates in every state holiday. During this year's Children's Day festivities in Donetsk, young Ukrainians tried on military gear and gained familiarity with replica weapons provided by the National Guard, while United Russia staged a parade of militarized baby strollers.

According to Sulyalina, the movement has 24,000 child participants in occupied Crimea and 60,000 in the Luhansk Region. The activist has called on the international community to help stop this militarization. So far, however, the world has responded only with sanctions: Movement of the First is on the list in Ukraine, Canada, the EU, and Switzerland, while Young Army is sanctioned by the EU, Australia, the U.S., Canada, Ukraine, the United Kingdom, Switzerland, and Japan.

Summer camps for Ukrainians: despair, integration, prayers

“Today, there isn’t a single child in Kherson Region who hasn’t been on at least one such trip,” emphasized Tatiana Kuzmich, an occupation official overseeing assistance to evacuees in Kherson Region who in September 2024 spoke about educational events and tours for local children to various Russian regions.

Young Ukrainians are sent to summer camps and sightseeing tours across Russian cities, and also to the Crimean coast. Young Army offers summer schools with a focus on arts, patriotic education, and military-athletic training at four of Russia's largest summer camps: Artek in Yalta, Orlyonok and the Smena Center in Krasnodar Krai, and Okean in Vladivostok.

As part of its Cultural Map 4+85 project, the Russian Ministry of Culture also organizes “cultural and educational routes” specifically for schoolchildren from the “new regions.” Last year the program drew in more than 20,000 Ukrainian children — twice as many as in 2023 — offering them an introduction to the “rich historical, cultural, scientific, and technological heritage” of Russia.The occupation authorities set annual participation targets, and in 2025, they promise to attract at least 30,000 children from the “LPR,” 14,000 from the “DPR,” 4,000 from the Kherson Region, and 8,000 from Zaporizhzhia.

As a teacher from Donetsk admitted to The Insider, children in her city “have no options”:

“What’s there to see in Donetsk? The children see grayness and destruction, watch everything collapse before their eyes, witness helplessness. Over there, they get clothed, fed, and taken on excursions. Many bring canisters of water from summer camps back to Donetsk because we’re facing a humanitarian disaster. People go months without running water, or get it only three times a week. Of course, the children don’t understand that it’s Russia that brought the region to this catastrophe.”

Since 2022, Russian universities have been hosting summer programs for high school students from the “new regions” to help them with socialization and career orientation. As part of the project, teenagers travel to Russian regions, visit local universities, study Russian history and the culture of its peoples, and explore potential professional paths.

In June 2025, school students from the Donetsk Region attended a play in Grozny, Chechnya. Others played lapta at a ski resort in Birobidzhan, and five program participants have already joined a university in Ufa. This year, the Russian government allocated over 150 million rubles ($1.9 million) to support the participation of more than 2,000 young Ukrainians in these educational events, which include a powerful ideological component.

In 2025, the Russian government allocated $1.9 million to support the participation of more than 2,000 young Ukrainians in summer schools with an ideological component

Marina Kovyneva, the project leader and chief methodologist at Don State Technical University, compiled a set of guidelines titled How to Build Resilience Against the Spread of Destructive Ideas Among Children from Combat Zones, which was issued by the National Center for Information Counteraction to Terrorism and Extremism in Educational Environments and the Internet. From June to September 2022, her team conducted 10 sessions for 2,000 teenagers evacuated from occupied regions. According to Kovyneva, many children said that “Ukraine has nothing to do with Nazism,” then drew swastikas and shouted: “Ukraine will live forever! Glory to Ukraine!”

Under Kovyneva’s guidance, the children took a course titled “The Baptism of Rus,” which focused on the “correct” version of history, saying: “I always stressed the name of the state, ‘Kievan Rus,’ and the image of Vladimir the Great, prince of Kiev and all Rus,’” At the end of the summer school, Kovyneva noted that some of the Ukrainian children “left deep in thought,” while others “thanked and hugged me with tears for the truth they learned and heard for the first time at our lessons.”

A Donetsk educator assigned to teach at the University Summer Schools described the psychological effects of re-education to The Insider:

“They make such an effort to integrate children into Russian society because they still remember Ukraine. One could call it cultural exposure if both languages had been preserved in our territories and Ukrainian was taught as extensively as before 2014. Instead, they’ve knocked the ground out from under the children’s feet in terms of national identity — erased it, and replaced it with another. It’s similar to how Nazi Germany took children from other countries who met the ‘Aryan standards’ and raised them under their propaganda.”

The U.S. Institute for the Study of War draws a similar conclusion: “These various summer camp programs are intended to indoctrinate and militarize Ukrainian children, eradicating their Ukrainian identities and instilling pro-Russian hyper-militarized sentiments in them to create the next generation of loyal Russians.”

Young propagandists' school

Launched in the “liberated territories” just a few months after the occupation of Kherson began, the Tavriya Youth Media School expected its best graduates to become employees of local television and radio companies and deliver “truthful information” to their fellow residents.

According to propagandist Alexander Malkevich, the school's founder and the First Deputy Chair of the Media Commission of the Civic Chamber of the Russian Federation, a career in local journalism will serve as an “example of ‘Stalinist-era’ social mobility.” Since 2022, Malkevich has worked in political messaging for the late Wagner chief Yevgeny Prigozhin’s team and has launched several TV companies: Tavriya TV in Kherson Oblast, ZA TV in Melitopol, and Mariupol 24. He was awarded a medal for the “operation to evacuate correspondents” from Kherson.

The first cohort of the media school included about 50 participants aged 15 to 47. Malkevich hired minors to work at his TV channels: for example, Vlada Lugovskaya was filming news segments for Tavriya starting at the age of 15, and some staff members were 16–17 years old. The propagandist acknowledges that he rules out freedom of expression and aims to provide children with “consistent information about ongoing processes.” In his own words:

“I don’t understand why there should be a spectrum of opinions when we’ve been declared at war. And we’re not promoting some gloomy ideology.”

In Zaporizhzhia Region, blogger and Melitopol native Alexander Gurov founded the Mediatopol School of Journalism. Reporters Without Borders describe the organization as a “Kremlin propaganda school.” Among the students are teenagers: Gurov mentioned 16-year-old Kostya Nizhnikov, who is “already earning money from his work.”

Gurov himself is 21 years old. He works as a press secretary for the presidential platform “Russia: Land of Opportunity” in Zaporizhzhia Region. The latest news about the media school was published in May 2024 on the Telegram channel of the YugMolodoy (“Young South”) movement.

Further efforts to raise young propagandists were visible at a media center in Mariupol intended for schoolchildren aged 14 to 17. Founded in September 2024 by graduates of the Russian government program New Media Workshop, the project is partially funded by a presidential grant of nearly 12 million rubles ($150,000). As part of learning “ the basics of media work,” students are taken on tours of federal TV studios and are offered internships at editorial offices of pro-government media outlets such as Komsomolskaya Pravda, AiF, and News Media, with prospects of employment. One student already works at Mash.

The “School of Bloggers,” founded by the Donbas Media Center in Luhansk in 2024, invites those aged 16 to 25, promising to teach them how to shoot and edit videos, promote content on social media, and engage with followers. The project has graduated over 100 participants and also opened branches in Mariupol, Donetsk, and Melitopol.

The tuition is free of charge, a point emphasized in school commercials on regional channels. The School of Bloggers takes pride in its international recognition: CNN journalists covered its activities as part of an investigation into the propaganda efforts of pro-Russian bloggers, highlighting their collaboration with the Kremlin’s program Russia: Land of Opportunity.

“Look at all those Russkies coming here”

Another regular re-education practice involves organizing meetings of demobilized war veterans with Ukrainian schoolchildren living under occupation. The exact frequency — and toll — of these events is unknown, but in honor of the “Liberation of Mariupol Day” alone, the “DPR” authorities organized 70 events for 1,500 teenagers. During these gatherings, schoolchildren interacted with soldiers and examined replica weapons. “Special military operation fighters” often conduct so-called “Lessons of Courage” at schools. The Donetsk Cadet Corps hosted a session by Artem and Denis Lopatin, a father and son who went to the front lines at the very start of the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, where they participated in the Battle of Mariupol. After being demobilized, they met with around 100 schoolchildren as part of the Russia: Land of Opportunity project.

Another entry in this genre is the Open Dialogues organized by the Znaniye (“Knowledge”) Russian Society. In Luhansk, for instance, a participant in the “special military operation” gave a lecture titled Knowledge: Heroes. More than 1,000 teenagers from Luhansk attended such events throughout 2024. In addition, the Russian Patriot Center organizes Dialogues with Heroes for children, including those in occupied territories. On International Women’s Day, Young Army members in Zaporizhzhia Region spoke with a “special military operation” participant serving as a military doctor.

Teachers who bring their students to “patriotic events” are not necessarily acting of their own free will, as their colleague from Donetsk told The Insider:

“This is a huge system, and every person in it is just a cog. The teacher pressures the student, the administration pressures the teacher, the education department pressures the administration, the regional Ministry of Education pressures the education department, and the federal Ministry of Education and Science pressures the regional ministry. It’s a massive system where everyone acts formally, no one truly cares, but everyone puts pressure on everyone else.”

Patriotic events are the responsibility of educational advisors to the headmaster, who work in coordination with public organizations. As a teacher explains: “This purely propagandist but well-paid position has been introduced in all schools and vocational institutions. It’s like a Soviet-era pioneer leader, but now it’s called a ‘Childhood Navigator.’ To get the job, one has to take a course and pass exams. I’ve seen these advisers — they dress almost identically, wear ‘Childhood Navigator’ badges, don’t interact with teachers, and have the same lifeless eyes.”

They also organize meetings with “special military operation participants” following a standard format: the “hero” shares their life story, explains when and why they decided to sign a contract and come to Donbas, recounts combat experiences, offers words of advice, and takes questions from the audience.

All meetings with “SMO participants” follow the same script

These events also maintain the same set of narratives:

“They all say they are sorry to see Ukraine treat its citizens like that and that Russia has never attacked other states — not once in its history — and has only taken up arms in self-defense or to protect those who are weaker. So they could not stay on the sidelines and watch Ukraine erase Russian identity. Every one of them says they are not here to kill but to bring peace to the region, to protect the civilian population, and to ensure that local children have a happy childhood.”

The teacher admits she has accompanied teenagers to such meetings as well — and even co-organized one of them in order to “meet educational targets” assigned to every school and city district. At the same time, she has doubts about the propagandist effect of “dialogues with heroes”:

“It's all for show. Everyone's bored to death because no one wants to be there — neither the children nor the organizers. The only ones interested are the SMO participants, who get to feel significant.”

According to the teacher, the “heroes” do not view residents of Donbas as their fellow countrymen: “We are not Russians for them but khokhly [a slur for Ukrainians]. Everyone here knows that.” She emphasizes the reality that children show little enthusiasm for these gatherings: “Teenagers quickly get bored and openly laugh at the cliché phrases, like ‘we never started the war, we're only protecting Donbas.’ They laugh when they hear about ‘dumb Ukrainians hopping around on the Maidan.’ Children are very attuned to falsehood.”

She has also noticed a similar attitude toward Russian servicemen among local adults, who understand that Russians do not view them as equals: “We are khokhly for them — that's what they call us among themselves. Meanwhile, locals call them ‘Russkies,’ as in ‘look at all those Russkies coming here.’”

Always ready to stand up for God and Russia

Russia also seeks to seize control over the minds of young Ukrainians in the spiritual domain, using the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC) as yet another tool of propaganda and militarization in the occupied territories. The anti-Ukrainian policy of the clergy is enshrined in the Mandate of the 25th World Russian People's Council — titled “The Present and Future of the Russian World” and dated March 24, 2024. The document calls Putin's invasion of Ukraine a “holy war” and maintains that the entire territory of modern-day Ukraine “must be included in the zone of Russia's exclusive influence.”

The ROC states that “the acquisition of worldview ideas, spiritual and moral values of the Russian civilization” is an important element of young people’s education and has already ensured the integration of a discipline called “Basics of Religious Cultures and Secular Ethics” in the fourth grade curriculum.

In 2022, a textbook was developed to “broaden the schoolchildren's minds and facilitate the fostering of decent, honest, and worthy citizens and patriots who love their Motherland, their Fatherland, and their native land, and are ready to serve their Fatherland.” Meanwhile,Crimean schoolchildren study the Basics of Crimea's Orthodox Culture starting from the first grade.

The religious section of patriotic upbringing is not limited to weekly classes: the clergy seeks to expand their reach to extracurricular activities through the All-Church Youth Orthodox Movement “Vernye” [The Loyal], which aims to “raise a young generation healthy in spirit and body, loving Russia, and ready to stand for its interests.” Other goals of the movement include fostering a “patriotic attitude toward our Motherland” and “increasing the prestige of military service.”

Another ROC project is the Brotherhood of Orthodox Christian Pathfinders — the children's division of the Moscow Patriarchate's youth movement. The Brotherhood's motto resembles an election campaign slogan: “Stand ready! Always ready to stand up for God and Russia!” An Orthodox Christian portal describes the “pathfinders” as scouts with a focus on Christianity and patriotism.

Those participating in the program are taught “Scripture and Motherland Studies,” as well as a more practical discipline simply called “Pathfinding.” In January 2025, Pathfinders from Melitopol visited occupied Crimea in order to attend a winter convention of the Cadet Corps. The trip was organized by the regional branch of the St. Luke of Crimea Women's Orthodox Organization. Children participated in a wide range of activities — from prayer to the construction of military fortifications.

Forced treatment and guidelines on “terrorism detection”

The effectiveness of propaganda depends on the age of the child and the duration of exposure. Dima Zitser, a pedagogue labeled a “foreign agent” by the Russian authorities, is convinced that an abrupt change of identity and language from Ukrainian to Russian can disorient anyone — but is most harmful for primary school students:

“At the age of seven or eight years old, a child has developed a certain worldview, but once it shifts, they lose their footing. A 15-year-old is more likely to experience inner resistance, feel like they are in the enemy's rear — which, by the way, is accurate. They can set the goal of preserving their identity and position while pretending to play along. Young children can't do that.”

Human rights activist Sulyalina noted that even after leaving the occupied territories, children continue to experience fear, along with feelings of apprehension toward their Ukrainian peers:

“They are afraid to speak freely, afraid to share their thoughts. One of our cases was a boy who came to Ukraine-controlled territory and spent half a year in his room. He thought he'd get beaten up for speaking Russian because that's what Russian propaganda taught him. He was afraid of showing that he came from occupied territory, so he had trouble finding new friends and trusting people in general.”
Even after leaving occupied territories, children continue to experience fear — this time toward their Ukrainian peers

Another major propaganda genre is the “fight against terrorism and neo-Nazism.” In Donetsk, coaches who teach boxing, archery, and other sports were obliged to give lectures at their clubs titled “Terrorism as a Global Issue.” The social media page of the Leader Sports School posted a video called “Get Neo-Nazi Ideas Out Of Your Head!” In the video, the protagonist clicks on the “like” button below opposition posts — and then has the police knock on his door.

According to Pavlo Lisyansky, a human rights defender and founder of the Eastern Human Rights Group, those under the age of eighteen who are charged with so-called “extremist activities” are subjected to forced psychiatric treatment. Human rights activist Vera Yastrebova, who works closely with Lisyansky, cited a great many cases to The Insider:

“The resemblance to Soviet punitive psychiatry is striking. In their mind, a sane person can only agree with the official agenda, and if a child sympathizes with Ukraine or calls a spade a spade, they can be deemed mentally incapable and institutionalized.”

According to the Eastern Human Rights Group, the majority of such cases have occurred in the Donetsk Region. Reports about the forced psychiatric treatment of underage “extremists” were confirmed at a session of the interagency working group on juvenile crime prevention held in Mariupol in October 2024.

Security agencies reported that 16 underage defendants had been prosecuted for actions “of extremist, nationalist, and terrorist nature.” They also reported161 “underage radicals” had been “brought to justice,” with 48 of them having been subjected to forced treatment.

Despite the pressure, teenagers in occupied territories try to resist. As Sulyalina stresses:

“Children protest in every way they can. We've had cases of children posting videos on Facebook in which they speak in support of Ukraine or say they are waiting for the Ukrainian army. Every one of them was brought in for questioning by the FSB or Center for Combating Extremism.”

Sulyalina also notes that the risk of prosecution often prevents parents from having open discussions with their children about the threat posed by Russian propaganda:

“I've heard of a case in which a child was two or so when the occupation began, and the parents decided not to talk about politics in front of him so that he wouldn't say something he shouldn't. They lived in Sevastopol, and he went to school with the children of Russian military personnel. When in the first grade, he got an assignment to ‘draw his country,’ he drew Russian tanks with tricolor flags. So there is no telling when it's too early to start telling your children about propaganda.”

A report by the Eastern Human Rights Group warns that building a false image of the “enemy” — along with the all-out militarization of education — presents the prospect that a generation of Ukrainians living under occupation will grow up to be brainwashed Russians who are eager to participate in military aggression against other countries: not only Ukraine, but also the U.S., the UK, and EU member states. As the authors of the study note, while “the extent of indoctrination and militarization is unrivalled even by Hitler's Germany,” the underlying mechanism is simple: a warped presentation of present political processes and a purposeful misinterpretation of historic events.



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