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    <title>THE INSIDER</title>
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    <description>The Insider — investigations, analysis, opinions</description>
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      <title>THE INSIDER</title>
      <link>https://theins.press</link>
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    <lastBuildDate>Fri, 20 Nov 2026 21:21:24 +0000</lastBuildDate>
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      <title><![CDATA[Ex-riot police officer tied to first Novichok murder case in 1995 named acting head of Russian-occupied Nova Kakhovka]]></title>
      <link>https://theins.press/en/news/299844</link>
      <guid>https://theins.press/en/news/299844</guid>
      <dc:creator><![CDATA[The Insider]]></dc:creator>
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      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Earlier this week, the Russia-installed “governor” of the occupied part of Ukraine’s Kherson Region <a href="https://t.me/VGA_NovayaKahovka/64742">appointed</a> Artur Talanov as acting head of Nova Kakhovka, <a href="https://t.me/radiosvoboda/107045">Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty</a> reports. Most notably, <i>RFE/RL</i> had previously found that Talanov was involved in organized crime in Latvia in the 1990s, and may also have been involved in the purchase of Novichok, the Soviet-developed nerve agent used in the 1995 poisoning of Rosbusinessbank CEO Ivan Kivelidi, the first known victim of the poison.</p><p>The toxic substance was applied to the telephone receiver in Kivelidi’s office, and his wife also died in the assassination. Chemist Leonid Rink gave testimony to Russia’s Federal Security Service (FSB) about the case saying that in spring 1995 he sold an ampule containing a substance similar to Novichok to Talanov, a former member of the Riga OMON riot police unit. Talanov then resold the substance to Vladimir Khutsishvili, a member of the bank’s board of directors, who was charged with the killing. Talanov confirmed that account in court.</p><p>Talonov himself also has an extensive criminal record. In 1997, a court in the Estonian city of Pärnu sentenced him to seven years in prison for an armed attack on four Latvians who were transporting a large sum of money to an Estonian bank. He later moved to Russia, where in the mid-2010s he tried to develop municipal transportation services in Buryatia, registering more than 10 companies in his name over the years.</p><p>Talanov entered politics in 2016, when he won a <span class="termin" data-description="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">United Russia</span> primary for the position of head of the Rodniki settlement in the Ramensky District. He lost the election but became deputy head and briefly served as acting head. In 2019, media reports said that as a member of the local election commission representing United Russia, he obstructed observers from the liberal Yabloko party. His predecessor, Vladimir Oganesov, stepped down “at his own request” — a standard Russian bureaucratic phrase for a resignation. According to Ukraine’s Center for Investigative Journalism, Oganesov had extorted money from residents and business owners in the Kalanchak District.</p><p>Vladimir Uglev, who helped develop Novichok with Rink under the supervision of Pyotr Kirpichev, <a href="https://theins.press/en/news/299119">died</a> on Oct. 26. He had lived in the southern Russian coastal city of Anapa in recent years. In recent years, he had lived in the southern Russian resort city of Anapa. His name became widely known in 2018 when the biochemist gave a series of interviews following the poisoning of Sergei and Yulia Skripal in Salisbury, England. Uglev also spoke extensively to the media about the properties of Novichok after Navalny was poisoned in 2020.</p><aside class="related-posts"><ul><li><a href="https://theins.press/en/news/299119">Russian scientist who helped develop Novichok nerve agents dies at the age of 80</a></li><li><a href="https://theins.press/en/politics/262611">The Lab: How FSB chemical weapons experts tried to poison Alexei Navalny</a></li><li><a href="https://theins.press/en/confession/293288">“We were told we were developing antidotes”: The inner workings of the St. Petersburg lab where Novichok was tested</a></li><li><a href="https://theins.press/en/news/289394">Toxin used to poison Alexei Navalny was synthesized at the same institute that created the Novichok nerve agent</a></li><li><a href="https://theins.press/en/politics/254325">“He was not supposed to survive”: One of Navalny’s poisoners admits to the assassination attempt</a></li><li><a href="https://theins.press/en/inv/291614">Olympic deception: Russia’s doping program is run by the same FSB team that poisoned Navalny</a></li></ul></aside>]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Fri, 20 Nov 2026 18:43:48 +0000</pubDate>
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      <title><![CDATA[Scramble for the spoils: Arrests of regional officials have surged fivefold as Russia’s elites carve up the country’s shrinking resources]]></title>
      <link>https://theins.press/en/politics/299842</link>
      <guid>https://theins.press/en/politics/299842</guid>
      <dc:creator><![CDATA[Konstantin Ivanov]]></dc:creator>
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      <description><![CDATA[<p>Russia’s intensifying repression during the ongoing full-scale invasion of Ukraine has affected not only traditional government critics, but also officials inside the system itself. According to researchers at the&nbsp;<a href="https://cedarus.io/research/elite-repression?lang=ru">CEDAR</a> center, from the beginning of 2023 through mid-2026, one in 10 mayors of large and midsize cities, 9% of senior regional officials, and around 8% of ministerial-level administrators were named as defendants in criminal cases. Overall, the rate of arrests among officials has risen fivefold since the start of the full-scale war in Ukraine, with Russia’s regional elites bearing the brunt of the campaign. Growing economic problems and declining revenues are fueling a new redistribution of property. Unsurprisingly, Moscow’s security services are playing a central role.</p>]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Since May 2024, seven deputy governors serving under Krasnodar Krai governor Veniamin Kondratyev have been <a href="https://theins.ru/news/297842">detained</a> (even as Kondratyev himself remains in office). Over the past year and a half, Russian law enforcement authorities in the region have arrested seven deputy governors, a former mayor of the resort city of Sochi, the regional transport minister and two of his deputies, the head of the Kuban Cossack Host, and a former chairman of the regional court.</p><p>During a search at the mansion of deputy governor Andrei Korobka, who is responsible for the agricultural sector, investigators <a href="https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/8571166">found</a> four million dollars, seven million euros, and 31 million rubles in cash. Former construction deputy governor Sergei Vlasov signed a contract with the Defense Ministry after he was convicted; he <a href="https://www.kavkaz-uzel.eu/articles/423567">went missing</a> after his first assault mission. And on Aug. 5, former Sochi Mayor Alexei Kopaygorodsky was <a href="https://zona.media/news/2026/10/05/sochi">sentenced</a> to 15 years in prison.</p><p>Officially, this is an anti-corruption campaign. In practice, the Kuban (the common name for southern Russia’s Krasnodar Krai) represents the clearest example of how the country’s regional governments have been reshaped since the war began. As long as Russia had enough resources, the federal center tolerated the rents collected by the regional governors and their teams. However, now that resources are scarcer, the fight over them has become more intense, and established patronage streams are becoming prizes to be seized.</p><p>Kuban is not the only example. Officials are being hunted across the country, but redistribution takes place only where there is something valuable to be gotten.</p><h3 class="outline-heading">A fiefdom in exchange for loyalty</h3><p>Political scientists describe this kind of system as <a href="https://giga-hamburg.de/en/publications/refereed-articles/neopatrimonialism-reconsidered-critical-review-elaboration-elusive-concept">neopatrimonial</a>. From the outside, it looks like a formal system of official offices, powers, regulations, laws, and courts. Inside, however, are patron-client networks that fill those positions, making decisions and distributing resources for the benefit of a privileged few.</p><p>Under such an arrangement, the governor does the bidding of the federal patrons above him while coordinating the activities of his own deputy governors, mayors, and agency chiefs. The federal center effectively gives him the region as a source of rents, and, in exchange for the loyalty he directs upward, the governor distributes fiefs below in the spheres of construction, land use, subsidies, and roads. His subordinates control the cash flows making their way through these spheres of activity, sharing the proceeds with the governor in exchange for his protection.</p><blockquote>The governor receives the region from his patron as a source of rents, ensures loyalty upward, and distributes fiefs in the areas of construction, land, subsidies, and roads
</blockquote><p><i>Kormlenie</i> — literally “feeding” — is a Russian term rooted in the historical practice that saw officials draw their income from the territories they governed. Today, it is commonly used as shorthand for patronage-based access to public resources. The practice is formally illegal, but authorities often tolerate it so long as the political balance remains stable. The arrangements also leave evidence behind — kickbacks, property registered to relatives, and contracts awarded to favored firms — giving investigators material for criminal cases that can be activated against subordinates when needed.</p><p>Protection in this system comes from the practical influence of a patron, not their formal office. A governor with a powerful federal patron can blunt attacks by rival security-service clans, which of course have their own powers (including those of arrest and asset seizure). A governor whose patron has been weakened or departed their post loses that protection, and his positions are then gradually occupied by clients of other, stronger patrons. Formally, the structure remains unchanged, made up of the same deputy governor posts and the same ministries.</p><p>As long as there are enough resources in the system, conflict is rare. When the quantity of resources shrinks, however, groups that once tolerated someone else’s collection of rents begin making claims on them, and if a governor can no longer protect his clients, the security services gain an opening to enter the region to begin “fighting corruption.”</p><h3 class="outline-heading">Open season</h3><p>The shrinking resource base is visible in the numbers. From January through July 2026, the federal budget deficit <a href="https://novayagazeta.eu/articles/2026/08/23/siluanov-zaiavil-chto-v-biudzhete-rf-net-nikakikh-problem-seichas-defitsit-prevyshaet-plan-na-ves-god-v-17-raza-news">reached</a> 6.46 trillion rubles, 1.7 times the amount budgeted for the entire year. Oil and gas revenues are declining, the war demands ever more spending, and the old model in which every group had enough room to collect rents no longer works.</p><p>As the economy has tightened, the hunt for spoils has intensified. According to <a href="https://cedarus.io/research/elite-repression?lang=ru">CEDAR</a>, the number of arrests of senior officials rose from 21 in 2022 to 110 in 2025, with the annual risk of arrest for a senior official reaching close to 2%. The FSB participates in nearly 90% of such cases, up from 76% in 2018, with the value of confiscated assets jumping from 90 billion rubles in 2022 to 1.6 trillion rubles in 2025. <a href="https://re-russia.net/analytics/0459/">Re</a> concluded that such campaigns serve to consolidate power rather than to actually eradicate corruption.</p><p>There is a fiscal logic to this, but it is secondary. Prosecutor General Igor Krasnov said the state received <a href="https://ru.themoscowtimes.com/2025/03/20/kreml-podklyuchil-silovikov-kpoisku-deneg-dlya-byudzheta-a158644">500 billion rubles</a> in assets from corruption cases in 2024. But those assets consisted mainly of real estate, stakes in companies, and leasing rights, none of which can directly plug a budget deficit. In fact, confiscations function more as a performance indicator for the security services than a source of readily available cash (even if they make for a nice “bonus”).</p><p>Most importantly though, the nationwide surge in such law enforcement actions serves as a signal from above: the federal center has effectively given the security services a license to hunt, even if who hunts whom in any particular region is determined locally, according to the balance among elite groups.</p><blockquote>The simultaneous surge across the country indicates a signal from above: the federal center has effectively given the security services a license to hunt
</blockquote><p>In some places, such as Kuban, arrests have been followed by the replacement of entire networks. Elsewhere, however, certain officials have been swapped out while the real power brokers remain unchanged.</p><h3 class="outline-heading">Why Kuban: A governor without a patron</h3><p>Kuban illustrates this logic in its purest form. Kondratyev has no powerful active patron in Moscow, and that proved to be his undoing.</p><p>Kondratyev was elevated to the governorship in 2015 by Alexander Tkachev — then Russia’s agriculture minister and previously governor of the region. But Tkachev’s group has lost considerable influence in recent years, and Kondratyev never acquired new protection at the federal level despite overseeing one of the country’s wealthiest regions.</p><p>Kuban contains major agricultural businesses, ports, resorts, roads, and extensive construction interests. In figures, that amounted to <a href="https://www.raexpert.ru/releases/2026/aug10d">5.9 trillion rubles</a> in gross regional product and about 1 trillion rubles in investment in 2025.</p><p>But that pie is shrinking as well. Investment in the region fell 20% in real terms that year, while construction volume declined 30%. Once resources contracted and federal groups began making claims on other people’s fiefs, Krasnodar became an ideal target — there was plenty to take, and no one powerful enough to defend it. </p><blockquote>The Krasnodar Krai became an ideal target — there is plenty to take and no one powerful enough to defend it
</blockquote><p>The wave of law enforcement action in Kuban began in the spring of 2024 and <a href="https://ru.themoscowtimes.com/2026/04/06/uvitse-gubernatora-krasnodarskogo-kraya-potrebovali-izyat-aktivi-na10-milliardov-rublei-a191872">accelerated sharply</a> in 2025. That same year, Leonid Mikhailyuk took over the regional FSB directorate after <a href="https://news.rambler.ru/community/53975815-aksenov-obyavil-o-smene-nachalnika-upravleniya-fsb-v-krymu-i-sevastopole/">heading</a> the security service in Russian-occupied Crimea and Sevastopol.</p><p>Krasnodar journalist Alexander Savelyev <a href="https://echofm.online/stories/tuchi-nad-gubernatorom-kondratevym-sgushhalis-ne-pervyj-mesyacz-v-krasnodarskom-krae-prodolzhayutsya-zaderzhaniya-krupnyh-chinovnikov-pod-arest-otpravlen-bli">links</a> the campaign’s intensification directly to Mikhailyuk’s arrival. According to Savelyev’s sources, the general was “sent there specifically to look for money that the budget apparently does not have enough of.”</p><figure><img src="https://theins.press/storage/content_image/display/6b0/6b0090e1e5b4d9.36263145/CMmxaaukAon2wby8BME8htm0IgCOhm9wX3cZHMDG.jpg" alt="Leonid Mikhailyuk, head of the FSB directorate for the Krasnodar Krai"/><figcaption>Leonid Mikhailyuk, head of the FSB directorate for the Krasnodar Krai</figcaption></figure><p>Kondratyev’s team is being dismantled while the governor himself is left in place. Removing him would offer a public signal that a redistribution is underway. Keeping him, by contrast, allows fiefs to be taken over quietly — Kondratyev’s clients disappear, and their positions are occupied by clients of stronger outside patrons.</p><h3 class="outline-heading">How the fiefs are redistributed</h3><p>As a result of the criminal cases, assets and posts move from one elite group to another. In Kuban, the officials overseeing the region’s construction sector have been replaced one after another. Sergei Vlasov was detained in May 2024 and <a href="https://www.kavkaz-uzel.eu/articles/419510">sentenced</a> in December 2025 to 11 years for taking a bribe. His successor, Alexander Nesterenko, was <a href="https://www.caucasianknot.org/articles/78017">sentenced</a> in August 2026 to nine years for approving substandard school repairs in the occupied Kherson region, with damages estimated at 146.7 million rubles. And the next official overseeing construction, Dmitry Maslov, <a href="https://vfokuse.mail.ru/news/69636691-sergej-lagutin-naznachen-novyim-vitse-gubernatorom-kubani-po-stroitelstvu/">lasted</a> less than a year.</p><p>Maslov and his successor, Sergei Lagutin, have one agency in common: Rostekhnadzor, Russia’s industrial, technological, and nuclear safety regulator. Maslov <a href="https://kuban.rbc.ru/krasnodar/freenews/6900b2be9a7947cdc01aad8d">headed</a> the agency’s North Caucasus department for five years, and Lagutin served there as deputy head. Alexander Trembitsky, a former head of the same department, has <a href="https://theins.ru/news/240620">led</a> the entire federal agency since 2021.</p><p>Trembitsky’s current deputy, Vadim Sergeyev, <a href="https://finance.rambler.ru/markets/48450912-naznacheny-novye-zamestiteli-rukovoditelya-rostehnadzora/">followed</a> the same route through the North Caucasus department and Kuban’s construction sector. Notably, Alexander Trembitsky, Jr. also served as a deputy governor on Kondratyev’s team. Since October 2022, he has <a href="https://www.pnp.ru/social/kto-rodilsya-28-oktyabrya-9.html">represented</a> the regional legislature in Russia’s Federation Council, the upper house of parliament.</p><p>Construction, in other words, is passing to a group with its own direct connection to a federal agency. And while there is no direct evidence that Rostekhnadzor’s chief personally arranged the appointments, the personnel pattern is clear: one post after another in Kuban’s construction sector is going to the elder Trembitsky’s former subordinates.</p><p>A similar pattern can be seen in the Cossack sector. Alexander Vlasov, a deputy governor and <i>ataman</i> — a leader of the Kuban Cossack Host — was <a href="https://www.interfax.ru/russia/1119990">sentenced</a> in October 2026 to 14 years in prison. The court said he ordered the theft of some equipment bought with a 100 million-ruble subsidy for Cossack volunteers and had it sold through a classified-ad website.</p><figure><img src="https://theins.press/storage/content_image/display/6b0/6b00910dc69792.42456529/4VTXqQaSa02IUN04W5ygTR92NsLuei5vuILXoqLx.jpg" alt="Alexander Vlasov, ataman of the Kuban Cossack Host and deputy governor"/><figcaption>Alexander Vlasov, ataman of the Kuban Cossack Host and deputy governor</figcaption></figure><p>Vlasov was <a href="https://kuban.rbc.ru/krasnodar/freenews/6900b2be9a7947cdc01aad8d">replaced</a> by Alexander Agibalov, who since 2020 had worked in the Sakhalin and Khabarovsk regions, fought in the war, and become ataman of the Ussuri Cossack Host. He returned to the Krasnodar Krai with combat credentials and a career built outside the local system.</p><p>The core of the governor’s team has also been hit. Korobka — who, like Kondratyev, is a native of the Dinskaya district — was the only deputy governor who had <a href="https://ru.themoscowtimes.com/2026/04/06/uvitse-gubernatora-krasnodarskogo-kraya-potrebovali-izyat-aktivi-na10-milliardov-rublei-a191872">served</a> alongside him continuously since 2015. According to a <a href="https://echofm.online/stories/tuchi-nad-gubernatorom-kondratevym-sgushhalis-ne-pervyj-mesyacz-v-krasnodarskom-krae-prodolzhayutsya-zaderzhaniya-krupnyh-chinovnikov-pod-arest-otpravlen-bli">report</a> by the Kub Mash Telegram channel, searches of Korobka’s estate turned up permits for 15 types of weapons issued in the governor’s own name.</p><p><i>Kommersant’s</i> sources <a href="https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/8571166">believe</a> such arrangements could not have operated without the presence of powerful patrons. In a lawsuit brought by the Prosecutor General’s Office, a court <a href="https://rg.ru/2026/04/08/reg-ufo/vmeste-s-usadboj.html">transferred</a> to the state 114 properties belonging to Korobka, along with assets worth 8 billion rubles and lease rights to 12,500 hectares of fertile land.</p><figure><img src="https://theins.press/storage/content_image/display/6b0/6b00913269d878.40462483/3vbFEx6n5SoMIBAKADUx7MK67HTOkAibVFS4rUec.jpg" alt="Krasnodar Krai Deputy Governor Andrei Korobka"/><figcaption>Krasnodar Krai Deputy Governor Andrei Korobka</figcaption></figure><p>In October, a court <a href="https://rapsinews.ru/judicial_news/20261021/312302725.html">released</a> Korobka from pretrial detention under travel restrictions, but by then his property had already been transferred.</p><p>In March 2026 the authorities <a href="https://theins.ru/news/297918">seized</a> assets worth about 1.6 billion rubles from Alexei Kopaygorodsky and people associated with him. Additionally, the Prosecutor General’s Office sought more than 120 properties and stakes in 27 companies from former Deputy Gov. Anatoly Voronovsky and his associates in the road-building sector. In January 2026, authorities <a href="https://ru.themoscowtimes.com/2026/01/22/vkrasnodarskom-krae-zaderzhali-ministra-transporta-idvuh-ego-zamestitelei-a185164">detained</a> serving Transport Minister Alexei Pereverzev and two of his deputies. In 2025 alone, courts in the region <a href="https://theins.ru/news/297842">confiscated</a> assets worth more than 76 billion rubles.</p><h3 class="outline-heading">Belgorod: The same scenario taken to its conclusion</h3><p>In summer 2025, authorities <a href="https://semnasem.org/articles/2026/05/13/iskrennost-pod-obstrelami">detained</a> Belgorod region deputy governor Rustem Zainullin and former deputy governor Vladimir Bazarov in a case involving alleged theft during construction of fortifications along the Ukrainian border. Governor Vyacheslav Gladkov had <a href="https://novayagazeta.eu/articles/2026/04/21/general-gubernator">brought</a> Bazarov with him from Sevastopol, and by the time of his arrest, Bazarov was already <a href="https://istories.media/stories/2025/09/10/khinshtein/">serving</a> as deputy governor of the neighboring Kursk region, where he was once again overseeing construction.</p><p>According to the Prosecutor General’s Office, nearly 1 billion rubles was stolen from the fortification program. In July 2026, a court <a href="https://novayagazeta.ru/articles/2026/07/30/dvukh-eks-zamestitelei-gladkova-otpravili-na-19-i-20-let-v-koloniiu-strogogo-rezhima-po-delu-o-zubakh-drakona-news">sentenced</a> Zainullin to 20 years in a penal colony and Bazarov to 19.</p><p>Gladkov was <a href="https://meduza.io/news/2026/06/26/byvshiy-gubernator-belgorodskoy-oblasti-vyacheslav-gladkov-naznachen-poslom-v-abhazii">supported</a> by figures close to Sergei Kiriyenko, the powerful Kremlin official responsible for domestic politics. But that patron’s influence was only sufficient to protect the governor himself, not his team. Amid a <a href="https://novayagazeta.ru/articles/2026/05/21/rbk-eks-gubernatora-belgorodskoi-oblasti-otpraviat-v-abkhaziiu-chego-on-iakoby-sam-i-khotel-news">conflict</a> with the Defense Ministry and FSB over widespread communications shutdowns in May 2026, Gladkov resigned early, and in June he was <a href="https://novayagazeta.ru/articles/2026/06/26/putin-naznachil-gladkova-poslom-rossii-v-abkhazii-news">appointed</a> Russia’s ambassador to Abkhazia.</p><blockquote>Gladkov was supported by Sergei Kiriyenko’s circle, but the patron only had enough influence to protect the governor himself, not his team
</blockquote><p>The networks were then replaced. After <a href="https://echofm.online/news/kandidatom-na-post-glavy-belgorodskoj-oblasti-istochniki-nazvali-uchastnika-vojny-v-ukraine-generala-aleksandra-shuvaeva-pepel-novaya-gazeta-evropa">commanding</a> a brigade formed from units of the self-proclaimed “Donetsk People’s Republic,” taking part in the Kremlin’s “Time of Heroes” program for war veterans, and serving as deputy governor of the Irkutsk region for a few months, in May General Alexander Shuvayev <a href="https://theins.ru/news/292534">became</a> the new governor in Belgorod.</p><p>When the regional legislature approved Shuvayev’s government in October, not a single member of the previous team <a href="https://www.belpressa.ru/politics/vlast/100070.html">retained</a> deputy governor status. The government was <a href="https://www.go31.ru/news/vlast/personalii-izvestny-utverzhdyen-novyy-sostav-pravitelstva-belgorodskoy-oblasti/">headed</a> by Vladimir Zverkov, a former deputy prime minister of the Russian-controlled “Donetsk People’s Republic” who had previously spent more than a decade working at Russia’s Economic Development Ministry.</p><p>The Finance Ministry went to Andrei Zakharov, formerly finance minister of the occupied part of Zaporizhzhia region. Construction, housing and utilities, and roads were <a href="https://fonar.tv/article/2026/10/15/novye-lica-starye-znakomye-i-odno-pustoe-kreslo-kak-aleksandr-shuvaev-sobral-pravitelstvo-belgorodskoy-oblasti-iz-chinovnikov-treh-gubernatorskih-epoh">assigned</a> to Alexei Gerzhik, who had worked in the Moscow city and Moscow regional governments and, after the invasion, on reconstruction in the Ukrainian territories that Russia calls its “new regions.” Security went to Eduard Petrukhin, a former first deputy director of Russia’s Federal Penitentiary Service.</p><p>Belgorod followed the same pattern as Kuban — first criminal cases against the governor’s team, then the governor’s departure, followed by the transfer of assets — only there, not even the governor kept his post.</p><p>The prize is easy to understand. Belgorod is an agricultural and metals-producing region where authorities <a href="https://investfuture.ru/articles/belgorodskaya-oblast-uskoryaet-promyshlenniy-i-selskokhozyaystvenniy-rost-A3058D6F50934AA243258D64004FE105">expected</a> to see more than 217 billion rubles in investment in 2025. Large amounts of federal money also flow through the border region, earmarked for the construction of fortifications and the reconstruction of homes damaged by shelling.</p><p>In the Belgorod Region, the security services dismantled the circles around two governors in succession. While Gladkov was still in his post, they imprisoned several close associates of his predecessor, Yevgeny Savchenko, who had ruled the region for 27 years. His deputies Konstantin Polezhayev and Yevgeny Glagolev were among those sentenced. On Sept. 22, it emerged that Polezhayev, who had signed a contract with the Ministry of Defense following his conviction, had been killed in the war in Ukraine.</p><h3 class="outline-heading">Chuvashia: “An absolutely toothless region”</h3><p>In Chuvashia, there is almost nothing to divide. Oleg Nikolayev was appointed to serve as head of the republic in 2020 after the scandal-driven resignation of Mikhail Ignatyev. There are no powerful players in the region apart from billionaire Viktor Vekselberg, and political scientist Sergei Markelov calls the republic “an absolutely toothless region” that was handed to A Just Russia (a nominally opposition party loyal to the Kremlin) for the sake of interparty balance.</p><p>Nevertheless, the hunt is underway there too, and criminal cases are plentiful. Transport Minister Vladimir Osipov, appointed by Nikolayev, was <a href="https://www.pnp.ru/incident/ria-novosti-soobshhili-o-zaderzhanii-eks-ministra-transporta-chuvashii.html">detained</a> in December 2023 after searches connected with road contracts. Deputy Prime Minister and Construction Minister Pavel Danilov was detained in Moscow in March 2024, with investigators alleging he <a href="https://www.svoboda.org/a/v-chuvashii-byvshego-vitse-premera-obvinili-vo-vzyatkah-na-50-5-mln-rubley/33334496.html">received</a> 50.5 million rubles in exchange for helping secure government contracts. Nikolayev <a href="https://regcomment.ru/main/glava-chuvashii-podelitsya-vlastyu-s-premerom-pochemu-nikolaev-otkazyvaetsya-ot-rukovodstva-kabminom/">fired</a> the next construction minister, Mikhail Koleda, “for loss of confidence” after he helped arrange contracts worth 1.5 billion rubles without competitive bidding. In October 2026, former First Deputy Prime Minister and Finance Minister Mikhail Nozdryakov <a href="https://pg21.ru/news/130862">ended up</a> in a Moscow pretrial detention center.</p><p>Nikolayev is filling the vacant posts from his own bench. Sergei Artamonov, who had <a href="https://fedpress.ru/news/21/policy/3366228">headed</a> the republic’s Agriculture Ministry since 2015, became prime minister. The Finance Ministry <a href="https://moygorod.online/society/society_64030.html">went</a> to a former finance minister from neighboring Mordovia. Nikolayev’s aide Natalia Voskresenskaya was <a href="https://pg21.ru/news/130885">appointed</a> deputy prime minister. None of the new appointees has an independent line into a federal agency.</p><p>Compared with Kuban, the amounts available to siphon off are modest, a function of the size difference between the two regional economies. Kuban’s gross regional product in 2025 <a href="https://www.raexpert.ru/releases/2026/aug10d">reached</a> 5.9 trillion rubles, with fixed-capital investment of about 1 trillion. According to an <a href="https://raexpert.ru/releases/2025/dec15g">estimate</a> by Expert RA, Chuvashia’s respective figures were around 700 billion rubles and 100 billion rubles. One-third of the republic’s budget revenue <a href="https://budget.cap.ru/Show/Content/2654">comes</a> from the federal government, and its most notable infrastructure asset — the district heating networks in Cheboksary and Novocheboksarsk — has been <a href="https://ura.news/articles/1036290652">operated</a> by the Vekselberg-affiliated firm T Plus since 2021, effectively putting it off-limits.</p><p>To make any real money from government contracts, one has to occupy a ministerial post — and after a series of arrests, those offices have become dangerous places to sit — the risk is high, and the potential reward is comparatively small.</p><p>Chuvashia shows the limits of the neopatrimonial system. The license to hunt operates there just as it does everywhere else — and arrests continue — but mostly for the purpose of boosting law enforcement performance indicators — the federal center pads its statistics while gaining leverage over the governor, the governor keeps his post by sacrificing his own people, and outside networks do not move into the republic.</p><blockquote>In Chuvashia, arrests continue mainly for performance indicators — the federal center boosts its statistics and gains leverage over the governor, who keeps his post by sacrificing his own people
</blockquote><p>In sum, in Kuban, the governor’s network has no protection and the prize is enormous; his team is dismantled, people from Rostekhnadzor and the front take their places, and the governor remains in place simply to provide a false sense of continuity. In Belgorod, where the prize was substantial, the governor’s team was imprisoned, the governor was removed, and the local government was rebuilt by outside networks. In Chuvashia, there is no protection, but there is little worth taking; arrests continue, while the governor fills the vacancies from his own bench. Overall, arrests happen everywhere, but the owners change only where there is something worth seizing.</p><h3 class="outline-heading">Nowhere to run</h3><p>The purges are changing the behavior of those officials who remain free. They effectively have two options: demonstrate loyalty, or face a choice between jail and the front. Since 2024, <a href="https://www.dp.ru/a/2025/02/24/sudi-peterburga-priostanovili">signing</a> a contract with the military has been enough to have  criminal proceedings suspended.</p><p>However, the Kuban cases show that, for senior officials, neither option works particularly well. The front-line escape hatch has effectively closed for the upper echelon, as Ataman Alexander Vlasov was arrested shortly after telling a council of Cossack leaders that serving the Motherland was a <a href="https://echofm.online/news/vicze-gubernatora-krasnodarskogo-kraya-aleksandra-vlasova-zaderzhali-posle-togo-kak-on-obyavil-o-reshenii-pojti-na-vojnu">“great honor,”</a> going so far as to announce that he was joining the Kuban brigade. Kopaygorodsky volunteered for the war after resigning but was <a href="https://www.currenttime.tv/a/zaderzhan-byvshiy-mer-sochi-aleksey-kopaygorodskiy/33134432.html">detained</a> in occupied Luhansk in September 2024. And Sergei Vlasov’s contract helped him leave prison after he had already been sentenced, but it did not save him: he went missing after his first assault operation.</p><p>Demonstrations of loyalty offer no better protection. In a neopatrimonial bargain, loyalty is a condition of the deal, not a service for which one receives extra protection. The case is opened over the fief, not disloyalty, so additional displays of devotion change nothing.</p><blockquote>The case is opened over the fief, not disloyalty, so additional displays of devotion change nothing
</blockquote><p>Personal popularity provides no protection either, and it may even arouse suspicion. Khabarovsk region Gov. Sergei Furgal was arrested in 2020 at the height of his popularity. Belgorod’s Gladkov, one of the country’s most recognizable governors, first lost his team and then his post. The Kremlin does not need genuinely popular governors; it prefers unremarkable administrators such as Kondratyev.</p><p>The ritual of loyalty can, however, protect the patron. On April 7, the day Korobka was arrested, Kondratyev met Patriarch Kirill, declaring that “Kuban without faith is not Kuban.”</p><figure><img src="https://theins.press/storage/content_image/display/6b0/6b0091eb57f8f8.39200970/zj5PcYkoNC8kLenNMNzWKnsZbYM28zgcb45APBAD.jpg" alt="Veniamin Kondratyev meets Patriarch Kirill, the head of the Russian Orthodox Church"/><figcaption>Veniamin Kondratyev meets Patriarch Kirill, the head of the Russian Orthodox Church</figcaption></figure><p>The next meeting took place in the Kremlin, where the governor <a href="https://echofm.online/stories/tuchi-nad-gubernatorom-kondratevym-sgushhalis-ne-pervyj-mesyacz-v-krasnodarskom-krae-prodolzhayutsya-zaderzhaniya-krupnyh-chinovnikov-pod-arest-otpravlen-bli">reported</a> to presidential chief of staff Anton Vaino on the region’s development. Kondratyev kept his job while his team continued to shrink.</p><p>Fear has another side: paralysis. The authors of the CEDAR report note that in such an environment, the rational choice is either to make no decisions at all or to take whatever option still can before it is too late.</p><h3 class="outline-heading">Who wins</h3><p>Three players benefit. The federal center redistributes fiefs to more loyal and manageable groups without bearing the political cost — after all, formally at least, it is “fighting corruption.” The FSB gets performance statistics and increased leverage over a weakened governor. And groups with their own links to federal agencies — such as the Rostekhnadzor network in Kuban construction, war veterans in the Cossack structures, or veterans of occupation administrations in Belgorod’s government — receive the newly vacant sources of rents.</p><p>The losers are the officials who actually come in for punishment, even as the formal structure of the region remains intact — the same posts, the same offices, the same governor still in place. Kondratyev remains precisely because he now threatens no one and lays claim to nothing: he is a convenient facade masking the takeovers underway below the surface.</p><p>The same pattern can be seen elsewhere as well. Former Krasnodar Mayor and State Duma lawmaker Yevgeny Pervyshov, who served at the front and completed the Kremlin’s “Time of Heroes” program, <a href="https://zona.media/news/2024/11/05/pervyshov">became</a> acting governor of the Tambov Region in November 2024, replacing Maxim Yegorov. In summer 2025, Yegorov — by then a former governor — was <a href="https://www.currenttime.tv/a/33482545.html">detained</a> on charges of bribery.</p><p>Belgorod offers a possible preview of how the process could end: the governor will leave office with his standing intact, while control of the most lucrative portfolios will pass to outsiders.</p><p>For now, the key unanswered question in Kuban is who will take over the region’s most valuable portfolio — agriculture — after Korobka. The appointment could indicate which federal power group has ultimately secured control over the region.</p><aside class="related-posts"><ul><li><a href="https://theins.press/en/inv/284967">Family values: FSB chief’s nephew tied to corrupt businessmen including Putin’s old judo partners</a></li><li><a href="https://theins.press/en/inv/287544">Privatization for hire: Russia’s state property chief is on the payroll of Putin pal Arkady Rotenberg</a></li><li><a href="https://theins.press/en/inv/289804">Theft, mistresses, and U.S. passports: The double lives of the Russian MPs building a “digital GULAG” while preaching “traditional values”</a></li></ul></aside>]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Fri, 20 Nov 2026 18:33:27 +0000</pubDate>
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      <title><![CDATA[Spending people, not money: Putin&#039;s Russia is sacrificing less to fight its war in Ukraine than than the USSR or U.S. did in WWII]]></title>
      <link>https://theins.press/en/economics/299800</link>
      <guid>https://theins.press/en/economics/299800</guid>
      <dc:creator><![CDATA[Vadim Belkin]]></dc:creator>
      <enclosure url="https://theins.press/storage/post_cover/display/299/299800/LO5UX0rO41kTmubxTR3tktBOM6G0m5TdReoUXXQD.jpg" length="0" type="image/jpeg"/>
      <description><![CDATA[<p>Russia’s war is costing its people more every year, and the government is still preparing <a href="https://www.finmarket.ru/main/article/6749017">new taxes and levies</a>. Yet by the standards of the Second World War, the burden on society is still relatively mild. Stalin’s USSR introduced ration cards, cut consumption by almost two-thirds, and paid one-twelfth of wages in bonds. The state raised the price of vodka 7.5-fold and opened commercial shops for the elite to bring money back into the treasury. The result was a society in which it was impossible either to get rich or to go broke. In today's Russia, military spending as a share of GDP is three to four times lower than it was for the belligerents in the world wars. The current Kremlin is protecting not the budget, but the illusion of normal life on which loyalty depends. But the one thing it does not protect is people.</p>]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p style="margin-left:0pt;">The material damage the war in Ukraine has inflicted on Russia’s population is so far far less than most opposition commentators expected in 2022, but it is simultaneously much greater than the authorities admit. The government is trying to place the main burden on businesses, but economic forces still shift much of the true cost onto ordinary people. Even if prices for consumers do not increase faster than wages, companies’ profit margins shrink, which ultimately hurts ordinary people too.</p><p style="margin-left:0pt;">Profits at Russian companies have been <a href="https://theins.ru/ekonomika/293802">falling</a> for the third consecutive year after their 2023 peak. Investment began to <a href="https://theins.ru/ekonomika/294037">decline</a> in 2025, making a rise in profitability in the foreseeable future unlikely. The wage bill keeps growing, but that cannot go on for long. And the weaker business activity becomes, the narrower the range of goods and the less accessible consumer products are. </p><p style="margin-left:0pt;">Consumers are also hit by tax increases, especially VAT and excise duties, as well as mandatory charges such as recycling and technology fees. Many Russians are also losing out as government spending on health care, education, and social policy falls.</p><p style="margin-left:0pt;">At least the purchasing power of the ruble has been relatively stable: average inflation in 2022–2026 was lower than during the period of rapid growth from 2000–2008. Of course, many familiar and important services, especially foreign online shops and payment systems, are no longer directly accessible. For example, intermediaries are needed to access many AI services (like <a href="https://skillbox.ru/media/code/google-ai-studio/">Google AI Studio</a>) and to launch new computer games such as <a href="https://dtf.ru/howto/3466902-kak-legalno-kupit-sid-meiers-civilization-7-v-rossii?ysclid=mvc89sam5m902891097">Civilization VII</a>.</p><p style="margin-left:0pt;">But all this inconvenience is entirely out of proportion to the heated rhetoric of Russian officials, who present their invasion of Ukraine as a battle to preserve Russia, its people, and its culture. The stakes in this conflict really are very high: the question is whether the world will return to the 1940s — the last time a European country annexed its neighbor's territory until Putin broke the norm in 2014.</p><blockquote>The inconvenience Russians face as consumers is entirely out of proportion to the authorities’ heated rhetoric</blockquote><p style="margin-left:0pt;">Given that this basic rule of international politics is now on the verge of collapse, it is fair to ask: could ordinary Russians' wallets return to the realities of the 1940s too? Objectively, the answer is no, but it is nevertheless useful to consider where Russia stands relative to other wartime economic models of the past century.</p><p style="margin-left:0pt;">In its fifth year of war, Putin’s Russia is losing the ability to contain the federal budget deficit, which is nearing 3–4% of GDP after posting a surplus of 0.4% in 2021. In monetary terms, Putin’s war against Ukraine is very cheap, at least compared with the outlays of the United States in the Second World War. In human lives, however, it is not cheap: as of the end of October 2026, the names of 285,000 Russian soldiers killed have been confirmed <a href="https://www.bbc.com/russian/articles/cqy4313ek09no">individually</a>, and Rosstat date indicates that 450,000 have been <a href="https://rosstat-leaks.com/?lang=ru">killed in the war</a>. The total death toll has therefore already exceeded U.S. losses in 1941–1945 (407,000, according to the <a href="https://www.nationalww2museum.org/students-teachers/student-resources/research-starters/research-starters-us-military-numbers">National WWII Museum</a>). In Russian history, the closest precedent is the number of people the Russian army lost in all its<span class="termin" data-description="PHA+SGlzdG9yaWFuc+KAmSBlc3RpbWF0ZXMgPGEgaHJlZj0iaHR0cHM6Ly9taWxpdGFyeS53aWtpcmVhZGluZy5ydS83NTg1Ij5yYW5nZTwvYT4gZnJvbSAxMjAsMDAwIHRvIDQ1MCwwMDAgcGVvcGxlIGtpbGxlZCBvciBkZWFkIGZyb20gZGlzZWFzZS48L3A+">wars against Napoleon,</span>from Austerlitz to the capture of Paris. </p><h3 class="outline-heading">Before the war: Stalinist free trade</h3><p style="margin-left:0pt;">The Soviet economy of the 1940s had a centrally planned command structure based on the allocation of physical resources by directives from the center. But money still circulated, and markets with prices determined by supply and demand never disappeared entirely.</p><p style="margin-left:0pt;">A typical city dweller earned a salary in Soviet rubles and spent it in shops, buying goods at state-set prices. For each type of product, the authorities determined a “market fund” — the volume to be sold to citizens through Soviet retail outlets. For example, the share of cotton fabrics allocated to the retail market was <a href="https://cbr.ru/content/document/file/48229/archivalfonds_005.pdf">44% in 1940</a>, but only 8% in 1942.</p><p style="margin-left:0pt;">At the beginning of 1941, on the eve of the war with Germany, Soviet cities had three categories of places where money could be exchanged for goods: ordinary shops, “collective-farm markets,” and “commercial shops.” Ordinary shops belonged to the state and sold goods at government-set prices. For political reasons, those prices were artificially low, generally two to four times below market levels. This type of trade accounted for most retail turnover, but it also meant shortages, queues, a limited selection, and poor-quality goods, especially outside major cities and priority industrial centers.</p><blockquote>In Soviet shops, prices were set for political reasons at two to four times below market levels, causing shortages and queues</blockquote><p style="margin-left:0pt;">So-called collective-farm markets were permitted in 1932, when the Lenin-era New Economic Policy was abolished, private trade was destroyed, and the state-only supply system proved inadequate, threatening millions with premature death from hunger. City dwellers spent about one-sixth of their usual outlays at the markets. Sellers included collective-farm representatives, people with household plots and gardens, and city residents selling their personal belongings.</p><p style="margin-left:0pt;">Market prices were not regulated, and sellers did not have to declare their income. Taxation amounted to an entry fee or a charge for a stall. Nevertheless,  “speculation” — i.e. buying something and reselling it at a profit — was punished harshly, as were selling goods produced with hired labor, lending at interest, and engaging in commercial leasing. A Soviet citizen could legally sell only personal belongings and things made by hand in their spare time.</p><figure><img src="https://theins.press/storage/content_image/original/6af/6aff26f865f8b4.61899726/hWuKURUSpgrkAcR6psroUG9RA22HkTGZhDRseL3m.jpg" alt="Collective-farm market, 1936"/><figcaption>Collective-farm market, 1936</figcaption></figure><p style="margin-left:0pt;">Commercial shops were the smallest retail sector by turnover, but the authorities paid them the most attention. Like ordinary shops, they belonged to the state, but they nevertheless served a very different purpose: their windows were meant to display Soviet abundance on a par with that of the bourgeois world. To keep their shelves from being emptied, prices were kept high, roughly in line with market rates. Most visitors could only go there as if on a museum tour, and they existed primarily in Moscow, Leningrad, and the capitals of the Union republics.</p><figure><img src="https://theins.press/storage/content_image/original/6af/6aff271ee384e8.99931425/66fIEIEhdgf4tIOfd0XAjEOx2CptyBjbhgJMgtCb.jpg" alt="Torgsin in Moscow (Torgsin was the All-Union Association for Trade with Foreigners)"/><figcaption>Torgsin in Moscow (Torgsin was the All-Union Association for Trade with Foreigners)</figcaption></figure><p style="margin-left:0pt;">These three worlds coexisted from January 1935 to June 1941, a period in which there was no need for ration-card distribution in the cities, and the markets and commercial shops had no shortages at all. But the crisis was already developing. Residents of small towns with meager supplies flocked to Moscow to buy manufactured goods, especially clothes. Their growing presence in queues spoiled the showcase of prosperity, and the authorities responded by tightening the domestic passport regime and carrying out brutal police raids at stations and on trains. Anyone caught engaging in unauthorized economic activity risked being sent to the Gulag as a supposed speculator or saboteur.</p><h3 class="outline-heading">The ruble in retreat and counteroffensive</h3><p style="margin-left:0pt;">As soon as Hitler’s invasion began, this fragile balance collapsed, and the USSR stopped pretending to have a market economy. On June 23, 1941, one day after Nazi forces crossed the border, the Soviet government <a href="https://www.prlib.ru/item/1348646">banned</a> savings-bank depositors from withdrawing more than 200 rubles a month, “in order to reduce cash payments to the population.”</p><p style="margin-left:0pt;">To fight inflation, workers were not paid compensation for unused vacation, and workers were given no vacation <a href="https://rjmf.econs.online/upload/iblock/956/9566c49e7d4db1a63d6e9622081c5e45.pdf" target="_blank">whatsoever</a> during the war (the money was transferred to special savings accounts and could be withdrawn only after the war). Military personnel, too, were urged to deposit their pay in the state labor savings banks on the grounds that they did not need money at the front and could collect it after victory. Thirty percent of service members never collected it, and that money went into the budget.</p><p style="margin-left:0pt;">Commercial shops were abolished and, like ordinary shops, turned into ration-card outlets. Food was not given away for free with ration cards, but was sold at fixed prewar prices, which had become even more detached from the reality of supply and demand. </p><p style="margin-left:0pt;">The free markets, however, survived, and their prices reflected the Soviet ruble’s rapid inflation. According to official figures, the amount of money in circulation stood at 19 billion rubles just before the war began, it rose to 35 billion by January 1, 1942, and it reached 70 billion by May 1, 1945.</p><figure><img src="https://theins.press/storage/content_image/original/6af/6aff27c725f358.56788846/CUDiCyEh0ZZEUqbCmzI1rvaqY7oAwE0VAxQgeF0x.png" alt=""/></figure><p style="margin-left:0pt;">In fact, the rapid pace of ruble creation was confined to 1941 and early 1942. In 1943, the amount of money in circulation rose by only 25.3%, and the pace then gradually slowed. Compare this with the growth of Russia’s <a href="https://cbr.ru/statistics/macro_itm/dkfs/monetary_agg/">M2 money supply</a> during the current war with Ukraine: 24.4% in 2022, 19.6% in 2023, 19.2% in 2024, and 10.6% in 2025. In 2026, the money supply is growing at an annual rate of 12.8%. Russia’s money supply grew almost as much in 2022 as it did in 1943; it is now growing slightly faster than it did in 1944. Over the entire war against Hitler, it increased by a factor or about 3.6; since the beginning of 2022, it has grown 2.1-fold.</p><p style="margin-left:0pt;">However, there was far less money in the USSR during the Second World War than there is today. Almost immediately after the German attack, a ration-card system was introduced — starting in Moscow and Leningrad on July 18, 1941 and spreading to all large cities on November 1, 1941. Ration allowances varied widely by region and population group.</p><p style="margin-left:0pt;">For many people, the system meant constant hunger, and for others, it created a heavy dependence on relatives or acquaintances with adequate rations. Losing a food ration card usually meant death, and even valid ration cards could not always be used to obtain the promised goods. A heavy-industry worker in Moscow, for example, was entitled to 2.5 kilograms of meat and 900 grams of butter a month, but Muscovites received neither meat nor butter in August and September 1942. Peasants lived on what they grew themselves (and could keep from requisitioning).</p><p style="margin-left:0pt;">When Soviet citizens during the war used their ration cards, they spent only about a third of their money; the other two-thirds went to the markets. But because prices at ration shops were dozens of times lower than market prices, people received as many goods as they could through the ration system.</p><p style="margin-left:0pt;">In the market sector, prices rose substantially — albeit unevenly across regions and towns. On average, inflation was at least 25% a month until April 1942. It was sharpest in January 1942, when the Central Statistical Administration’s price index rose by almost 45%.</p><p style="margin-left:0pt;">At the start of the war, the Soviet ruble was losing ground even as a medium of exchange at collective-farm markets, where barter took its place. The most common exchanges were bread for milk and potatoes for salt or vodka. In a 1943 analytical memo titled “The State of Monetary Circulation in 1943,” S. Barngolts, an expert at the USSR State Bank, <a href="https://docs.historyrussia.org/ru/nodes/203957">noted</a> that direct barter accounted for 21.5% of collective-farm market turnover in 1942, 15% in 1943 overall, and only 7.7% in the second half of 1943. Monetary circulation therefore normalized considerably during 1943: money creation slowed, barter at markets became much less common, and price increases stayed below 10% a month.</p><p style="margin-left:0pt;">In 1941–1942, the price index rose much faster than the money supply because money creation was not the only driver of inflation: consumer-goods production collapsed, while demand for those goods surged. In January 1943, market prices were about 17 times their prewar level, but they began to fall as civilian production recovered.</p><p style="margin-left:0pt;">The first overall decline in prices was recorded in July 1942, and it happened again in September. These drops were seasonal, but in 1943 market prices also fell outside the harvest months. From 1944 onward, deflation became the rule rather than the exception. By September 1944, prices were nine times their prewar level; in 1945, they were 5.5 times higher (almost in line with the 3.5-fold increase in the money supply over the course of the war).</p><figure><img src="https://theins.press/storage/content_image/original/6af/6aff287c771116.54803807/WxE89QR5jrkBBXPIyVY0oolbbBnUaqd8D7CnoTuD.png" alt=""/></figure><p style="margin-left:0pt;">These averages conceal the fact that prices rose less in small settlements and more in large cities. Disrupted transport and anti-speculation laws made it impossible to smooth out these differences. Price increases also varied by product category. The sharpest rises affected essential foods that could be stored for long periods: grain, flour, and groats.</p><p style="margin-left:0pt;">In Saratov, for example, in 1942 flour already cost 90 times its prewar price; in Ufa, it cost 30 times as much. In Moscow, Yaroslavl, Tula, Ryazan, Gorky, Kirov, Sverdlovsk, Chelyabinsk, and Novosibirsk, flour could generally <a href="https://cbr.ru/content/document/file/48229/archivalfonds_005.pdf">not be bought</a> at the market for any amount of money.</p><p style="margin-left:0pt;">The government made an exception for vodka, which rose in price 7.5-fold, making the state monopoly on vodka sales an important source of budget revenue. As a result, vodka’s share of retail turnover in ordinary shops rose from 11.6% in 1940 to 26.7% in 1944. The state earned 45 billion from the increase in price on vodka, tobacco, and perfume over the course of the war, almost as much as the 50 billion rubles it brought in from money creation.</p><h3 class="outline-heading">Rebuilding the temples of Soviet trade</h3><p style="margin-left:0pt;">Once the immediate risk of military defeat had receded, Stalin’s government decided to recreate the “showcase of abundance” in commercial shops. On March 18, 1944, the Council of People’s Commissars of the USSR issued <a href="https://docs.historyrussia.org/ru/nodes/320901">Resolution No. 283</a>, “On the Organization of Shops and Restaurants in Moscow to Serve Scientists, Engineers, Artists, Writers, and Senior Officers of the Red Army.”</p><p style="margin-left:0pt;">Under the new system, known as Osobtorg, members of the Soviet elite could buy ordinary goods with cash and without ration cards  —almost like in a capitalist country, though there were limits on “the quantity sold to one person.”</p><p style="margin-left:0pt;">From April 15, 1944, Moscow opened 20 food shops, including eight grocery stores and 12 specialty shops, as well as 50 restaurants. These included 20 “first-class night restaurants, with music and stage performances, open until 5 a.m.”</p><p style="margin-left:0pt;">There were special restaurants for scientists, architects, writers, film workers, musicians, performers, arts workers, officers, and “aviation and aircraft-industry workers” — one restaurant for each favored category.</p><p style="margin-left:0pt;">The other restaurants, divided into classes, were open to everyone. On May 15, 1944, Moscow also opened the Central Department Store and four specialty shops selling manufactured goods. The menus and product ranges of all these establishments were set out in unpublished appendices to the same Council of People’s Commissars resolution.</p><p style="margin-left:0pt;">The new commercial shops and restaurants charged “special” prices, well above ration-card rates and close to market levels. As a result, there were almost no shortages or queues. People whom Stalin’s state deemed most useful gained access to open, comfortable, prestigious consumption that was completely out of reach for most Soviet citizens. A party leader, general, academic, or famous performer was meant to be a “person with money” in a victorious empire, able to enjoy life.</p><blockquote>People whom Stalin’s state deemed most useful gained access to open, comfortable, and prestigious consumption</blockquote><p style="margin-left:0pt;">Alongside their social-engineering and propaganda aims, commercial shops also served a purely financial purpose. They generated profits for the state and prevented money from flowing out of the cities and into the countryside, which the authorities considered undesirable.</p><p style="margin-left:0pt;">Stalin’s government had a very dim view of citizens trying to accumulate cash and used every means to retrieve money once it had been issued to private individuals. One reason for allowing trade and public catering to return to something closer to normal was to bring that money back.</p><h3 class="outline-heading">Soviet bonds</h3><p style="margin-left:0pt;">Another way to extract money from the population was to issue war bonds. Mass campaigns to sell them took place every May from 1942 through 1945. The 1942 issue raised 10 billion rubles, the 1943 issue 12 billion, the 1944 issue 25 billion, and the 1945 issue another 25 billion.</p><p style="margin-left:0pt;">Most bonds were issued as “prize loans”: every six months, the state paid bondholders 2% of the face value. But interest was not paid proportionally on every bond; instead, it was distributed through a lottery. Most bonds, like lottery tickets, yielded nothing, while the rest won prizes ranging from 150% of face value to sums hundreds of times larger than the initial investment.</p><p style="margin-left:0pt;">A winning bond was considered redeemed and withdrawn. The expectation was that the typical, less lucky bond buyers would get their money back at face value after 20 years, with no return. Others might win only near the end of that period, with a prize unlikely to compensate them for the wait. Some would win earlier, but only modestly, earning a return comparable to an ordinary bank rate. A small, luckiest group would win the top prizes.</p><p style="margin-left:0pt;">People were often forced to buy bonds simply by being paid part of their wages in them — usually one-twelfth. As a State Bank report <a href="http://www.cbr.ru/content/document/file/48229/archivalfonds_005.pdf">put it</a>, wage increases did not require a corresponding rise in cash payments because voluntary and compulsory contributions withheld from workers’ and employees’ paychecks had increased. Taxes and voluntary payments, which amounted to 8.4% of the wage bill in 1940, had risen to 26.7%.</p><p style="margin-left:0pt;">The 1941–1945 war cost the USSR dearly, and the country’s citizens had to give up butter for guns in the most literal sense. In nominal terms, retail turnover in 1942 was 45% of its prewar level; in constant prices, it was only 35% — meaning that actual consumption had been cut almost threefold. Even in 1945, retail turnover at constant prices was just 57% of the prewar level. Most of that trade still went through the ration-card system, which kept the majority of the population on near-starvation rations.</p><p style="margin-left:0pt;">Yet the Soviet ruble did not turn into trash, as often happens to the currencies of countries fighting a major conflict. The amount of money in circulation grew 3.5-fold over the four years of war, while prices at collective-farm markets rose an average of 5.5-fold. That was less than in Russia in 1993 alone. Money-supply growth in 1941–1945 was roughly the same as in 2017–2026.</p><blockquote>Over four years of war, prices at Soviet collective-farm markets rose an average of 5.5-fold. That was less than in Russia in 1993 alone</blockquote><p style="margin-left:0pt;">Money creation was not the main way the war was financed. It brought in 50 billion rubles, while non-monetary measures — war taxes and loans, voluntary and compulsory contributions, and increases in regulated prices — brought in a total of 170 billion. Having learned the lessons of the First World War, Stalin’s government, like its allies and enemies, took great care to avoid a slide into hyperinflation. It believed that people would endure high taxes, forced loans, and ration cards more readily than chaotic price hikes.</p><h3 class="outline-heading">The dollar mobilized and repressed</h3><p style="margin-left:0pt;">Even at the height of the most brutal war, then, the socialist economy did not abolish money. It preserved some real value for it, tried to protect its purchasing power, allowed private trade at market prices (with caveats), and broadly presented itself as capitalist — including through interest-bearing bonds. </p><p style="margin-left:0pt;">But what happened in the United States, the most market-oriented of the major participants in the Second World War? There, too, the burden of military spending was crushing and deeply distorted the economy, calling its market character into question. Yet the illusion of normality was maintained even better than in the USSR: the dollar’s nominal purchasing power and key financial-market indicators remained as if nothing extreme were happening. The government achieved this through a highly unusual package of measures known as “financial repression.”</p><p style="margin-left:0pt;">During the war, U.S. federal spending rose from 10% to 44% of GDP — and nearly tenfold in dollar terms. The federal budget deficit increased over the first three years of the war from $3 billion to $55 billion — a jump from 3% to 30% of GDP. In 1943, government spending totaled $78.6 billion (44% of GDP), 3.2 times its revenue of $24 billion (13% of GDP), and the national debt rose 80% in a year. Before the war, federal debt securities held by investors amounted to 44% of GDP; by the end of 1945, the figure was 106% — a genuine catastrophe for public finances.</p><figure><img src="https://theins.press/storage/content_image/original/6af/6aff29297cd535.60307147/eTsWJZZnV7cAARnQvkwche9dhDjQZ3pcWIniV1W8.png" alt=""/></figure><p style="margin-left:0pt;">Taxes were raised to unprecedented levels, but that was not enough. The top marginal income-tax rate was 81% in 1941, 88% in 1942–1943, and from 1944, it came in at 94% on incomes above $200,000 a year. Yet these measures reduced the federal deficit by only 7.5% — from 30.3% of GDP in 1943 to 22.8% in 1944.</p><p style="margin-left:0pt;">The unprecedented fiscal pressure of the war years had remarkably little effect on the dollar’s nominal purchasing power or on financial markets. Even the formal peg of the dollar to gold at $35 an ounce remained in place.</p><p style="margin-left:0pt;">In practice, dollars could not be freely exchanged for gold inside the United States during the war (in fact, the practice had been suspended during the Great Depression a decade earlier). From 1944–1945, however, foreign governments that joined the <span class="termin" data-description="PHA+VGhlIEJyZXR0b24gV29vZHMgQWdyZWVtZW50IGVzdGFibGlzaGVkIGFuIGludGVybmF0aW9uYWwgbW9uZXRhcnkgc3lzdGVtIGluIDE5NDQsIHJlcGxhY2luZyB0aGUgZ29sZCBzdGFuZGFyZC4gVGhlIGRvbGxhciBiZWNhbWUgdGhlIGJhc2lzIGZvciBjdXJyZW5jeSBwYXJpdGllcywgYW5kIGdvbGQgd2FzIGZpeGVkIGF0ICQzNSBwZXIgdHJveSBvdW5jZS48L3A+">Bretton Woods agreement</span> were given that option.</p><p style="margin-left:0pt;">Even in the hardest year, 1942, the U.S. consumer price index rose by just 11%; in 1943 it rose by 6%, and thereafter by about 2% a year. Yields on three-month Treasury bills were held firmly at 0.375% throughout the war, while long-term bonds, including special war bonds, yielded no more than 3%. The Federal Reserve maintained these rates through constant intervention. Under an agreement with the Treasury Department, it bought government obligations in unlimited amounts, keeping their nominal yield at a minimum.</p><p style="margin-left:0pt;">Preventing a major rise in prices and interest rates was the central goal of U.S. wartime financial policy. On January 30, 1942, Congress passed the Emergency Price Control Act, creating the Office of Price Administration (OPA), whose director was empowered to set price ceilings on all manufactured goods and rents, and to regulate the rationing of scarce goods. In May, sales at prices above the seller’s March price for the same good or service were banned, and special regional price ceilings were added to this general rule. From October 1942, the OPA’s authority was extended to agricultural products and wages.</p><p style="margin-left:0pt;">To stop businesses from evading price ceilings, regulation became ever more complex. “Regulation W” effectively banned sales on credit and installment plans, and compulsory standardization and classification nearly eliminated the freedom to create new grades and brands. It was also strictly forbidden to lower a product’s quality while keeping price constant, or to sell one product only as part of a bundle with another. The OPA relied on a network of 250,000 “volunteers,” mostly housewives and pensioners, to monitor compliance.</p><p style="margin-left:0pt;">The U.S. authorities followed one rule strictly: no one was to get rich from the war. Any profit above a fixed return on invested capital (8% a year for capital up to $5 million, 5% for capital of $200 million or more) or above the average for 1936–1939 was considered “excess profit” and was taxed at a confiscatory rate: 90% from 1942 and 95% from 1943.</p><blockquote>The US authorities followed one rule strictly: no one was to get rich from the war</blockquote><p style="margin-left:0pt;">Army suppliers were also subject to the Contract Settlement Act. If a special commission found that a supplier had broken no rules but had optimized its costs and thereby earned “too much,” the government retroactively lowered the purchase price to “normalize” its profit margin. Profit margins were directly regulated in aircraft and shipbuilding as well. Capital could not be moved abroad, and businesses were not supposed to seek places with higher returns. Even pay raises were capped at 15% above 1941 levels.</p><p style="margin-left:0pt;">It was also hard to go broke in wartime America. Thanks to government procurement, almost every business had a guaranteed market for its products. Risky ventures lost their appeal because, if they succeeded, extraordinary taxes would take all the excess profit. A high-interest loan to finance a gamble was impossible because the government had effectively banned such borrowing, while no one would lend at low rates. Regulation W wiped out consumer credit due to the fact that people now had to spend no more than they earned. Amidst the constraints, the number of bankruptcies fell to a historic low.</p><p style="margin-left:0pt;">In effect, during the Second World War the United States was a society of total control and strict social guarantees, one in which no one could soar nor crash. The USSR, by contrast, became the arena of a merciless struggle to survive — one in which the authorities turned a blind eye to violations.</p><p style="margin-left:0pt;">Walter Graebner’s book <i>Round Trip to Russia</i> describes the shock <a href="https://archive.org/details/roundtriptorussi0000unse/page/166/mode/2up">the American correspondent felt</a> at Moscow’s Central Market, where collective-farm sellers “are not subject to any price regulation and can ask as much as they can get.”</p><p style="margin-left:0pt;">Graebner recounts fights over places in line and writes about how one customer, after buying a single egg for one and a half rubles, sucked it raw right there at the counter. Eggs at Moscow’s free market cost about 60 times as much as under rationing in the United States, beef cost 40 to 50 times as much, and milk 150 times as much. Barter was banned, but at the market a bottle of vodka could be exchanged for a quarter of a bucket of potatoes, and the police preferred not to intervene. The ban on photographing queues, however, was enforced as scrupulously as price controls in America.</p><h3 class="outline-heading">What should people today expect?</h3><p style="margin-left:0pt;">The USSR and the United States represented two extremes, but in both countries the wartime economy was a peculiar mix of markets and socialism. Notably, neither looked much like today's Russia. Stalin and Roosevelt were extremely afraid of inflation, and even though Putin understands its dangers too, he is even more afraid of introducing ration cards. Russia's Federal Antimonopoly Service sometimes terrorizes sellers by accusing them of “unjustified price increases,” but this is only a pale shadow of what the American OPA could do in the 1940s.</p><p style="margin-left:0pt;">A major war kills money, as the more of it a military budget needs, the harder it is to raise. The so-called "inflation tax" is convenient because it can be collected without chasing taxpayers and their property — the government need only create additional units of money and quickly use them to buy real assets or pay off its obligations. If it does so at a moderate pace that keeps inflation within normal bounds, the public is unlikely to flee the national currency.</p><p style="margin-left:0pt;">Unlike in the United States during the Second World War, no one in today’s Russia hides excess profits (and fewer would even need to try given that total profits among domestic businesses are falling). Bankruptcy is now a common service available to a broad swath of the population, and consumer loans at 40% interest a year are entirely normal — even the government borrows at 17%. Taxes, as in the 1940s, are being raised systematically, but Russia in 2026 is still far from both American rates of 90% and Stalin’s crushing taxes on household plots.</p><p style="margin-left:0pt;">Military spending as a share of Russia’s GDP is still three to four times lower than it was for the countries fighting the world wars of the 20th century, even if it is growing. Keeping it in check is necessary so that the illusion of normal life does not collapse too quickly. That illusion is the key condition for maintaining political stability in Russia.</p><p style="margin-left:0pt;">The top leadership in Moscow apparently considers that stability very fragile and is unwilling to impose a financial burden on its subjects comparable to the catastrophic weight of the 1940s. After all, lower-ranking regime functionaries remain loyal precisely because, so far, they have not had to make significant material sacrifices.</p><aside class="related-posts"><ul><li><a href="https://theins.press/en/economics/294325">Farewell to windfall: Сompanies in almost all Russian industries are getting poorer</a></li><li><a href="https://theins.press/en/economics/294266">Fighting for a poorer future: A sharp drop in investment points to a long-term structural crisis in Russia&#039;s economy</a></li><li><a href="https://theins.press/en/economics/295498">No-holds-barred budget: With finances in “manual control” mode, the Kremlin is set to plunge the Russian market into uncertainty</a></li><li><a href="https://theins.press/en/economics/297384">The consumer boom is over: Ukrainian drone strikes on Wildberries and Ozon mark the end of Russians’ spending spree</a></li><li><a href="https://theins.press/en/economics/298459">Butter melted down into guns: Russia is once again cutting social spending to pay for its war in Ukraine</a></li></ul></aside>]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Fri, 20 Nov 2026 18:03:56 +0000</pubDate>
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      <title><![CDATA[UN court ruling on genocide in Myanmar could complicate Israel’s defense in case brought by South Africa, expert says]]></title>
      <link>https://theins.press/en/news/299839</link>
      <guid>https://theins.press/en/news/299839</guid>
      <dc:creator><![CDATA[The Insider]]></dc:creator>
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      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>The ruling of the International Court of Justice in the case on the genocide of the Rohingya Muslim minority in Myanmar could have serious consequences for Israel, as South Africa has also filed a genocide case over the Israeli military operation in the Gaza Strip. <strong>International criminal law expert and genocide scholar William Schabas </strong>explained the ramifications of the decision in a conversation with <i>The Insider</i>.</p><p>According to Schabas, the court’s ruling is of fundamental importance for assessing the actions of the Israeli army, because the court recognized that genocidal intent can exist simultaneously with other motives.</p><blockquote><p>“The consequences of the judgment are devastating for Israel. To take one example, the judgment refers to the killing of 2,100 children as evidence of genocidal intent. More than ten times that number of Palestinian children have been killed,” Schabas said.</p></blockquote><p>The expert drew particular attention to the court’s conclusion that the presence of additional goals does not rule out genocidal intent, explaining that:</p><blockquote><p>“The judgment says that genocidal intent can coexist with other forms of intent. Thus, Israel’s argument that its attacks on Palestinians amount to counter-terrorism, self-defence, punishment, or reprisal does not in any way negate the possibility that it is driven by genocidal intent.”</p></blockquote><p>On Nov. 19, the United Nations’ International Court of Justice <a href="https://theins.press/en/news/299815">issued a ruling</a> in the case on Myanmar’s violation of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. The proceedings were initiated by The Gambia in connection with the persecution of the Rohingya, hundreds of thousands of whom were forced to flee the country after the 2017 military operation.</p><p>Schabas stressed that the ICJ’s ruling establishes the responsibility of a state, not the criminal responsibility of specific leaders. The latter falls within the competence of the International Criminal Court (ICC), which is also investigating the situation in Myanmar.</p><p>In the expert’s assessment, enforcing any direct punishment against Myanmar’s leadership remains unlikely as long as the military retains power. The country is not a party to the Rome Statute and is not obliged to execute ICC arrest warrants.</p><p>At the same time, Schabas believes that the ICJ’s ruling could improve the prospects for the Rohingya’s return to Myanmar and lead to changes in national legislation in their favor.</p><p>South Africa filed its case against Israel at the ICJ in December 2023, accusing it of violating the Genocide Convention during military operations in the Gaza Strip. Israel rejects the accusations, arguing that its actions are directed against Hamas and have been carried out consistent with the right to self-defense.</p><p>The ruling on Myanmar does not predetermine the outcome of the proceedings against Israel, but the legal approaches formulated by the court during its most recent genocide case suggest that a similar ruling against Israel has become a real possibility. </p><aside class="related-posts"><ul><li><a href="https://theins.press/en/news/299815">UN top court finds Myanmar guilty of committing genocide against its Rohingya minority</a></li></ul></aside>]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Fri, 20 Nov 2026 17:39:57 +0000</pubDate>
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      <title><![CDATA[Ukraine is targeting the main and backup supply routes to Crimea, forcing Russia onto secondary roads and creating bottlenecks]]></title>
      <link>https://theins.press/en/news/299834</link>
      <guid>https://theins.press/en/news/299834</guid>
      <dc:creator><![CDATA[The Insider]]></dc:creator>
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      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Ukraine is increasing pressure on Russia’s military supply network to Crimea by striking not only the Kerch Strait Bridge but also alternative land routes through Russian-occupied areas of southern Ukraine. Damage to bridges and crossings is forcing Russian forces to use secondary roads, slowing deliveries and requiring additional resources for repairs and temporary crossings. <strong>John Helin, founder of the Black Bird Group analytical team,</strong> described the situation to <i>The Insider</i>.</p><p>Helin said at least six bridges in the Rostov and Novoazovsk areas had been struck since early October. The bridges do not necessarily have to be completely destroyed to disrupt logistics, he explained, because even temporary closures create additional problems for Russian supply operations.</p><blockquote><p>“Damaged bridges force more trucks onto secondary roads, create bottlenecks, and slow down the movement of supplies,” Helin said.</p></blockquote><p>The main road supply route to Crimea through occupied Ukrainian territory remains the R-280 highway along the Sea of Azov. Its importance increased after the Crimean Bridge was bombed in 2022, when the movement of heavy trucks across the bridge was sharply restricted. The transport of some types of military cargo (including fuel and ammunition) over the bridge’s railway section has also been restricted.</p><p>The road span of the Crimean Bridge collapsed following Ukrainian attacks on Nov. 16-17. <strong>Konstantinos Tsavdaridis, a professor of structural engineering at City St George’s, University of London,</strong> <a href="https://theins.press/en/news/299804">told</a><i> The Insider</i> that restoring it would take many months even under normal conditions. The railway section was also damaged, and Russia’s Transport Ministry said on Nov. 19 that train traffic across the bridge had been suspended. Ukraine has also targeted Russian ferries and landing ships that have been used to carry cargo across the Kerch Strait, as noted by retired general and military analyst Mick Ryan.</p><p>Helin said Ukraine has been striking bridges and crossings since June. Several more crossings along the Sea of Azov coast were hit immediately before the latest attack on the Kerch Bridge. In his assessment, that suggests the strikes on several logistics routes may have been coordinated.</p><p>Russian forces are capable of repairing smaller bridges and building temporary crossings, but Ukraine can also target the replacements, Helin said. That forces the Russian military to carry out repairs again, search for detours, keep engineering units in the area, and potentially reinforce the crossings with additional air defenses.</p><p>However, Helin cautioned against overstating the effects of the Ukrainian strikes. Despite the disruption, the Russian military retains the ability to supply its forces in Crimea. A route being interrupted for several days or weeks, he said, is significantly different from being able to put it out of service for months:</p><blockquote><p>“While I think there is a fairly clear Ukrainian effort to make these routes increasingly difficult to use, I wouldn't conclude that Russia is close to losing its logistical connections to Crimea altogether. Disrupting traffic for days or weeks is one thing. Keeping these routes out of operation for months, despite Russian repair efforts and alternative crossings, is another.”</p></blockquote><p>The collapse of the road section of the Kerch Strait Bridge primarily deprives Russia of a backup route that could be used if the land supply network encountered serious problems, Helin said. A complete halt to rail traffic could have more significant consequences, although the volume of military cargo transported across the bridge has already been limited for some time.</p><p>Helin said Ukraine’s campaign of strikes at intermediate depth behind the front has likely contributed to slowing the Russian advance. Combined with growing manpower problems in the Russian military, mounting logistics difficulties could further limit Russia’s ability to increase the pace of offensive operations:</p><blockquote><p>“What these strikes can do is make Russian offensive operations increasingly difficult and when combined with Russia's mounting manpower problems, I think it becomes harder and harder to see how the Russians could substantially pick up the pace of their offensive operations, which have already slowed to a crawl during this year.”</p><p>“Ultimately, I think the more important story here is not necessarily the destruction of the Crimean Bridge itself, but the growing pressure Ukraine is putting on Russia's logistics system as a whole,” Helin said.</p></blockquote><aside class="related-posts"><ul><li><a href="https://theins.press/en/news/299804">Ukraine had technical plan to strike Kerch Bridge by summer 2025 but lacked precision weapons, source tells The Insider</a></li><li><a href="https://theins.press/en/politics/294084">Roads of death: Ukrainian strikes on transport corridors are disrupting Russia’s military logistics</a></li></ul></aside>]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Fri, 20 Nov 2026 15:14:49 +0000</pubDate>
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      <title><![CDATA[Russia’s ex-deputy defense minister and close Sergei Shoigu ally Ruslan Tsalikov handed 10 years in prison for bribery and embezzlement]]></title>
      <link>https://theins.press/en/news/299821</link>
      <guid>https://theins.press/en/news/299821</guid>
      <dc:creator><![CDATA[The Insider]]></dc:creator>
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      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>A Moscow court has sentenced Russia’s former First Deputy Defense Minister Ruslan Tsalikov to 10 years in a high-security penal colony, the Telegram channel <i>Ostorozhno Novosti</i> <a href="https://t.me/ostorozhno_novosti/57388">reported</a> on Nov. 19.</p><p>The court also ordered Tsalikov to pay a 500 million-ruble fine ($6.1 million) and barred him from holding government positions for 15 years after his release. He was convicted on several charges, including embezzlement, money laundering, and accepting bribes.</p><p>The former deputy minister was detained in March as part of an investigation into the alleged creation of a criminal organization. That charge was later <a href="https://life.ru/p/sud-prekratil-delo-protiv-eks-zamministra-tsalikova-po-state-ob-ops">dropped</a>. Prosecutors had initially <a href="https://t.me/ostorozhno_novosti/57373">sought</a> an 18-year prison sentence for Tsalikov, who was placed under house arrest after being detained.</p><p>As the Kremlin-aligned newspaper Kommersant<i> </i><a href="https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/8512383?from=top_main_1">reported</a> in March, the investigation alleged that Tsalikov accepted bribes — including a motorcycle worth about 2.3 million rubles ($28,000) and 50 million rubles ($608,000) in cash — in exchange for protecting Defense Ministry contractors. He was also accused of involvement in the embezzlement of more than 6.6 billion rubles ($80.3 million) from contracts to supply military clothing and equipment through Voentorg, a state-linked military retail and procurement company.</p><p>In May, Russian authorities seized assets belonging to Tsalikov worth a total of 5.5 billion rubles ($66.9 million).</p><p>Tsalikov, who served as a deputy defense minister from 2015 to 2024, was regarded as one of Sergei Shoigu’s closest associates. Before his appointment to the MoD, he worked in Russia’s Emergency Situations Ministry and with the Moscow Region government. At the time of his detention, he was a member of the Supreme Khural, the regional parliament of the Republic of Tuva.</p><aside class="related-posts"><ul><li><a href="https://theins.press/en/news/290018">Russia’s ex-Deputy Defense Minister Ruslan Tsalikov arrested on corruption charges, yet another Shoigu associate detained since MoD shakeup</a></li><li><a href="https://theins.press/en/news/291341">Former Russian deputy defense minister Pavel Popov sentenced to 19 years in prison</a></li><li><a href="https://theins.press/en/news/289568">Imprisoned ex-Deputy Defense Minister Timur Ivanov sues Russia’s MoD over refusal to send him to the frontlines in Ukraine</a></li><li><a href="https://theins.press/en/news/282689">Russia’s former Deputy Defense Minister sentenced to 13 years in prison for embezzlement</a></li><li><a href="https://theins.press/en/politics/276574">First Blood: 10 takeaways from Andrei Belousov’s first six months as Russia’s Defense Minister</a></li><li><a href="https://theins.press/en/news/272460">Putin appoints his cousin&#039;s daughter, billionaire Anna Tsivileva, as Russia&#039;s Deputy Defense Minister </a></li><li><a href="https://theins.press/en/news/254396">Russian Deputy Defense Minister&#039;s family owns $80 million worth of real estate, reports Team Navalny</a></li></ul></aside>]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Fri, 20 Nov 2026 09:58:17 +0000</pubDate>
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      <title><![CDATA[Russian Navy frigate escorting “shadow fleet” tankers reportedly collides with Russian refuelling vessel off the UK coast]]></title>
      <link>https://theins.press/en/news/299819</link>
      <guid>https://theins.press/en/news/299819</guid>
      <dc:creator><![CDATA[The Insider]]></dc:creator>
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      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>The Russian frigate <i>Neustrashimy</i>, which spent several months escorting tankers linked to Russia’s “shadow fleet” off the British coast, collided with a Russian refueling vessel while taking on supplies in the North Sea. Both ships sustained minor damage, according to a <a href="https://www.dailymail.com/news/article-16303315/russian-warships-death-protect-vladimir-putin-shadow-fleet.html">report</a> by the the <i>Daily Mail</i>  citing sources in NATO.</p><p>The tabloid did not name the second vessel or give the exact date of the collision. However, the open source intelligence (OSINT) project Russian Forces Spotter <a href="https://x.com/TiaFarris10/status/2123396275986903371">suggested</a> that it may have been the Russian replenishment oiler <i>Valentin Rykov</i> (IMO: 4750653), which was headed toward Neustrashimy in October for a refueling operation.</p><p>As <i>The</i> <i>Telegraph</i> previously <a href="https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2026/10/23/drone-and-warship-monitor-russian-navy-vessel-wind-farms/">reported</a>, the <i>Valentin Rykov </i>left the Baltic Sea and headed toward the Galloper offshore wind farm off England’s east coast. The newspaper said the tanker spent about 17 hours east of the wind farm, where it was believed to have attempted to refuel <i>Neustrashimy</i>.</p><p><i>The Insider</i> reviewed vessel-tracking data from the <a href="https://www.starboardintelligence.com/" target="_blank">Starboard Maritime Intelligence</a> platform and found that the <i>Valentin Rykov </i>had maintained relatively high speed until Oct. 20 before abruptly stopping in the North Sea near Outer Galloper. The location matches the area of the suspected refueling operation. <i>Valentin Rykov</i> then changed course and returned to the Baltic Sea, where it was <a href="https://theins.ru/news/298796">spotted</a> with <i>Neustrashimy</i> on Oct. 27 in Denmark’s Great Belt strait. By then, the frigate had spent more than three months off the British coast escorting Russian “shadow fleet” tankers through the English Channel.</p><div>https://t.me/theinsru/4309</div><p>According to British defense sources cited by <i>The Telegraph</i>, difficult weather conditions forced the Russian vessels to seek calmer waters off Scotland’s east coast in order to complete the transfer. On Oct. 22, they were monitored by the British patrol ship HMS <i>Tyne </i>and an MQ-9B Protector surveillance drone that had taken off from RAF Waddington.</p><p>Russian Forces Spotter said the collision may have occurred during refueling in heavy seas, with waves making it difficult for the vessels to maintain a safe distance from one another.</p><p>NATO sources cited by the <i>Daily Mail </i>linked the increased risk of accidents to prolonged deployments of Russian naval vessels, adding that the need to escort tankers was forcing the Russian Navy to delay repairs and modernization. One source told the newspaper that Russian ships were effectively being operated until they were no longer serviceable.</p><aside class="related-posts"><ul><li><a href="https://theins.press/en/news/296217">Russian frigate spotted in Baltic Sea escorting LNG tanker, which likely chose new route to avoid Ukrainian attacks</a></li><li><a href="https://theins.press/en/news/293873">First “shadow fleet” tanker passes through English Channel after British forces detain the Smyrtos, sailing near Russian Navy frigate</a></li><li><a href="https://theins.press/en/news/291852">Russian frigate Admiral Grigorovich escorted several more sanctioned tankers through the English Channel and remains in the strait</a></li><li><a href="https://theins.press/en/news/294292">“Here speaks Russian warship 531, stay away”: Russian Navy corvette drives observers away from “shadow fleet” tanker in the Baltic Sea</a></li><li><a href="https://theins.press/en/news/282883">Russian Navy corvette escorts MoD-owned ships through Baltic and English Channel towards the Mediterranean</a></li></ul></aside>]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Fri, 20 Nov 2026 09:46:28 +0000</pubDate>
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      <title><![CDATA[UN top court finds Myanmar guilty of committing genocide against its Rohingya minority]]></title>
      <link>https://theins.press/en/news/299815</link>
      <guid>https://theins.press/en/news/299815</guid>
      <dc:creator><![CDATA[The Insider]]></dc:creator>
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      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>On Nov. 19, the International Court of Justice, the United Nations’ top court, ruled that Myanmar’s actions against the Rohingya in 2017 were carried out with the intent to destroy a substantial part of the group, actions that meet the legal definition of genocide. <i>Reuters </i><a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/top-un-court-finds-myanmar-committed-state-sponsored-genocide-against-muslim-2026-11-19/">reported</a> that it was only the fourth time since the Holocaust that an international court had found the legal threshold for genocide had been met.</p><p>“The court finds that Myanmar's security forces killed thousands of Rohingya civilians, perpetrated widespread acts of sexual violence as well as acts of extreme violence against children, and attacked fleeing Rohingya,” presiding Judge Yuji Iwasawa stated in a reading of the decision.</p><p>International courts have rarely made findings of genocide, as the burden of proof requires prosecutors or applicant states to establish the perpetrator’s specific intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnic, racial, or religious group.</p><p>The UN court began hearing the genocide case involving the Rohingya, a predominantly Muslim minority from Myanmar’s Rakhine state, in January. The case was originally filed in November 2019 by The Gambia. As the United Nations <a href="https://news.un.org/en/story/2026/01/1166746">reported</a>, in 2017 so-called “clearance operations” carried out by Myanmar’s military involved mass killings, sexual violence, the burning of villages, and other abuses on such a scale that more than 700,000 Rohingya were forced to flee to neighboring Bangladesh.</p><p><strong>Melanie O’Brien, an international law expert and professor at the University of Western Australia,</strong> told <i>The Insider</i> that those responsible for the genocide are unlikely to be punished, but that the ruling could improve the situation for Rohingya refugees:</p><blockquote><p>“The ICJ has ruled that Myanmar must investigate, prosecute, and punish offenders of genocide. The perpetrators of the genocide range from low-level soldiers all the way to Min Aung Hlaing at the very top of the military, so potentially even the head of the military could – and should – be held accountable. However, the likelihood that perpetrators will hold themselves accountable is very low.</p><p>The Court has [also] ordered that Myanmar allow and facilitate the safe and dignified return of the Rohingya to Myanmar. However, it will be a challenge to overcome decades of discrimination and persecution, and of course the Rohingya villages have been destroyed, so they currently have nowhere to return to. The ruling is important to provide definitive recognition of the protected status of the Rohingya, and hopefully will result in more protection for any Rohingya refugees currently outside of Myanmar.”</p></blockquote><p><strong>O’Brien</strong> also noted the potential impact of today’s ruling on a separate case, brought by South Africa, involving Israel’s actions in the Gaza Strip:</p><blockquote><p>“The ICJ’s ruling in the <i>Gambia v. Myanmar</i> case will definitely have implications for South Africa’s case against Israel, as there are factual and argument similarities. The ICJ found Myanmar's claim of having the intent to fight an insurgency not to be credible, and that, looking at all the conduct, it was clear that Myanmar had genocidal intent. The same argument can be applied to Israel, which is arguing that its goal is to fight Hamas. There are also similarities in the crimes committed. For example, part of what determined that Myanmar had committed genocide was the killing of children, and Israel has killed more than 20,000 children in Gaza, so that will be a significant component of South Africa’s argument. The cases are legally independent, but the ICJ has now set down case law related to these issues, which it will follow if it makes a ruling in the South Africa case against Israel.”</p></blockquote><aside class="related-posts"><ul><li><a href="https://theins.press/en/politics/286535">Genocide now: The Darfur massacre is more international than it might appear</a></li><li><a href="https://theins.press/en/opinion/evhen-tsybulenko/269476">Prepare rather than wait: What should the international tribunal on Ukraine look like, and who will stand trial?</a></li><li><a href="https://theins.press/en/history/291603">The Hague precedent: How Slobodan Milošević became the first head of state tried by an international tribunal</a></li><li><a href="https://theins.press/en/history/272253">Life after deaths: How nations reconcile following bloody conflicts</a></li></ul></aside>]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Fri, 20 Nov 2026 07:36:58 +0000</pubDate>
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      <title><![CDATA[No easy heat: Europe heads into the upcoming winter with decade-low reserves and gas prices at their highest level since 2022]]></title>
      <link>https://theins.press/en/economics/299827</link>
      <guid>https://theins.press/en/economics/299827</guid>
      <dc:creator><![CDATA[George Voloshin]]></dc:creator>
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      <description><![CDATA[<p>Late last month, European gas prices climbed above €100 per megawatt-hour for the first time since 2022, tripling the level seen before the U.S.-Israeli war against Iran began. European Energy Commissioner Dan Jørgensen <a href="https://444.hu/2026/10/24/unios-biztos-a-444-nek-fennall-a-veszely-hogy-az-europai-fiataloknak-mar-nem-lesz-jobb-elete-mint-a-szuleiknek">warned</a> of another energy crisis and a difficult winter in which households could be forced to choose between heating and eating. In 2022, Europe lost most of its Russian pipeline gas; this time, Qatari liquefied natural gas (LNG) has all but disappeared after an Iranian strike on Ras Laffan. The EU is heading into winter with its lowest gas reserves in a decade and must now compete with Asia for U.S. LNG. As a result, Europe is importing record volumes of Russian LNG from the Yamal project, but long-term contract deliveries will be banned starting in 2027. For Europeans, that means an expensive winter, as energy already accounts for nearly half of eurozone inflation, which accelerated to 3.8% in September despite the European Central Bank raising interest rates two times this year.&nbsp;</p>]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>In 2022, Europe paid the price when Russia ended most pipeline gas deliveries. Now it is paying for the near-disappearance of Qatari LNG from the global market. After Iran struck Qatar’s Ras Laffan complex on March 19, gas prices <a href="https://tradingeconomics.com/commodity/eu-natural-gas/news/534637">rose</a> as high as €62 per megawatt-hour before <a href="https://tradingeconomics.com/commodity/eu-natural-gas/news/540021">falling</a> to €44 following an April ceasefire. But prices began rising again in late summer, and on Oct. 28 the benchmark futures contract at the Netherlands’ TTF gas hub <a href="https://www.euronews.com/2026/10/28/european-gas-price-crosses-100-for-first-time-since-2022-as-eu-warns-of-new-crisis">climbed</a> above <span class="termin" data-description="PHA+RGF5LWFoZWFkIHNwb3QgZ2FzIHByaWNlcyByZWFjaGVkIOKCrDEwMC44NSBwZXIgbWVnYXdhdHQtaG91ciBvbiBPY3QuIDI4LCBlcXVpdmFsZW50IHRvIGFib3V0ICQxLDE2MCBwZXIgMSwwMDAgY3ViaWMgbWV0ZXJzLiBQcmljZXMgY29udGludWVkIHRvIHJpc2UsIHJlYWNoaW5nIOKCrDEwNCBwZXIgbWVnYXdhdHQtaG91ciBieSBPY3QuIDMwLjwvcD4=">€100 per megawatt-hour</span> for the first time since December 2022. The new crisis still has a Russian dimension: in recent months, the European Union has been importing record volumes from Russia’s Yamal LNG project, while Washington has proposed restoring Russian gas supplies to Europe as part of a hypothetical peace plan for Ukraine.</p><h3 class="outline-heading">A storm in prices</h3><p>There are three immediate reasons for the surge in prices.</p><p>The first is the <strong>Strait of Hormuz</strong>. Before the war in Iran, Qatar accounted for around 19% of global LNG exports. However, in the first six months of 2026 it, <a href="https://gasprocessingnews.com/news/2026/08/as-war-strands-qatari-gas-for-6-months-us-sales-rise-and-european-stocks-plummet/">shipped</a> just 18 cargoes, compared with 509 a year earlier. Iranian missiles <a href="https://www.bnnbloomberg.ca/business/2026/03/19/iran-attack-wipes-out-17-of-qatars-lng-capacity-for-up-to-five-years-qatarenergy-ceo-says/">disabled</a> two production trains at Ras Laffan that had a combined annual capacity of 12.8 million metric tons; repairs are expected to take three to five years. QatarEnergy <a href="https://www.edison.it/sites/default/files/documents/pr_qe_fm_august_28_def.pdf">extended</a> force majeure on some contracts through early November, while attacks on vessels in the strait <a href="https://globallnghub.com/natural-gas-prices-weekly-update-jkm-ttf-and-henry-hub-13-october-2026/">increased</a> in early October.</p><blockquote>Qatar, which accounted for about 19% of global LNG exports before the war, shipped just 18 cargoes in the first six months of 2026, compared with 509 a year earlier
</blockquote><p>The second is <strong>Europe’s record-low gas reserves for this time of year</strong>. Underground storage facilities are 75% full, compared with <a href="https://www.euronews.com/my-europe/2022/10/25/energy-crisis-europes-gas-prices-fall-below-100-mwh-for-the-first-time-since-mid-june">93%</a> at the end of October 2022. Forecasts of an approaching cold spell and unplanned disruptions in Norway have <a href="https://swedenherald.com/article/european-gas-prices-hit-100-per-megawatthour-for-first-time-since-2022-crisis">added</a> to market anxiety in recent days.</p><p>The third is <strong>competition with Asia</strong> for uncommitted cargoes. Asia’s share of U.S. LNG exports rose from 16% in summer 2025 to 29% in summer 2026, according to <a href="https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/war-strands-qatari-gas-6-months-us-sales-rise-european-stocks-plummet-2026-08-26/" target="_blank">data intelligence firm</a> <span class="termin" data-description="PHA+SUNJUywgb3IgSW5kZXBlbmRlbnQgQ29tbW9kaXR5IEludGVsbGlnZW5jZSBTZXJ2aWNlcywgaXMgYSBsZWFkaW5nIGdsb2JhbCBtYXJrZXQgaW50ZWxsaWdlbmNlIGFuZCBhbmFseXRpY3MgcHJvdmlkZXIgc3BlY2lhbGl6aW5nIGluIGNoZW1pY2FscywgcGV0cm9jaGVtaWNhbHMsIGZlcnRpbGl6ZXJzLCBlbmVyZ3kgYW5kIHJlY3ljbGluZyBtYXJrZXRzLjwvcD4=">ICIS</span>.</p><p>In 2025, after replacing much of its Russian pipeline gas with LNG delivered by tanker, the EU <a href="https://energy.ec.europa.eu/data-and-analysis/market-analysis_en">received</a> 45% of its gas imports in liquefied form. That has made European prices less dependent on long-term pipeline contracts and more sensitive to the global spot market, meaning developments in the Persian Gulf now significantly affect European prices.</p><figure><img src="https://theins.press/storage/content_image/original/6b0/6b0040a175c9c1.74021296/VkAbl2WexAwog9oEFqvq4IuP2ZTt54tMdITgiWha.png" alt=""/></figure><p>The current price levels are exceptional. In 2019-2020, gas in Europe <a href="https://sbereg.ai/raw/ttf">cost</a> an average of €10-14 per megawatt-hour, and in 2023-2025, it averaged €35-40. Today it is around €100.</p><p>The resemblance to 2022 is largely limited to the price level and Brussels’ calls for voluntary conservation. EU gas demand is now about 20% below its precrisis level, according to an <a href="https://www.euronews.com/2026/10/28/european-gas-price-crosses-100-for-first-time-since-2022-as-eu-warns-of-new-crisis">estimate</a> by the EU Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators (ACER). Europe has reduced gas consumption partly by expanding renewable energy and partly because industrial output has fallen, with some plants closing because gas and electricity became prohibitively expensive.</p><p>Outside Europe, the picture varies widely. The Asian JKM LNG benchmark <a href="https://globallnghub.com/natural-gas-prices-weekly-update-jkm-ttf-and-henry-hub-19-october-2026/">rose</a> to nearly $30 per million British thermal units (MMBtu) in mid-October. Since €100 per megawatt-hour is roughly equivalent to $33 per MMBtu, European gas has broadly reached Asian price levels. U.S. Henry Hub prices, by contrast, <a href="https://lnginsights.com/">remain</a> at a mere $3 per MMBtu. That gap helps determine where U.S. LNG tankers go.</p><p>The situation is likely to persist for several more months, and the market does not expect a quick easing. In September, Bank of America <a href="https://www.aninews.in/news/business/european-gas-prices-may-rise-30-in-q4-2026-amid-low-storage-levels-bofa20261012121502/">raised</a> its average fourth-quarter TTF forecast to €100, about 20% above the level seen in mid-September.</p><h3 class="outline-heading">Where Europe’s gas comes from</h3><p>EU domestic production in 2025 <a href="https://energy.ec.europa.eu/data-and-analysis/market-analysis_en">totaled</a> 33 billion cubic meters and covered only about 10% of consumption, which reached 339 billion cubic meters. Imports totaled 289 billion cubic meters, while dependence on imported gas <a href="https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php?title=Natural_gas_supply_statistics">stood</a> at 87.6%, with the remainder coming from storage. The bloc’s largest producers are Romania, the Netherlands, and Germany, but none can substantially increase production this winter.</p><p>At the beginning of 2026, before the war in the Persian Gulf, imports were <a href="https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/infographics/where-does-the-eus-gas-come-from/">divided</a> as follows: Norway supplied 30.9% (89.3 billion cubic meters), almost entirely by pipeline; the United States provided 26.2% (75.6 billion cubic meters), all as LNG; North Africa  supplied around 13%, mostly through pipelines from Algeria and Libya plus Algerian LNG; Russia came in at 12.5% (36 billion cubic meters), through both pipelines and LNG; Azerbaijan’s 3.9% was delivered by pipeline; and Qatar’s 3.7% arrived entirely as LNG.</p><p>In 2021, Russia had supplied the EU with more than 150 billion cubic meters of gas, while the United States supplied only 18.9 billion. Then, over the course of four years, U.S. deliveries quadrupled, while Russian supplies fell by more than fourfold. In LNG imports specifically, the U.S. share <a href="https://www.rigzone.com/news/lng_made_up_45_percent_of_eu_gas_imports_in_2025-07-jul-2026-184076-article/">reached</a> 57.9%, Russia’s was 13.5% and Qatar’s 8%.</p><p>Although Qatar’s direct share of EU supply is relatively small — last winter it <a href="https://www.acer.europa.eu/key-developments-european-gas-wholesale-markets-winter-2025-2026">provided</a> 7% of LNG and about 4% of total gas imports — the indirect impact of losing those volumes has been enormous. Virtually no significant amount of Qatari gas reached the EU over the summer, leading LNG imports to <a href="https://www.acer.europa.eu/monitoring/key-developments-european-gas-wholesale-markets-summer-2026">fall</a> by 14%, and U.S. LNG’s share of Europe’s gas balance to rise to roughly 30%. Russian gas, including both pipeline gas and LNG, currently accounts for about 11% of supplies.</p><figure><img src="https://theins.press/storage/content_image/original/6b0/6b0041ffd0ec08.75469713/QQaQ6eo2Tw7jpVkowkb8uYilZmjAlJlodluVzqqM.png" alt=""/></figure><p>ACER <a href="https://www.acer.europa.eu/monitoring/key-developments-european-gas-wholesale-markets-summer-2026">estimates</a> that the war in Iran added between €18 billion and €33 billion to the EU’s gas import bill. The Hormuz crisis hits Europe mainly through prices because Asian countries deprived of Qatari gas are simply bidding away U.S. cargoes. Even after an interim U.S.-Iran agreement came into effect in June, LNG tanker traffic through the strait <a href="https://www.iai.it/en/events/presentation-latest-2026-edition-quarterly-gas-market-report-international-energy-agency-iea">remained</a> well below prewar levels. The U.S.-based Institute for Energy Economics and Financial Analysis (IEEFA) <a href="https://ieefa.org/european-lng-tracker">expects</a> Europe to receive two-thirds of all its LNG from the United States in 2026.</p><p>Amid high prices, the European Commission <a href="https://agenceurope.eu/en/bulletin/article/13963/13/falling-energy-demand-further-releases-from-emergency-reserves-irish-presidencys-options-for-tackling-price-crisis">agreed</a> to lower its Dec. 1 gas-storage target from 90% to 80%. Jørgensen had earlier <a href="https://www.euronews.com/2026/09/27/eu-tells-countries-to-curb-energy-demand-as-gas-prices-face-winter-squeeze">urged</a> governments to voluntarily reduce consumption, and on Oct. 29 energy ministers discussed preparations for possible gas disruptions but adopted no mandatory demand-reduction measures. Their only decision was a declaration on <a href="https://www.chronicle.lu/category/business/64339-luxembourg-signs-declaration-on-collective-action-to-stabilise-diesel-markets">releasing strategic petroleum-product reserves</a>.</p><p>While the EU and Canada are <a href="https://www.euronews.com/2026/10/28/european-gas-price-crosses-100-for-first-time-since-2022-as-eu-warns-of-new-crisis">considering</a> a long-term LNG agreement, Eni and TotalEnergies have already <a href="https://www.giignl.org/news/eni-and-totalenergies-take-fid-on-cyprus-gas-project-to-supply-lng-to-europe">made</a> a final investment decision on Cyprus’ Cronos gas field. Those additional supplies, however, will not become available before 2028.</p><h3 class="outline-heading">Higher prices, lower demand</h3><p>According to Eurostat’s latest complete data, natural gas <a href="https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php?title=Energy_statistics_-_an_overview">accounted</a> for 20.6% of the EU’s gross available energy in 2024, second only to oil and petroleum products at 37.8%. Gas had accounted for <a href="https://eea.europa.eu/soer/data-and-maps/indicators/primary-energy-consumption-by-fuel-3/assessment-1">23.5%</a> in 2011 and <a href="https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/SEPDF/cache/104551.pdf">23.7%</a> in 2020. That means nearly the entire decline came during the crisis years of 2022-2023, when industrial production fell and households cut back on heating.</p><p>The decline is even more striking in absolute terms. EU gas consumption <a href="https://ember-energy.org/latest-insights/eu-national-targets-show-gas-in-decline/fall-in-eu-gas-demand/">fell</a> from 404 billion cubic meters in 2021 to 326 billion in 2023. It <a href="https://energy.ec.europa.eu/data-and-analysis/market-analysis_en">rose</a> to 339 billion cubic meters in 2025, partly because of weak hydropower generation. The International Energy Agency (IEA) <a href="https://ceenergynews.com/oil-gas/iea-gas-market-report-q3/">expects</a> European demand to fall by more than 2% this year as expensive gas loses ground to renewables, which <a href="https://ember-energy.org/latest-insights/european-electricity-review-2026/">generated</a> nearly half of the EU’s electricity in 2025.</p><p>Gas plays a smaller role in electricity generation than in the overall energy mix, <a href="https://ember-energy.org/latest-insights/european-electricity-review-2026/2025-at-a-glance/">generating</a> 16.7% of all EU electricity in 2025 (slightly less than wind power at 16.9%). Gas-fired generation peaked in 2019 at 569 terawatt-hours and then declined for five consecutive years before rising to 466 terawatt-hours, a year-on-year increase of 8%.</p><p>More than 60% of the energy consumed by EU households goes toward heating, and gas remains the largest single household energy source. In 2024, it <a href="https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php?title=Energy_consumption_in_households">accounted</a> for 29.4% of household final energy consumption, more than electricity at 26.9%. And while solar power can displace some gas in the energy system during summer, winter heating demand is much harder to replace.</p><blockquote>Gas in the EU is used primarily for heating, which accounts for more than 60% of household energy consumption</blockquote><p>Under the EU Energy Efficiency Directive, the bloc’s final energy consumption in 2030 must not <a href="https://energy.ec.europa.eu/topics/energy-efficiency/energy-efficiency-targets-directive-and-rules/energy-efficiency-targets_en">exceed</a> 763 million metric tons of oil equivalent, compared with 901 million in 2024. The IEA <a href="https://www.iea.org/reports/gas-2025/executive-summary">expects</a> European gas demand to decline 8% between 2024 and 2030, with the Ember energy think tank <a href="https://ember-energy.org/latest-insights/eu-national-targets-show-gas-in-decline/fall-in-eu-gas-demand/">projecting</a> a similar decline. Most of the drop, according to IEA <a href="https://www.spglobal.com/energy/en/news-research/latest-news/lng/102725-oecd-european-gas-demand-forecast-to-fall-up-to-10-from-2024-2030-iea">calculations</a>, will come from the power sector, where gas-fired generation in European OECD countries is expected to fall by one-quarter by 2030.</p><h3 class="outline-heading">Storage starts winter from a low base</h3><p>EU underground gas storage facilities were <a href="https://www.euronews.com/2026/10/08/eu-faces-gas-shortfall-of-up-to-15-if-severe-winter-hits-report-warns">72% full</a> on Oct. 1 and <a href="https://www.acer.europa.eu/monitoring/key-developments-european-gas-wholesale-markets-summer-2026">75% full</a> on Oct. 21. But by Nov. 1, they had slipped slightly to <a href="https://agsi.gie.eu/">74.6%</a>, the <a href="https://ieefa.org/resources/eu-may-need-cut-winter-gas-demand-7-gas-storage-record-seasonal-low">lowest</a> level for this time of year in a decade. On Oct. 1, it was the lowest reading for that date since records began in 2011. For comparison, storage was around <a href="https://www.euronews.com/2026/10/08/eu-faces-gas-shortfall-of-up-to-15-if-severe-winter-hits-report-warns">83% full</a> on Oct. 1, 2025.</p><p>The picture varies sharply across EU member states. As of Nov. 1, according to <a href="https://agsi.gie.eu/" target="_blank">data </a>from <span class="termin" data-description="PHA+QUdTSSssIG9yIEFnZ3JlZ2F0ZWQgR2FzIFN0b3JhZ2UgSW52ZW50b3J5LCBpcyBhIEV1cm9wZWFuIG9ubGluZSBwbGF0Zm9ybSB0aGF0IHByb3ZpZGVzIHVwLXRvLWRhdGUgZGF0YSBvbiBuYXR1cmFsIGdhcyBzdG9ja3MgaW4gdW5kZXJncm91bmQgc3RvcmFnZSBmYWNpbGl0aWVzIGFjcm9zcyBFdXJvcGUuPC9wPg==">AGSI+</span>, Italy’s storage facilities were 91% full, France’s 87%, the Netherlands’ 66%, and Germany’s <span class="termin" data-description="PHA+Rm9yIGNvbXBhcmlzb24sIEdlcm1hbnnigJlzIHVuZGVyZ3JvdW5kIGdhcyBzdG9yYWdlIGZhY2lsaXRpZXMgd2VyZSA3Mi4yNSUgZnVsbCBvbiB0aGUgc2FtZSBkYXRlIGluIDIwMjEgYW5kIDc1LjE1JSBmdWxsIGluIE9jdG9iZXIgMjAyNS48L3A+">only 61%</span>. German storage facilities are the largest in the EU and <a href="https://www.cleanenergywire.org/news/low-german-gas-levels-threaten-eu-supply-security-strategic-reserve-not-ready-analysts">help supply</a> Austria, the Czech Republic and Switzerland. Germany was supposed to reach 70% by Nov. 1.</p><blockquote>The EU is heading into winter with storage facilities below target, and Germany is the biggest concern</blockquote><p>There are three reasons for the shortfall. First, Europe began refilling storage from a very low base after last years’ cold winter left facilities <a href="https://www.acer.europa.eu/monitoring/key-developments-european-gas-wholesale-markets-summer-2026">depleted</a> to 28%. Second, the market offered little incentive to build inventories because for much of the summer season, gas was no cheaper than in the winter, making it <a href="https://www.argusmedia.com/en/news-and-insights/latest-market-news/2841994-improved-spreads-spur-german-gas-storage-auctions">unprofitable</a> for traders to increase reserves. Third, as noted above, the war in Iran made Qatari LNG scarce and expensive, meaning exchange-traded gas at the end of summer <a href="https://theins.ru/news/296461">cost</a> roughly twice as much as it had a year earlier.</p><p>Under the European Network of Transmission System Operators for Gas (ENTSOG) base-case scenario, storage will <a href="https://www.entsog.eu/sites/default/files/2026-10/SO0072-26_Winter%20Supply%20Outlook%202026-27.pdf">fall</a> to 29% by the end of next March. In the event of a cold winter with scarce LNG and a complete halt to Russian pipeline supplies through TurkStream, stocks could fall to between 11% and 21%, depending on LNG availability. IEEFA <a href="https://ieefa.org/resources/eu-may-need-cut-winter-gas-demand-7-gas-storage-record-seasonal-low">estimates</a> that under such a scenario the EU would probably have to cut winter consumption by 7%, or about 14 billion cubic meters.</p><p>The Netherlands has <a href="https://energyscan.engie.com/europe-gas-storage-levels-weekly-fullness-rate-tracker-and-analysis/">subsidized</a> storage injections since July while lowering its national storage target <span class="termin" data-description="PHA+VGhhdCB0YXJnZXQgaGFkIGJlZW4gbWV0IGFuZCBleGNlZWRlZCBieSB0aGUgZW5kIG9mIE9jdG9iZXIuPC9wPg==">to 64%</span>. Germany does not plan to <a href="https://www.cleanenergywire.org/news/low-german-gas-levels-threaten-eu-supply-security-strategic-reserve-not-ready-analysts">establish</a> its own strategic gas reserve until next year, and the 24 terawatt-hours’ worth of supplies would cover only 18 days of a normal winter or 10 days of an extreme one. The European Commission, however, <a href="https://www.euronews.com/2026/09/27/eu-tells-countries-to-curb-energy-demand-as-gas-prices-face-winter-squeeze">insists</a> there is no immediate threat of supply disruptions.</p><p>Weather remains the decisive variable. El Niño could bring Europe a mild winter, which would reduce demand for heating and gas-fired power generation, as noted by the <a href="https://www.oxfordenergy.org/wpcms/wp-content/uploads/2026/10/OIES-Quarterly-Gas-Review-Issue-34.pdf">Oxford Institute for Energy Studies</a>. But if the winter turns cold, Europe will again compete with Asia for every available LNG cargo. Under such a scenario, the current €100 price may prove to be far from the peak.</p><h3 class="outline-heading">Goodbye, Yamal</h3><p>The EU’s phaseout of Russian gas was formalized in Regulation (EU) 2026/261, which <a href="https://www.jonesday.com/en/insights/2026/02/eu-moves-to-end-russian-natural-gas-imports-and-prepare-oil-ban">entered</a> into force on Feb. 3. Since March 18, <a href="https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/ending-russian-energy-imports/">supplies</a> under contracts signed or amended after June 17, 2025, have been prohibited, and restrictions on existing contracts are being phased in: since April 25, new short-term contracts for Russian LNG have been banned, and since June 17, pipeline gas supplied under short-term contracts has been prohibited. Long-term Russian LNG contracts will be banned starting Jan. 1, 2027, and a ban on all remaining pipeline gas will come into effect on Sept. 30, 2027 (with a Nov. 1 date possible in some exceptional cases).</p><p>For now, Europe is buying ahead of the ban. During the first nine months of the year, EU ports <a href="https://ru.euronews.com/2026/10/09/ru-eu-paid-79bn-for-russian-arctic-lng-amid-record-imports">received</a> a record 12.18 million metric tons of LNG from the Yamal LNG project, up 9.5% year-on-year and equal to 85% of the project’s shipments by volume. The cargoes were worth €7.88 billion. Over the same period, 13.2 billion cubic meters of gas flowed through TurkStream, up 1.4%.</p><p>The volumes that will disappear next fall amount to about 33 billion cubic meters annually, according to an <a href="https://www.iea.org/commentaries/eu-phase-out-of-russian-gas-creates-new-diversification-opportunities-for-central-and-eastern-europe">IEA estimate</a>. The ban on Russian LNG alone will <a href="https://www.aa.com.tr/en/europe/eu-faces-potential-gas-shortage-as-winter-approaches-report/4083341">reduce</a> imports by roughly 7 billion cubic meters this winter. Most of that gas will be replaced with U.S. LNG, meaning Europe’s dependence on Moscow will increasingly be replaced by dependence on Washington. At the same time, Donald Trump recently <a href="https://www.kslaw.com/Insights/Articles/President-Trump-Implements-and-Waives-New-Sanctions-and-Tariffs-Under-the-Graham-Act">postponed</a> new sanctions targeting Russia’s energy sector.</p><p>Practical alternatives include new LNG projects that are scheduled to be completed in 2027 and 2028, along with a rapid restoration of transit through the Strait of Hormuz. Hungary and Slovakia are the weakest links in the EU plan. Budapest <a href="https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX%3A62026CN0046">challenged</a> the regulation before the EU Court of Justice in February, while Hungary and Slovakia have <a href="https://www.euronews.com/2026/10/19/visegrad-four-urge-brussels-to-ease-russian-energy-phase-out-rules">asked</a> Brussels for greater flexibility.</p><p>Private initiatives have also intensified. <i>Reuters</i> reported that Trump’s son-in-law Jared Kushner and Kremlin special envoy Kirill Dmitriev <a href="https://meduza.io/amp/en/news/2026/10/08/us-russia-discuss-possibility-of-selling-gas-to-europe-via-nord-stream">discussed</a> bringing a U.S. investor into the Nord Stream pipelines. On Oct. 19, the European Commission <a href="https://audiovisual.ec.europa.eu/en/media/video/I-296530">rejected</a> suggestions that purchases through the pipelines could resume.</p><p>Novatek CEO Leonid Mikhelson <a href="https://1prime.ru/20261022/novatek-874502208.html">says</a> the Russian company will sell gas “all over the world.” Because the Northern Sea Route is <a href="https://euronews.com/my-europe/2026/09/11/europe-spends-record-73bn-on-russian-arctic-gas-in-just-eight-months-surpassing-2025-total">closed</a> to direct Asia-bound voyages during winter, NOVATEK <a href="https://www.interfax.ru/business/1124210">plans</a> to build receiving infrastructure in Vietnam. Mikhelson <a href="https://www.vedomosti.ru/business/news/2026/10/22/1239225-gaz-vne-es">said</a> TotalEnergies would sell its share of Yamal LNG outside Europe after 2027, an option permitted under the EU’s 21st sanctions package.</p><p>The U.S. <span class="termin" data-description="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">Graham Act</span> poses a more tangible future risk. The sanctions law <a href="https://gcaptain.com/u-s-sanctions-law-puts-russias-arctic-yamal-lng-fleet-in-crosshairs/">threatens</a> the <span class="termin" data-description="PHA+QXJjNyBpcyBhbiBpY2UtY2xhc3MgcmF0aW5nIHVuZGVyIHRoZSBSdXNzaWFuIE1hcml0aW1lIFJlZ2lzdGVyIG9mIFNoaXBwaW5nIGFuZCBpcyBhbW9uZyB0aGUgaGlnaGVzdCBpY2Utc3RyZW5ndGhlbmluZyBjbGFzc2lmaWNhdGlvbnMgZm9yIG1lcmNoYW50IHZlc3NlbHMuIFRoZXJlIGFyZSBjdXJyZW50bHkgMTUgQXJjNyBMTkcgY2FycmllcnMgY2FwYWJsZSBvZiBuYXZpZ2F0aW5nIHRocm91Z2ggaWNlIHdpdGhvdXQgYW4gaWNlYnJlYWtlci48L3A+">Arc7</span> ice-class tanker fleet serving NOVATEK’s project, although the White House suspended its main sanctions provisions beginning Oct. 16.</p><p>China, meanwhile, pays substantially <a href="https://theins.ru/news/298509">less</a> for gas delivered through the Power of Siberia pipeline than Russia’s other customers do. According to Russia’s Economic Development Ministry, China paid an average of $240.30 per 1,000 cubic meters in 2025, compared with $406.50 for other customers outside the former Soviet Union — a discount of 41%.</p><p>Power of Siberia 2, meanwhile, remains stalled because China is demanding prices comparable to those on Russia’s domestic market. As a result, the record 38.8 billion cubic meters <a href="https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2025/12/30/gazproms-gas-exports-to-europe-fall-to-lowest-level-since-early-1970s-a91591">pumped</a> to China in 2025 comes nowhere close to compensating Gazprom for lost European revenue, whether measured in volume or in price.</p><p>Russia has not recovered from the loss of the European market. For now, it is earning money from the final months of Yamal sales to Europe, but the EU market is closing on a fixed timetable, and China cannot provide an equivalent replacement.</p><h3 class="outline-heading">Who will pay?</h3><p>Expensive gas has already reached consumers. Eurostat data show that eurozone inflation <a href="https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/products-euro-indicators/w/2-16102026-ap">accelerated</a> to 3.8% in September, up from 3.2% in August, significantly higher than the 2.2% recorded a year earlier. Energy — including fuel, gas and electricity — rose 19% over the year and contributed 1.7 percentage points to inflation, nearly half of the total increase in prices.</p><p>The winter impact will be softened somewhat because household gas bills include components that do not depend on wholesale prices. Taxes and levies <a href="https://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/economic-bulletin/focus/2026/html/ecb.ebbox202606_04~5f026ee8e2.en.html">accounted</a> for about 31% of household gas charges in 2025. In simplified terms, for a €100 gas bill, €31 would consist of taxes and levies and €69 would go towards the gas itself and its delivery. Even if that entire latter portion doubled, the total bill would rise to €169 despite the commodity price doubling (and in reality, the increase would be smaller because network charges are also largely insulated from wholesale prices).</p><p>Even so, the increase will be significant. For a gas-heated home that consumes 10,000 kilowatt-hours between November and March, the cost of the gas alone will rise by roughly €600, according to a <a href="https://www.euronews.com/2026/10/27/european-natural-gas-prices-soar-what-it-means-for-your-winter-bills"><i>Euronews </i>calculation</a>. Electricity is also becoming more expensive because gas-fired plants continue to set the market price during periods of peak demand.</p><p>Other prices follow. Gas is needed to make fertilizers, steel, glass, and chemicals, and companies pass higher input costs on to consumers. Research published by VoxEU <a href="https://cepr.org/voxeu/columns/different-effects-oil-and-gas-supply-shocks-euro-area-inflation">shows</a> that gas shocks push core inflation higher and keep it elevated longer than oil shocks, especially when inflation is already high, even if the effect can take more than a year to work its way through to service prices.</p><p>How quickly wholesale prices reach household bills depends on the country. In September the ECB <a href="https://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/economic-bulletin/focus/2026/html/ecb.ebbox202606_04~5f026ee8e2.en.html">surveyed</a> national central banks, finding that in countries accounting for more than half of eurozone energy consumption, higher wholesale gas prices now reach consumers within one to three months, while in countries accounting for about one-third of consumption, the delay is six months to a year.</p><p>Bills rise fastest in the Netherlands, where energy prices to consumers adjust almost immediately. In France, Italy, and Spain, Oxford Economics estimates that consumer gas prices will <a href="https://www.euronews.com/2026/08/26/europes-gas-prices-are-surging-who-will-be-the-first-to-pay-more">rise</a> within several months. Germany and Austria rely more heavily on fixed-price contracts lasting 12 to 24 months, meaning the peak impact there will arrive roughly a year later.</p><figure><img src="https://theins.press/storage/content_image/original/6b0/6b00427628d246.53057192/fdNO0rN0EF5HVte2E5tbqSlK3AF96eoa1iFc66A0.png" alt=""/></figure><p>The ECB has already responded, raising interest rates in <a href="https://www.bde.es/wbe/en/noticias-eventos/actualidad-bce/decisiones-politica-monetaria/bce-tipos-junio26.html">June</a> and <a href="https://www.bde.es/wbe/es/noticias-eventos/actualidad-bce/decisiones-politica-monetaria/el-bce-sube-los-tipos-25-puntos-basicos-en-septiembre-2026.html">September</a> — the first increases since 2023 — bringing the deposit rate to 2.5%. For households, that also means more expensive mortgages and loans. On Oct. 29, the central bank <a href="https://www.ajbell.co.uk/news/articles/ecb-holds-rates-energy-shock-threatens-inflation-and-growth">held</a> rates steady but warned that higher energy costs threatened to accelerate inflation and slow economic growth.</p><p>The ECB’s September forecast <a href="https://www.ecb.europa.eu//press/key/date/2026/html/ecb.sp260924~e0eceef02c.en.pdf">projects</a> inflation of 3% for 2026 as a whole and 2.5% in 2027, the consequence of a projection that energy prices for the fourth quarter of 2026 will be almost 15% higher than those seen in 2025. However, the forecast was based on prices in mid-August, when December TTF futures traded at around €63. Since then, gas prices have risen by roughly another 50%.</p><p>Wood Mackenzie <a href="https://www.woodmac.com/press-releases/wood-mackenzie-european-gas-storage-at-risk-of-being-below-70-ahead-of-winter-202627/">estimates</a> that the LNG market may not return to balance until 2028. Although inflation remains well below the level seen in 2022, when it exceeded 10%, forecasts suggest Europe is heading into another expensive winter, and inflation is likely to remain above the ECB’s 2% target through at least 2027.</p><p>Overall, three factors beyond the control of European bureaucrats will determine the severity of the price rise: the weather, the situation in the Strait of Hormuz, and the volume of U.S. LNG diverted to Asia. Under ENTSOG’s base-case scenario, current reserves should be just enough to get the continent through a normal winter. In the event of another cold weather, however, IEEFA estimates that the EU would have to cut consumption by about 7%. </p><aside class="related-posts"><ul><li><a href="https://theins.press/en/news/299177">Hungary to give up Russian gas by fall 2027 after years of Orbán government’s reliance on Moscow, foreign minister says</a></li><li><a href="https://theins.press/en/news/297921">Russia’s oil and gas revenues fall 17% in 2026 despite doubling of Urals crude prices</a></li><li><a href="https://theins.press/en/news/296464">Russia expands its LNG carrier fleet for gas shipments to China ahead of planned EU ban</a></li><li><a href="https://theins.press/en/news/293601">Sales to China have not made up for Russia’s loss of European natural gas and coal markets, GreenThinkTank analysts report</a></li><li><a href="https://theins.press/en/news/296475">Europe risks entering winter with half-empty storage facilities as Qatari LNG exports plunge 96% amid U.S. war with Iran</a></li></ul></aside>]]></content:encoded>
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      <title><![CDATA[Ukraine had technical plan to strike Kerch Bridge by summer 2025 but lacked precision weapons, source tells The Insider]]></title>
      <link>https://theins.press/en/news/299804</link>
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      <dc:creator><![CDATA[The Insider]]></dc:creator>
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      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Ukraine’s military leadership had the technical information needed to successfully strike the Kerch Strait Bridge as early as summer 2025, an informed source told <i>The Insider</i>, but the operation had to be postponed due to a lack of necessary strike capabilities. As the source explained:</p><blockquote><p>“The idea was to weaken the ties and cable-supported section of the arch and then give nature some time to do its work — the waves and the wind — before slightly lifting the structure with a blast wave. Let the laws of physics do the heavy lifting.</p><p>To do that, it was necessary to hit specific small points where force could be applied most effectively, and to do so in a particular sequence. What was missing were ultra-precision strike capabilities — a communications link, a stable video feed, telemetry, and control — as well as sufficient operator experience. It is extremely difficult to hit a target the size of a washing machine with a missile weighing hundreds of kilograms and traveling at 400 to 800 kilometers per hour, especially while air defenses and electronic warfare systems are operating and amid <a href="https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/21792">Starshield outages</a>.”</p></blockquote><h3 class="outline-heading">Weak points</h3><p><i>The Insider</i> reviewed an analytical briefing outlining the results of an examination of the bridge’s technical documentation, along with photographs. Among the structure’s most vulnerable elements, the report identified the steel suspension cables supporting the main span of the road bridge.</p><p>The briefing examined several possible ways to disable the bridge.</p><ul><li>A cyberattack on the bridge’s lighting control systems while large Russian vessels were passing underneath. The idea was that, in darkness, the vessels could crash into the bridge supports and damage them. The report also proposed hacking the automated traffic-management system to create traffic jams and crashes on the bridge that could damage structural elements. The authors described this as the easiest option to carry out but noted that it would not necessarily cause serious damage.</li><li>Destroying the bridge’s power infrastructure. This option was also considered relatively simple but not particularly effective.</li><li>A missile strike using precision weapons in sufficient numbers to hit several key points on the bridge simultaneously. The targets identified were the support areas, the key upper joint of the arch, and the tie members of the bridge span.</li><li>An attack using unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs).</li><li>An attack using unmanned surface or underwater vessels.</li><li>Detonating a vehicle on the bridge, as was previously <a href="https://theins.press/en/news/287216">done</a> in October 2022.</li></ul><div>https://t.me/theinsru/4307</div><h3 class="outline-heading">Nature of the damage and consequences</h3><p>At <i>The Insider</i>’s request, <strong>Konstantinos Tsavdaridis, </strong>Professor and Chair of Structural Engineering at City St George’s, University of London, reviewed publicly available information about the attacks on the bridge and provided an expert assessment of the damage:</p><blockquote><p>“The failure appears to have happened in two stages. After the strike on Nov. 16, the road arch was visibly tilted sideways, which indicates that its bearings or lateral restraints had already been compromised. The second strike then brought it down. This sequence matters for everything that follows.</p><p>The navigation span is a tied arch: the arch and the deck balance each other's forces, so its collapse should not, in itself, pull down the adjacent approach spans. The vulnerable points are the two transition piers where the span sat, together with their bearings and expansion joints. The road and railway are separate structures. The railway is not affected through shared load, but it was exposed to the same attacks.</p><p>[The piers] is where I would be most cautious. The span stood tilted under its own weight for about a day, and then more than 5,000 tonnes slid or dropped off the pier tops. Damage to the pier heads and bearing seats should be the working assumption, and undamaged foundations should not be assumed. Debris lying against the pier bases also increases the risk of scour. Only a survey of pier position and inclination, together with an underwater inspection, can show whether the piers can be reused, need local repair, or need substantial reconstruction.</p><p>A complete new arch should be assumed. Steelwork that has twisted, fallen, and been submerged in seawater cannot realistically be certified for reuse (if undamaged, it could potentially be reused). Building a replacement is technically feasible. The original was assembled on shore in 2017, floated out on pontoons, and lifted into place. The difference now is security: a float-in operation of a structure this size takes days and would be highly exposed to attack.</p><p>Under normal conditions, a permanent replacement of the road span would in my view take on the order of 12 to 24 months, depending above all on the condition of the piers. Under the present threat conditions, I would not put an upper limit on it. A temporary low-level crossing could restore road traffic sooner, but it would block the navigation channel, so restoring the road and restoring shipping are competing objectives. A restricted passage could be opened once a corridor has been cut through the wreckage, well before all the steel is removed.</p><p>Permanent restoration of the road span is a matter of many months at the very least, and under current conditions it is not possible to put a credible date on it.”</p></blockquote><p>Russia’s Transport Ministry <a href="https://t.me/Mintrans_Russia/12102">said</a> on Nov. 17 that rail traffic across the Kerch Bridge had resumed on one track, while repair work continued on the second. Professor <strong>Tsavdaridis </strong>said that this indicated the railway section of the bridge had also been damaged and was “in restricted operation”:</p><blockquote><p>“A damaged structure can be operated safely with restrictions. The longer-term concern is the fatigue performance of any damaged hangers or connections under repeated heavy freight loading. I would describe the rail bridge as standing and in restricted operation, not as intact.”</p></blockquote><p><strong>Tsavdaridis</strong> stressed: “Most of the figures now circulating about the Crimean Bridge come from Telegram channels and OSINT reconstructions, not from inspection. Until the structure has been surveyed, any firm statement about reuse, repair time, or reopening dates is speculation, whoever makes it.”</p><p>Retired general and military analyst <strong>Mick Ryan</strong> told <i>The Insider</i> that the damage to the Kerch Bridge would complicate Russian military logistics:</p><blockquote><p>“It cuts road traffic to Crimea, although there are alternatives through southern Ukraine. But these have been subject to interdiction by Ukraine's mid-range strike campaign in recent months, as have Russian ferries and landing ships. So Russia has no land supply route to Crimea not able to be held at risk by Ukraine.</p><p>Dropping the road span into the waterway below will also restrict shipping into and out of the Sea of Azov, impacting Russian exports.”</p></blockquote><h3 class="outline-heading">Three attacks</h3><p>The bridge, which connects Russia’s Taman Peninsula in the Krasnodar Region with the Kerch Peninsula in Russian-occupied Crimea, was <a href="https://theins.press/en/news/299708">partially destroyed</a> after two attacks on Nov. 16 and 17.</p><p>On Nov. 17, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky <a href="https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/21848">said</a> several types of drones had been used in the operation, with Neptune and Flamingo missiles and Ruta missile-drones carrying out the final strike. The missiles struck the road deck, while the drones targeted the railway tracks.</p><p>“This is the result of the seventh stage of an operation that has been underway for several weeks, and which was developed and coordinated by the Security Service together with the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. Our soldiers systematically destroyed air defense systems, radars, electronic warfare equipment, and other designated targets along the way to the final objective,” Zelensky said.</p><p>Overnight into Nov. 19, Ukraine <a href="https://theins.press/en/news/299803">attacked</a> the Crimean Bridge again for the third time in a week. Russia’s Transport Ministry <a href="https://t.me/Mintrans_Russia/12187">said</a> rail traffic across the bridge had been halted following the strikes.</p><aside class="related-posts"><ul><li><a href="https://theins.press/en/news/299803">Ukraine attacks Kerch Strait Bridge for third time in a week, damage appears limited</a></li><li><a href="https://theins.press/en/news/299754">Founder of Russia’s first private space company says his European startup’s missiles helped collapse Kerch Bridge span</a></li><li><a href="https://theins.press/en/news/299708">Kerch Bridge linking mainland Russia with occupied Crimea partially collapses after second Ukrainian attack in two days</a></li></ul></aside>]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Thu, 19 Nov 2026 17:25:46 +0000</pubDate>
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      <title><![CDATA[Ukraine attacks Kerch Strait Bridge for third time in a week, damage appears limited]]></title>
      <link>https://theins.press/en/news/299803</link>
      <guid>https://theins.press/en/news/299803</guid>
      <dc:creator><![CDATA[The Insider]]></dc:creator>
      <enclosure url="https://theins.press/storage/post_cover/display/299/299803/NtgtNsfUC7x701GxlgzD4Fe14CwEDc3kaPVs8x0k.jpg" length="0" type="image/jpeg"/>
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      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Last night, Ukrainian forces struck the Kerch Strait Bridge for the third time in a week. However, unlike the previous strike on Nov. 17, the latest attack did not cause significant damage.</p><p>The strikes on the bridge, which links the Russian-occupied Crimean peninsula to Russia’s Krasnodar Region, were reported by the Telegram channels <a href="https://t.me/exilenova_plus/34886">Exilenova+</a> and <a href="https://t.me/Crimeanwind/113021">Krymsky Veter</a> (Crimean Wind). The attack was also confirmed by the peninsula’s <a href="https://t.me/Aksenov82/10192">Russian-installed authorities</a> and by Russia’s <a href="https://t.me/Mintrans_Russia/12187">Transport Ministry</a>.</p><p>The railway section of the bridge was likely the target of the overnight strike, and train traffic was temporarily suspended following the attack.</p><p>The General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine also <a href="https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42945">confirmed</a> the attack on the Kerch Strait Bridge later in the day. Ukrainian officials said the railway tracks were damaged and that Neptune missiles were used in the strike.</p><div>https://t.me/exilenova_plus/34886</div><p>The extent of the damage remains unclear. Sergei Aksyonov, the Russian-installed head of occupied Crimea, said Russian specialists were assessing the damage. Crimean Wind, citing eyewitnesses, said the bridge was hit at least <a href="https://t.me/Crimeanwind/113016">twice</a>, but that there was <a href="https://t.me/Crimeanwind/113036">no significant damage</a>.</p><p>The Nov. 17 strike notably caused a span on the road section of the bridge to <a href="https://theins.press/en/news/299708">collapse</a> into the water below. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky <a href="https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/21848">said</a> Ukraine had spent several weeks preparing the operation. Russian Deputy Prime Minister Marat Khusnullin <a href="https://xn--90aivcdt6dxbc.xn--p1ai/articles/news/marat-khusnullin-neobkhodimo-operativno-otsenit-sroki-vosstanovleniya-krymskogo-mosta/">reported</a> to Vladimir Putin on preparations for repairs.</p><p>On Nov. 18, at least 10 vessels were spotted near the collapsed arch, including six tugboats, the suction dredger <i>Ivan Cheremisinov,</i> and the oil-spill response vessel <i>Lamor</i>, according to a <a href="https://verstka.media/na-mesto-obrusheniya-krymskogo-mosta-otpravili-zemlesos-i-sudno-dlya-likvidaczii-razlivov-nefti">report</a> by the independent Russian outlet <i>Verstka</i>. The road section of the bridge remains closed. Russia’s Transport Ministry has not said when vehicle traffic or commercial shipping through the area will resume.</p><p><i>The Insider</i> also <a href="https://theins.ru/news/299758">reviewed</a> data from the Starboard Maritime Intelligence vessel-monitoring service. Three vessels were shown on the map in the Kerch-Yenikale Canal area on the evening of Nov. 18: <i>Uporny</i>, <i>Portovik Novorossiyska,</i> and <i>Utrish</i>. The first two were among the vessels <i>Verstka</i> identified near the collapsed arch.</p><aside class="related-posts"><ul><li><a href="https://theins.press/en/news/299754">Founder of Russia’s first private space company says his European startup’s missiles helped collapse Kerch Bridge span</a></li><li><a href="https://theins.press/en/news/299708">Kerch Bridge linking mainland Russia with occupied Crimea partially collapses after second Ukrainian attack in two days</a></li></ul></aside>]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Thu, 19 Nov 2026 16:54:19 +0000</pubDate>
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      <title><![CDATA[EU bars residents of Russia from taking part in Erasmus+ exchanges and scholarships]]></title>
      <link>https://theins.press/en/news/299802</link>
      <guid>https://theins.press/en/news/299802</guid>
      <dc:creator><![CDATA[The Insider]]></dc:creator>
      <enclosure url="https://theins.press/storage/post_cover/display/299/299802/vbzuZVmDeibV9uDF8JlfWIqVlDKRcp5GT32TawkA.jpg" length="0" type="image/jpeg"/>
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      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>People living in Russia, as well as Russian organizations, have been barred from participating in the European Union’s Erasmus+ program, according to the official <a href="https://erasmus-plus.ec.europa.eu/sites/default/files/2026-11/programme-guide-erasmus-27_en.pdf#page=37">guide</a> for next year published by the European Commission.</p><p>The ban applies to all permanent residents of Russia, regardless of citizenship — they will be prohibited from participating in the program in any capacity.</p><p>Residents of Russia will also be ineligible for Erasmus Mundus Joint Masters (EMJM) scholarships, which are offered to graduate students pursuing master’s degrees.</p><p>It is unclear whether the new rules will affect scholarships and projects that have already been approved and awarded funding. The document does not specify how such cases will be handled.</p><p><span class="termin" data-description="PHA+RXJhc211cysgaXMgdGhlIEV1cm9wZWFuIFVuaW9u4oCZcyBwcm9ncmFtIHRoYXQgZnVuZHMgc3R1ZGVudCBleGNoYW5nZXMsIHN0dWR5IGFuZCB0cmFpbmluZyBhYnJvYWQsIGFuZCBjb29wZXJhdGlvbiBiZXR3ZWVuIGVkdWNhdGlvbmFsIGluc3RpdHV0aW9ucy48L3A+">Erasmus+</span>, which allows students to study abroad through exchange programs, has existed for around three decades. More than 13,000 students and academic researchers from Russia took part in the program between 2014 and 2021, according to a <a href="https://www.dw.com/ru/es-zakryl-dla-rossian-stipendii-erasmus-dla-obucenia-v-evrope/a-79986918">report</a> by <i>Deutsche Welle</i>.</p><p>In May 2022, Russia’s Education and Science Ministry <a href="https://www.rbc.ru/society/31/05/2022/629653af9a794761d5a829e6">recommended</a> that universities under its jurisdiction refrain from cooperating under Erasmus+ programs. Russian authorities also began putting pressure on organizations that helped students prepare applications and documents. In 2024, for example, Moscow-based UniPage, which <a href="https://theins.ru/news/277301">helped</a> applicants enroll at universities abroad, was charged for its alleged cooperation with an “undesirable organization” — a Russian legal designation that can expose individuals and organizations to administrative or criminal penalties for involvement with blacklisted foreign groups.</p><p>Until now, the Erasmus program’s rules had not explicitly barred participation by people living in Russia.</p><aside class="related-posts"><ul><li><a href="https://theins.press/en/news/292524">BBC reports first known death of Russian college student recruited into drone forces</a></li><li><a href="https://theins.press/en/news/291591">“Complete your military service working with Geran drones”: Alabuga Polytech in Russia’s Tatarstan launches recruiting campaign for students</a></li><li><a href="https://theins.press/en/news/290979">Russian government instructs universities to send 2% of students to the war in Ukraine</a></li><li><a href="https://theins.press/en/dispatch/290225">“Join the elite drone forces, and you’ll come home famous!”: Russian universities are luring students into paid military service</a></li><li><a href="https://theins.press/en/confession/279317">“Photos of Putin and Kadyrov were in the dean’s office, like icons”: Russian students expelled for their anti-war views share their stories</a></li><li><a href="https://theins.press/en/news/270580">Russia has unofficial blacklist of “undesirable organizations” barring students from U.S. exchange programs</a></li></ul></aside>]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Thu, 19 Nov 2026 16:44:19 +0000</pubDate>
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      <title><![CDATA[Russian national arrested in California over surveillance of Palantir employees in Palo Alto]]></title>
      <link>https://theins.press/en/news/299794</link>
      <guid>https://theins.press/en/news/299794</guid>
      <dc:creator><![CDATA[The Insider]]></dc:creator>
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      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Russian national Igor Diu has been arrested in California on suspicion of spying on employees of a technology company, the U.S. Justice Department <a href="https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/russian-national-indicted-acting-foreign-agent-russia-target-silicon-valley-technology-and">announced</a> on Nov. 18. According to the <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cq20xg80ly47o"><i>BBC</i></a>, the surveillance targeted employees of Palantir Technologies, a U.S. data analytics firm that has cooperated extensively with Ukraine.</p><p>Diu is charged with acting as an agent of a foreign government, interstate stalking, and fraud in connection with identification documents. Authorities said they found a falsified U.S. passport in Diu’s possession under the name “Hugo Landry Johns.” He was arrested in October and has remained in custody since his first court appearance on Nov. 2. The Justice Department disclosed his arrest only on Nov. 18.</p><p>“The allegations in this case describe a state-sponsored operation to target and harass employees of an American technology and defense company because of that company's assistance to Ukraine in its war with Russia,” said U.S. Attorney for the Northern District of California Craig Missakian. “We will not tolerate any efforts — by foreign governments or otherwise — to turn Silicon Valley into a base for foreign intelligence operations.”</p><p>The 25-year-old Diu previously used the surname Golodnyuk but changed it in September 2022, <i>The Insider</i> found.</p><figure><img src="https://theins.press/storage/content_image/original/6af/6aff195c305715.72827088/XDuEQuzVW9CW7ls8f8sAu891BAzyoZDZEcoPr7Hf.jpg" alt="Russian passports belonging to Igor Diu"/><figcaption>Russian passports belonging to Igor Diu</figcaption></figure><figure><img src="https://theins.press/storage/content_image/original/6af/6aff195c3b4f56.06207034/JXpWSTAwESi0RNXJvhJevD7qDAGL0Zr753gP9vuI.png" alt="Diu’s fake U.S. passport"/><figcaption>Diu’s fake U.S. passport</figcaption></figure><p>Diu is originally from Russia’s Kamchatka Peninsula. His employment history in Russia in recent years included jobs at fitness clubs, tattoo parlors, and in the transportation sector. His mother <a href="https://www.bbc.com/russian/articles/c84gnpwvr3q0o">told</a> the <i>BBC Russian Service </i>that he left Kamchatka about a year ago:</p><blockquote><p>“He said he was going away for work, as a security guard, and that everything was fine. He didn’t like talking about things much; he’s an adult. He wanted to travel, earn some money, and then come back to Kamchatka… He’s a good, hardworking guy — an athlete. He spent a lot of time on sports and trained as a lawyer. A very smart boy.”</p></blockquote><p>Diu’s mother learned about his arrest from the media.</p><figure><img src="https://theins.press/storage/content_image/display/6af/6aff19e2604b93.68019359/ucxCdsD0Xnbs7uUvO3Z9YfcuPbVFvXg1UoJNGzik.jpg" alt="Igor Diu"/><figcaption>Igor Diu</figcaption></figure><p>According to investigators, this summer Diu illegally entered the United States through Mexico “after being recruited by co-conspirators through the messaging platform Telegram to carry out clandestine assignments targeting employees of a large technology and defense company with an office in Palo Alto, California.” His recruiters told him he was working for the “Motherland” and directed him “to gather information about the company because it was supplying weapons used against Russia in Ukraine.”</p><p>Investigators say Diu was instructed to regularly visit a Palo Alto coffee shop frequented by Palantir’s employees. He was tasked with identifying them and photographing their laptops. His handlers appear to have planned to use Diu’s own laptop in an attempt to gain remote access to the Palantir employees’ computers.</p><figure><img src="https://theins.press/storage/content_image/original/6af/6aff19f5629f03.34334506/ybk36v6RQUNOTpyXfOnvihVofZvyfSJdXwPB3M0G.png" alt="Photos D&#039;iu took of Palantir employees&#039; computers"/><figcaption>Photos D&#039;iu took of Palantir employees&#039; computers</figcaption></figure><p>In May 2026, Ukraine’s Defense Ministry <a href="https://t.me/zedigital/6794">said</a> Palantir technology was being used to support strikes deep inside Russia. That cooperation may have made the company a target of Russian intelligence services.</p><p>The case against Diu also includes allegations of stalking. In one instance, investigators say he followed a female employee’s car for about 30 miles as she drove toward San Francisco. He stopped following her only after she called 911 and drove toward a police station.</p><p>During an October search, police seized documents, electronic devices, and around $18,000 in cash from Diu. Authorities also found a notebook containing 10 handwritten addresses, some of which corresponded to the homes of Palantir employees, as well as detailed profiles of at least three employees. The files contained personal information, names of family members, education and employment histories, and assessments of the employees’ strengths and weaknesses.</p><aside class="related-posts"><ul><li><a href="https://theins.press/en/news/299059">Poland arrests Russian trainspotter on charges of espionage, family says railway photography is his longtime hobby</a></li><li><a href="https://theins.press/en/news/299416">Two Ukrainians who photographed critical infrastructure facilities in Poland detained on suspicion of spying for Russia</a></li></ul></aside>]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Thu, 19 Nov 2026 15:50:05 +0000</pubDate>
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      <title><![CDATA[Leaders of Russia, China, and U.S. adopt “peace declaration” calling for UN reform and warning the ICC not to “abuse” its powers]]></title>
      <link>https://theins.press/en/news/299787</link>
      <guid>https://theins.press/en/news/299787</guid>
      <dc:creator><![CDATA[The Insider]]></dc:creator>
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      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Following the meeting of Vladimir Putin, Donald Trump, and Xi Jinping on the sidelines of the APEC summit earlier today in Shenzhen, China, the parties issued a joint declaration. The Kremlin <a href="http://en.kremlin.ru/supplement/6618">published</a> the full document.</p><p>The text of the joint declaration covers several topics:</p><ul><li><strong>Reform of the United Nations</strong>, so that the organization “can respond more effectively to global challenges and conform to its fundamental mission of international peace and security.” Russia, China, and the U.S. expressed commitment to these reforms.</li><li><strong>The production and supply of refined petroleum products</strong> “for the benefit of all nations”</li><li><strong>The powers of the International Criminal Court</strong> (ICC), with the signatories stating that immunity of state officials is “of paramount importance,” and that the ICC and similar bodies “must not abuse their jurisdiction.”</li><li><strong>Nuclear weapons</strong>, with the <a href="https://english.www.gov.cn/news/202611/19/content_WS6afeda1ac6d00ca5f9a0e790.html">document</a> reading that: “The three heads of state reaffirmed that a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought. The three countries will conduct a dialogue on reducing nuclear risks and preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons.”</li></ul><p>Notably, the <i>Financial Times</i> <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/5621d364-c767-4b40-a090-054042d1c49b?syn-25a6b1a6=1">reports</a> that Donald Trump wanted to discuss nuclear arms control, but realized this is a “difficult topic” for China. The trilateral talks <a href="https://t.me/RIAKremlinpool/21118">continued</a> for around an hour and a half. Putin, Xi, and Trump did not make statements to the press after the meeting.</p><aside class="related-posts"><ul><li><a href="https://theins.press/en/politics/296266">The dragon spreads its wings: China is balancing between rival powers to expand its influence</a></li><li><a href="https://theins.press/en/inv/294635">Shooting Starlink: The “no limits” partnership between Russia and China is taking aim at Elon Musk</a></li></ul></aside>]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Thu, 19 Nov 2026 14:40:27 +0000</pubDate>
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      <title><![CDATA[“No one is particularly angry at Ukraine”: Employees at Wildberries, Ozon, and Yandex speak out about drone attacks]]></title>
      <link>https://theins.press/en/confession/299734</link>
      <guid>https://theins.press/en/confession/299734</guid>
      <dc:creator><![CDATA[Valentina Matrenina]]></dc:creator>
      <enclosure url="https://theins.press/storage/post_cover/display/299/299734/44n4ywgb6LMxssM7VyGhPf60Vt3lscny8zlFJDyJ.jpg" length="0" type="image/jpeg"/>
      <description><![CDATA[<p>After a brief pause, Ukraine has resumed its strikes on marketplace warehouses. The latest attacks in early November hit a Wildberries facility in Ryazan and an Ozon warehouse in Adygea. The attacks directly affect the operations of major companies: IT systems fail, logistics become more difficult, and costs rise. Employees of three Russian companies that have been frequent targets told <i>The Insider</i> how safety and evacuation procedures have been revised, and why logistics are shifting toward smaller hubs. At the same time, businesses are being forced to cut staff and abandon investment and future plans, and workers themselves do not expect things to improve any time soon.</p>]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3 class="outline-heading">“In my view, Wildberries is probably not a legitimate target. But I understand why it is being done”</h3><p style="margin-left:0pt;"><i><strong>Sergey, Wildberries management employee, Moscow</strong></i></p><p style="margin-left:0pt;">Wildberries is such a large company that things cannot be completely bleak across the board. Operationally, delivery has of course become more difficult. In some places a little, in others much more. It depends a lot on the region. Overall, though, logistics are now being reorganized around smaller warehouses instead of large ones.</p><p style="margin-left:0pt;">There is no catastrophe so far. Logistics are inherently flexible, because the company has a large fleet of its own vehicles to handle deliveries. But clearly, delivery costs will rise, as will the final price for consumers and sellers.</p><p style="margin-left:0pt;">Warehouses in Kazakhstan and Belarus may help in some ways. But building those facilities usually takes two or three years, and there is no capacity for that right now. Intermediate supply points have to be created. The idea is that a truck carries goods from one warehouse to another, where they are then distributed across the region in smaller shipments.</p><p style="margin-left:0pt;">That model made it possible to save a great deal on logistics. Now that Moscow and St. Petersburg, the two biggest hubs, have been knocked out, delivery costs will rise by one and a half to two times.</p><figure><img src="https://theins.press/storage/content_image/display/6af/6afda25c065ac2.83233917/tpvb8B0K44c6tSbsOXRWLpEn8jMbkYzae5UWtpKs.jpg" alt="Aftermath of the attack on the Wildberries warehouse in Shushary, Leningrad Region"/><figcaption>Aftermath of the attack on the Wildberries warehouse in Shushary, Leningrad Region</figcaption></figure><p style="margin-left:0pt;">The investment program is being restricted because the flow of investment has now been halted. That means the company is not buying new businesses, and every capital expenditure is being reassessed three times over. On top of that, the company still does not know how much it owes, or to whom, or what to do next. The attacks are continuing.</p><p style="margin-left:0pt;">Hiring has been frozen for many positions while the company takes stock of its finances. People in the IT department panicked a little and started quitting. But the market is very tough right now, so it is extremely difficult for IT workers in Russian businesses to move from one job to another.</p><p style="margin-left:0pt;">People are not panicking in general. The mood is more like, 'maybe things will go to hell, maybe they will not.' Either way, it is easier to stay while the company is still paying a salary. Employees understand that anything could happen and that they may have to look for a new job.</p><p style="margin-left:0pt;">We used to have a lot of people joining and not many leaving. The company is consistently among the market leaders both in pay and in the number of people it hires. Some bonus programs, salaries, and other benefits will probably be reviewed this year.</p><p style="margin-left:0pt;">The biggest question is what the lenders, VTB among them, will do, and what the government will do. But given the roles of <span class="termin" data-description="PHA+VGF0eWFuYSBLaW0gKEJha2FsY2h1ayBpcyBoZXIgZm9ybWVyIGh1c2JhbmTigJlzIHN1cm5hbWUpIGlzIFdpbGRiZXJyaWVz4oCZIGZvdW5kZXIgYW5kIENFTy48L3A+">Bakalchuk</span> and <span class="termin" data-description="PHA+QWNjb3JkaW5nIHRvIGludmVzdGlnYXRpdmUgcmVwb3J0aW5nLCBiaWxsaW9uYWlyZSBTdWxlaW1hbiBLZXJpbW92IHdhcyBpbnZvbHZlZCBmcm9tIHRoZSBvdXRzZXQgaW4gZXN0YWJsaXNoaW5nIHRoZSBqb2ludCB2ZW50dXJlIExMQyBSV0IsIGZvcm1lZCBieSB0aGUgbWVyZ2VyIG9mIFdpbGRiZXJyaWVzIGFuZCB0aGUgUnVzcyBHcm91cC48L3A+">Kerimov</span>, it will probably all be financed out of some government coffers.</p><p style="margin-left:0pt;">Can Wildberries warehouses be considered legitimate targets for the Ukrainian Armed Forces? In the current war, I do not think that matters anymore. Look at how many unlawful targets Russia has hit, and at Ukraine’s bombardment of Belgorod and the like. The concept of a legitimate target has become far too blurred.</p><p style="margin-left:0pt;">In my view, Wildberries is probably not a legitimate target. But I understand why it is being done. I understand that this is one way to put pressure on the economy, and one way to hit consumers at the same time — so they feel the war and see it close to home — while also putting pressure on circles very close to the people at the top.</p><p style="margin-left:0pt;">The damage could amount to as much as 0.5% of GDP. That is not a huge sum by Russian standards, but it is still significant. It could add, say, one and a half to two percentage points to inflation in Russia.</p><p style="margin-left:0pt;">Does this have a serious impact? Probably not. Striking oil refineries and oil-loading points is much more effective than hitting Wildberries. Wildberries and Ozon can simply redistribute goods among fifty small warehouses instead of five large ones. There would be no end to the effort required to destroy all of them. Business itself is too flexible these days for this kind of pressure to work.</p><p style="margin-left:0pt;">The propaganda aim of the strikes probably works. The economic aim probably does not. The military aim? I would say it misses the mark almost 90 percent of the time. This is not a military target. Otherwise, you could bomb bakeries for supplying bread to soldiers.</p><p style="margin-left:0pt;">As for restrictions on military goods being sold on the platform, they will not stop being listed on the marketplace. Wildberries has struggled even to fight counterfeits, as everyone knows. It is a very complicated issue. As far as I know, the company was not planning to remove such goods from the platform entirely; they just made them less visible. They also downranked them in search results, so they would not appear at the top and would be found only by people who knew what to look for.</p><h3 class="outline-heading">“The strikes hit us hard”</h3><p style="margin-left:0pt;"><i><strong>Oleg, Yandex Lavka employee, Siberia</strong></i></p><p style="margin-left:0pt;">I joined Yandex fairly recently, after working at Leroy Merlin (now called Lemana PRO). I wanted to stay in warehouse work but change employers. Yandex Lavka made me a good offer.</p><p style="margin-left:0pt;">We have a regional distribution center that receives products and distributes them to the individual stores. A partner now handles the warehouse operations. Our job is oversight. I am not an IT specialist; I handle inventory and the movement of goods. I make sure our systems work well together and that everything is displayed correctly.</p><p style="margin-left:0pt;">Yandex itself is going through a period, I would say, of restructuring all its processes. Some things are being merged, others added, and unprofitable operations are being shut down. At Yandex Lavka specifically, next year’s priority is to move as many stores as possible to a franchise model to reduce staffing costs.</p><p style="margin-left:0pt;">The strikes hit us hard, though the first one was different — on the night of October 7–8, 2026, in the town of Sasovo in Ryazan Region, the data center was seriously damaged and shut down completely. After that first strike, things slowed down. But the second and third strikes — Kaluga on October 9 and Vladimir on October 11 — hit hard, and every system went down. We spent a day or two trying to restore them. We brought systems back according to their importance — the ones that generated the most revenue first. So customer apps were restored quickly, but the internal reporting systems we use are still down.</p><figure><img src="https://theins.press/storage/content_image/display/6af/6afda27b1cd691.76750810/EbWMEheWlyedihGidOXDG383pDCrIH6NJ9xxk5Ye.jpg" alt="Attack on a Yandex data center in Vladimir"/><figcaption>Attack on a Yandex data center in Vladimir</figcaption></figure><p style="margin-left:0pt;">Most of my work is done in 1C. 1C was not affected at all. Essentially, it can run on a computer, so we were affected the least.</p><p style="margin-left:0pt;">Obviously, some things are running more slowly or working worse. There are limits on sending files through the internal Yandex Mail. Our internal Yandex Disk has not been fully restored either. We cannot save anything. We can retrieve data, but we cannot add to it. So right now we are working more with Google Drive.</p><p style="margin-left:0pt;">Even before the strikes on the data centers, we were short on capacity. By one estimate, we were missing around 100 to 150 megawatts, I think, for development. Now another 310 megawatts have been knocked out. They say it will take six months to replace that capacity and restore everything fully, but I think this will be a two-year process at least. As I understand it, chip production is heavily backlogged. Everything the factories have yet to make has already been spoken for.</p><blockquote>They say it will take six months to restore capacity fully, but I think this will be a two-year process</blockquote><p style="margin-left:0pt;">When Ozon and Wildberries started being hit, we never discussed the possibility that Yandex might be next. Once, we did talk about distribution centers (DCs) — that concrete shelters might be installed at sites with large distribution centers and lots of our employees.</p><p style="margin-left:0pt;">We were more worried that the nearby DC might be hit, because our own center in Kotelniki is not far from an oil refinery. As Vladimir Vladimirovich [Putin] put it, we did not think they would do that. It was all so unexpected.</p><p style="margin-left:0pt;">[Ukrainian Unmanned Systems Forces commander Robert Brovdi] "Madyar" is a pretty capable guy from the standpoint of military strategy and everything else. He had a successful business career before joining the Ukrainian Armed Forces. So, in principle, this is a fairly sound decision.</p><p style="margin-left:0pt;">We all understand that the budget is made up of taxes. Wildberries, Ozon, and Yandex pay taxes in the millions. And that is not just the companies themselves, but also all the other companies attached to them. If I am not mistaken, the service sector accounts for 70% of the core budget here. So after the strikes, all the tax legislation and the entire tax base are being reconsidered.</p><p style="margin-left:0pt;">There was talk that after the Ukrainian strikes, the state might take over Yandex. But the company had already become state-controlled when the “special military operation” began and foreign assets had to be separated. They set up a management council, a board of directors — call it what you like. It includes two Yandex directors and the founders who stayed here, Kovalchuk and Kiriyenko. Those four people make the decisions and run Yandex. The state already owns 50 percent.</p><blockquote>The state already owns 50 percent of Yandex</blockquote><p style="margin-left:0pt;">What if Yandex, for instance, gives a billion rubles to the “special military operation”? My colleagues and I try not to have those conversations. I cannot say that we openly discuss the war. Our team is very diverse — there are millennials, Gen Z, and probably even Gen Alpha by now. No one is cheering that Kyiv is being demolished, and no one is cheering when something in Russia is being demolished. But it is undeniable that people are unhappy with what the country is becoming. That discontent is not hidden; it is discussed and spoken about.</p><p style="margin-left:0pt;">We really do love the country. Our families are here, our grandmothers, the graves of our relatives, the places we are from. But the question is who the country has fallen into the hands of and what is happening with the government. The criticism is very clear, even if people can only talk about the way they did in the Soviet past — around the kitchen table.</p><p style="margin-left:0pt;">It is hard to understand or predict what will happen next. Even in business, the planning horizon is six months at most. No one makes long-term plans or launches long-term projects, because nothing is clear at all. People understand that even if a peace agreement is signed next week, nothing good will come of it for us as Russian citizens.</p><blockquote>Even if a peace agreement is signed next week, nothing good will come of it for us as Russian citizens</blockquote><p style="margin-left:0pt;">Things will get worse. Yes, we are getting used to air-raid warnings. Ukrainians are getting used to living in a state of war, with constant bombardments and all the rest. People adapt. You are driving, you see a traffic police checkpoint, and you do not feel safe. They may stop you and check your license, or they may ask to see your phone. You could end up in prison for ten years just because you follow something online.</p><p style="margin-left:0pt;">Why do we not take to the streets? Maybe we simply do not see a way out of this situation. Politics in Russia has been completely destroyed. You understand there is no alternative, not even a temporary government that could do anything. The politicians who left for Europe have, in many ways, lost touch with reality. Sometimes you listen to them and it makes you cringe. I do not blame them though. Good for them for doing what they do, for speaking out, and so on.</p><p style="margin-left:0pt;">And it is terrifying to think about what will happen when the “special military operation” ends and people start coming back from there. I remember the Chechen war and all of the aftermath clearly — it was my childhood. It was frightening. You go to a disco, and guys who returned from Chechnya show up. They drink until, at some point, they snap, and then it starts.</p><p style="margin-left:0pt;">That is what lies ahead for us. Honestly, I am sick of living in a history textbook.</p><h3 class="outline-heading">“Business tries to remain neutral”</h3><p style="margin-left:0pt;"><i><strong>Dmitry, Ozon employee, St. Petersburg</strong></i></p><p style="margin-left:0pt;">I work at Ozon now. Before that, I worked at Wildberries, at a warehouse in St. Petersburg — until it burned down after the attacks. The work is roughly the same: moving boxes from one place to another. I work in cross-docking. We sort large boxes onto pallets, then send them to the area where forklifts load them onto trucks bound for different cities.</p><p style="margin-left:0pt;">Ozon, like Wildberries, has large warehouses, by the way. The work is organized a little differently, but overall it is largely the same.</p><p style="margin-left:0pt;">As for discipline, at Ozon you do not have to go through security in your underwear. There are no fines. At least, I have not received a single one while working here. At Wildberries, they fine you constantly. If you cannot find an item in the designated place while filling an order, they may fine you the full cost of it. I remember once racking up 12,000 rubles [almost $150 in fines in a single shift. At Ozon, as far as I know, the penalty for that kind of mistake is a fixed 40 rubles [around 50 cents].</p><figure><img src="https://theins.press/storage/content_image/original/6af/6afda2e141d753.89620368/WXphXK0KeQfLlaN5m6UCaXpquF3NjfElCUODHag6.jpg" alt=""/></figure><p style="margin-left:0pt;">Ozon, it seems to me, treats its employees more humanely. In general, everything there is more democratic. You can even wear your own clothes to work; you do not have to wear a uniform. There are some restrictions, of course — for example, hoodies are not allowed. I do not know why. Maybe it makes security checks easier, so guards do not have to check the hood at the back as well.</p><p style="margin-left:0pt;">Recently, posters appeared at Wildberries workplaces explaining what to do during a missile alert or a drone attack, and fire evacuation drills were held periodically.</p><blockquote>Posters appeared at Wildberries workplaces explaining what to do during a missile alert or a drone attack</blockquote><p style="margin-left:0pt;">At Ozon, alerts come straight to the handheld data terminal we use. If a missile alert is declared, employees are evacuated immediately. In the case of a drone threat, evacuation does not begin right away — it starts after an attack has already taken place. There is a certain escalation procedure. During a fire alarm, obviously, everyone is evacuated too. Drills are held periodically.</p><p style="margin-left:0pt;">I have been in situations like that already. Once there was a fire drill, and we all simply left the warehouse. The important thing is that downtime is compensated. So you still get a little bit of money for it.</p><p style="margin-left:0pt;">There was also a drone alert one time. I had already left the warehouse and was in the smoking area. We have protective bunkers there — concrete boxes, you have probably seen them in photos. A security guard came out and said, “Everyone, get into these bunkers; there is a threat.” We sat there for about twenty minutes. Then they announced, “Alert canceled, return to your workstations.”</p><p style="margin-left:0pt;">At first it was quite hard to think about all this. You keep wondering: 'should I go out or not?' Now everyone is used to it. People hardly discuss it at work or in the smoking area. There was a threat, we evacuated, sat around and smoked, then went back to work. What can you do? It has become part of life.</p><p style="margin-left:0pt;">One thing I did not like about what happened at Wildberries was that after two warehouses in St. Petersburg burned down, people wrote in the chats — and the news reported it too — that employees had to make their own way to the metro.</p><p style="margin-left:0pt;">You have to understand that during an evacuation, everyone leaves their personal belongings behind. Phones are prohibited in the warehouse, so you end up with no phone, no bank card, nothing at all. You cannot even pay for your own ride.</p><p style="margin-left:0pt;">Ozon has dealt with this issue. We have been told that employees will be taken away in the event of an evacuation. They will probably also work out how to get people home.</p><p style="margin-left:0pt;">In general, I think most employees understand what is going on with the war. No one is particularly angry at Ukraine. People take it as a fact of life.</p><p style="margin-left:0pt;">But you also have to understand the economic consequences of attacks like these. Picture a standard Khrushchev-era apartment block. Now picture ten or fifteen of them lined up in a row. That is roughly the size of an enormous building packed full of all kinds of goods. That is what a warehouse is.</p><p style="margin-left:0pt;">Behind all that are thousands of entrepreneurs and tens of thousands of warehouse workers. They may not all be working there at the same time, but that is how many people work with the facility. A lot of them are students who come to earn some extra money. Students probably make up as much as half of the workforce.</p><p style="margin-left:0pt;">When a warehouse is destroyed, all those people lose their income for a while. They have to adjust and look for another job. It is stressful either way. And seeing what is happening is stressful in itself.</p><p style="margin-left:0pt;">When drones attacked St. Petersburg on October 18, my wife and I were standing by the window watching. We could hear the drones and see the tracer rounds. It was unsettling, and we had no idea what to do.</p><p style="margin-left:0pt;">As for military goods, I have never seen anything military in the Wildberries or Ozon warehouses in St. Petersburg. The most I have come across is ordinary khaki clothing — pants, for instance. But that is a favorite style among men over fifty who are into hunting and fishing. They wear khaki all the time.</p><p style="margin-left:0pt;">Of course, if you wanted to, you could classify such things as dual-use goods, but you would really have to stretch the definition. Maybe warehouses in border regions do have dual-use goods; I cannot rule that out. But I have not come across anything like that in St. Petersburg, other than the same clothes or some backpacks. And those are ordinary hiking backpacks, only green.</p><p style="margin-left:0pt;">I have not seen public support for the war from Wildberries or Ozon either. The only thing I remember is that after the warehouse attacks, Tatyana Bakalchuk said they were terrorist attacks by Ukrainian forces.</p><p style="margin-left:0pt;">But I have not seen any public events, collections for the military, or anything like that at the warehouses themselves. People just come to work. I have not seen anything political, quasi-political, or even humanitarian at either Wildberries or Ozon. It seems to me that businesses do try to remain neutral.</p><p style="margin-left:0pt;">Will the strikes continue? We never thought all this would go on for so long. But the hostility keeps growing. It seems to me that for the first two years Ukraine tried to avoid any ambiguity in its attacks, even if mistakes happen everywhere — on both our side and the Ukrainian side. But now, it seems to me, those lines have been erased.</p><p style="margin-left:0pt;">Do the companies have a plan in case they are hit so hard that they end up on the brink of bankruptcy? I do not know. I am just an ordinary worker. I come in and move little boxes from one pallet to another. Maybe management has a plan.</p><p style="margin-left:0pt;">Despite everything that is happening, I am not afraid to go to work. Evacuations are carried out, and you know what you are supposed to do. Besides, I work close to an exit.</p>]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Thu, 19 Nov 2026 06:43:33 +0000</pubDate>
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      <title><![CDATA[Getting personal: Why sanctions have failed to split the Russian elite — and how to change that]]></title>
      <link>https://theins.press/en/opinion/vladislav-inozemtsev/299728</link>
      <guid>https://theins.press/en/opinion/vladislav-inozemtsev/299728</guid>
      <dc:creator><![CDATA[Vladislav  Inozemtsev]]></dc:creator>
      <enclosure url="https://theins.press/storage/post_cover/display/299/299728/AdvhJxnDbxznVZ2WaFw9d7IeJKDQosHLyWPiPXUP.jpg" length="0" type="image/jpeg"/>
      <description><![CDATA[<p>Following the European Union's lead, Switzerland has <a href="https://www.theins.org/news/299178">lifted sanctions</a> on Alisher Usmanov and Mikhail Fridman, even as their lists of nefarious Russian individuals and entities continues to grow. The announcement of new rounds of restrictions, however, should not be taken as a success in itself. After all, sanctions have not reduced the fortunes of Russian billionaires, triggered a split among the elite, or turned big business interests against the Kremlin, economist Vladislav Inozemtsev argues. But it is still not too late to implement the sorts of measures that might actually produce the desired effect.&nbsp;</p>]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p style="margin-left:0pt;">The recent <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/eu-renews-russia-sanctions-drops-russian-billionaires-usmanov-fridman-2026-09-22/">decision</a> by the EU Council to lift sanctions on Russian billionaires Alisher Usmanov and Mikhail Fridman, followed by a <a href="https://eutoday.net/switzerland-lifts-sanctions-usmanov-fridman-eu-deal/">similar move</a> from Swiss authorities, was one of the most controversial steps in the history of the European Union’s sanctions policy toward Russia. Many observers rushed to declare that the entire framework would begin to crumble. Fortunately, such catastrophizing seems premature to me —especially since, as a safeguard, sanctions against the other Russians on the list <a href="https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2026/09/22/ukraine-s-territorial-integrity-eu-extends-individual-listings-for-further-three-years/">were extended for three years</a>, while the 22nd package <a href="https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/eu-adopts-its-largest-ever-package-sanctions-listings-targeting-industry-behind-russias-war_en">added more than 800 people</a>, bringing the total to at least 4,000. <a href="https://www.castellum.ai/russia-sanctions-dashboard">Some sources put the number of Russians subject to various restrictions at more than 13,000</a> (although the <a href="https://eutoday.net/switzerland-lifts-sanctions-usmanov-fridman-eu-deal/">Swiss added “only” 115 new names</a> in its latest round).</p><p style="margin-left:0pt;">My position is well known: I do not consider this instrument effective, or even legitimate. In my view, it <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/23739770.2024.2374174">conflicts</a> in too many ways with fundamental principles of law. I will point to just three of its most obvious flaws, though there are many more.</p><p style="margin-left:0pt;">First, unlike a sound law, personal sanctions do not apply to an open-ended class of people who have committed a particular act. If Western governments intend to punish Russia’s political leadership for invading Ukraine, it would be logical, for example, to sanction all cabinet ministers or governors. Yet sanctions have never covered every senior member of the government, and <a href="https://sledstvie.info/news/3190-canktsionnyj_spisok_evrosojuza_protiv_rossijskih_gubernatorov_okazalsja_znachiteljno_skromnee_chem_u_velikobritanii_ili_">more than 50 of the country’s 89 regional leaders</a> remain unaffected (including six in Russian-occupied regions of Ukraine).</p><p style="margin-left:0pt;">If the aim is to target the financing of an aggressive regime, then “influential Russian businesspeople” should include, for example, all <a href="https://www.forbes.ru/milliardery/559579-155-milliarderov-rossii-rejting-forbes-2026">155 dollar billionaires holding Russian passports</a>. In reality, however, the sanctions lists have included <a href="https://forbes.ua/ru/richest/sanktsii-proti-rosii-bezsili-i-tse-dovodit-shchorichniy-reyting-forbes-37-z-55-pidsanktsiynikh-rosiyskikh-oligarkhiv-za-minuliy-rik-rozbagatili-vnaslidok-viyni-v-ukraini-08042024-20393">between 55 and 65 of them</a> at different times. </p><p style="margin-left:0pt;">If the goal is to designate the Russian army or security services as criminal organizations, then the sanctions have failed here as well, as only a couple hundred out of Russia's 1,400 to 1,800 generals have been designated. This alone suggests that, unlike sectoral sanctions, personal sanctions are an exercise in arbitrary selection and political maneuvering.</p><p style="margin-left:0pt;">Second, the purpose of such sanctions remains unclear. Laws are generally meant to deter people from criminal acts by threatening punishment. If sanctions policy followed the same logic, Western governments would have to specify which acts would trigger restrictions. Had a warning circulated on the morning of February 24, 2022, that any businessperson who met with Vladimir Putin would automatically be put on the list, far fewer people would have attended <a href="http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/67846">the president’s meeting with the leadership of the Russian Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs</a> that afternoon.</p><p style="margin-left:0pt;">In any case, between February 28 and April 8, 2022, every participant in that meeting was sanctioned, <a href="https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=OJ:L:2022:110:FULL">the stated reason</a> being that the person “attended a meeting of oligarchs at the Kremlin with President Vladimir Putin on February 24, 2022.” In other words, personal sanctions have been imposed for actions that were not considered criminal when they took place. By applying the punishments retroactively, they lose their deterrent effect.</p><blockquote>Personal sanctions are imposed for actions that were not considered criminal when they took place</blockquote><p style="margin-left:0pt;">Third, sanctions seriously undermine the foundations of Western rule of law by imposing various restrictions (including on property and citizenship rights) without due process. I have <a href="https://ru.themoscowtimes.com/2025/09/17/o-sanktsiyah-vizovih-ogranicheniyah-i-pravah-cheloveka-a174649">often said</a> that EU and U.S. authorities <a href="https://www.lexpress.fr/monde/europe/quiconque-a-servi-dans-larmee-russe-apres-2022-doit-etre-interdit-dentree-en-europe-par-vladislav-FSDZWMHDDJEIHAVD2GW5MRRUUE/">have every right</a> to bar any category of person from any country from receiving visas. But <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/cyprus-revoke-passports-four-sanctioned-russians-sources-2022-04-07/">revoking</a> passports or residence permits that have already been issued is quite another matter.</p><p style="margin-left:0pt;">To be clear, it is entirely fair to require businesspeople to sell their assets and move “dirty” money out of “clean” jurisdictions. Freezing those assets, however, is questionable, as it shifts the state’s blame onto its subjects. </p><p style="margin-left:0pt;">Finally, sanctions policy devalues the role of courts. Decisions to impose sanctions are often based on secret information that cannot be disclosed, and when <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/eu-court-takes-russian-billionaires-fridman-avan-off-sanctions-list-2024-04-10/">a challenge does succeed in court</a>, sanctions are sometimes <a href="https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex%3A32023R0571">reimposed in a new decision</a> on the same grounds. I would go so far as to say that sanctions against private individuals directly contradict the classical concepts of rule-of-law, Western countries have yet to recognize both this reality and its consequences.</p><p style="margin-left:0pt;">Still, given that sanctions are a purely political instrument, the more useful question is what political goals they are meant to achieve and how effectively they reach their intended aims.</p><p style="margin-left:0pt;">Let me be blunt: personal sanctions, like sanctions more broadly, are in many ways an apology by Western politicians for providing Ukraine with too little military aid. They are meant to create the appearance of an active effort to defend Ukraine’s interests in the absence of sufficient actual action. Consider the sweeping sanctions on Russia’s oil and gas industry: in 2026, they <a href="https://ru.themoscowtimes.com/2026/11/04/za-nas-za-vas-i-za-gaz-a210443">reduced</a> the sector’s export revenue by 10 percent, or $23–24 billion, compared with 2021. Yet in the EU alone, at least €800 billion <a href="https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/europes-spend-energy-crisis-nears-800-billion-euros-2023-02-13/">had to be set aside</a> in 2022 to offset the resulting losses.</p><blockquote>Sanctions embody Western politicians’ apology for providing Ukraine with too little military aid</blockquote><p style="margin-left:0pt;">Personal sanctions are even harder to explain in this context. They have not reduced the fortunes of Russian billionaires, which rose from <a href="https://www.forbes.ru/milliardery/509414-cislo-rossijskih-milliarderov-vyroslo-do-rekordnyh-125-celovek">$606.2 billion</a> in 2021 to <a href="https://www.forbes.ru/milliardery/559579-155-milliarderov-rossii-rejting-forbes-2026">$696.5 billion</a> in 2026. They have not prompted capital to flee Russia (on the contrary, many major businesspeople rushed to bring money back). Nor have they split the elite. Apart from a few Russian tech entrepreneurs, no one left the country, gave up their citizenship, or condemned the war against Ukraine.</p><p style="margin-left:0pt;">The reason, in my view, is clear, and it ultimately comes down once again to the lawless nature of sanctions. Ordinary law allows for a reduced or canceled sentence if someone abandons a crime before completing it, and for a criminal record to be expunged after a sentence has been served or damages have been repaid. Sanctions practice offers nothing comparable. That is precisely why personal sanctions have alienated the most pro-Western social group in Russia, and it has done so with no tangible benefit to the West: no signs of domestic discontent with Putin’s regime are visible even as the disastrous invasion of Ukraine approaches its fifth anniversary.</p><blockquote>Personal sanctions alienated the most pro-Western social group in Russia from “Western values”</blockquote><p style="margin-left:0pt;">Can personal sanctions limit the Kremlin’s resources, persuade big business to distance itself from the Kremlin, or secure future compensation for Ukraine? In my view, the likelihood of achieving any of these aims is close to zero.</p><p style="margin-left:0pt;">The West’s practice of immobilizing Russian businesspeople’s assets prompted a sweeping response from the Kremlin. First, it began to pressure Western companies that had condemned the war and tried to leave the Russian market, effectively <a href="https://kyivindependent.com/reuters-losses-of-foreign-firms-who-exited-russia-surpass-107-billion/">confiscating</a> tens of billions of dollars’ worth of their property. Then, just as Western governments had done with Russian assets, the Kremlin began <a href="https://ru.themoscowtimes.com/2024/12/02/factbox-kakie-aktivy-rf-zabrala-vo-vremennoe-upravlenievyvela-iz-pod-nego-a149364">placing Western companies under “temporary administration.”</a> A total of 29 companies, <a href="https://www.tks.ru/reviews/2026/09/29/0001/metro-stala-28-j-inostrannoj-kompaniej-chi-aktivyi-peredali-vo-vremennoe-upravlenie/">valued at no less than 2 trillion rubles</a> ($24.3 billion), have already faced this measure.</p><p style="margin-left:0pt;">It is hard for me to see how these outcomes can be described as “limiting the Kremlin’s resources.” If anything, they have increased the wealth of Vladimir Putin’s inner circle, brought additional revenue into the state budget, and effectively expanded the space for lawlessness by giving it a pretext: it can now be presented not as violations of the law but as a “mirror response” to the actions of Western governments.</p><p style="margin-left:0pt;">Likewise, sanctions have not led businesspeople to distance themselves from the Kremlin. In 2023, Vladimir Putin <a href="https://www.dw.com/ru/vznos-na-vojnu-putin-vvel-nalog-na-sverhpribyl/a-66446485">asked</a> some big businesses to hand over 10 percent of their “extraordinary” profits to the state, a "request" that was unquestionably more attractive than having those same assets completely frozen in Western jurisdictions.</p><p style="margin-left:0pt;">It is also important to remember that, despite major efforts to move money abroad and legitimize it, virtually none of Russia’s billionaires has <a href="https://www.forbes.ru/milliardery-photogallery/343801-im-ne-strashna-nacionalizaciya-10-milliarderov-s-naibolshimi">shifted the center of gravity of their business empires</a> outside the country (tech companies excepted). The only way to achieve the desired “distancing,” then, might have been to fully legalize assets moved abroad and encourage capital to leave — but such a policy runs directly counter to the ideology behind sanctions, and it only could have worked if it had been implemented in the first months of the war. By now, big business has restructured around the new reality and Russian businesspeople have lost trust in the West and its institutions.</p><p style="margin-left:0pt;">Finally, neither support for Ukraine nor compensation for it can serve as a goal capable of mobilizing Russia’s business community. On the one hand, Kyiv has <a href="https://www.gazeta.ru/politics/news/2026/04/23/28330339.shtml">initiated</a> and lobbied for many sanctions decisions against Russian businesspeople — decisions that have sometimes led to the outright <a href="https://www.rbc.ru/business/08/06/2022/62a091e29a794703cb864bec">theft</a> of their assets in Ukraine. As a result, in the eyes of Russian business, helping Ukraine, which might have seemed reasonable in the early stages of the war, now looks wholly irrational.</p><p style="margin-left:0pt;">On the other hand, with the exception of a few individuals who either serve as “Putin’s wallets” or combine corporate positions with government roles, Russia’s business community bears no responsibility for the war and has no reason to pay compensation to Ukraine. Even after Nazi Germany’s defeat, only a small number of businesspeople were <a href="https://www.bostonreview.net/articles/erica-x-eisen-nuremberg/">convicted</a> by occupation courts, mostly for producing military goods and means of killing people in concentration camps, or for using the labor of civilians from occupied countries and territories who had been forcibly deported to the Reich.</p><p style="margin-left:0pt;">What can be done about personal sanctions at this point in Putin’s war against Ukraine? In the abstract, I see two possible approaches.</p><p style="margin-left:0pt;">The first is the most obvious and conventional, though it is also controversial. Western governments could, for example, announce that they are prepared to lift sanctions on people who condemn the war, declare that they are ending their cooperation with Vladimir Putin’s regime, and are willing to donate some of their wealth to support Ukraine. This sounds appealing, but I see no way to put it into practice.</p><p style="margin-left:0pt;">On the one hand, all of this can be done only from outside Russia, most likely in countries Russia deems “unfriendly” and are thus difficult for sanctioned individuals to enter. They would also need either to hold substantial funds in the jurisdictions that imposed the sanctions and be confident that those funds would be unfrozen (which is far from certain), or else move significant assets to third countries (which would arouse the Kremlin’s suspicions, an extremely dangerous course for anyone resident in Russia).</p><p style="margin-left:0pt;">On the other hand, such an offer is legally questionable. If these people break with the regime, they will immediately be added to Moscow's lists of extremists, denied consular services, and stripped of their civil rights. That would raise the question of how they could secure legal status in their hypothetical new countries of residence. Moreover, thousands of Russians have already condemned the war, fled Russia, and even provided material support to Ukraine, yet they have not been warmly welcomed in Western countries. It is difficult to imagine those currently under sanctions being greeted any better (and if they were, they would be given priority over Russians who have actually opposed the war all along).</p><p style="margin-left:0pt;">The second course of action is so adventurous that I would not expect Western politicians to attempt it. It starts from the assumption that the war can be stopped only by a change of regime in Moscow, and that the goal should be to split the elite radically, triggering a “war of all against all” at the highest levels of power. This conflict is already simmering beneath the surface. Russia is stepping up persecution of businesspeople suspected of offshore dealings, disloyalty, or moving capital abroad. An “anti-corruption” campaign is also expanding, ensnaring many officials, lawmakers, and judges.</p><p style="margin-left:0pt;">Against this backdrop, Western governments could begin lifting sanctions without announcing anything in advance, explaining that the individuals had been mistakenly placed on the lists as they were not actively supporting the war in Ukraine. They could start with officials and businesspeople whose activities may make the Kremlin uneasy or arouse its suspicions. Such a move would be highly likely to provoke preemptive repression against those against whom restrictions have been eased, prompting some members of the elite to flee.</p><p style="margin-left:0pt;">Given how many Russians are on sanctions lists, Western governments have enormous scope to maneuver. Used skillfully, it could break up many of the financial and organizational ties within Russia’s upper ranks and push the Kremlin into a campaign of arbitrary terror against those who have been and remain loyal to it. This is unlikely to trigger a palace coup or an internal crisis, but it would almost certainly end the unity of the Russian elite that has held since the beginning of the war, founded on the sense that everyone is “in the same boat.”</p><p style="margin-left:0pt;">The West's personal sanctions policy now looks like a complete failure. Its main mistake in dealing with Russian citizens was applying the same measures against everyone. In my view, it would have made far more sense to divide all those the West considers “objectionable” into at least three categories. The first would include those suspected of war crimes: the commanders and personnel of military units, along with those who enabled such crimes (including the country’s top leadership and lawmakers and the leading propagandists who defended those decisions). This group would face the harshest sanctions, which could not be lifted under any circumstances. They would ultimately have to stand trial.</p><p style="margin-left:0pt;">The second category would include people whose economic activity or official position contributes to the regime’s functioning and supports its war effort without rising to the level of war crimes. Sanctions on these individuals could be lifted if they ended that support by resigning their offices or leaving their businesses.</p><p style="margin-left:0pt;">The third category would include people connected to Putin’s system only indirectly — for example, major taxpayers. They should be offered a kind of “green corridor” to escape Putin’s “paradise,” subject to conditions that would prevent them from returning.</p><p style="margin-left:0pt;">Had this kind of categorization been implemented in the first weeks of the war, it might, to some extent, have split Russia’s upper class. Even if there are serious doubts that it could be effectively applied today, the attempt would still have a better chance at success than a continuation of the current policy does.</p>]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Wed, 18 Nov 2026 20:11:49 +0000</pubDate>
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      <title><![CDATA[France confirms presence of its troops in Ukraine for the first time, following a deployment without parliamentary approval]]></title>
      <link>https://theins.press/en/news/299756</link>
      <guid>https://theins.press/en/news/299756</guid>
      <dc:creator><![CDATA[The Insider]]></dc:creator>
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      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>The presence of active-duty French troops in Ukraine has been <a href="https://www.lefigaro.fr/international/guerre-en-ukraine-il-est-absurde-d-affirmer-que-les-soldats-francais-dans-le-pays-participent-directement-au-conflit-affirme-alice-rufo-20261117">confirmed</a> by Alice Rufo, France’s Minister Delegate to the Minister of the Armed Forces and Veterans Affairs, in a statement in parliament. According to Rufo, the small contingent of troops deployed do not take part in combat and are located far from the front line. Their tasks are limited to training Ukrainian soldiers and carrying out maintenance and repair of equipment supplied by Paris. Earlier, the French radio station <i>RFI</i> <a href="https://theins.ru/news/299648">reported</a> that the troops are operating in Ukraine as part of a secret mission of which the French parliament was not notified.</p><p>“There is indeed a coordination structure in Ukraine that works closely with the military mission and makes it possible, when necessary, to carry out targeted training, as well as to provide maintenance and repair of equipment,” Rufo said. She stressed that French troops carry out short-term assignments and do not take part in combat missions. Rufo also rejected accusations by Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov that the presence of French troops constitutes Paris’s direct participation in the war. Rufo called this interpretation absurd.</p><h4>French troops were sent to Ukraine under the guise of a mission in Poland</h4><p>According to <i>RFI</i> sources, a secret French military mission called Volia (the Ukrainian for “will”), headed by a French general, has been operating in Ukraine since at least the summer of 2026. Its members arrive in small groups for short-term tasks, including repairs of complex weapons systems such as CAESAR self-propelled howitzers, Mirage 2000 fighter jets, and precision-guided missiles. As <i>RFI</i> reports, Paris decided to send military personnel rather than civilian specialists for this work because of the war-related risks.</p><p>To conceal the presence of French troops, France used the official training mission Gerfaut, which has operated in Poland since February 2023 as part of the European Union’s EUMAM Ukraine program for training Ukrainian troops. <i>RFI’s</i> sources claim that French soldiers sent to Ukraine were told to say they were going to Poland.</p><p>At the same time, <i>Le Monde</i> <a href="https://www.lemonde.fr/en/international/article/2026/11/16/french-troops-are-now-operating-in-ukraine_6782174_4.html">writes</a> that small groups of French troops have come to Ukraine periodically for training and equipment repair since the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion in February 2022. Recently their presence has expanded. According to the newspaper, French troops linked to intelligence units are also working in Ukraine, performing observation tasks closer to the front line.</p><h4>French authorities believe that sending troops does not require notifying parliament</h4><p>Under <a href="https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/codes/article_lc/LEGIARTI000019241022">Article 35</a> of the French Constitution, the government is obliged to notify parliament of a decision to send armed forces abroad no later than three days after the start of an operation. If the operation lasts more than four months, the continued presence of troops must receive parliamentary approval.</p><p>However, as <i>RFI</i> <a href="https://www.rfi.fr/ru/%D1%83%D0%BA%D1%80%D0%B0%D0%B8%D0%BD%D0%B0/20261116-%D1%84%D1%80%D0%B0%D0%BD%D1%86%D1%83%D0%B7%D1%81%D0%BA%D0%B8%D0%B5-%D0%B2%D0%BE%D0%B5%D0%BD%D0%BD%D1%8B%D0%B5-%D0%B4%D0%B5%D0%B9%D1%81%D1%82%D0%B2%D1%83%D1%8E%D1%82-%D0%B2-%D1%83%D0%BA%D1%80%D0%B0%D0%B8%D0%BD%D0%B5-%D0%B2-%D1%80%D0%B5%D0%B6%D0%B8%D0%BC%D0%B5-%D1%81%D0%B5%D0%BA%D1%80%D0%B5%D1%82%D0%BD%D0%BE%D1%81%D1%82%D0%B8-%D0%BA%D0%B0%D0%BA-%D0%BC%D0%B8%D0%BD%D0%B8%D0%BC%D1%83%D0%BC-%D1%81-%D0%BB%D0%B5%D1%82%D0%B0-2026-%D0%B3%D0%BE%D0%B4%D0%B0">found</a>, parliament was not informed of the existence of the Volia mission. Rufo explained that the French government does not consider the activities of troops in Ukraine a military intervention within the meaning of Article 35 of the Constitution. She cited the limited number of participants, the short-term nature of the assignments, the considerable distance from the front line, and the absence of any intention to take part in the fighting itself.</p><p>Earlier, French President Emmanuel Macron repeatedly discussed the possibility of sending French military instructors to Ukraine. In May 2024, <i>Reuters</i> <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/france-could-announce-sending-military-trainers-ukraine-soon-diplomats-say-2024-05-30/">reported</a> that Paris was considering sending its personnel to train Ukrainian units, clear mines, and maintain Western weapons.</p><p>Subsequently, France and the United Kingdom proposed creating a multinational contingent that could be deployed in Ukraine after the fighting ends. Its troops are expected to help rebuild the Ukrainian army and provide security guarantees. In response, Vladimir Putin <a href="https://theins.ru/news/299504">threatened</a> to resume hostilities in the event that European troops are deployed in Ukraine after the conclusion of a peace agreement.</p><aside class="related-posts"><ul><li><a href="https://theins.press/en/news/279293">Macron unveils French-British peace plan for Ukraine: Partial ceasefire and deployment of peacekeepers</a></li><li><a href="https://theins.press/en/politics/271076">Legion of shame: Russian warmongers still hold highest French award</a></li><li><a href="https://theins.press/en/politics/271073">Behind enemy lines: The French Riviera still welcomes Russian politicians and oligarchs</a></li></ul></aside>]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Wed, 18 Nov 2026 17:50:02 +0000</pubDate>
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      <title><![CDATA[New Rwanda deportation hub could expose rejected asylum-seekers to a forced return to Russia, rights advocate warns]]></title>
      <link>https://theins.press/en/news/299755</link>
      <guid>https://theins.press/en/news/299755</guid>
      <dc:creator><![CDATA[The Insider]]></dc:creator>
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      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Human rights organizations have broadly condemned an <a href="https://www.government.nl/latest/news/2026/11/16/the-netherlands-and-european-partners-working-with-rwanda-to-establish-a-return-hub?utm_source=chatgpt.com">agreement</a> by five EU countries to establish a deportation center for migrants in Rwanda. Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, the International Rescue Committee, and dozens of other European humanitarian and rights groups have criticized the plan, as has the Spanish government. Human rights advocate <strong>Evi Chayka</strong> told <i>The Insider</i> that Rwanda’s human rights record raises serious concerns and that Russian nationals could be among those sent there. She said the arrangement could leave some Russians at risk of eventually being returned to Russia against their will.</p><h3>Dozens of rights groups oppose the plan</h3><p>The decision by Germany, Denmark, Austria, Greece, and the Netherlands to establish a deportation center in Rwanda for people whose asylum applications have been rejected or who have otherwise lost the right to remain in the European Union has triggered widespread criticism from human rights groups. As Spanish government spokesperson Elma Saiz <a href="https://efe.com/espana/2026-11-17/gobierno-espana-centro-deportacion-ruanda-migrantes/">said</a>: </p><blockquote><p>“We do not support in any way these innovative solutions, which, incidentally, are of questionable legality.”</p></blockquote><p>Amnesty International  <a href="https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2026/11/europe-rwanda-deportation-deal-repeats-mistakes-of-the-past/">called</a> the European countries’ agreement with Rwanda a “black hole for human rights” and noted the bitter irony that the deportation center was announced in Vienna, where “states came together to affirm the universality of human rights.”</p><p>Human Rights Watch <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2026/11/16/germany-should-not-deport-anyone-to-rwanda">said</a> the five EU countries had carried out no prior risk assessment before launching the project and noted that Rwanda had already participated three times in other countries’ programs to remove unwanted migrants, with human rights violations reported in each case. The group said, for example, that Rwanda agreed in 2025 to accept 250 third-country nationals from the United States in exchange for $7.5 million, but that little is currently known about the fate or whereabouts of the more than 20 people deported there.</p><p>The International Rescue Committee <a href="https://www.deutschlandfunk.de/abschiebezentrum-ruanda-eu-staaten-return-hubs-100.html">said</a> such hubs normalize holding migrants in prison-like conditions outside Europe, where they could face “persecution, torture or worse.”</p><p>In addition, 47 human rights, humanitarian, and charitable organizations from 15 EU countries <a href="https://www.rescue.org/eu/press-release/joint-statement-47-organisations-call-eu-protect-peoples-rights-not-outsource-them">signed</a> a joint statement opposing the agreement, calling on the European Union to “protect people’s rights, not outsource them.” Other organizations have also criticized the arrangement and called for the Rwanda deal to be abandoned.</p><h3>Russian citizens could ultimately end up back in Russia through Rwanda</h3><p><strong>Evi Chayka, head of the international human rights organization EQUAL PostOst,</strong> told <i>The Insider</i> that the five EU countries plan to send to Rwanda individuals who have already been denied international protection and are subject to enforceable return decisions. She said people are generally first given a deadline to leave voluntarily, but if they do not, authorities can begin forced-removal proceedings. As Chayka explained:</p><blockquote><p>“The new EU regulation provides for the possibility of free legal assistance during appeals, although access to it is subject to certain conditions. There is also a significant problem: filing an appeal against a return decision does not in itself guarantee that its enforcement will be suspended. A person may have to separately petition a court for such a suspension.</p><p>The proposal is to send to Rwanda people who cannot be returned to their country of origin within a reasonable period of time. For example, this could be because the necessary documents cannot be obtained, the person’s nationality cannot be established, or the country of origin refuses to take them back. A lack of cooperation with immigration authorities may also be one reason for considering such an option. But this is not limited to people deemed security threats or those who refuse to disclose their identity.”</p></blockquote><p>Chayka said the mechanism agreed by the five EU countries also poses significant risks for Russians who have been denied asylum and who, after being deported to Rwanda, could ultimately end up back in Russia. She continued:</p><blockquote><p>“Russian citizenship in itself does not exclude a person from this procedure. If someone has been definitively denied protection and has no other grounds to remain in the EU, they could potentially be among those sent to Rwanda.</p><p>However, the principle of <i>non-refoulement</i> applies here. It prohibits sending a person to a country where they face torture, persecution, or other serious human rights violations. The prohibition also applies when a person is first transferred to a third country from which they may later be returned to their country of origin.</p><p>And this is where one of the main questions arises. If a person cannot be returned to Russia because they face a risk of persecution, how will it be guaranteed that after being transferred to Rwanda they will not find themselves in an even more vulnerable position and eventually be sent back?”</p></blockquote><p>Chayka said that under the proposed plan, Rwanda would be expected to issue residence permits to those arriving and to provide for their integration and employment. In her view, however, European governments currently cannot credibly guarantee that the rights of transferred migrants will be protected, adding:</p><blockquote><p>“Rwanda has serious human rights problems, including political repression, arbitrary detention, and restrictions on civil liberties. Another question is access to legal protection after transfer. Who will provide independent legal assistance? How will a person be able to report a violation of their rights? Who will monitor their living conditions and how, and most importantly, what effective mechanisms will European governments have if Rwanda fails to meet its obligations? Responsibility for a person cannot simply be transferred to another country along with their physical relocation.</p><p>I am particularly concerned that such a system could create a situation of prolonged uncertainty. A person has already lost the possibility of remaining in Europe, cannot safely return home, and finds themselves in a country with which they have no connection. Even if they are formally allowed to live and work there, that does not necessarily mean they have genuine access to safety, protection, or the chance to start a new life.”</p></blockquote><aside class="related-posts"><ul><li><a href="https://theins.press/en/politics/293704">Europe&#039;s black holes: The EU is moving to legalize offshore camps and strip migrants of their rights</a></li><li><a href="https://theins.press/en/dispatch/292209">“The judge said he sees no threats in Russia”: Anti-war Russians are being denied asylum all around the world</a></li><li><a href="https://theins.press/en/news/294585">Russian anti-war activist Ariadna Litvinova arrested in St. Petersburg after deportation from Turkey</a></li><li><a href="https://theins.press/en/news/297929">Russian activist deported from U.S. sentenced to six years in prison</a></li></ul></aside>]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Wed, 18 Nov 2026 17:27:34 +0000</pubDate>
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      <title><![CDATA[Founder of Russia’s first private space company says his European startup’s missiles helped collapse Kerch Bridge span]]></title>
      <link>https://theins.press/en/news/299754</link>
      <guid>https://theins.press/en/news/299754</guid>
      <dc:creator><![CDATA[The Insider]]></dc:creator>
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      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>European defense company Destinus, founded by former Russian entrepreneur Mikhail Kokorich, <a href="https://www.linkedin.com/posts/destinus-ruta-missiles-struck-the-kerch-ugcPost-7528392709280174080-V-lX/">said</a> that seven of its Ruta cruise missiles <a href="https://theins.press/en/news/299708">struck the Kerch Strait Bridge</a> on Nov. 17, causing one of its spans to collapse. Kokorich is known as the founder of Dauria Aerospace, Russia’s first private space company. He left Russia in 2014-2015 after Russian authorities twice sought to open a criminal case against him.</p><p>According to Destinus, Ukrainian forces used Ruta missiles against the bridge on two consecutive days. The company said the first attack damaged the upper load-bearing structure, while seven missiles struck the bridge on Nov. 17, causing a span to collapse onto the seabed. Destinus also said Ukrainian forces used the company’s LORD/Da Vinci unmanned systems to suppress Russian air defenses.</p><p>Destinus President Alexander Daniluk <a href="https://www.reuters.com/business/aerospace-defense/european-made-ruta-missiles-only-foreign-weapons-used-ukraines-crimean-bridge-2026-11-17/">told</a> <i>Reuters</i> that Ukrainian forces launched nine Ruta Block 1 missiles, seven of which reached the bridge. He said Destinus-made systems were the only foreign-made weapons used in the operation.</p><h3>Zelensky confirms use of Ruta missiles but does not say which weapons brought down bridge span</h3><p>Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky <a href="https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/21848">confirmed</a> that Ruta missile-drones were used in the operation against the Kerch Bridge, adding that preparations for the seven-stage operation took several weeks, with Ukrainian forces systematically targeting Russian air defense systems, radar stations, and electronic warfare equipment that were helping protect the structure.</p><p>In the final stage, Palyanytsia drones targeted the road section of the bridge, while Neptune, FP-5 Flamingo, and Ruta missiles struck the railway section, Zelensky said. The attack <a href="https://theins.ru/news/299665">caused</a> a road section of the bridge more than 270 meters long to collapse. The railway tracks were also damaged. Russia’s Transport Ministry announced that both road and rail traffic had been suspended following the Nov. 17 attack. The ministry said preliminary information indicated there were no injuries.</p><p>Destinus began supplying weapons to Ukraine in 2023, with the first Ruta missiles arriving in 2024. By the end of October 2026, the company had <a href="https://www.reuters.com/business/aerospace-defense/destinus-monthly-output-tops-europes-pre-war-annual-cruise-missile-production-2026-10-29/">produced</a> more than 1,750 missiles in the Ruta family, increasing monthly output to nearly 300. Destinus is also developing the more powerful Ruta Block 2, which it says will have a range of more than 700 kilometers and carry a 250-kilogram warhead.</p><h3>Kokorich left Russia after the FSB began investigating his business — and later renounced his Russian citizenship</h3><p>Mikhail Kokorich founded Dauria Aerospace in the early 2010s. The company developed small satellites and received a contract from Roscosmos, Russia’s state space agency, to build two spacecraft. But it soon encountered difficulties raising financing, and Kokorich says Russian security agencies began investigating his activities.</p><p>In a 2018 <a href="https://thebell.io/stali-sheptat-chto-shpion-pochemu-osnovatel-pervoj-v-rossii-chastnoj-kosmicheskoj-kompanii-uehal-v-ssha-i-kak-stroit-tam-vodyanye-rakety">interview</a>, Kokorich detailed how Russia’s Federal Security Service (FSB) investigated Dauria Aerospace and twice attempted to open a criminal case against him only to be blocked by prosecutors. Kokorich moved to the United States in 2014-2015 and sold his stake in the Russian company.</p><p>In 2017, he founded the U.S. space startup Momentus, followed by Switzerland-based Destinus in 2021. The company initially developed civilian hypersonic aircraft but shifted toward strike drones and cruise missiles after Russia launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine. In January 2024, Kokorich <a href="https://theins.ru/news/268300">renounced</a> his Russian citizenship, citing his opposition to the war and to Vladimir Putin’s policies.</p><p>Kokorich is also a member of the Russian Antiwar Committee, a group formed in exile by Russian public figures opposed to the invasion of Ukraine. In October 2025, the FSB <a href="https://theins.press/en/news/285858">launched</a> a criminal case against him and other members of the committee on charges of organizing a terrorist organization and attempting to seize power by force. In November, Russian authorities added Kokorich to the country’s official list of “terrorists and extremists.”</p><aside class="related-posts"><ul><li><a href="https://theins.press/en/news/285858">FSB launches criminal case against Mikhail Khodorkovsky and Russian Antiwar Committee for “attempting to seize power by force”</a></li><li><a href="https://theins.press/en/news/299708">Kerch Bridge linking mainland Russia with occupied Crimea partially collapses after second Ukrainian attack in two days</a></li></ul></aside>]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Wed, 18 Nov 2026 17:19:13 +0000</pubDate>
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      <title><![CDATA[Russia to prosecute donors to 2023 fundraiser for political prisoners, treating payments as support for Alexei Navalny’s outlawed foundation]]></title>
      <link>https://theins.press/en/news/299721</link>
      <guid>https://theins.press/en/news/299721</guid>
      <dc:creator><![CDATA[The Insider]]></dc:creator>
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      <description><![CDATA[]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>A Russian court has imposed fines against donors to the “<span class="termin" data-description="PHA+VGhlIOKAnFlvdSBBcmUgTm90IEFsb25l4oCdIGNhbXBhaWduIHdhcyBsYXVuY2hlZCBieSBpbmRlcGVuZGVudCBSdXNzaWFuLWxhbmd1YWdlIG1lZGlhIG9uIEp1bmUgMTIsIDIwMjMsIHRvIHJhaXNlIG1vbmV5IGZvciBwb2xpdGljYWwgcHJpc29uZXJzLCB0aGVpciBmYW1pbGllcyBhbmQgcGVvcGxlIHByb3NlY3V0ZWQgZm9yIGFudGktd2FyIGFjdGl2aXR5LiBJdCBsYXRlciBiZWNhbWUgYW4gYW5udWFsIGZ1bmRyYWlzZXIgaGVsZCBvbiBSdXNzaWEgRGF5LjwvcD4=">You Are Not Alone</span>” fundraiser, independent human rights group OVD-Info <a href="https://ovd.info/2026/11/17/siloviki-presleduyut-lyudey-za-donaty-marafonu-podderzhki-politzaklyuchennykh-schitaya">reports</a>. Investigators treated the ruble-denominated transfers as financing for the late Alexei Navanly’s Anti-Corruption Foundation (ACF), which in 2021 was liquidated after being <span class="termin" data-description="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">outlawed</span> as “extremist.” Two criminal cases are known to have been opened after the Federal Security Service (FSB) obtained records of 7,500 transfers to the same DonationAlerts wallet. It is unclear how many people made those payments.</p><p>Both defendants made the transfers during the fundraiser, which took place on June 12, 2023. According to the independent outlet <a href="https://zona.media/article/2026/11/17/dotanionalerts"><i>Mediazona</i></a>, the FSB obtained a confession from the donor in the first case stating he had knowingly sent money to the ACF. A court fined him a substantial amount of money in the summer of 2026. The second case is expected to be tried in absentia. At least five other donors in several parts of Russia were investigated during the summer and fall of 2026, with security officers searching homes, seizing electronic devices, and summoning people for questioning.</p><p>After news of the cases became public, the “You Are Not Alone” fundraiser team contacted people who had donated in foreign currencies using cards issued by banks outside Russia. Organizers said Russian law enforcement agencies do not have records of those transactions but still advised such donors to avoid traveling to Russia or Belarus if possible, warning that border officials could uncover evidence of the donations while inspecting their electronic devices.</p><h3>A 3,000-ruble transfer could carry up to eight years in prison</h3><p>One of the defendants is accused of making a transfer of 3,000 rubles (around $35). He was detained on his way to work in October 2025 and taken back to his home, where security officers seized his electronic devices. The man said FSB officers repeatedly urged him to admit that he had donated to the foundation and promised to let him go home if he confessed. He refused and soon left Russia. A criminal case was opened in April 2026 under a law on financing extremist activity, which carries a maximum sentence of eight years in prison.</p><p>At the FSB’s request, Russia’s financial intelligence agency, Rosfinmonitoring, determined that the money from the man’s card had been sent to a wallet on DonationAlerts. Sberbank provided records of transactions on his accounts, while the settlement company VK Payment Solutions supplied a table showing incoming payments to the wallet.</p><p>To link the fundraiser to the ACF, investigators reviewed announcements posted by Navalny’s team, reconstructed the fundraiser’s webpage using a web archive, and commissioned a linguistic analysis. The expert cited a section on the ACF’s website about assistance to political prisoners that described “You Are Not Alone” as a joint project organized with the help of independent Russian media outlets. As “evidence of the defendant’s views,” the investigators pointed to saved posts made by Alexei and Yulia Navalnaya, his subscriptions to <i>Mediazona</i> and OVD-Info, and comments posted during the fundraiser livestream. The man said he intended to support human rights groups that provide lawyers to political prisoners and stressed that he did not finance the ACF.</p><h3>How the money was collected and where it went</h3><p>At the start of the fundraiser, the independent Russian broadcaster <i>TV Rain</i> accepted ruble donations through DonatePay. On the day of the broadcast, the service <a href="https://t.me/meduzalive/85685">shut down</a> the fundraiser after a complaint from RT correspondent Konstantin Pridybaylo. Political commentator Maxim Katz then offered the use of his DonationAlerts wallet. <i>Mediazona</i> reported that the FSB also requested data on transfers to <i>TV Rain’s</i> DonatePay wallet. It is not known whether its investigators received a response.</p><p>Katz told OVD-Info that he withdrew the money from his DonationAlerts wallet to an Israeli bank card and then transferred it to <i>TV Rain</i>, saying the ACF had no control over the funds. Fundraiser representative Ksenia Fadeeva said the ACF-affiliated channels Navalny Live and Popular Politics carried the broadcast alongside other participants, and that the donations were collected to support political prisoners — not the work of the ACF.</p><p>According to a <a href="https://t.me/tvrain/78597">report</a> from <i>TV Rain</i>, the 2023 fundraiser collected 39.4 million rubles ($480,000). Of that, 10.2 million rubles went toward care packages, deposits into prisoners’ accounts, and family visits, while 9.7 million rubles covered legal expenses. Human rights and anti-war projects received another 9.9 million rubles. The total amount distributed exceeded the original sum raised because of fluctuations in currency and cryptocurrency exchange rates.</p><h3>The same company supplied the authorities with donor data in another criminal case</h3><p>VK Payment Solutions, a Russian payment-services company <a href="https://www.cbr.ru/finorg/foinfo/?ogrn=1127711000042">licensed</a> by the Central Bank of Russia, <a href="https://vkpay.com/documents/">provides</a> payment processing for VK Pay. DonationAlerts was no longer owned by VK at the time of the June 2023 fundraiser, as VK had <a href="https://corp.vkcdn.ru/media/2022/09/27/vk-announces-the-sale-of-mygames_rus.pdf">sold</a> its MY.GAMES gaming division, which included DonationAlerts, in 2022. In December 2024, MY.GAMES <a href="https://about.my.games/news/300">completed</a> the sale of DonationAlerts (along with the creator platform Boosty) to companies controlled by Cyprus-based businessman Pavel Kharaneka.</p><p>The same payment company previously <a href="https://theins.ru/news/290692">provided</a> Russian law enforcement agencies with DonationAlerts donor data in the case of Andrei Khoroshko, who was accused of involvement in Artpodgotovka, an opposition movement that Russia banned as extremist in 2017, later designating it as a terrorist organization. The records included the donor’s IP address and email address. In April 2026, a court <a href="https://zona.media/news/2026/04/16/khoroshko">sentenced</a> Khoroshko to 16 years in prison over four transfers totaling 2,201.59 rubles (around $25) and two messages sent to Artpodgotovka founder Vyacheslav Maltsev.</p><p>The ACF was added to Russia’s register of “extremist” organizations in 2021. By October 2026, at least 219 people in Russia had been <a href="https://theins.ru/news/298072">convicted</a> in cases involving donations to the foundation. OVD-Info has <a href="https://ovdinfo.legal/instruction/marathon-donaty-fbk">published</a> detailed guidance for people who donated to the 2023  fundraiser using Russian bank cards. </p><aside class="related-posts"><ul><li><a href="https://theins.press/en/society/282442">Adding insult to injury: Russia is fabricating new cases against political prisoners</a></li><li><a href="https://theins.press/en/news/295981">St. Petersburg university lecturer detained over donations to Alexei Navalny’s Anti-Corruption Foundation</a></li><li><a href="https://theins.press/en/news/287224">Russia’s top court labels U.S.-based arm of Alexei Navalny’s Anti-Corruption Foundation a “terrorist organization”</a></li><li><a href="https://theins.press/en/news/291843">Political prosecutions in Russia involve increasingly severe charges, Memorial report says</a></li><li><a href="https://theins.press/en/society/288867">Dissidents by chance: The Kremlin has turned to labeling random people in Russia as traitors and terrorists</a></li><li><a href="https://theins.press/en/news/264023">Navalny LIVE YouTube technician Daniel Kholodny sentenced to 8 years in prison in “extremism” case</a></li><li><a href="https://theins.press/en/news/283612">Russian journalist and activist Olga Komleva sentenced to 12 years over ties to Navalny</a></li><li><a href="https://theins.press/en/news/280587">Russia hands four journalists 5.5 years each in Navalny “extremism” case</a></li></ul></aside>]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Tue, 17 Nov 2026 21:34:19 +0000</pubDate>
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      <title><![CDATA[Hitting diesel: Ukraine’s refinery strikes could leave Russia short of fuel this winter]]></title>
      <link>https://theins.press/en/economics/299687</link>
      <guid>https://theins.press/en/economics/299687</guid>
      <dc:creator><![CDATA[George Voloshin]]></dc:creator>
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      <description><![CDATA[<p>A new wave of Ukrainian strikes has <a href="https://theins.ru/news/299440">hit</a> Russia’s largest oil refineries, targeting plants that account for more than half of the country’s total capacity. As a result, the ongoing fuel shortage will worsen as stockpiles accumulated during the pause are depleted, with the freight transport and retail sectors likely to suffer the most economically. Overall, the domestic diesel shortage could become particularly acute in winter — mere months after Moscow claimed to have sufficient surpluses to resume exports (including to the United States). It is already clear that the much discussed "diesel deal" benefited neither side, as not a single tanker carrying Russian fuel ever reached American shores. It will probably go down in history as yet another short-lived and futile PR project by the U.S. president.</p>]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p style="margin-left:0pt;">The United States never <a href="https://theins.ru/news/299425">accepted</a> a single tanker of Russian diesel. Unlike Donald Trump, American companies are not prepared to trade with Russia. Russia could not place the fuel in Brazil either, as it proved easier for buyers there to purchase cheaper fuel from neighboring countries.</p><p style="margin-left:0pt;">That does not mean the world has a surplus of diesel. On the contrary, diesel remains a scarce commodity on the global market. The average retail price in the United States <a href="https://www.eia.gov/petroleum/gasdiesel/">was $6.10 a gallon</a> on Nov. 10, compared with $3.69 at the beginning of February (before the war in Iran constrained shipping through the Strait of Hormuz). In the EU, it was <a href="https://energy.ec.europa.eu/data-and-analysis/weekly-oil-bulletin_en">€2.15 a liter</a> on Nov. 9, compared with €1.59 on the eve of the war with in the Middle East. In Russia, the exchange price of <span class="termin" data-description="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">winter diesel</span> <a href="https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/9007563">set a record</a> of 92,500 rubles ($1,130) per ton on Oct. 1.</p><p style="margin-left:0pt;">In a purported effort to bring prices down, on Oct. 9 the U.S. Treasury issued <a href="https://ofac.treasury.gov/media/937216/download">General License No. 135</a>, authorizing transactions involving Russian diesel — including imports into the United States — until April 7, 2027. Paradoxically, however, the Russian government <a href="https://www.vedomosti.ru/business/news/2026/10/31/1241750-zapret-na-eksport-topliva">extended</a> its ban on diesel exports until Jan. 31, retaining exceptions only for certain deliveries to the global market. </p><p style="margin-left:0pt;">The question remains: if there is enough fuel, why is Moscow maintaining the ban, and if there is not enough, what did Washington expect to achieve by lifting the sanctions? The answer can be found not in the halls of the U.S. Treasury, but at Russia’s oil refineries.</p><h3 class="outline-heading">A quarter down</h3><p style="margin-left:0pt;">It is extremely difficult to say exactly how much diesel Russia is producing today. In late September, Moscow's <a href="https://publication.pravo.gov.ru/document/0001202609280007">Decree No. 686</a> rendered the last remaining public data (including refinery throughput and output, as well as exchange transactions in diesel and gasoline) classified. The only option is therefore to rely on <a href="https://fief.ru/en/media/news/butylochnye-gorshlyki-pochemu-trudno-kupit-dizelnoe-toplivo-khotya-ego-mnogo/">estimates</a> by industry sources and analysts.</p><p style="margin-left:0pt;">Experts estimate that Russia produced about 85 million tons of diesel in 2025 — roughly 230,000 tons a day —while domestic consumption stood at 46–54 million tons. Historically, production was around double domestic demand, and roughly half of Russian refineries' output was exported.</p><p style="margin-left:0pt;">According to <a href="https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/russias-diesel-output-falls-further-10-may-after-drone-attacks-data-analysis-2026-05-29/"><i>Reuters</i></a>, production in March 2026 was a healthy 7.5 million tons — approximately 240,000 tons a day. However, two consecutive months of decline followed, with April coming in at 6.5 million tons and May's figure falling to around 5.9 million.</p><p style="margin-left:0pt;">At the beginning of autumn, production was still <a href="https://theins.ru/news/298758">holding</a> at roughly 175,000 tons a day, but in the first half of October, it fell to about 160,000 tons before rising again to nearly 180,000 tons — about a quarter below the March level. Rosstat data indirectly confirm the picture: September 2026 output of petroleum products and coke <a href="https://rosstat.gov.ru/storage/mediabank/osn-09_2026.pdf">fell</a> by 17% year-on-year.</p><blockquote>Even Rosstat’s official figures show a 17% decline in petroleum-products and coke output in September</blockquote><p style="margin-left:0pt;">Six refineries produce about half of Russia’s diesel, and four of them have already been attacked this month. The Omsk refinery caught fire on <a href="https://theins.ru/news/299440">Nov. 11</a> but did not report a shutdown for repairs. Kirishinefteorgsintez (Kinef) was hit on <a href="https://theins.ru/news/299331">Nov. 9</a>; the Volgograd refinery was hit on <a href="https://theins.ru/news/299532">Nov. 13</a> (the fourth time this year that it has halted refining); and NORSI in Kstovo caught fire on <a href="https://theins.ru/news/299009">Nov. 1</a>. The remaining two are Permnefteorgsintez, which was last attacked on <a href="https://theins.ru/news/297543">Sept. 25</a> (just as it was due to complete repairs after an August strike), and TANECO in Tatarstan, which has not yet been hit (although the neighboring Nizhnekamskneftekhim plant was also <a href="https://theins.ru/news/299599">attacked</a> in November).</p><p style="margin-left:0pt;">As early as September, three of the six had either <a href="https://ru.themoscowtimes.com/2026/09/15/tri-izshestiosnovnih-proizvoditeleidiztopliva-vrossii-snizili-ili-ostanovili-vipusk-posle-atak-bpla-a206123">stopped</a> or sharply reduced output after drone attacks. Kinef shut down completely, while the Volgograd refinery and NORSI significantly reduced their output. According to Kpler, the average throughput of Russian refineries <a href="https://www.kpler.com/blog/winter-2026-27-scenarios-for-the-russian-oil-industry">was about 3.8 million barrels a day</a> in the summer and recovered to <span class="termin" data-description="PHA+RGllc2VsIHByb2R1Y3Rpb24gaXMgY2xlYXJseSBmYWlsaW5nIHRvIGtlZXAgcGFjZSB3aXRoIHJlZmluZXJ5IHV0aWxpemF0aW9uLiBPbmUgcG9zc2libGUgZXhwbGFuYXRpb24gaXMgdGhlIGRpZmZlcmluZyBzcGVlZCBvZiByZXBhaXJzOiBhY2NvcmRpbmcgdG8gdGhlIElFQSwgbWlub3IgZGFtYWdlIHRvIHByaW1hcnkgZGlzdGlsbGF0aW9uIHVuaXRzIGNhbiBiZSByZXBhaXJlZCB3aXRoaW4gb25lIHRvIHR3byB3ZWVrcywgd2hpbGUgbWFqb3IgZGFtYWdlIHRvIGNvbXBsZXggcHJvY2Vzc2luZyB1bml0cyBtYXkgdGFrZSBzaXggdG8gZWlnaHQgbW9udGhzLjwvcD4=">approximately 5 million</span> only by the end of October; the October average was around 4.3 million barrels a day.</p><h3 class="outline-heading">Winter is coming</h3><p style="margin-left:0pt;">When it comes to diesel, the composition of output matters more than the quantity. Russia critically needs so-called winter diesel, which can withstand temperatures of –30°C thanks to the inclusion of anti-freezing components. Yet Russia traditionally produces little of it, and the fuel is not exported due to the lack of major buyers with similarly cold climates. That makes it unprofitable to increase production or build up large stocks, even though the government calls on refineries to raise output every year. Notably, for small- and medium-sized refineries, procuring equipment for producing winter diesel was beyond their means even before the war.</p><p style="margin-left:0pt;">There are no recent data broken down by diesel type, and the latest public estimates date back to 2022. According to Petroleum Trading, of the 78 million tons of diesel produced that year, <a href="https://www.interfax.ru/business/862488">about 14 million tons</a> (less than one-fifth) were winter grades. The Energy Ministry estimated demand for those grades at roughly 20 million tons.</p><p style="margin-left:0pt;">The shortage of winter fuel has traditionally been covered with a substitute: a mixture of <span class="termin" data-description="PHA+U3VtbWVyIGRpZXNlbCAoc3VtbWVyLWdyYWRlIGRpZXNlbCBmdWVsKSBpcyB0aGUgc3RhbmRhcmQgdHlwZSBvZiBkaWVzZWwgZnVlbCBpbnRlbmRlZCBmb3IgdXNlIGR1cmluZyB0aGUgd2FybWVyIG1vbnRocywgd2hlbiBhaXIgdGVtcGVyYXR1cmVzIGRvIG5vdCBmYWxsIGJlbG93IDDCsEMuIFVubGlrZSB3aW50ZXItZ3JhZGUgZnVlbCwgc3VtbWVyIGRpZXNlbCByZXRhaW5zIGhlYXZpZXIgcGFyYWZmaW4gaHlkcm9jYXJib25zLiBXaGVuIHRlbXBlcmF0dXJlcyBkcm9wLCB0aGVzZSBoeWRyb2NhcmJvbnMgY3J5c3RhbGxpemUsIGNsb2cgdGhlIGZ1ZWwgZmlsdGVyLCBhbmQgYmxvY2sgdGhlIGZsb3cgb2YgZnVlbCB0byB0aGUgZW5naW5lLiBGaWxsaW5nIHN0YXRpb25zIHR5cGljYWxseSBzZWxsIGl0IGZyb20gYXJvdW5kIEFwcmlsIG9yIE1heSB0aHJvdWdoIE9jdG9iZXIsIGRlcGVuZGluZyBvbiB0aGUgcmVnaW9uIGFuZCBjbGltYXRlLjwvcD4=">summer diesel</span> and kerosene. In autumn 2025, <a href="https://www.vedomosti.ru/business/news/2025/10/12/1146255-otmena-aktsiza">Decree No. 724</a> exempted this fuel from excise duty until May 1, 2026. Refineries equipped with dewaxing units can produce winter and arctic grades without additives. In 2022, new units at the Omsk refinery and TANECO were expected to increase output. Both plants were <a href="https://www.kpler.com/blog/ukraines-drone-campaign-pushes-russian-refinery-runs-to-21-year-lows">attacked</a> in 2026, but it is not known which units were damaged.</p><p style="margin-left:0pt;">Ukraine’s military intelligence service <a href="https://censor.net/ru/news/4032178/rossiyiskaya-neftepererabotka-pod-udarami-15-npz-ostanovleny">claims</a> that, by the end of September, 15 of Russia’s 38 main refineries had been knocked out and another 12 had reduced production. The figures cannot be independently verified. One risk this winter is that, if <a href="https://ru.themoscowtimes.com/2026/09/15/tri-izshestiosnovnih-proizvoditeleidiztopliva-vrossii-snizili-ili-ostanovili-vipusk-posle-atak-bpla-a206123">attacks</a> resume, strikes could <a href="https://www.kpler.com/blog/winter-2026-27-scenarios-for-the-russian-oil-industry">shift</a> from gasoline capacity to light gas oil — the feedstock for both winter diesel and aviation kerosene.</p><h3 class="outline-heading">Who will face the shortage</h3><p style="margin-left:0pt;">Domestic Russian consumption of ordinary diesel typically <a href="https://theins.ru/news/298758">falls</a> to about 140,000 tons a day in October as the harvest ends and the summer freight season winds down. With output at about 180,000 tons, the safety margin is nearly 30% — well below the 80% margin <a href="https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/9007563">claimed</a> by Deputy Prime Minister Alexander Novak, who on Oct. 30 <a href="https://xn--90aivcdt6dxbc.xn--p1ai/articles/news/aleksandr-novak-nakoplenie-dizelya-na-zimu-idet-v-dostatochnom-obeme/">assured</a> the public that winter diesel was “sufficient, given the production plans of the companies, naturally.” But those plans changed after the Ukrainian attacks in November, potentially wiping out the entire margin.</p><p style="margin-left:0pt;">For now, the shortage is regional and grade-specific. In St. Petersburg, the share of filling stations with diesel available <a href="https://ru.themoscowtimes.com/2026/11/02/v-peterburge-voznikla-nehvatka-dizelya-posle-srochnogo-vivoza-topliva-v-ssha-a210339">fell</a> from roughly 70% to less than 40% over the course of a week. Economist Janis Kluge <a href="https://x.com/jakluge/status/2116947799720030584" target="_blank">has written</a> that Russia was still producing enough diesel in October and that the shortage was caused by the logistical <a href="https://novostitambova.ru/news/2612285547435/" target="_blank">challenge</a> of moving fuel through nearby Primorsk.</p><p style="margin-left:0pt;">On Oct. 26, diesel was <a href="https://novostitambova.ru/news/2612285547435/">unavailable</a> at 29 of 214 filling stations in Tambov Region. In Sverdlovsk Region, some Tatneft stations <a href="https://tagilcity.ru/news/2026-11-01/itogi-oktyabrya-na-azs-ekaterinburga-benzin-desheveet-no-gde-vzyat-dizel-5721957?utm_source=ru.themoscowtimes.com&utm_medium=referral&utm_campaign=ru.themoscowtimes.com&utm_referrer=ru.themoscowtimes.com">stopped</a> selling it. By Nov. 9, Rosneft stations had <a href="https://ru.themoscowtimes.com/2026/11/09/nekotorye-regiony-vnov-vveli-ogranicheniya-na-roznichnuyu-prodazhu-topliva-a210769">introduced</a> sales restrictions in Karelia (where drivers on the highways could buy no more than 50 liters of diesel) and in Ulan-Ude.</p><p style="margin-left:0pt;">Restrictions were also <a href="https://novayagazeta.eu/articles/2026/11/09/rosneft-vernula-ogranichenia-na-svoikh-azs-v-shesti-regionakh-news">reported</a> in the Transbaikal, Arkhangelsk, and Penza regions, and Krasnoyarsk Krai. Once the reserves that were accumulated during the pause in Ukrainian refinery attacks run out, the acute shortage will spread, albeit unevenly.</p><p style="margin-left:0pt;">The first to suffer will be cold regions with long, expensive supply chains and dependence on one or two refineries, namely the Northwest, Eastern Siberia, and the Far East, where winter and arctic diesel are required. For everyone else, diesel will become substantially more expensive. Prices for winter diesel <a href="https://www.interfax.ru/business/928009">traditionally peak</a> at the beginning of October, but this year, they will likely remain at record highs for far longer.</p><p style="margin-left:0pt;">Freight transport will be hit hardest, as fuel is its main variable cost (accounting for 30% of the bill for a typical long-haul trip). Retail, however, will suffer as a consequence. <a href="https://pro.rbc.ru/demo/6a5665699a7947a550fd207c?utm_source=telegram&utm_medium=messenger&utm_campaign=rbc_news&utm_content=6a5665699a7947a550fd207c">According to the ATI.SU exchange</a>, average road-haulage rates <a href="https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/8989333">rose</a> 17.5% from late May to mid-July and by 28.8% year-on-year. By Sept. 5, the ATI.SU freight-cost index had <a href="https://www.tks.ru/logistics/2026/10/19/0004/avtoperevozki-v-rossii-dorozhayut-iz-za-toplivnyih-pereboev-i-nehvatki-transporta/">reached</a> an all-time record of 2,443 points.</p><p style="margin-left:0pt;">The army, which is supplied centrally, will probably be affected last. </p><h3 class="outline-heading">Racing the drones</h3><p style="margin-left:0pt;">This year has shown clearly that, during intense Ukrainian drone campaigns, Russian refining capacity is knocked out faster than it can be repaired. According to the International Energy Agency, in the first eight months of the year Ukrainian drones successfully <a href="https://oilprice.com/Latest-Energy-News/World-News/Drone-Strikes-Cripple-Half-of-Russias-Top-Diesel-Refineries.html">struck</a> Russian refining facilities roughly once every three days.</p><p style="margin-left:0pt;">Repairs to key units <a href="https://www.kpler.com/blog/ukraines-drone-campaign-pushes-russian-refinery-runs-to-21-year-lows">take months</a>, according to Kpler, and refineries are often hit again before repairs are complete. From May to September, refinery throughput <a href="https://kommersant.ru/doc/9081165">fell</a> by 1.5 million barrels a day. During the July pause, about 1 million barrels a day of capacity were <a href="https://www.kpler.com/blog/winter-2026-27-scenarios-for-the-russian-oil-industry">restored</a>, and by the end of October refining had risen to approximately 5 million barrels a day.</p><p style="margin-left:0pt;">The lull did not last long. After Trump’s announced “energy truce” collapsed on Oct. 30, Ukraine attacked key Russian refineries, knocking out another 30% of refining capacity. “Taking into account the strikes on Omsk and Volgograd, the attacks hit facilities producing about 55% of Russia’s marketable gasoline, with roughly the same share of domestic supplies,” says Sergei Vakulenko, a senior research fellow at the Carnegie Russia Eurasia Center in Berlin. Vakulenko <a href="https://t.me/sergeyvakulenko/251">notes</a> that there are still no precise data on the damage, and he does not rule out the possibility that the plants may need to shut down completely.</p><p style="margin-left:0pt;">Moscow’s export promises are becoming increasingly unrealistic. Russia planned to export about 2.15 million tons of diesel in November, including 500,000 tons under its deal with the United States. But 2.15 million tons in November means about 72,000 tons a day. With domestic demand at 140,000 tons, refineries would have to produce more than 210,000 tons a day — far more than they were producing at the end of October.</p><p style="margin-left:0pt;">Does maintaining the export ban mean the government expected a shortage? In part. Officially, the ban was extended to keep the domestic fuel market stable. The quotas allow the authorities to regulate exports manually, depending on what is happening at the refineries.</p><p style="margin-left:0pt;">But the ban has a second function: it keeps domestic prices down. The December ICE gas-oil futures contract <a href="https://www.ice.com/products/34361119/low-sulphur-gasoil-futures/data?marketId=6227608&span=1">closed</a> at $1,298 per ton on Nov. 13. Interseasonal diesel was trading on the Russian exchange that day at $737 per ton. Even after freight and discounts are taken into account, unrestricted exports would quickly pull fuel out of the domestic market, and the budget is already spending huge sums on the fuel-price damping mechanism. In October, for example, payments to oil companies <a href="https://minfin.gov.ru/ru/statistics/fedbud/oil?id_57=122094-svedeniya_o_formirovanii_i_ispolzovanii_dopolnitelnykh_neftegazovykh_dokhodov_federalnogo_byudzheta_v_2018-2026_godakh">exceeded</a> 550 billion rubles ($6.7 billion).</p><h3 class="outline-heading">The Ukrainian military did what sanctions could not</h3><p style="margin-left:0pt;">Until recently, Russia was a major diesel exporter, <a href="https://carnegieendowment.org/ru/russia-eurasia/politika/2026/10/russia-usa-diesel-agreement">supplying</a> around 40 million tons to the global market in 2025. For comparison, its seaborne exports of diesel and gas oil <a href="https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2026/07/08/russia-bans-diesel-exports-to-ensure-domestic-supply-after-targeted-ukrainian-drone-strikes-a93202">amounted</a> to 1.8 million tons in June, compared with 3.35 million tons a year earlier. After Moscow announced its export ban on July 8, the spread between gas-oil and Brent prices <a href="https://theins.ru/news/298523">rose</a> to a then-record $60 a barrel, later climbing to nearly $95 at the end of September. From the start of the year through Oct. 20, Russian diesel exports <a href="https://theins.ru/news/298640">fell</a> 41% year-on-year.</p><p style="margin-left:0pt;">Nevertheless, the main driver of the price increase was not the strikes on Russian refineries but the war in Iran. According to the IEA, Middle Eastern petroleum-product exports <a href="https://www.ogj.com/general-interest/economics-markets/news/55411809/iea-oil-supply-rebound-remains-fragile-diesel-tightness-persists">amounted</a> to 1.9 million barrels a day in September, compared with 4.7 million before the start of the conflict. The price of diesel also set a historic high in September, reaching $200 a barrel. Russia’s situation intensified the price shock, but it did not cause it.</p><blockquote>Strikes on Russian refineries intensified the price shock, but the shock was caused by the US war with Iran</blockquote><p style="margin-left:0pt;">The Trump administration was actively <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/10/17/trump-eases-russia-oil-sanctions-but-is-europe-still-buying-moscows-gas">trying</a> to bring fuel prices down before the Nov. 3 midterm elections. In addition to the diesel deal with Russia, the United States applied direct pressure on Ukraine, which Trump and his Treasury secretary, Scott Bessent, publicly <a href="https://www.ng.ru/economics/2026-10-11/1_9600_price.html">blamed</a> for aggravating the crisis. But prices did not fall.</p><p style="margin-left:0pt;">Between Oct. 9 and 28, retail diesel in the United States <a href="https://www.yahoo.com/news/us/articles/trump-putin-diesel-deal-not-094000834.html">rose</a> from $6.28 to $6.35 a gallon. Not a single tanker reached the United States, with New Jersey Governor Mikie Sherrill warning operators of the state’s ports and terminals that accepting Russian diesel could result in criminal liability.</p><p style="margin-left:0pt;">A group of U.S. senators issued a similar warning to banks, port authorities, and fuel distributors. As a result, the tanker <i>Agioi Fanendes</i>, carrying 40,000 tons of fuel, <a href="https://theins.ru/news/298640">left</a> Primorsk on Oct. 22 and was due to unload on Nov. 7. Insead, it slowed down, changed its status to “awaiting instructions,” and turned toward Canada. Two other tankers listed under the Trump–Putin diesel deal headed toward Brazil and the Mediterranean. Brazilian traders <a href="https://theins.ru/news/299495">rejected</a> the offer because the price was too high compared with American diesel.</p><p style="margin-left:0pt;">The sharp rise in fuel prices also contributed to the Republicans’ defeat in the midterm congressional elections. Although oil and diesel prices fell temporarily in early November, that was primarily due to <a href="https://mansfield.energy/2026/11/06/week-in-review-oil-prices-retreat-on-iran-peace-hopes-and-weaker-global-demand/">hopes</a> of de-escalation around Iran, not expectations of Russian supplies.</p><p style="margin-left:0pt;">As for sanctions, the European Union’s embargo and price cap, in force since 2023, did not remove Russian diesel from the global market. Instead, Russian supplies were <a href="https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/6110233">redirected</a> to Turkey, Brazil, and other buyers. This year, the physical volume of Russian exports was constrained more by drones and Moscow’s own export ban than by U.S. sanctions, which is why relaxing the sanctions did not add to supply. </p><aside class="related-posts"><ul><li><a href="https://theins.press/en/inv/299072">Oil on the water: How Russia avoided accountability for the Black Sea tanker disaster caused by its sanctions evasion efforts</a></li></ul></aside>]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Tue, 17 Nov 2026 19:01:57 +0000</pubDate>
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      <title><![CDATA[Trove of leaked documents show Deutsche Bank served Russian companies after 2022 and conducted transactions for sanctioned oligarchs]]></title>
      <link>https://theins.press/en/news/299712</link>
      <guid>https://theins.press/en/news/299712</guid>
      <dc:creator><![CDATA[The Insider]]></dc:creator>
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      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>An international group of journalists has gained access to 15.6 million confidential documents from Deutsche Bank, Germany’s largest financial institution. The documents reveal its financial transactions with Russian oligarchs, American financier Jeffrey Epstein, and other clients who aroused suspicion among the bank’s employees. Titled “Inside Deutsche Bank,” the <a href="https://www.lemonde.fr/en/les-decodeurs/article/2026/11/17/inside-deutsche-bank-an-investigation-by-230-journalists-and-50-news-orgs-into-15-million-files_6782703_8.html">investigation</a> was a joint effort by more than 230 journalists from around 50 media outlets, including <i>Le Monde</i>, <i>Der Spiegel,</i> and the <i>Financial Times</i>.</p><p>The leak includes about 9 million emails, internal review findings, suspicious activity reports, and client risk assessment documents. They cover the bank’s activities from the early 2010s. As the <i>Financial Times</i> <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/4f8dae68-bfec-43bd-bef6-b830815ec538">writes</a>, the documents point to systemic problems when it comes to compliance with anti-money-laundering requirements, which persisted despite management’s promises to reform the bank.</p><p>One of the findings concerns Deutsche Bank’s work with Russian business. According to <i>Le Monde</i>, the bank <a href="https://www.lemonde.fr/en/les-decodeurs/article/2026/11/17/inside-deutsche-bank-despite-scandals-and-war-in-ukraine-bank-maintained-business-ties-with-russians_6782702_8.html">continued</a> interacting with companies including Sibur and Polyus even after their partial owners came under sanctions.</p><p>At the beginning of 2022, Deutsche Bank classified 59 Russian clients as its riskiest, singling out six of them because of their especially controversial reputations. Russian petrochemical giant Sibur made the list due to the fact that 14.5% of the company belonged to Gennady Timchenko, who had been under U.S. and Canadian sanctions since 2018. Sibur’s shareholders also included Kirill Shamalov, who is described as Vladimir Putin’s former son-in-law. In an internal memo, Deutsche Bank acknowledged that Sibur owed its success largely to Timchenko’s political connections. The bank nevertheless continued to serve the company, noting that sanctions against shareholders do not prohibit working with the entity as long as their combined stake does not exceed 50%.</p><p>In an internal investigation, Deutsche Bank also found an approved transfer of €1.1 billion allegedly made in the interests of Russian billionaire Suleiman Kerimov in mid-2020, at a time when Kerimov was already under U.S. sanctions. The money was transferred from the Russian accounts of the British Virgin Islands–registered company Fren Global to its Swiss accounts. Deutsche Bank suspected that Kerimov was the actual beneficiary of the transaction.</p><p>The documents also point to problems with vetting Russian government clients. After Russia’s illegal annexation of Crimea in 2014, Deutsche Bank tightened its control procedures; however, according to the journalists, employees of commercial units tried to circumvent the restrictions. In addition, the bank’s Russian division was suspected of hiring relatives of officials in order to win lucrative contracts. Deutsche Bank paid more than $16 million to settle the related investigation in the U.S., while the bank’s own review found no violations of internal rules.</p><p>Another part of the investigation concerns Donald Trump. As the independent outlet <i>iStories</i> <a href="https://istories.media/stories/2026/11/17/amerikanskii-prezident-i-landromati/">found</a>, since 2014 his companies have received transfers from firms linked to Russian and Azerbaijani money-laundering schemes. In particular, in 2015, Trump’s THC Baku Services received more than $140,000 from the British company Faberlex, which took part in the Azerbaijani Laundromat — a scheme that, among other things, was used to bribe European politicians. According to Deutsche Bank’s internal documents, by 2020 Trump’s companies had appeared in suspicious transactions totaling more than $3 million. At the same time, in 2019 the bank claimed that it knew nothing about Trump’s ties to Russia. Trump himself did not respond to journalists’ questions.</p><p>Another part of the <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/72ac6fee-55f3-4db5-a1e3-873ef39c0b96">investigation</a> is devoted to financier Jeffrey Epstein, who was accused of sexual exploitation of minors and sex trafficking. According to the leak, in 2019 Deutsche Bank sent U.S. authorities 21 suspicious activity reports related to Epstein. They covered around 3,200 transactions totaling $582 million, including transfers to women, transactions involving charitable funds, and payments from wealthy clients of the financier. In particular, they involved billionaires Leon Black and Glenn Dubin.</p><p>Deutsche Bank began serving Epstein in 2013 despite his first conviction for sex crimes in 2008. According to the journalists, bank employees repeatedly raised concerns about the risks associated with the financier. Deutsche Bank received about $1 million in annual revenue from serving Epstein during much of 2015–2018. The bank subsequently paid a total of about $225 million in fines and compensation over the services it provided to Epstein.</p><p>The leak also revealed other problems at Deutsche Bank. As the <i>Financial Times</i> <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/4f8dae68-bfec-43bd-bef6-b830815ec538">reports</a>, the bank failed to record a financial instruments transaction that led to losses of $456 million. The documents also describe cases in which the bank’s CEO, Christian Sewing, challenged decisions by employees responsible for risk control.</p><p>Deutsche Bank said that in recent years it has substantially changed its internal control system, investing €7 billion in such initiatives from 2019 to 2025. The bank also stated that its credit risks related to Russia fell from €3 billion at the end of 2021 to €13 million by the end of 2025. According to <i>Le Monde</i>, the leaked documents were handed over not only to journalists but also to the U.S. Department of Justice and the U.S. financial intelligence unit FinCEN.</p><aside class="related-posts"><ul><li><a href="https://theins.press/en/news/295295">EU sanctions A7 cryptocurrency network and Russian banking executive exposed by The Insider</a></li><li><a href="https://theins.press/en/news/297923">The Insider confirms Russia ties of UK businessman involved in VexPay project, promoted by A7 “shadow banking” network to evade sanctions</a></li></ul></aside>]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Tue, 17 Nov 2026 17:52:50 +0000</pubDate>
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      <title><![CDATA[Kerch Bridge linking mainland Russia with occupied Crimea partially collapses after second Ukrainian attack in two days]]></title>
      <link>https://theins.press/en/news/299708</link>
      <guid>https://theins.press/en/news/299708</guid>
      <dc:creator><![CDATA[The Insider]]></dc:creator>
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      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Ukrainian forces attacked the Kerch Strait Bridge for the second time in two days overnight into Nov. 17, leading to a collapse of one of its arches. Sergei Aksyonov, the Russia-installed head of occupied Crimea, <a href="https://t.me/Aksenov82/10189">reported</a> the new attack late on Nov. 16, adding that traffic across the bridge had been halted.</p><p>Russia’s Transport Ministry <a href="https://t.me/Mintrans_Russia/12101">confirmed</a> that following the overnight drone attack, “traffic on both the road and railway sections of the Crimean Bridge has been temporarily suspended,” adding that ”specialists are assessing the damage. According to preliminary information, no one was injured in the incident.”</p><p>A government commission responsible for dealing with the consequences of the attack was reported to have scheduled a meeting today, according to state-run news agency <a href="https://t.me/tass_agency/406101" target="_blank">TASS</a>.</p><p>Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky later confirmed that the attack on the bridge was part of a large-scale operation by Ukraine’s Security Service (SBU) and the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine that took several weeks to prepare.</p><p>In a statement <a href="https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/21848">posted</a> on social media, Zelensky called the operation “unprecedented” and linked it to Russian strikes on Ukrainian infrastructure. He said Moscow had repeatedly rejected proposals for de-escalation while continuing to attack Ukrainian bridges and other strategic objects across the country.</p><p>The strike on the bridge was the seventh and final stage of the operation, according to Zelensky. Before that, Ukrainian forces targeted Russian air defense systems, radars, electronic warfare equipment, and other facilities used by Russia to protect the structure.</p><p>Several types of drones were used in the attack, while the final strike involved Neptune and Flamingo missiles and Ruta drones. The missiles struck the road deck, while the drones targeted the railway tracks.</p><p>Zelensky also shared footage of Ukrainian missiles approaching the bridge, as well as the aftermath of the strikes, which clearly showed the destruction of the road bridge and the collapsed arch:</p><div>https://t.me/theinsru/4303</div><p>The open source intelligence (OSINT) project Dnipro Osint ⟨ Harbuz ⟩ used a 3D reconstruction to <a href="https://t.me/DniproOfficial/8398">recreate</a> a preliminary picture of the damage caused by the attack. “As a result of multiple strikes, an arched span of the road section of the Kerch Bridge more than 270 meters long collapsed. Damage to the railway tracks has also been observed,” the group said. The channel said the attack halted road and rail traffic across the bridge as well as shipping through the Kerch Strait.</p><figure><img src="https://theins.press/storage/content_image/display/6af/6afc8af7310981.95085245/V7y19MOYJvp9jCMhrmIG415oQ0Mp4fd5cphLsQKv.jpg" alt="A key section of the 12-mile-long, double-arched bridge has collapsed onto the seabed following multiple Ukraine strikes over the course of two days"/><figcaption>A key section of the 12-mile-long, double-arched bridge has collapsed onto the seabed following multiple Ukraine strikes over the course of two days</figcaption></figure><p>The Ukrainian monitoring channel Exilenova+ also <a href="https://t.me/exilenova_plus/34748">reported</a> that the arch of the road section had <a href="https://t.me/exilenova_plus/34746">collapsed</a> into the waters of the strait. Meanwhile, Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov <a href="https://www.interfax.ru/russia/1129537">commented</a> that there was “no doubt” that the bridge would be rebuilt:</p><blockquote><p>“A plan will be drawn up. The sequence of work and the timetable for reconstruction will be determined. There is no doubt that the bridge will be restored and will be even better than before.”</p></blockquote><p>The Kerch Strait Bridge was previously <a href="https://theins.ru/news/299653">attacked</a> on Nov. 16, leading to a temporary suspension of traffic. The pro-war Russian Telegram channel Dva Mayora (lit. “Two Majors”) <a href="https://t.me/dva_majors/102081">wrote</a> at the time, citing a newly published photograph, that the bridge had “generally held up” after the strike. According to the security-services-linked Telegram channel Mash, the warhead of one of the drones <a href="https://t.me/mash/79406">“fell onto the right-hand arch from the Crimea side,”</a> causing it to appear to shift by about 15 degrees.</p><p>Construction of the 12-mile-long Kerch Bridge began in February 2016. The road section opened in May 2018, followed by the railway section in December 2019.</p><p>OSINT researcher Special Kherson Cat <a href="https://x.com/bayraktar_1love/status/2122616069718196551">noted</a> that installing the arch during the bridge’s construction took 14 months. Assembly began on land in August 2016, and the arch was not installed on the bridge until October 2017.</p><aside class="related-posts"><ul><li><a href="https://theins.press/en/inv/295748">Unwilling “terrorists”: The Insider speaks with the men the Kremlin accuses of bombing the Kerch Strait Bridge</a></li><li><a href="https://theins.press/en/news/287216">Russia sentences eight defendants in Kerch Bridge bombing case to life imprisonment</a></li><li><a href="https://theins.press/en/news/281809">Kerch Strait Bridge briefly closed to traffic after Ukraine says it damaged supports in underwater blast</a></li></ul></aside>]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Tue, 17 Nov 2026 17:14:49 +0000</pubDate>
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      <title><![CDATA[EU naval mission targeting Russia’s “shadow fleet” has no port for detained tankers, maritime expert says]]></title>
      <link>https://theins.press/en/news/299706</link>
      <guid>https://theins.press/en/news/299706</guid>
      <dc:creator><![CDATA[The Insider]]></dc:creator>
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      <description><![CDATA[]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>On Nov. 15, EU foreign policy chief Kaja Kallas <a href="https://theins.ru/news/299607">announced</a> that European military personnel had boarded the tanker <i>Midag</i> (<span class="termin" data-description="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">IMO</span>: 9266841) in the Mediterranean Sea and confirmed that it was sailing under a false flag. The vessel was not detained, however, and was instead allowed to continue its voyage. As <i>The Insider</i> <a href="https://theins.press/en/news/299623">found</a>, the tanker had previously loaded Russian oil in Russia’s Primorsky Krai before being sanctioned by the United States for transporting Iranian crude.</p><p>One problem limiting the ability of the EU’s IRINI naval mission to detain such vessels is the absence of a designated port where they can be taken and subjected to further inspections, maritime security expert Gonzalo Saiz Erausquin told <i>The Insider</i>.</p><p><strong>Erausquin, a research fellow at the Centre for Finance and Security at the UK think tank Royal United Services Institute (RUSI),</strong> said the mission depends on individual EU countries being willing to accept detained vessels and to bear the associated costs:</p><blockquote><p>“The EU decision to expand IRINI's mandate to cover maritime domain awareness in the Mediterranean was a bold move to counter Russia's shadow fleet operations. IRINI has successfully boarded several tankers for flag verification but IRINI does not have a designated port where it can hold detained vessels and perform extensive inspections.</p><p>IRINI currently relies on coastal Member States making their own port to hold a detained asset. This makes IRINI dependent on inconsistent national appetites to face related costs and could be mitigated by the EU providing a designated port to IRINI to conduct its operations and carry out inspections that could further disrupt shadow fleet operations.</p><p>Most European detentions of shadow fleet vessels have been carried out under Article 110 of UNCLOS, that allows states to board vessels suspected of having no nationality — that is, falsely flagged tankers. The intervening state can then conduct the necessary inspections and if it identifies other technical deficiencies, it could decide to detain the ship until these are mitigated.</p><p>Most detentions have then allowed shadow fleet tankers to resume their voyage after a days or weeks, forcing Russia to incur greater delays and costs, but failing to cease their transits entirely.”</p></blockquote><p>An internal <a href="https://fragdenstaat.de/dokumente/274948-sachstand-mission-irini-24022026/">document</a> from the European External Action Service dated Feb. 23, 2026, and sent to the Council of the EU the following day also states that IRINI has no dedicated port or facility for holding detained vessels. The document’s authors said the lack of necessary infrastructure limited the mission’s effectiveness. As an example, they cited the July 2025 inspection of the vessel <i>Aya 1</i> (IMO: 9293557) as part of IRINI’s efforts to enforce the arms embargo on Libya. A port to which the ship could be taken and a facility where it could be held would have to be designated before a full inspection and seizure of cargo could take place, the document said.</p><p>In the same document, European officials recommended expanding IRINI’s monitoring of Russia’s “shadow fleet” and allowing military personnel to board vessels suspected of using false flags, citing Article 110 of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) as justification. According to the mission, 442 out of the nearly 600 Russian tankers then under EU sanctions passed through IRINI’s area of responsibility in 2025. Since it began carrying out maritime situational awareness tasks in 2025, IRINI has identified 72 vessels suspected of lacking nationality and confirmed 18 cases in which ships were sailing under false flags.</p><p>On Oct. 9, 2026, the Council of the EU extended IRINI’s mandate through the end of March 2029 and added countering Russia’s “shadow fleet” to its tasks. According to the mission’s Nov. 9 <a href="https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/eunavfor-med-irini-activity-report-october-2026_en">report</a>, however, that work primarily involves monitoring vessels, gathering information, and verifying their nationality. By early November, IRINI personnel had carried out six vessel boardings to check flags.</p><p>The lack of a port is not the mission’s only limitation. Article 110 itself does not specify what should happen to a vessel once it has been confirmed to lack valid registration, <strong>Nele Matz-Lück, co-director of the Walther Schücking Institute for International Law and a professor of international law,</strong> told <i>The Insider</i>:</p><blockquote><p>“Article 110 does not say anything about the consequences of the inspection. It is silent on the next steps, if the control results in confirmation that the vessel is stateless or was sailing under a (second) false flag.</p><p>States react differently: some ships that were boarded and considered stateless have been detained and fined, some have continued their journeys. While every ship must have a nationality, control rights do not automatically lead to confiscation. There is still private ownership of the vessel and its cargo.</p><p>The mere fact that a ship is listed on the EU list of ‘shadow fleet vessels’ is not sufficient for controls or detention on the high seas. On the high seas (including for that purpose the EEZ) only allegations of piracy or – as here – statelessness give rights to interception but, as above, not necessarily detention.”</p></blockquote><p>As international maritime law experts previously <a href="https://theins.press/en/news/287009">explained</a> to <i>The Insider</i>, even after a tanker is detained, authorities still face questions over the legality of continuing to hold it, who will maintain the vessel, and what should happen to its cargo and crew.</p><aside class="related-posts"><ul><li><a href="https://theins.press/en/news/299623">EU forces board Russian “shadow fleet” tanker and confirm its use of a false flag before allowing sanctioned vessel to continue its voyage</a></li><li><a href="https://theins.press/en/news/287009">EU drafts new sanctions targeting Moscow’s “shadow fleet,” aiming to block flag states from registering Russian vessels</a></li><li><a href="https://theins.press/en/inv/294884">Crewing the shadows: The Insider exposes the firms staffing Russia’s sanctions-busting fleet of oil tankers and explains why they matter</a></li><li><a href="https://theins.press/en/opinion/vladimir-milov/272913">Ghost ships: Vladimir Milov explains why Putin&#039;s “shadow fleet” defies sanctions and what can be done about it</a></li><li><a href="https://theins.press/en/news/294417">France fines owner of detained “shadow fleet” tanker Tagor €1 million for lack of flag as ship resumes voyage</a></li></ul></aside>]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Tue, 17 Nov 2026 16:43:17 +0000</pubDate>
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      <title><![CDATA[Les Misérables 2.0: The recent wave of violent protests in France is having a remarkably small impact on presidential polls]]></title>
      <link>https://theins.press/en/politics/299672</link>
      <guid>https://theins.press/en/politics/299672</guid>
      <dc:creator><![CDATA[Sergei Mikhaylov]]></dc:creator>
      <enclosure url="https://theins.press/storage/post_cover/display/299/299672/ocdEmGCg1BfKH3lhjZppHKBRnSYNh5YgJZvYmeqH.jpg" length="0" type="image/jpeg"/>
      <description><![CDATA[<p>Contrary to the forecasts of some political scientists, the new wave of protests in France has not led to any significant shift in the country’s political alignments. The sharp rise in social discontent among the French youth has so far had no substantial impact on the ongoing presidential campaign. Polling does not show a strengthening of the positions of radical candidates such as Marine Le Pen and Jean-Luc Mélenchon. Instead, paradoxically, after a month and a half of turmoil, it is the moderate forces (such as the Socialist Raphaël Glucksmann) that have come out ahead — even if the shift has not yet been enough to put them through to the second round of the election this spring.</p>]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>This April, France will go to the polls to choose Emmanuel Macron’s replacement. Almost from the beginning, however, the election campaign has been driven not by the candidates, but by the citizens in the streets. It all started with protests by high school students, who on Sept. 17 <a href="https://www.lemonde.fr/campus/article/2026/10/05/au-lycee-saint-exupery-de-creteil-ou-les-blocages-ont-commence-les-cours-ont-repris-mais-les-revendications-demeurent_6788551_4401467.html">announced</a> a blockade of high schools. Their example spread quickly, aided by the fact that parents and teachers alike acknowledged that the demands of the older students were justified.</p><p>While the government was pondering how to deal with the situation, the demonstrations escalated to include <a href="https://www.lexpress.fr/idees-et-debats/lycee-incendie-a-nantes-a-force-de-compatir-nous-avons-cesse-dinstruire-par-pierre-bentata-NN3ENUVJTRBPDMPD634IXFW3E4/">clashes</a> with the police and fires not only in garbage containers but in classrooms and even entire high schools. Very soon, college students joined the protests by blockading universities. Negotiations between the government and the students failed to produce a compromise, and youth leaders called for their actions to continue.</p><p>Perhaps the government hoped that the unrest would simply subside during the nationwide school vacation in late October — after all, it might seem pointless to blockade high schools that are closed anyway. Instead, however, the protest movement received a new impetus: “adult” unions, as well as numerous left-leaning political and civic forces (from Jean-Luc Mélenchon’s La France Insoumise party to the yellow vests and environmentalists) called for nationwide demonstrations on Oct. 17 to rally against the “rising cost of living” and, more broadly, a lack of social justice.</p><p>The Oct. 17 protests were <a href="https://www.lefigaro.fr/politique/limoges-l-incendie-de-la-mairie-a-ete-premedite-il-y-a-eu-des-reperages-affirme-le-maire-20261019">marked</a> by street riots and fights with the police, massive fires that destroyed the city hall in Limoges and <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-bMa0t16hCY">the tourist office</a> in Lyon, damage to numerous administrative buildings, and looting at hundreds of small shops, cafés, and offices. The number of demonstrators reached 800,000, according to the organizers, and 550,000, according to <a href="https://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Manifestations_du_17_octobre_2026_en_France">police estimates</a>. France had not seen such violence since the peak of the yellow vest movement.</p><figure><img src="https://theins.press/storage/content_image/display/6af/6afc0cb2e14c63.26830947/bwAtchRlS2NaDCkKr9CJ4aetqNvaPIt19EoBsj4N.jpg" alt="The historic Limoges city hall building burned down almost completely as a result of arson"/><figcaption>The historic Limoges city hall building burned down almost completely as a result of arson</figcaption></figure><p>Despite the obvious domestic shock and the deterioration of France’s image around the world, the same forces called for the action to be repeated a week later, on Oct. 24, under the same slogans — as if nothing had happened.</p><p>This time the police were better prepared, and as a result, the number of clashes and detentions was lower and no city halls burned. But riots still took place. The organizers again claimed 800,000 participants, while the police <a href="https://www.lemonde.fr/societe/live/2026/10/24/en-direct-manifestations-du-24-octobre-entre-410-000-et-800-000-manifestants-corteges-sous-haute-surveillance-tensions-en-fin-de-journee-revivez-la-journee-de-mobilisation_6799445_3224.html">counted</a> 410,000.</p><p>The government is trying to meet the high school students halfway. The authorities promise to increase funding for problem areas and to abolish Parcoursup — the electronic system for assigning graduates to universities, which has <a href="https://www.franceinfo.fr/societe/education/blocage-des-lycees/ce-qui-va-changer-pour-les-lyceens-apres-l-annonce-du-remplacement-de-parcoursup_8255467.html">attracted</a> widespread criticism. Despite these accommodating steps, the unions are not inclined to reconcile.</p><p>On Saturday, Oct. 31, 70,000 law enforcement officers maintained order on the streets, although the new marches drew fewer participants and were almost entirely peaceful.</p><p>This may be explained both by the fact that the authorities had earlier opened 83 criminal cases over the use of excessive force by police and gendarmes, and by the festive occasion: Oct. 31 marked both the end of the vacation and Halloween. As a result, many potential protesters had made personal plans, putting civic engagement on hold.</p><h3 class="outline-heading">From protests to riots</h3><p>The most spectacular feature of the French unrest was footage of rioting. One might get the impression that a significant part of the demonstrators consists precisely of this type of people — athletic-looking, masked, clad in black, and pulling incendiary devices out of backpacks.</p><p>The reality, of course, was different. Mass protests can only happen if they are supported by a multitude of very different people willing to set aside their daily affairs. Those who plan to provoke violence first hide in the crowd, using the columns of demonstrators to cover their intentions.</p><p>At the current protests in France, there are two types of rioters. The first is members of various ultra-left <a href="https://www.lefigaro.fr/actualite-france/qui-sont-vraiment-les-casseurs-ultra-violents-du-17-octobre-20261019">groups</a> that recognize revolutionary violence as one of the legitimate methods of defending their rights. They are not large in number, but they coordinate their actions online and how to show up where the police are not expecting them. They act quickly, and even if only a few dozen of them are present, that is enough to cause serious damage.</p><p>The second category is residents of disadvantaged neighborhoods who are not political but are always up for looting a shop with broken windows. In a sense, these two types complement each other. In the last 10 to 15 years, French left-wing protests have frequently seen the involvement of rioters, even if the unions and Socialists always disavow them.</p><blockquote>French left-wing protests have frequently attracted rioters 
</blockquote><p>Not all mass events in France turn violent. When Pope Leo XIV came to the country for a four-day <a href="https://www.pape-france.fr/programme/">visit</a> at the end of September, no unrest occurred during or after public Masses despite the fact that the religious events gathered hundreds of thousands of believers. As a result, many got the feeling that rioters feel uncomfortable in Catholic France, while in Mélenchon’s France they can count on understanding, if not support.</p><h3 class="outline-heading">Political beneficiaries of the protests</h3><p>Marine Le Pen’s rating has been coming in at 35% or more in almost all recent polls. Moreover, she has now become the <a href="https://www.ipsos.com/fr-fr/presidentielle-2027-melenchon-progresse-le-pen-reste-en-tete">perceived leader</a> of any potential second-round runoff in May, regardless of who her opponent is. The government’s inability to suppress the unrest is largely seen as a weakness of Macron’s policy, affecting the ratings of all center-left or center-right candidates.</p><p>Throughout her long political career, Le Pen has maintained an image counter to that of more traditional party leaders, with their tendency to always negotiate and often buy social peace by yielding to pressure from the street. Instead, Le Pen has assured voters that she would use the harshest methods to deal with the rioters, and while these are nothing but promises so far, the more burned buildings and looted shops ordinary citizens see, the sooner they will tie their hopes to a political force that prioritizes restoring elementary order.</p><p>One <a href="https://actu.fr/politique/marine-le-pen-veut-reserver-le-benefice-des-apl-aux-francais-qui-sont-les-etrangers-qui-peuvent-toucher-cette-aide_64784105.html">clause</a> in Le Pen’s program provides for cutting social benefits for foreigners, even for those with legal residency and employment. It goes without saying that she is preparing additional sanctions against participants in the unrest, as well as against the migrant parents of underage high school students who have been implicated in illegal actions. At the same time, Le Pen promises tax breaks to raise the overall standard of living, although how she expects to finance them remains unclear.</p><p>Notably, her program says nothing about the boring legal and technical obstacles that would have to be overcome in order to implement these plans, but such details are of interest to relatively few voters. Nor do they care about the fact that the overwhelming majority of those detained during the unrest on Oct. 17 and 24 were French nationals.</p><p>If France gets bogged down in protests, as it did in the days of the yellow vests, the pre-election wind will keep blowing in Le Pen’s sails, maintaining the illusion that she is the only candidate who knows what to do to solve the problem. </p><blockquote>If France gets bogged down in protests, as it did in the days of the yellow vests, the pre-election wind will keep blowing in Marine Le Pen’s sails
</blockquote><p>The left-wing Jean-Luc Mélenchon is too partisan to enjoy broad support. It would seem that the protests should help raise his rating, keeping him in the spotlight and offering him the stage to voice his most radical views as he tries to assign roughly equal responsibility to the rioters and the police. But such rhetoric convinces only his supporters. His rating <a href="https://www.publicsenat.fr/actualites/politique/sondage-presidentielle-2027-un-second-tour-le-pen-melenchon-assure-la-droite-et-le-bloc-central-peine-a-remonter-lisnard-confirme-sa-percee">remains</a> unchanged at approximately 18%, putting him second in the first round of the election.</p><p>Moderate candidates, both on the right and on the left, are in for a hard time. They clearly condemn violence and call for rioters to be held to account, but these declarations remain mere words. The centrists’ opponents are armed with a convincing reproach — that the moderates, who have been in power for decades, are responsible for bringing the country to its current riotous state. </p><figure><img src="https://theins.press/storage/content_image/display/6af/6afc0d0a2594b1.75179396/n5X49Yv3PkAmutt24IAVxevn6HCDvB6VLZpDDRdA.jpg" alt=""/></figure><p>Judging by the ratings of moderate candidates from Édouard Philippe to Raphaël Glucksmann, the only way either of them could pass Mélenchon and get the chance to go head-to-head with Le Pen in the second round is by joining forces. The problem is that such a broad union of centrists is unlikely because of both their personal ambitions and discord within their potentially overlapping electorate. Nevertheless, in January and February some alliances may still take shape.</p><h3 class="outline-heading">Impact of the crisis</h3><p>The cost of servicing France’s government debt, as <i>The Insider</i> has noted, <a href="https://theins.press/en/economics/298652">exceeded</a> 5% for ten-year bonds, meaning that the budget needs emergency austerity measures. Meanwhile, practically all the demands of the demonstrators involve additional funding.</p><p>High school students were the first to present the government with a bill for overcrowded classes, a shortage of teachers, and poor operation of cafeterias and school nurse offices. Obviously, eliminating these shortcomings would require money immediately, and the allocations would have to become regular.</p><p>The protesters' demands grew with the scale of the protests. The slogan against the “rising cost of living” alone means that the problem cannot be fixed with targeted measures. The demonstrators call for lower fuel prices, an increase in the minimum wage, better social services, and lower taxes. Even those who have not been taking part in rallies largely agree that the outrage of their fellow citizens is justified. It is precisely this public support, not always explicit but nevertheless tangible, that lends legitimacy to those who propose continuing the protests.</p><p>The government has no good options. On the one hand, it is under pressure from Brussels and the financial markets. On the other, the pressure from angry crowds is growing. It is impossible to keep on track with gradually reducing the budget deficit and restoring manageability of government debt while simultaneously handing out more money to various categories of citizens.</p><p>President Emmanuel Macron, in his <a href="https://www.liberation.fr/societe/manifestations-du-24-et-25-octobre-ce-quil-faut-retenir-de-la-prise-de-parole-demmanuel-macron-20261022_JDN6RFDJSVBRJDZKXKAABPIJOE/">speech</a> in the wake of the events of Oct. 17 and 24, did not declare a state of emergency but urged the nation to show its civic stance by postponing the protests so as not to interfere with the election. But the street is not inclined to wait.</p><figure><img src="https://theins.press/storage/content_image/display/6af/6afc0d29d2c315.41741700/5s3QWjveSwnoiZ1r5GFs77Vabf1lGKr0rv5gktcl.jpg" alt="Emmanuel Macron did not dare to introduce a state of emergency in France"/><figcaption>Emmanuel Macron did not dare to introduce a state of emergency in France</figcaption></figure><p>As a result, the election campaign is taking place against a backdrop of destructive unrest and growing public discontent. In such conditions, populists thrive, as they provide straightforward solutions that many voters find appealing. At the same time, the radicalization of the protests brings back to the forefront the problem of necessary but unpopular reforms.</p><p>During his campaign ten years ago, presidential candidate Emmanuel Macron published a <a href="https://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/R%C3%A9volution_(essai)">book</a> titled <i>Revolution</i>, proposing a plan of transformations that was supposed to bring France to prosperity. The author boldly criticized the indecisiveness of the political elites and their inability to act.</p><p>Today, summing up Macron’s two presidential terms, citizens reproach him for the same indecisiveness, and pension reform still remains one of the most pressing problems. Time has been lost, France’s economic situation has become significantly worse, and voters will have to entrust someone new with the authority to look for solutions: Marine Le Pen with her rhetoric of national priority, a new reformer from the centrist camp, or the elemental force of the street protests themselves.</p><aside class="related-posts"><ul><li><a href="https://theins.press/en/economics/298652">A choice between debt and inflation: As protests rage, the French government has no good option for solving its financial problems</a></li><li><a href="https://theins.press/en/politics/285647"> Macron’s latest PM is out: France’s return to political turmoil</a></li><li><a href="https://theins.press/en/politics/297761">A referendum on Marine Le Pen: Sunday&#039;s elections to the French senate showed a populist victory is possible in the 2027 presidential race</a></li></ul></aside>]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Tue, 17 Nov 2026 08:17:46 +0000</pubDate>
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      <title><![CDATA[Half of the Russians in new EU sanctions package listed with incomplete or incorrect data, The Insider finds]]></title>
      <link>https://theins.press/en/news/299662</link>
      <guid>https://theins.press/en/news/299662</guid>
      <dc:creator><![CDATA[The Insider]]></dc:creator>
      <enclosure url="https://theins.press/storage/post_cover/display/299/299662/UYoXX4N01cd75YbPJrDb1YTfKAhimTED1WompnMe.jpg" length="0" type="image/jpeg"/>
      <description><![CDATA[]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>The European Union’s latest sanctions package against Russia <a href="https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2026/11/16/russia-s-fimi-and-malicious-cyber-activities-council-imposes-sanctions-on-30-individuals-and-two-entities/">targets</a> 42 individuals and 103 organizations. <i>The Insider</i> found that while the entries for legal entities are largely accurate, the list of individuals contains two significant errors and dozens of cases lacking necessary identifying information.</p><p>Under <a href="https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=OJ:L_202602558">Council Decision 2026/2556</a> of Nov. 16, 2026, sanctions were imposed on the <span class="termin" data-description="PHAgc3R5bGU9Im1hcmdpbi1sZWZ0Oi01cHg7Ij7QntCe0J4gwqvQkNCz0LXQvdGC0YHRgtCy0L4g0YHQvtGG0LjQsNC70YzQvdC+0LPQviDQv9GA0L7QtdC60YLQuNGA0L7QstCw0L3QuNGPwrsgKNCe0J7QniDCq9CQ0KHQn8K7KTxicj4mbmJzcDs8L3A+">Social Design Agency (SDA)</span>, along with 30 individuals. Of those 30 people, 29 have no passport numbers listed, 16 do not include a date of birth, and four are missing even their patronymics — middle names derived from a person’s father’s first name that are commonly used in Russia. The document from the Council of the EU, however, does feature some information about user IDs on the social network VK.</p><figure><img src="https://theins.press/storage/content_image/original/6af/6afb7207210652.17336607/RnTzqJfgFKpx8astZ8RcwqgU7n14ZfY7dznK39gu.png" alt="Entry no. 89 in the new sanctions list identifies Social Design Agency employee Elena Grigoreva"/><figcaption>Entry no. 89 in the new sanctions list identifies Social Design Agency employee Elena Grigoreva</figcaption></figure><p>For example, entry no. 89 identifies Social Design Agency employee Elena Grigoryeva (spelled “Grigoreva” in the designation) but lists no date of birth, passport number, or patronymic. Russia’s business registry alone contains 279 active and 1,082 inactive individual entrepreneurs with that name, while the total number of women named Elena Grigoryeva throughout the country is likely in the thousands.</p><p>The lack of precise identifying information can create both enforcement gaps and problems for unrelated people with the same name. Due to the imprecision, sanctioned individuals are more likely to slip through screening when applying for visas or opening bank accounts, while namesakes risk being wrongly denied such services.</p><p>Another document published Nov. 16, <a href="https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=OJ:L_202602575">Council Decision 2026/2575</a>, imposed restrictions on 12 individuals and 101 legal entities. Of the 101 organizations, two contain errors in their names or legal forms. <span class="termin" data-description="PHAgc3R5bGU9Im1hcmdpbi1sZWZ0Oi01cHg7Ij7QntCe0J4gwqvQk9Cw0LfQv9GA0L7QvCDQvdC10YTRgtC10YXQuNC8INCh0LDQu9Cw0LLQsNGCwrs8L3A+">Gazprom Neftekhim Salavat LLC</span> is listed as an <span class="termin" data-description="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">OJSC</span>, or open joint-stock company, while <span class="termin" data-description="PHA+PHNwYW4gc3R5bGU9ImJhY2tncm91bmQtY29sb3I6cmdiKDI1NSwyNTUsMjU1KTtjb2xvcjpyZ2IoNjgsNzEsNzApOyI+0J7QntCeIMKr0KDQmC3QmNC90LLQtdGB0YLCuzwvc3Bhbj48L3A+">RI-Invest LLC</span> is listed under its former name, <span class="termin" data-description="PHA+PHNwYW4gc3R5bGU9ImJhY2tncm91bmQtY29sb3I6cmdiKDI1NSwyNTUsMjU1KTtjb2xvcjpyZ2IoNjgsNzEsNzApOyI+0J7QntCeIMKr0KDRg9GB0LjQvdCy0LXRgdGCwrs8L3NwYW4+PC9wPg==">Rusinvest LLC</span> (even if an a.k.a. section does mention LLC ‘RI - INVEST.)</p><p>None of the 12 individuals has passport information listed, and <span class="termin" data-description="PHAgc3R5bGU9Im1hcmdpbi1sZWZ0Oi01cHg7Ij5JbiB0d28gY2FzZXMsIGl0IGlzIG1pc3NpbmcgZW50aXJlbHk7IGluIHR3byBvdGhlciBjYXNlcywgb25seSB0aGUgeWVhciBpcyBsaXN0ZWQuPC9wPg==">four</span> lack a complete date of birth. Two are also listed with incorrect Russian taxpayer identification numbers (TINs): Luiza Zavenovna Papazyan is assigned a TIN belonging to another sanctioned individual, Artur Robertovich Paranyants, while Ruslan Baysarov (often described in Russian media as a “<span class="termin" data-description="PHA+QSDigJx3YWxsZXTigJ0gKDxpPtC60L7RiNC10LvRkdC6PC9pPikgaXMgYW4gaW5mb3JtYWwgdGVybSBmb3IgYSB0cnVzdGVkIGFzc29jaWF0ZSB3aG8gaG9sZHMgb3IgbWFuYWdlcyBhc3NldHMgb24gYmVoYWxmIG9mIGEgbW9yZSBwb3dlcmZ1bCBwb2xpdGljYWwgZmlndXJlLCBhY3RpbmcgYXMgdGhlaXIgZmluYW5jaWFsIHByb3h5LjwvcD4=">wallet</span>” for Chechen leader Ramzan Kadyrov), is listed with a TIN that belongs to Tatyana Kim, the founder and CEO of the online marketplace Wildberries.</p><p>The Chinese companies <a href="https://theins.press/en/inv/298263">Xingkai Technology</a> and <a href="https://theins.press/en/inv/292355">Harxon</a>, meanwhile, remain absent from the sanctions lists despite supplying Russia’s <span class="termin" data-description="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">Alabuga</span> drone factories with nearly all of their mesh modems and anti-jamming GNSS antennas.</p><p>Last month, <i>The Insider</i> <a href="https://theins.press/en/inv/298740">reported</a> that a previous EU sanctions package had been prepared with the help of a large language model (LLM) — it, too, contained numerous errors. The list included companies that had long ceased operations, individuals without dates of birth, and aliases used in place of real names. Chinese companies were also largely absent despite China’s growing role in the Kremlin’s sanctions circumvention efforts.</p><aside class="related-posts"><ul><li><a href="https://theins.press/en/inv/298263">China’s drone modem pipeline: How mesh technology helps Russian UAVs penetrate deep into Ukraine</a></li><li><a href="https://theins.press/en/inv/292355">Geraniums in bloom: The Insider and Nordsint reveal how a large Chinese firm supplies Russian drone production</a></li><li><a href="https://theins.press/en/inv/298740">Copy-paste from Brussels: The EU’s error-riddled new sanctions package was generated using an LLM</a></li><li><a href="https://theins.press/en/news/299661">EU sanctions 24 employees of Kremlin-linked disinformation operation after The Insider’s investigations</a></li></ul></aside>]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Mon, 16 Nov 2026 21:16:17 +0000</pubDate>
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      <title><![CDATA[EU sanctions 24 employees of Kremlin-linked disinformation operation after The Insider’s investigations]]></title>
      <link>https://theins.press/en/news/299661</link>
      <guid>https://theins.press/en/news/299661</guid>
      <dc:creator><![CDATA[The Insider]]></dc:creator>
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      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>The European Union has imposed sanctions on 24 employees of the Social Design Agency (SDA), one of the Kremlin’s most visible contractors for spreading disinformation abroad. The move follows a series of investigations from <i>The Insider</i> that identified members of the Kremlin-linked operation and exposed the methods it has used to target audiences in Europe, Armenia, and Israel. The agency itself, which has been under EU sanctions since July 2023, was also included in the bloc’s new sanctions list. In all, the <a href="https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2026/11/16/russia-s-fimi-and-malicious-cyber-activities-council-imposes-sanctions-on-30-individuals-and-two-entities/">Council of the EU said</a> it had imposed restrictions on 30 people and two organizations over Russia’s destabilizing activities and cyberattacks.</p><p>According to the <a href="https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/dec/2026/2556/oj">Council’s decision</a>, the Social Design Agency conducts large-scale disinformation and foreign-interference campaigns financed and controlled by the Russian presidential administration. Major SDA operations abroad require approval from Sergei Kiriyenko, the first deputy chief of staff of the Russian presidential administration, while their day-to-day implementation is overseen in part by Sofia Zakharova, an employee of the Kremlin’s information and communications technology directorate who has been under EU sanctions since December 2024.</p><p>One of the SDA’s goals is to undermine public support for Ukraine throughout Europe. The EU specifically cited interference in the 2024 European Parliament elections and information operations targeting Germany and France. SDA employees who were sanctioned took part in what the agency called its “European counter-campaign” and “Ukrainian counter-campaign.”</p><p>In an <a href="https://theins.press/en/inv/298359">October investigation</a> into the Doppelgänger disinformation network, <i>The Insider</i> detailed how the Kremlin’s projects were organized, who ran them, and who produced the fabricated content they put out.</p><h3 class="outline-heading">What The Insider uncovered about the Kremlin’s disinformation operation</h3><p><i>The Insider</i> obtained hacked correspondence between employees of the SDA and Russia’s presidential administration, as well as internal agency documents. The records showed that one of the initiators of the Doppelgänger campaign was Kiriyenko, while its direct implementation was overseen by political consultant Ilya Gambashidze, who had previously worked with State Duma lawmakers Leonid Slutsky and Pyotr Tolstoy.</p><p>As early as spring 2022, shortly after Russia launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Kiriyenko and Gambashidze discussed organizing a propaganda campaign in the West. That summer, the Kremlin decided to launch the operation in five European countries. One of the SDA’s main methods involved the creation of websites mimicking well-known Western media outlets and using them to publish fabricated news stories.</p><p>Among the false stories spread by the agency’s employees were claims that Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky had bought two luxury yachts, reports of expensive purchases by first lady Olena Zelenska, and fake images of graffiti depicting Zelensky in European cities. Inside the agency, fabricated photographs, videos, and documents were referred to as “augmented reality.”</p><p>In early 2023, the SDA also launched a separate “Ukrainian counter-campaign” aimed at discrediting the government in Kyiv, dividing the country’s elites, demoralizing the Ukrainian armed forces, and sowing disorder among the population. The Kremlin official primarily responsible for overseeing the project was Alexander Kharichev, who at the time headed the presidential directorate responsible for supporting the work of Russia’s State Council. SDA employees fabricated directives purportedly issued by Ukraine’s Defense Ministry and circulated fake quotations attributed to the ministry’s officials.</p><p><i>The Insider</i> also published separate investigations into the Social Design Agency’s activities in three countries:</p><ul><li><strong>Hungary.</strong> Ahead of the April 2026 parliamentary elections, <i>The Insider</i> <a href="https://theins.press/en/inv/291361">reported</a> how the Kremlin used its disinformation networks to support Viktor Orbán and discredit his main rival, Péter Magyar. Russian propagandists sought to persuade Hungarians that Magyar’s rise to power would lead to higher prices and draw the country into a war with Russia on Ukraine’s side. The information campaign involved structures linked to Russia’s presidential administration and the GRU, Russia’s military intelligence agency.</li><li><strong>Armenia.</strong> Ahead of the country’s June 7, 2026, parliamentary elections, <i>The Insider</i> <a href="https://theins.press/en/inv/293081">found</a> that SDA political consultant Andrey Perla, who had previously taken part in similar operations in Europe, the U.S., and Latin America, was among those coordinating the spread of disinformation in Armenia. The agency reported back to the Kremlin on the work of the Yerevan First website, which published material targeting Armenia’s political leadership. Pro-Kremlin networks spread false claims about Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan’s health, alleged corruption, and a purportedly impending war with Russia.</li><li><strong>Israel.</strong> As <i>The Insider</i> <a href="https://theins.press/en/inv/298619">found</a> in October 2026, the SDA used not only media outlets and social networks to spread Kremlin narratives but also specially created pseudo-expert organizations designed to appear independent. Among the main themes of Russian disinformation in Israel were claims that Western weapons supplied to Ukraine were being diverted to Hamas. Internal agency documents helped establish links between participants in the campaign and local journalists, influencers, rabbis, and members of the Knesset.</li></ul><p>The Social Design Agency itself has been under EU sanctions since 2023. In October 2024, Britain also imposed sanctions on the <a href="https://search-uk-sanctions-list.service.gov.uk/designations/RUS2292/Entity">SDA</a>, its head <a href="https://search-uk-sanctions-list.service.gov.uk/designations/RUS2290/Individual">Ilya Gambashidze</a>, and political consultant <a href="https://search-uk-sanctions-list.service.gov.uk/designations/RUS2289/Individual">Andrey Perla</a>.</p><h3 class="outline-heading">Who else was sanctioned by the EU?</h3><p>In addition to SDA employees, the European Union imposed sanctions on six propagandists. They include Vitaly Eliseev, host of Pervy Kanal’s flagship evening news program Vremya; REN TV presenter Petr Marchenko; blogger Yuri Podoliaka; and Irish RT correspondent Chay Bowes.</p><p>The restrictions also target the pro-Russian hacking group NoName057(16), which emerged in March 2022. The group has claimed responsibility for cyberattacks against government agencies, critical infrastructure, and private companies in Ukraine, the United States, and EU countries. Its targets in Europe have included energy and transportation companies, banks, water systems, political parties, and individual candidates.</p><p>Assets in the EU belonging to the sanctioned individuals and organizations must be frozen, and providing them with funds is prohibited. The sanctioned individuals are also barred from entering or transiting through the European Union.</p><h3 class="outline-heading">Full list of those sanctioned</h3><p><strong>Social Design Agency employees:</strong></p><ul><li>Andrey Naumovich Perla — chief ideologue and analyst.</li><li>Alexey Vitalyevich Ulyanov — political consultant and head of media operations.</li><li>Viktor Nikolaevich Ostreshko — head of the content department and analyst.</li><li>Anastasia Olegovna Kazakova — head of the social media department and editor at the Ves publishing house.</li><li>Vladimir Igorevich Golovashin — writer.</li><li>Alexander Pavlovich Kochetov — writer.</li><li>Sergey Vyacheslavovich Tatti — editor of the “Pulse” system and director of the Tver City Youth Center.</li><li>Elena Grigoreva — anti-monitoring operator, responsible for tracking and countering efforts to detect or disrupt the agency’s campaigns.</li><li>Olga Alexandrovna Polosina — monitoring department employee.</li><li>Viktoria Igorevna Gordeeva — monitoring department employee.</li><li>Andrey Petrovich Manzolevskiy — project manager.</li><li>Mikhail Alexandrovich Baraev — head of the design department and analyst.</li><li>Aleksei Vladimirovich Medvedev — senior analyst and ideologue.</li><li>Yan Gennadyevich Nalimov — editor and writer.</li><li>Evgenia Viracheva — editor and writer.</li><li>Gulnara Vilsurovna Androsova — writer.</li><li>Igor Vladimiroch Bogatyrev — writer.</li><li>Vladimir Viktorovich Kremlev — artist and caricaturist.</li><li>Sergey Nikolaevich Korsun — artist and caricaturist.</li><li>Armen Genrikhovich Asryan — writer.</li><li>Ilya Vladimirovich Lipkind — writer and analyst.</li><li>Vladimir Aleksandrovich Troshin — systems administrator in Manzolevsky’s department.</li><li>Aleksei Andreevich Klimovskiy — writer.</li><li>Alina Maratovna Gabdullina — team leader in Manzolevskiy’s department.</li></ul><p><strong>Propagandists:</strong></p><ul><li>Chay Bowes — Irish RT correspondent and co-founder of The Islander News.</li><li>Aleksey Stefanov — Sputnik Latvia journalist and coordinator of the channels Shproty v Izgnanii (lit. “Sprats in Exile”) and S Baltiyskim Privetom (lit. “Greetings From the Baltics”).</li><li>Vitaliy Borisovich Eliseev — host of Pervy Kanal’s Vremya news program.</li><li>Yurii Ivanovich Podoliaka — military blogger.</li><li>Daniil Viktorovich Bezsonov — military blogger and former senior official in the so-called “Donetsk People’s Republic.”</li><li>Petr Valentinovich Marchenko — host of REN TV’s Itogovaya Programma (lit. “Final Program”).</li></ul><p><strong>Organizations:</strong></p><ul><li>Social Design Agency LLC (SDA).</li><li>NoName057(16) — a pro-Russian hacking group.</li></ul><p>On the same day, the European Union <a href="https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2026/11/16/ukraine-eu-lists-113-individuals-and-entities-to-further-restrict-russia-s-ability-to-finance-its-war-of-aggression/">imposed</a> sanctions on an additional 12 individuals and 101 organizations linked to financing Russia’s war against Ukraine. Those targeted include <a href="https://theins.ru/news/299631">Tatyana Kim</a>, the founder and CEO of the online marketplace Wildberries, as well the St. Petersburg Oil Terminal and around 50 Russian banks and financial institutions.</p><aside class="related-posts"><ul><li><a href="https://theins.press/en/inv/298359">Putin’s “Doppelgängers”: The Insider gets inside the operations of the Kremlin&#039;s foreign disinformation network</a></li><li><a href="https://theins.press/en/inv/291361">“Matryoshka” enters the fray: The Kremlin and the GRU are spreading disinformation in Hungary ahead of its pivotal parliamentary election</a></li><li><a href="https://theins.press/en/inv/293081">“Pashinyan’s illness,” “looming war with Russia,” and “gas chambers on Mount Ararat”: Moscow floods Armenia with disinfo ahead of elections</a></li><li><a href="https://theins.press/en/inv/298619">“Write like a 38-year-old Israeli woman”: The Kremlin used fake media and fabricated “experts” to spread disinformation in Israel</a></li></ul></aside>]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Mon, 16 Nov 2026 21:00:17 +0000</pubDate>
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      <title><![CDATA[Three men convicted in killing of Boris Nemtsov released from prison and living in Chechnya, Proekt reports]]></title>
      <link>https://theins.press/en/news/299660</link>
      <guid>https://theins.press/en/news/299660</guid>
      <dc:creator><![CDATA[The Insider]]></dc:creator>
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      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Zaur Dadaev and brothers Anzor and Shadid Gubashev, who were convicted in the 2015 killing of Russian opposition politician Boris Nemtsov, have been released from prison and are living freely in Chechnya, according to an <a href="https://www.proekt.media/investigation/ubiytsy-nemzova-na-svobode/">investigation</a> by the Russian investigative outlet <i>Proekt</i>. Before their release, the men signed contracts with the Russian Defense Ministry, but they are not taking part in the war against Ukraine.</p><p>Dadaev, whom a court found to be the gunman who killed Nemtsov, was sentenced to 20 years in prison. However, according to <i>Proekt</i>, Dadaev and his accomplices — Anzor Gubashev, who was sentenced to 19 years, and Shadid Gubashev, who was sentenced to 16 years — signed military contracts with Russia’s Defense Ministry, allowing them to be released from the penal colonies where they were serving their time. However, they were not sent to the front in Ukraine. Instead, they returned to Chechnya, where a source cited by <i>Proekt </i>said they are living “quiet lives.” The source said keeping a low profile was a condition of their release, “so that no one would find out they were free.”</p><p><i>Proekt </i>said leaked records showed that Dadaev, who had been serving his sentence at Penal Colony No. 3 (IK-3) in Irkutsk, left the facility “in connection with a transfer,” but no records were found showing his arrival at another prison. The same wording was used to describe the transfer of other inmates from the same colony who signed contracts with the Defense Ministry and who actually went to fight in Ukraine.</p><p>Leaked social insurance records also show Dadaev registered as a resident of the Yukarchoi hamlet in Chechnya, a mountainous, heavily forested area located approximately 50 miles from Grozny. During his imprisonment, Dadaev married Irsana Mukaeva, an employee in the legal department of Chechen leader Ramzan Kadyrov’s administration. A personal account was also opened in the name of Zaur Sharipovich D. at Promsvyazbank, a state-controlled Russian bank that serves military personnel.</p><p>The Gubashev brothers have also been released from prison and are living in Chechnya, according to <i>Proekt</i>. Anzor’s sentence was due to run until 2034, and he would not have been eligible for parole before 2027. Shadid was supposed to remain imprisoned until 2031 and became eligible for parole in 2025.</p><p><i>Novaya Gazeta Europe</i> previously <a href="https://novayagazeta.eu/articles/2024/08/13/oni-svoikh-killerov-ne-brosaiut">reported</a> that Temirlan Eskerkhanov, another man convicted in Nemtsov’s killing, had also been released from prison. He was pardoned after signing a contract with Russia’s Defense Ministry but was not deployed to the front lines and instead was sent to guard industrial plants in Russian-occupied Mariupol in southern Ukraine.</p><p>The only person convicted in the case who was released after serving his full prison sentence was Khamzat Bakhaev. All of the men convicted in Nemtsov’s murder are now free.</p><p>Boris Nemtsov was <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-31669061">killed</a> on Feb. 27, 2015, on Moscow’s Bolshoy Moskvoretsky Bridge, just outside the Kremlin walls. His attackers shot him seven times before fleeing by car. Those who ordered the killing have never been identified.</p><p>As <i>The Insider</i> <a href="https://theins.press/en/politics/249717">reported</a>, operatives from the same Federal Security Service (FSB) assassination unit linked to the poisonings of the late Alexei Navalny, writer Dmitry Bykov, and opposition politician Vladimir Kara-Murza repeatedly followed Nemtsov during the final months of his life. Their surveillance began shortly after Nemtsov started actively lobbying for expanded sanctions against associates of Vladimir Putin and stopped on Feb. 21, just days before Nemtsov was killed near the Kremlin.</p><aside class="related-posts"><ul><li><a href="https://theins.press/en/politics/249717">Protection from the Constitution: Before Nemtsov&#039;s murder, he was tailed by the same FSB hitmen who poisoned Navalny, Bykov, and Kara-Murza</a></li></ul></aside>]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Mon, 16 Nov 2026 20:54:08 +0000</pubDate>
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      <title><![CDATA[At least 110,000 Swiss precision rounds shipped to Russia in sanctions-evasion scheme, The Insider identifies importers]]></title>
      <link>https://theins.press/en/news/299659</link>
      <guid>https://theins.press/en/news/299659</guid>
      <dc:creator><![CDATA[The Insider]]></dc:creator>
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      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Despite a ban on Swiss ammunition exports to Russia that has been in place since 2014, Russia has received at least 110,000 rounds of high-precision Swiss-made ammunition after the start of its full-scale invasion of Ukraine. The Swiss newspaper <i>NZZ am Sonntag</i> <a href="https://www.nzz.ch/schweiz/vom-berner-oberland-nach-moskau-schweizer-scharfschuetzenmunition-gelangt-illegal-nach-russland-ld.10060901">found</a> that sniper-rifle ammunition manufactured by RUAG Ammotec reached Russia through Slovenia and Kyrgyzstan. <i>The Insider</i> identified the recipients as the Russian arms companies Varyag and Hunter Ru and also found documents covering another shipment of 10,400 rifle rounds from the same Swiss manufacturer.</p><p><i>NZZ</i> journalists found documents in the database of Rosakkreditatsiya, Russia’s Federal Accreditation Service, covering two shipments of Swiss ammunition. The first, consisting of 60,000 rounds, was registered on Dec. 30, 2022, and the second, containing 50,000 rounds, on April 5, 2023. In both cases, the manufacturer was listed as RUAG Ammotec AG of Thun, Switzerland.</p><p><i>The Insider</i> found that the recipient of the first shipment was Moscow-based Varyag, while the second went to Hunter Ru. Varyag imported 60,000 rounds of .338 Lapua Magnum ammunition with 250-grain (16.2 gram) HPBT bullets, while Hunter Ru imported 50,000 rounds of .308 Winchester ammunition with 168-grain (10.9-gram) bullets. <i>The Insider</i> also found documents for a third shipment of Swiss ammunition: on March 5, 2022, St. Petersburg-based Levsha Group received a certificate of conformity covering 10,400 rounds of RUAG Ammotec AG .223 Remington ammunition.</p><p>The Russian importers declared both shipments identified by NZZ as intended for civilian use. Ammunition in those calibers, however, is commonly used in precision and sniper rifles. Switzerland’s State Secretariat for Economic Affairs (SECO), which oversees arms-export controls and sanctions compliance, confirmed to the newspaper that the ammunition listed in the Russian documents was classified as military materiel.</p><p>Until the summer of 2022, the plant in Thun belonged to the Swiss state-owned defense company RUAG. It was then acquired by Italian firearms group Beretta. The facility now operates as SwissP Defence; the ammunition that ended up in Russia is marketed under the slogan “The Sniper’s Choice.”</p><h3>How the Swiss ammunition reached Russia</h3><p>According to <i>NZZ</i>, the ammunition was initially exported legally from Switzerland to Slovenia under a permit issued by SECO. The buyer was Slovenian arms dealer Gašper Hejbal, who assured Swiss authorities that the ammunition would remain in Slovenia.</p><p>Documents from Slovenia’s Defense Ministry reviewed by the journalists indicate that Hejbal resold the ammunition to two companies in Kyrgyzstan specializing in hunting goods. Kyrgyzstan is a member of the Eurasian Economic Union, a status that facilitates the subsequent movement of goods into Russia. NZZ did not name the Russian recipients but noted that both companies had previously appeared in cases involving the illegal import of Western sniper rifles into Russia.</p><p>Hejbal had already been the subject of a <i>Politico</i> investigation in 2023. The outlet found that his company, Valerian, appeared in Russian documents covering shipments of hundreds of thousands of rounds for Orsis rifles. The same investigation found that Wagner Group mercenaries used U.S.-made sniper ammunition in Ukraine. Hejbal denied supplying ammunition to Russia at the time. This time around, he did not respond to <i>NZZ’s</i> requests for comment.</p><p>In a post published on Oct. 7, 2024, the Russian pro-war Telegram channel Bolshoi Panda <a href="https://t.me/bigbattlepanda/13707">published</a> a photograph of a box of Swiss-made SWISS P Target .308 Winchester ammunition. The channel’s author praised the rounds’ accuracy, adding that they had been issued to Russian troops by a military rocket and artillery armaments service. The caliber and bullet weight match those listed in the certificate for the shipment of 50,000 Swiss rounds received by Hunter Ru in 2023.</p><p>In an edited version of the post, the blogger also claimed that such ammunition had been sold in Russian gun stores before 2014. He provided no documentary evidence, however, to suggest that the rounds in question had been imported before sanctions were introduced.</p><p>SwissP Defence said it had never exported ammunition to sanctioned countries and was cooperating with authorities. SECO said it was reviewing the information. According to <i>NZZ’s</i> sources, Swiss authorities have already prohibited exports to the company through which Hejbal purchased the ammunition. Hejbal no longer works for that company.</p><h3><i>The Insider</i> previously uncovered shipments of RUAG ammunition to Russia</h3><p>In October 2025, as part of a joint investigation with Canada’s <i>Global News</i> into shipments of Cadex sniper rifles, <i>The Insider</i> <a href="https://theins.press/en/news/286486">found</a> that Moscow-based arms company Varyag had imported ammunition produced by RUAG Ammotec AG. During the first two years of the full-scale war, the company imported 501 firearms and 141,000 rounds of ammunition from various manufacturers, including ammunition for long-range sniper rifles.</p><p><i>The Insider</i> also <a href="https://theins.press/en/society/268988">investigated</a> shipments of weapons and ammunition produced by the Beretta group. The Italian manufacturer maintained a direct presence on the Russian market through Russian Eagle, a joint venture with businessman Mikhail Khubutia. In particular, the Khubutia-linked Okhotnik group of companies <a href="https://theins.ru/news/269923">imported</a> hundreds of thousands of rounds made by European Beretta facilities after the start of the war, including RUAG Ammotec plants in Germany, Sweden, and Hungary.</p><p>In September 2026, <i>The Insider</i> <a href="https://theins.ru/news/297124">found</a> that Russian snipers continued to receive Western-made ammunition and ammunition components. After a series of investigations into the smuggling of European weapons, Rosakkreditatsiya stopped publishing declarations covering several customs codes, but new shipments continue to be documented through posts by Russian military personnel, gun stores, and advertisements on specialized forums.</p><p>The <i>NZZ </i>investigation was published two weeks before a Swiss referendum, scheduled for Nov. 29, in which voters will decide whether to loosen the country’s arms-export laws. Opponents of the changes warn that easing rules governing the re-export of Swiss weapons to third countries would weaken oversight of who ultimately receives them.</p><aside class="related-posts"><ul><li><a href="https://theins.press/en/news/294097">Beretta CEO served on board of Russian arms importer after start of war in Ukraine, supplying Benelli shotguns used by Russian forces</a></li><li><a href="https://theins.press/en/news/286486">Russian snipers are using Canadian Cadex rifles as shipments continue despite sanctions</a></li><li><a href="https://theins.press/en/news/297195">Russian military receives sniper rounds assembled with American and Finnish components</a></li><li><a href="https://theins.press/en/society/268988">Et tu, Beretta? Italian companies continue to supply weapons to Russia no matter what</a></li><li><a href="https://theins.press/en/news/289791">Meet the Pentagon contractor openly offering advice to Russian sniper rifle manufacturers</a></li><li><a href="https://theins.press/en/news/289445">Russia puts up memorial to GRU officer holding an Austrian rifle — the type used by its snipers in Ukraine despite sanctions</a></li><li><a href="https://theins.press/en/news/278477">Russian state TV shows military using U.S.-made sniper rifles and ammunition, despite 2014 embargo</a></li><li><a href="https://theins.press/en/politics/277169">Shooting Ukraine in the back: Sniper rifles and ammunition from the EU and U.S. are being supplied to Russia despite sanctions</a></li></ul></aside>]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Mon, 16 Nov 2026 20:34:17 +0000</pubDate>
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      <title><![CDATA[Estonia to close all border crossings with Russia after suspected GRU plot targeting drone maker]]></title>
      <link>https://theins.press/en/news/299657</link>
      <guid>https://theins.press/en/news/299657</guid>
      <dc:creator><![CDATA[The Insider]]></dc:creator>
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      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Estonia will close all border crossings with Russia starting Dec. 1, according to a Nov. 15 announcement <a href="https://x.com/MFAestonia/status/2121984246890049781">posted</a> by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Tallinn. The decision follows an <a href="https://www.err.ee/1610196715/laupaeva-oosel-runnati-vene-luureteenistuse-tellimusel-kaitsetoostusettevotte-threod-hoonet">attempt</a> to set fire to a facility belonging to Threod Systems, an Estonian defense company that manufactures drones. Estonian counterintelligence says the sabotage operation was organized by Russia’s military intelligence service, the GRU.</p><blockquote><p>“Russia’s attempts to intimidate, destabilise, or undermine our security will come with a price. We will take every necessary step to protect Estonia’s security,” the Foreign Ministry said.</p></blockquote><p>According to Estonian public broadcaster <a href="https://news.err.ee/1610196794/estonia-prepares-to-close-border-with-russia-after-gru-linked-sabotage-attacks"><i>ERR</i></a>, Interior Minister Igor Taro plans to submit a proposal to the government next week to close all road border crossings serving both pedestrians and vehicles. The government is expected to decide in the coming days whether the closure will be temporary or indefinite.</p><blockquote><p>“Estonia has already significantly restricted traffic to and from Russia at our border crossing points, warning each time that further escalation could result in a complete closure of traffic. Now that moment has arrived, following discussions with the prime minister, I will propose to the government that all Estonia-Russia road border crossing points be closed to both pedestrians and vehicles from the beginning of December,” Taro said.</p></blockquote><p>The minister noted that Estonian residents and truck drivers currently in Russia would have another two weeks to return home. After that, Taro warned, the journey back could become long and difficult. He said closing the border would reduce security risks and help prevent sanctions violations.</p><p>There are currently three road border crossings between Estonia and Russia: Narva-Ivangorod, Koidula-Kunichina Gora, and Luhamaa-Shumilkino. All operate from 7 a.m. to 7 p.m. Estonian time, a measure that has been in effect since this past February, when Estonian authorities <a href="https://theins.ru/news/289156">decided</a> to close all border crossings at night.</p><p>According to Estonia’s Interior Ministry, approximately 444,000 people crossed the border through the three checkpoints in the first half of 2026, 13% fewer than during the same period a year earlier. Vehicle crossings fell by 20% to 35,000.</p><p>Overnight into Nov. 14, an attempted bombing and arson attack on a building belonging to Estonian defense company Threod Systems, whose products are used in Ukraine, was <a href="https://www.err.ee/1610196715/laupaeva-oosel-runnati-vene-luureteenistuse-tellimusel-kaitsetoostusettevotte-threod-hoonet">foiled</a>. Eight people from Latvia were detained on suspicion of involvement. Estonian authorities had also previously accused Russian intelligence services of <a href="https://theins.press/en/news/297689" target="_blank">organizing</a> an arson attack in August on a facility belonging to Milrem Robotics, another producer of unmanned aerial vehicles.</p><p>Estonian Prime Minister Kristen Michal <a href="https://www.valitsus.ee/en/news/prime-minister-michal-preparedness-and-cooperation-stopped-another-sabotage-attempt-russian">said</a> Russian intelligence services use cross-border travel to influence and recruit people, and that closing the border would reduce the threat to Estonian residents. He said Russia was seeking to intimidate Estonia and weaken its support for Ukraine, but that Tallinn’s response would be the opposite: Estonia would continue supporting Kyiv and increase its pressure on Moscow.</p><aside class="related-posts"><ul><li><a href="https://theins.press/en/news/297689">Estonia accuses Russia of ordering arson attack on drone manufacturer Milrem Robotics</a></li></ul></aside>]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Mon, 16 Nov 2026 19:34:16 +0000</pubDate>
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      <title><![CDATA[Lies, damn lies, and rape statistics: How manipulating data on sexual assault became a weapon of the populist right]]></title>
      <link>https://theins.press/en/society/299838</link>
      <guid>https://theins.press/en/society/299838</guid>
      <dc:creator><![CDATA[Andrey Smolyakov]]></dc:creator>
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      <description><![CDATA[<p>New York’s statistics on sexual assault showed a 22% increase in 2025, prompting critics to&nbsp;<a href="https://www.foxnews.com/media/mamdani-roasted-over-assertion-higher-nyc-rapes-come-from-expanded-definition">accuse</a> newly elected Mayor Zohran Mamdani of failing to take women’s safety seriously. But the statistics covering rape are particularly easy to manipulate, and right-wing politicians and propagandists have repeatedly done so. In New York, the increase reflected a change in the legal definition of rape rather than a sudden rise in the number of incidents. Similar revisions drove up FBI statistics in 2013 and Sweden’s figures over the past two decades. Donald Trump used the changing numbers to blame migrants for a nonexistent crime wave in Sweden, while British far-right politician Nigel Farage called Malmö the “rape capital” of Europe. Similar examples can be found across much of the Western world.</p>]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3 class="outline-heading">A fabricated rape epidemic</h3><p>In July 2026, New York Mayor Zohran Mamdani again came <a href="https://www.foxnews.com/media/mamdani-roasted-over-assertion-higher-nyc-rapes-come-from-expanded-definition">under attack</a> from conservative media and commentators. This time, they took the unusual tack of invoking feminism and women’s bodily autonomy.</p><p>During an interview, Mamdani was asked why the number of sexual offenses in the city had risen. He answered that the increase was caused by an expanded legal definition of “rape” adopted in 2025 and that crime was actually declining. That response brought further criticism, with opponents accusing him of downplaying the issue.</p><p>Right-wing bloggers and journalists seized on the opportunity to attack the left-wing politician from a new and electorally sensitive angle. Conservative activist and former athlete Riley Gaines <a href="https://x.com/Riley_Gaines_/status/2076743143798546787?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw%7Ctwcamp%5Etweetembed%7Ctwterm%5E2076743143798546787%7Ctwgr%5Ee3e07356593632cc94bfc6df07c339e3551e29aa%7Ctwcon%5Es1_&ref_url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.foxnews.com%2Fmedia%2Fmamdani-roasted-over-assertion-higher-nyc-rapes-come-from-expanded-definition">asked</a> how women could possibly have voted for him. Republican Rep. Chip Roy of Texas, who previously drew criticism for defending an apparent reference to lynching, also <a href="https://x.com/chiproytx/status/2076770638627303524?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw%7Ctwcamp%5Etweetembed%7Ctwterm%5E2076770638627303524%7Ctwgr%5Ee3e07356593632cc94bfc6df07c339e3551e29aa%7Ctwcon%5Es1_&ref_url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.foxnews.com%2Fmedia%2Fmamdani-roasted-over-assertion-higher-nyc-rapes-come-from-expanded-definition">weighed in</a>. “Rapes are up, rents are up,” he complained on X.</p><p>In fact, however, New York authorities had indeed broadened the legal definition of rape. In 2024, Governor Kathy Hochul signed a law <a href="https://www.pbs.org/newshour/politics/new-york-expands-the-legal-definition-of-rape-to-include-many-forms-of-nonconsensual-sexual-contact">expanding</a> the definition to cover various forms of nonconsensual sexual contact, rather than only forcible vaginal penetration. The law now also treats forced oral or anal penetration, including same-sex assaults, as rape.</p><p>Police subsequently <a href="https://www.cbsnews.com/newyork/news/rape-reports-increasing-nyc-2025/">reported</a> a substantially higher number of such crimes: 893 in 2025, up by 22%, or 163 cases, from 2024. A similar jump occurred after the FBI <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/07/us/politics/federal-crime-statistics-to-expand-rape-definition.html">broadened</a> its own statistical definition, but data sources, including state police and city statistics, use different definitions and collection methods. They <a href="https://www.criminaljustice.ny.gov/crimnet/ojsa/tableau_index_crime.htm">show</a> a modest decline in sexual violence in the city.</p><p>Figures from different agencies — such as the FBI, New York Police Department, and New York State Division of Criminal Justice Services — always differ somewhat because they are collected independently. <a href="https://counciloncj.org/ccj-directory/jeff-asher/">Jeff Asher</a>, an American criminologist, writer, analyst, and founder of <a href="https://www.ahdatalytics.com/">AH Datalytics</a>, <a href="https://jasher.substack.com/p/whats-causing-higher-reported-rape">reached</a> the same conclusion as the mayor: that there is no rape epidemic. The new law is simply doing what it was intended to do — making it easier for survivors of sexual violence to seek justice.</p><h3 class="outline-heading">How changes in the law change the statistics</h3><p>The more complicated a subject is, and the less the general public understands it, the easier it is to manipulate. Statistics on sexual offenses are a particularly clear example.</p><p>“Rape” is a legal definition that differs from country to country — and, in the United States, from state to state. That makes international comparisons almost <a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20240226174305/https://bra.se/bra-in-english/home/news-from-bra/archive/news/2020-09-30-difficult-to-compare-rape-statistics-in-european-countries.html">impossible</a>. Conduct that New York now classifies as rape — for example, sexual assault within a same-sex couple — would be classified in Russia as a separate offense, namely <a href="https://www.consultant.ru/document/cons_doc_LAW_10699/2d540378b753dcbdac4cc5719cc3907279bd5aec/">“violent acts of a sexual nature.”</a> It therefore does not appear in Russian rape statistics. Russian courts hear only <a href="https://sisters-help.ru/learn/statistics">about</a> 2,000 rape cases annually, while cases involving other “offenses against sexual inviolability” arise  roughly <a href="https://stat.xn----7sbqk8achja.xn--p1ai/stats/ug/t/11/s/1">8,000 times</a> a year.</p><p>Definitions also change over time, sometimes gradually through transitional periods and sometimes virtually overnight. As soon as the definition changes, statistics based on that definition change with it, as happened in New York.</p><p>The United States offers one of the clearest examples. Until 2012, the FBI’s Uniform Crime Reports counted rape using a <a href="https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/NBK202252/">definition</a> written in 1929: “the carnal knowledge of a female forcibly and against her will,” meaning only vaginal penetration. Russia still uses a similarly narrow legal definition of rape. Anal or oral assault was not counted as rape, and male victims — or female victims assaulted by other women — were absent from the FBI’s rape statistics, just as they are from Russia’s.</p><figure><img src="https://theins.press/storage/content_image/display/6b0/6b00843e3dbe90.46466392/YkeqGHRYuvzr26vugWmyRHyRoyPZB63sl63Pj29x.jpg" alt=""/></figure><p>In 2013, under Attorney General Eric Holder, the FBI adopted a broader <a href="https://ucr.fbi.gov/crime-in-the-u.s/2013/crime-in-the-u.s.-2013/rape-addendum/rape_addendum_final">definition</a>: penetration of the vagina or anus with any body part or object, or oral penetration, without consent. The agency <a href="https://slate.com/human-interest/2014/11/fbi-2013-crime-report-the-bureau-expands-its-definition-of-rape.html">estimated</a> that the change alone could increase the national number of recorded rapes by more than 40%. That did not mean the United States suddenly had 40% more rapists or rape victims overnight —when crimes were counted under the old definition, the number <a href="https://eu.pressconnects.com/story/news/public-safety/2016/09/09/rape-cases-surge-ny-stats-after-expanded-definition/89966922/">remained</a> essentially unchanged, even if the statistical <a href="https://www.statista.com/statistics/191137/reported-forcible-rape-cases-in-the-usa-since-1990/?srsltid=AfmBOop9uxg0-_AVOzakKcE53hd8g1qTgdPSS-DCGuMpGfcE6OlVq1CA">graph</a> suggested a rise.</p><p>Similar cases can be found elsewhere. In recent years Europe in particular has seen a <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S175606162400020X">wave</a> of legal reforms aimed at making consent central to sexual-offense laws. Denmark, for example, rewrote its rape law so that it primarily rests on the absence of explicit consent rather than threats or physical coercion by the perpetrator. After the law changed, the number of reports in a single year <a href="https://cphpost.dk/2022-01-17/news/rape-cases-increased-in-2021-heres-why/">jumped from 1,392 to 2,110</a>, while the number of cases reaching prosecution <a href="https://www.thelocal.dk/20230317/denmarks-sexual-consent-law-used-as-intended-in-first-two-years">rose from 1,079 to 1,695</a>. Denmark’s director of public prosecutions concluded that the law was “<a href="https://anklagemyndigheden.dk/da/opsamling-paa-fokusomraade-samtykkebaseret-voldtaegtsbestemmelse">working as intended</a>.”</p><p>The Netherlands <a href="https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2024/03/netherlands-historic-victory-as-dutch-law-adopts-consent-based-definition-of-rape/">adopted</a> a similar law in July 2024 and saw a <a href="https://www.dutchnews.nl/2026/07/sexual-violence-support-centre-reports-rose-further-in-2025/">54% increase</a> in reports to specialized support centers in just six months. In Amsterdam alone, complaints to police almost immediately <a href="https://www.qmeet.nl/news/175/amsterdam-sex-crime-reports-jump-31-as-the-netherlands-new-consent-law-starts-working">tripled</a>. Spain is another example. In October 2022, it adopted its “<a href="https://www.pinkerton.com/our-insights/blog/how-spains-consent-law-has-reshaped-crime-data">only yes means yes</a>” law, which merged several categories of sexual violence and abuse into a single offense based on consent. Since then, the number of <a href="https://inspain.news/number-of-rapes-in-spain-increased-by-more-than-53-percent-since-2019/">recorded</a> rape cases nationwide has risen 33.9%.</p><h3 class="outline-heading">“Look at what’s happening in Sweden!”</h3><p>In February 2017, speaking to a crowd in Melbourne, Florida, Donald Trump <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ak3-YHxoKyc">declared</a>: “You look at what’s happening last night in Sweden! ...Sweden, who would believe this? Sweden. They took in large numbers.They’re having problems like they never thought possible.”In reality, however, nothing particularly remarkable had “happened” in Sweden the previous night — at least by U.S. standards. Police <a href="https://www.cbsnews.com/amp/news/trump-tweets-again-about-sweden-attacks-media">arrested</a> a drunken driver and authorities issued an avalanche warning. Former Swedish Foreign Minister Carl Bildt responded to Trump by <a href="https://x.com/carlbildt/status/833219648044855296">asking</a>: “What has he been smoking?”</p><p>It later emerged that Trump had watched a Fox News segment built around a short documentary titled <i>Stockholm Syndrome</i>. In it, filmmaker Ami Horowitz <a href="https://globalnews.ca/news/3260518/trump-sweden-attack-documentary/amp">claimed</a> that sexual assaults had surged in Sweden as a result of the actions of refugees from predominantly Muslim countries.</p><p>Several days later, right-wing British politician Nigel Farage picked up the argument, saying Sweden had accepted more young male migrants per capita than any other European country. According to Farage, this had produced a “dramatic rise in sexual crime” so severe that Malmö had become the “<a href="https://www.sverigesradio.se/artikel/6657536">rape capital</a>” of Europe. In fact, it <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-politics-39056786#:~:text=The%20rate%20of%20reported%20rapes%20in%20Malmo%20has%20not%20dramatically%20risen%20in%20recent%20years%20and%20has%20in%20fact%20declined%20from%20its%20peak%20in%202010%2C%20before%20the%20recent%20large%20increases%20in%20refugees.">had not</a>.</p><p>Sweden is in some respects similar to New York. It broadened its rape law in 2005 and again in July 2018, adopting <a href="https://bra.se/rapporter/arkiv/2025-02-13-samtyckeslagens-tillampning-och-konsekvenser">consent legislation</a> and a new offense commonly translated as “<a href="https://www.domarbloggen.se/vad-menas-egentligen-med-oaktsam-valdtakt/">negligent rape</a>.” Sweden eliminated the previous requirement to prove violence, threats, coercive intent, or that the victim had been in a “particularly vulnerable situation.” Instead, the mere absence of active, affirmative consent became <a href="https://www.thelocal.se/20200616/how-swedens-new-consent-law-led-to-a-75-rise-in-rape-convictions/">sufficient</a> to qualify as rape. “Negligent rape” covers cases in which a person fails to take reasonable steps to establish whether the other person is participating voluntarily.</p><p>According to the Swedish National Council for Crime Prevention, known as Brå, adoption of the consent law increased rape convictions by 75% between 2017 and 2019. Brå’s latest <a href="https://bra.se/english/publications/archive/2025-04-08-application-and-consequences-of-the-consent-law">study</a> found that the increase in recorded rapes after 2018 was almost entirely attributable to the new law.</p><blockquote>The adoption of Sweden’s consent law increased rape convictions by 75% between 2017 and 2019</blockquote><p>Notable, Sweden also <a href="https://factually.co/fact-checks/justice/sweden-rape-legal-definitions-recording-practices-europe-comparison-885908">records each incident of rape separately</a>. If a woman is raped by the same partner multiple times over the course of a year and reports all of them at once, Swedish statistics record multiple rapes, while in many other countries, the same report might be counted as a single crime.</p><p>In a 2000 article titled “<a href="https://link.springer.com/article/10.1023/A:1008713631586">Crime Statistics as Constructs</a>,” a Swedish criminologist explained that comparisons of official crime statistics between countries are extremely risky. Reliable international comparisons, he argued, require standardized victimization surveys, which unfortunately do not exist on the necessary scale.</p><p>There is also no evidence that rape trends in Sweden are caused by migrants. <a href="https://bra.se/rapporter/arkiv/2019-05-28-indikatorer-pa-sexualbrottsutvecklingen-2005-2017">A succession of criminological studies</a> have failed <a href="https://politicalviolenceataglance.org/2019/06/24/swedish-report-shows-no-connection-between-immigration-and-rape/">to establish</a> a correlation or causal link between migration and crime rates, sexual or otherwise. Nevertheless, researchers’ attempts to <a href="https://www.dn.se/nyheter/sverige/bra-flyktingstrommen-forklarar-inte-fler-anmalda-sexualbrotten/">explain</a> that to politicians have had little effect.</p><h3 class="outline-heading">The Kremlin’s hand</h3><p>Kremlin propaganda has also taken advantage of manipulated rape statistics — while sometimes simply inventing such stories. <i>The Insider</i> <a href="https://theins.ru/antifake/19217">wrote about one such case 10 years ago</a>: in 2016, a 13-year-old Russian-German girl in Berlin, publicly known only as Lisa F., disappeared for 30 hours. When she returned, she told her parents that she had been kidnapped and raped by men of “Middle Eastern” or “North African” origin. German police investigated the incident and found no evidence either of abduction or rape. Forensic examination of her phone <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/prosecutors-conclude-russian-german-teens-rape-allegations-were-false/a-19012239">showed</a> that she had actually been hiding in the apartment of a 19-year-old acquaintance after getting into trouble at school. Russia’s state-run Pervy Kanal (lit. “Channel One”) presented the original allegation as fact, helping trigger protest marches by <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-russians-have-helped-fuel-the-rise-of-germanys-far-right-105551?ref=hir.harvard.edu">far-right activists</a> and Russian-speaking residents in several German cities. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov then <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/russia-wants-explanation-over-germanys-handling-of-teen-rape-case/a-19005535">accused</a> the German government of concealing information about the apparently non-existent crime.</p><p>The accusation was serious enough that Germany’s Foreign Ministry <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/germany-warns-russia-against-using-teen-rape-case-for-political-ends/a-19007807">summoned the Russian ambassador</a> and publicly warned Moscow against using “political propaganda” amid an already heated debate over immigration and sexual violence. A German security-policy think tank later <a href="https://www.baks.bund.de/sites/baks010/files/working_paper_2016_11.pdf">described</a> the “Lisa case” as a fabricated story created by Russian propaganda, which is known to deliberately amplify European problems involving immigrants.</p><blockquote>Russian propaganda deliberately amplifies European problems involving immigrants</blockquote><p>Then on Oct. 26, 2016, Channel One <a href="https://www.1tv.ru/news/2016-10-26/312768-v_avstrii_sud_opravdal_bezhentsa_kotoryy_byl_priznan_vinovnym_v_iznasilovanii_rebenka">aired</a> a report about an incident in Austria, claiming that a migrant convicted of rape had been acquitted by the country’s highest court. The claim bore little resemblance to reality, but that did not stop Putin himself <a href="https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2016/11/01/putin-cites-fake-story-from-state-tv-a55967">from referring</a> to it in a speech. <a href="https://theins.ru/antifake/34601">In fact</a>, however, the defendant had not been acquitted and the case had not been closed; it was merely being prepared for a partial retrial.</p><p>That same winter, Russian-language websites began circulating posts about a campaign under the hashtag #sorry that claimed European women who had been raped by migrants were publicly apologizing to their attackers for wearing provocative clothing. The “news” appears to have originated with the satirical outlet <a href="https://panorama.pub/1335-iznasilovannye-evropejki-pokayalis-pered-migrantami.html">Panorama</a>, but it was quickly picked up and embellished — first by <a href="https://cont.ws/@nyka/840280">blogs</a> and then by  relatively mainstream <a href="https://newsland.com/post/6190457-prosti-mustafa-chto-ty-menia-iznasiloval">outlets</a>.</p><p>There are more recent examples. In a January 2025 <a href="https://www.rt.com/news/610829-uk-grooming-gangs-police-failure/">article</a> about a whistleblower complaint concerning Britain’s Operation Linden investigation, Russia Today cited the same sources as British media. However, RT changed the emphasis, turning a story about the failures of a particular police force into an indictment of the British state as a whole.</p><p>Nationalist parties are another beneficiary. One example is the <a href="https://theins.ru/politika/279807">Sweden Democrats</a>, whose roots <a href="https://www.lemonde.fr/en/international/article/2022/10/12/the-sweden-democrats-a-nationalist-party-with-fascist-roots_6000008_4.html">extend</a> to the country’s 1980s-era neo-Nazi movement. During the 2010s, the party almost single-handedly pushed crime and immigration to the top of the national political agenda, significantly <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/epdf/10.1080/01402382.2024.2396775?needAccess=true">influencing</a> the overall public debate.</p><p>Researchers examining Swedish public opinion <a href="https://www.fondapol.org/en/study/sweden-democrats-an-anti-immigration/">found</a> that concern about crime, which had remained consistently low for years, rose sharply after 2015. By 2022, a study published in the <i>Nordic Journal of Criminology</i> showed how Sweden’s mainstream parties across the political spectrum — not only the far right — had begun adopting the same rhetoric once the Sweden Democrats made it politically costly to ignore the issue.</p><p>But political parties are clearly not the whole story. Similar news stories 20 years ago did not trigger such intense debate, fuel culture wars, or regularly become political talking points. Sweden’s 2005 legal reform, for example, almost <a href="https://www.sverigesradio.se/artikel/5241034">tripled</a> its rape statistics relative to other European countries but provoked little international political controversy at the time. As <a href="https://www.sverigesradio.se/artikel/5241034">Swedish Radio</a> noted, foreign criticism focused mainly on the fact that the new law was unusually harsh toward perpetrators.</p><h3 class="outline-heading">The collapse of media gatekeeping</h3><p>Twenty years ago, a rumor about migrants committing an assault would generally have had to pass through a local reporter, an editor, and a publication’s editor-in-chief before reaching a national audience. Major news organizations tried to avoid earning reputations for sensationalism and generally steered clear of obvious fabrications. Today, that quality-control function has largely disappeared, in part because of social media.</p><p>Irish journalist Una Smith <a href="https://www.rte.ie/news/primetime/2023/0209/1355782-false-claims-of-sexual-violence-by-migrants-trend-in-ireland/">described</a> a TikTok video that went viral in the country. It showed a half-dressed man running down a street and telling the person filming him that he had just been raped. The video ended there. Later, it was reposted on other platforms with entirely new details that had appeared from nowhere: the story was supposedly confirmed, and the attackers — now said to number five — were refugees.</p><p>In 2023, the Institute for Strategic Dialogue conducted an <a href="https://www.isdglobal.org/media-mentions/hate-in-plain-sight-extremists-unchecked-activity-spreads-on-tiktok/">investigation</a> analyzing TikTok, Twitter, and Telegram content in Ireland over the course of three months. Researchers found 877 separate unverified allegations of rape or sexual assault by migrants; they were shared or mentioned a total of roughly <a href="https://www.rte.ie/news/primetime/2023/0209/1355782-false-claims-of-sexual-violence-by-migrants-trend-in-ireland/">21,000 times</a>.</p><p>A separate fact-check that year found a viral video claiming that more than 20 migrants had been imprisoned for sexual offenses in Ireland in the previous six weeks alone. In reality, every case mentioned in the video had occurred between <a href="https://www.thejournal.ie/debunked-migrants-asylum-seekers-jailed-rape-sexual-assault-ireland-january-february-2022-6008528-Mar2023/">2000 and 2017</a>. The information had been repackaged and presented as current news by an account that regularly produces anti-immigration content.</p><p>Social media platforms <a href="https://theins.ru/obshestvo/281765">profit</a> from the spread of inflammatory material that provokes anger and hatred. <a href="https://www.frontiersin.org/journals/communication/articles/10.3389/fcomm.2025.1619367/full">Research</a> into social networks and accounts dependent on platform advertising revenue has shown that a single controversial post can attract 100,000 clicks within 24 hours, while a genuine investigation produced over several months may struggle to reach 1,000 views. The situation becomes worse when the algorithms are controlled by unreliable actors such as Elon Musk. Under his ownership, Twitter (now X) <a href="https://journals.plos.org/plosone/article?id=10.1371/journal.pone.0313293">became</a> significantly more hostile, more prone to hateful content, and more saturated with false information, according to researchers.</p><p>At its core, these platforms exploit crowd psychology. A Facebook post about migrants or a Telegram video about a supposedly “confirmed” attack by a refugee gang uses roughly the same mechanism as <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/05/03/opinion/tucker-carlson-mob-mentality.html">lynch mobs</a> did in the 19th century or <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2016/oct/13/social-media-witch-hunts">witch hunters</a> did in the 17th: the accusations are treated as true because everyone else in the crowd already believes them.</p><blockquote>Posts about “refugee gangs” exploit the same crowd psychology as 19th-century lynch mobs or 17th-century witch hunts</blockquote><p>A Pew Research Center study of Americans who primarily receive political news through social media <a href="https://www.pewresearch.org/journalism/2020/07/30/americans-who-mainly-get-their-news-on-social-media-are-less-engaged-less-knowledgeable/">found</a> that they were substantially less informed and more likely to believe false claims than people who relied on other sources of news. Importantly, that segment of the population has grown significantly across Western countries over the past decade, with a recurring Oxford <a href="https://reutersinstitute.politics.ox.ac.uk/sites/default/files/2026-06/DNR%202026%20FINAL_2.pdf">study</a> covering 46 countries finding that trust in news declined most sharply in media environments that had shifted most strongly from television toward social platforms.</p><p>Twenty years ago, “the media” generally meant a relatively small number of outlets that were all bound, however imperfectly, by professional standards. Today it increasingly means individual content creators and anonymous accounts bearing little institutional or reputational responsibility while competing to be first and loudest, regardless of the quality or truthfulness of what they publish.</p><p>One striking recent example came in April 2025, when far-right commentator Milo Yiannopoulos reposted a fabricated article falsely presented as coming from <i>The Atlantic</i>. Its headline read: “The rise in migrant sexual assaults is the price worth paying to end racism.” The post received more than 1 million views on X because the fake headline’s message aligned almost perfectly with the fears and prejudices of Yiannopoulos’ audience.</p><p>Another example emerged in France in 2024, when a claim went viral that the overwhelming majority of rape suspects in Paris were foreign nationals. According to the French Interior Ministry’s own <a href="https://www.misbar.com/en/editorial/2024/07/12/misleading-anti-immigrants-claims-regarding-sexual-crimes-in-france">2023 data</a>, however, 86% of people accused of rape nationwide were French citizens. The viral figure ultimately traced back to a narrow, selectively chosen sample of solved cases from a single police district.</p><p>Even though the “86%” figure is effectively meaningless and does not exist as a valid national statistic, it continues to appear in election debates. In other words, influencing a country’s politics on this scale required little more than one account with a large following on Musk’s platform. </p><aside class="related-posts"><ul><li><a href="https://theins.press/en/society/282269">The hate algorithm: How social media fuels radicalization</a></li><li><a href="https://theins.press/en/society/285412">From “immigrant” to “illegal”: Contrary to populist rhetoric, newcomers still commit crimes at a lower rate than native-born citizens </a></li><li><a href="https://theins.press/en/politics/287028">Bees against honey: Why many immigrants oppose new waves of migration</a></li></ul></aside>]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Mon, 16 Nov 2026 17:40:26 +0000</pubDate>
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      <title><![CDATA[Drones attack three commercial vessels off the coast of Romania, all bound for Moldova]]></title>
      <link>https://theins.press/en/news/299656</link>
      <guid>https://theins.press/en/news/299656</guid>
      <dc:creator><![CDATA[The Insider]]></dc:creator>
      <enclosure url="https://theins.press/storage/post_cover/display/299/299656/20CK8IgiJz5QkaFPdlpqWr0uX8b3QOqm8SuFBuYP.jpg" length="0" type="image/jpeg"/>
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      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>On the evening of Nov. 14, three commercial vessels were attacked by drones in the Black Sea near Romania’s Sulina shipping channel, Romanian Prime Minister Luca Niculescu <a href="https://x.com/LucaNiculescu/status/2121923799415189827">said</a>. <i>The Insider</i> found that all three vessels were headed to the Moldovan port of Giurgiulesti. One of the tankers, which was due to load 6,500 metric tons of sunflower oil in Moldova, changed its declared destination about 90 minutes after the attack and headed toward Greece.</p><p>According to Romania’s Defense Ministry, the first vessel attacked was the Greek-flagged tanker <i>Eviapetrol V</i> (IMO: 9358503) at about 9:10 p.m. local time on Nov. 14. The ship was located 7.4 kilometers from Sulina. Thirty-five minutes later, a drone struck the Saint Kitts and Nevis-flagged cargo ship <i>Marsol</i> (IMO: 9109512), which was 9.3 kilometers southeast of the channel. Both vessels were inside Romanian territorial waters.</p><p>The Romanian Defense Ministry later reported an attack on a third tanker, <i>Ali Najafov </i>(IMO: 9175195), which also sails under the flag of Saint Kitts and Nevis. Fires broke out after the strikes, but the crews were able to extinguish them. No sailors were injured.</p><p>Romanian Air Force fighter jets were scrambled twice on the evening of Nov. 14 after military radar detected aerial targets near the mouth of the Danube. Niculescu called the attacks on civilian vessels a violation of international law and linked them to the worsening security situation in the Black Sea amid Russia’s ongoing war against Ukraine. Romanian authorities, however, have not said who launched the drones that struck the three ships.</p><p>On the morning of Nov. 15, Russia’s Defense Ministry <a href="https://t.me/mod_russia/69025">said</a> Russian forces had continued strikes on Ukrainian port infrastructure and vessels that it claimed were involved in supplying the Ukrainian armed forces. The ministry said it had struck a cargo ship allegedly carrying military and dual-use goods to Odesa. It later <a href="https://t.me/mod_russia/69043">reported</a> striking another cargo ship. In both cases, the ministry did not identify the vessels, give the exact locations of the strikes, or publish video of the attacks. It is unclear whether those statements were connected to the documented attacks on commercial ships off the coast of Romania.</p><h3>All three attacked vessels were headed to Moldova</h3><p>According to data from the vessel-tracking service <a href="https://www.starboardintelligence.com/">Starboard Maritime Intelligence</a> analyzed by <i>The Insider</i>, <i>Eviapetrol V </i>left the Turkish port of Ambarli on Nov. 1 and headed toward Moldova’s port of Giurgiulesti. The tanker had arrived in the area on Nov. 13 and was near Sulina while waiting to enter the channel linking the Black Sea with the Danube.</p><p>At 10:40 p.m. local time on Nov. 14, about 90 minutes after the attack, the crew changed the tanker’s destination in its AIS data from Giurgiulesti to the Greek port of Piraeus. The <i>Eviapetrol V</i> then left the Sulina area. By 4:47 p.m. on Nov. 15, the tanker was in the southern Black Sea off Bulgaria and was moving southeast at 22.2 kilometers per hour.</p><p><i>The Eviapetrol V</i> had been scheduled to load about 6,500 metric tons of sunflower oil in Giurgiulesti. Moldovan agricultural group Trans-Oil <a href="https://logos-pres.md/en/news/trans-oil-the-tanker-eviapetrol-v-was-attacked-whilst-en-route-to-giurgiulesti-to-be-loaded-with-sunflower-oil/">said</a> the tanker was damaged in the attack and would be unable to complete the planned voyage. The company warned of possible delays to export shipments, additional logistics costs, and disruptions to contract deadlines.</p><p>Trans-Oil said it was the second attack in a month on a tanker headed to Giurgiulesti to load vegetable oil — the <i>Wine Trader</i> had been attacked near Sulina on Oct. 15.</p><p>According to Starboard data, <i>Marsol</i> left the area near the Romanian port of Constanta on the morning of Nov. 14 and headed toward the mouth of the Danube. Its crew listed Giurgiulesti as its destination, with an expected arrival on Nov. 16. After the attack, the cargo ship also moved south from the Sulina area. Starting from 1:23 a.m. on Nov. 15, it remained nearly stationary at a location several dozen kilometers southwest of the attack site. Its declared destination had not changed as of 4:44 p.m. on Nov. 15.</p><p>The third tanker attacked last night, <i>Ali Najafov</i>, had departed from the Turkish port of Ambarli on Nov. 11, with the crew reporting that the vessel was due to arrive in Giurgiulesti at 6 a.m. on Nov. 13. As of the evening of Nov. 13, however, the tanker was near Sulina, where it remained almost motionless for about a day. The latest AIS data available to Starboard for the tanker was recorded at 11 p.m. on Nov. 14. What happened to the vessel after the attack remains unknown.</p><p>Giurgiulesti Moldova’s only seaport, is located on the Danube near the borders with Romania and Ukraine. Moldova uses the port to import petroleum products and export agricultural goods, among other cargo.</p><h3>At least 13 commercial vessels have been attacked near NATO countries since early October</h3><p>Another tanker heading to Moldova to load vegetable oil — the aforementioned San Marino-flagged <i>Wine Trader  </i>(IMO: 8808707), was attacked by Russian drones on Oct. 15 while located approximately 24 kilometers from Sulina, putting it outside Romanian territorial waters but still within Romania’s exclusive economic zone.</p><p>Seven of the 12 crew members aboard <i>Wine Trader</i> were reported missing after the attack. In early November, human remains believed to belong to six sailors were <a href="https://theins.press/en/news/299367" target="_blank">found</a> aboard the tanker after it was brought to the Bulgarian port of Varna. Russia’s Defense Ministry later published video of the strike, claiming the vessel had been carrying military cargo for Ukraine. However, according to the San Marino Maritime Authority, the tanker was empty at the time of the attack.</p><div>https://t.me/theinsru/4275</div><p>Additionally, on Nov. 13 a drone <a href="https://www.antena3.ro/actualitate/o-nava-cargo-cu-destinatia-ucraina-a-fost-lovita-de-o-drona-langa-sf-gheorghe-in-apele-teritoriale-ale-romaniei-811141.html" target="_blank">damaged</a> a cargo crane aboard the Palau-flagged ship <i>Larissa 1 </i>(IMO: 9154268), which was 12.6 kilometers from the Romanian coast. The vessel was headed to Sulina with plans to continue to Ukraine. By <i>The Insider</i>’s count, at least 13 commercial vessels have been struck by drones near the coasts of NATO members Romania and Bulgaria since the beginning of October.</p><p>In response to the series of attacks, Romania has <a href="https://www.facebook.com/miruta.ro/posts/pfbid024aG2NPGDuEoyA1SqYD72wK1mDv9REF9N1BRghtWDBFZBzfWeXVusTiYj7zNGsxN2l?rdid=m1fc3Tmm5P1SGJyu">proposed</a> that NATO’s Black Sea countries establish a joint command to defend against drones. The alliance also <a href="https://www.reuters.com/business/aerospace-defense/nato-send-planes-drones-black-sea-after-attacks-shipping-2026-10-20/">announced</a> plans to strengthen its deployment of maritime patrol aircraft and drones in the region. France temporarily deployed an Atlantique 2 maritime patrol aircraft to Romania.</p><aside class="related-posts"><ul><li><a href="https://theins.press/en/news/299367">Remains of six sailors found aboard tanker that was struck by Russian drones off the coast of Romania in mid-October</a></li><li><a href="https://theins.press/en/news/298674">Cargo ship sinks off the coast of Romania, local authorities blame Russia</a></li></ul></aside>]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Mon, 16 Nov 2026 15:28:07 +0000</pubDate>
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      <title><![CDATA[EU forces board Russian “shadow fleet” tanker and confirm its use of a false flag before allowing sanctioned vessel to continue its voyage]]></title>
      <link>https://theins.press/en/news/299623</link>
      <guid>https://theins.press/en/news/299623</guid>
      <dc:creator><![CDATA[The Insider]]></dc:creator>
      <enclosure url="https://theins.press/storage/post_cover/display/299/299623/LM4f2dKfKUUHJkfDo5xBmS1fZX6AvLaBQPmixSPH.jpg" length="0" type="image/jpeg"/>
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      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>On Nov. 13, European Union military personnel boarded the oil tanker <i>Midag</i> (<span class="termin" data-description="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">IMO</span>: 9266841) in the Mediterranean Sea and determined that the vessel was sailing under a false flag, EU foreign policy chief Kaja Kallas <a href="https://x.com/kajakallas/status/2121893878567457205">announced</a>  on Nov. 15. According to Kallas, the operation was carried out as part of the EU naval mission IRINI, and the vessel in question is suspected to be part of Russia’s “<span class="termin" data-description="PHA+PHNwYW4gc3R5bGU9ImJhY2tncm91bmQtY29sb3I6dHJhbnNwYXJlbnQ7Y29sb3I6IzAwMDAwMDsiPlJ1c3NpYeKAmXMg4oCcc2hhZG93IGZsZWV04oCdIGlzIGEgbmV0d29yayBvZiBtb3N0bHkgb2xkZXIgb2lsIHRhbmtlcnMgdGhhdCBhcmUgdXNlZCB0byB0cmFuc3BvcnQgUnVzc2lhbiBjcnVkZSBvaWwgYW5kIHBldHJvbGV1bSBwcm9kdWN0cyB3aGlsZSByZWR1Y2luZyBleHBvc3VyZSB0byBXZXN0ZXJuIHNhbmN0aW9ucyBhbmQgdGhlIEc3IG9pbCBwcmljZSBjYXAuIFRoZSBzaGlwcyBvZnRlbiB1c2Ugb3BhcXVlIG93bmVyc2hpcCBzdHJ1Y3R1cmVzLCBmcmVxdWVudCBmbGFnIGNoYW5nZXMsIHF1ZXN0aW9uYWJsZSBvciBhYnNlbnQgaW5zdXJhbmNlLCBzaGlwLXRvLXNoaXAgdHJhbnNmZXJzLCBhbmQsIGluIHNvbWUgY2FzZXMsIGZhbHNlIGZsYWdzIG9yIG1hbmlwdWxhdGlvbiBvZiB0aGVpciBBSVMgdHJhY2tpbmcgc2lnbmFscy48L3NwYW4+PC9wPg==">shadow fleet</span>.” <i>The Insider</i> found that the tanker loaded cargo at Russia’s Kozmino oil terminal in Primorsky Krai in May and was later sanctioned by the United States for transporting Iranian oil. Despite the inspection, the vessel was allowed to continue on its voyage.</p><p>According to vessel-tracking data from <a href="https://www.starboardintelligence.com/">Starboard Maritime Intelligence</a> analyzed by <i>The Insider</i>, <i>Midag</i> passed south of Malta on Nov. 13 — the day of the EU operation — before heading toward the strait between Sicily and Tunisia. Available <span class="termin" data-description="PHA+PHNwYW4gc3R5bGU9ImJhY2tncm91bmQtY29sb3I6dHJhbnNwYXJlbnQ7Y29sb3I6IzAwMDAwMDsiPkFuJm5ic3A7PHN0cm9uZz5BSVMgc2lnbmFsPC9zdHJvbmc+IGlzIGEgcmFkaW8gdHJhbnNtaXNzaW9uIGZyb20gYSBzaGlw4oCZcyZuYnNwOzxzdHJvbmc+QXV0b21hdGljIElkZW50aWZpY2F0aW9uIFN5c3RlbTwvc3Ryb25nPi4gSXQgdHlwaWNhbGx5IGJyb2FkY2FzdHMgdGhlIHZlc3NlbOKAmXMgaWRlbnRpdHksIHBvc2l0aW9uLCBzcGVlZCwgY291cnNlLCBhbmQgb3RoZXIgbmF2aWdhdGlvbiBkYXRhIHRvIG5lYXJieSBzaGlwcywgY29hc3RhbCBzdGF0aW9ucywgYW5kIHNhdGVsbGl0ZXMuPC9zcGFuPjwvcD4=">AIS</span> data showed the tanker moving at between 20 and 23.5 kilometers per hour throughout the day. By 1:03 p.m. Central European Time on Nov. 15, <i>Midag</i> was north of Algeria and traveling west at 18.9 kilometers per hour. Kallas did not report that the vessel or its crew had been detained.</p><figure><img src="https://theins.press/storage/content_image/original/6af/6afaba9af29ea9.94013676/llEQtG5pVMTSdwmWnujOeiRtbKkEpul6sRkGeWMc.jpg" alt="EU IRINI mission personnel board the Midag tanker in the Mediterranean on Nov. 13, 2026"/><figcaption>EU IRINI mission personnel board the Midag tanker in the Mediterranean on Nov. 13, 2026</figcaption></figure><figure><img src="https://theins.press/storage/content_image/original/6af/6afaba9ae16766.61439400/Vbg2zvxMa26b1YwuECjXYeEB2cjTsQ0JIqq2ZhLn.jpg" alt="EU IRINI mission personnel approach the Midag tanker in the Mediterranean on Nov. 13, 2026"/><figcaption>EU IRINI mission personnel approach the Midag tanker in the Mediterranean on Nov. 13, 2026</figcaption></figure><p>Photos published by Kallas show military personnel descending by rope from a helicopter onto the tanker’s deck. Another image shows two warships alongside <i>Midag</i>. Kallas said the inspection was conducted under Article 110 of the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea, which allows vessels suspected of operating without a registered nationality to be boarded.</p><p>“The EU will keep disrupting Russia’s shadow fleet at sea and through diplomatic means,” Kallas wrote. She added that EU foreign ministers were expected to approve new sanctions against Russia on Monday, Nov. 16, including measures targeting banks, buyers, and companies that support the “shadow fleet.”</p><h3>Tanker loaded Russian oil at Kozmino before being sanctioned by the U.S.</h3><p><i>The Insider</i> found that <i>Midag</i> docked at the Russian ports of Vostochny and Kozmino in Primorsky Krai in May 2026. At the time, the vessel was named <i>Midas</i> and sailed under the Panamanian flag.</p><p>According to Starboard Maritime Intelligence data, the tanker arrived near Vostochny on May 5 and docked the following day at the Kozmino oil terminal, where it remained for nearly 23 hours. On the morning of May 7, the vessel’s declared AIS draft increased from 6 meters to 14.7 meters, indicating that it was loaded with cargo. Russia exports crude oil through Kozmino that arrives via the East Siberia-Pacific Ocean (ESPO) pipeline system. The vessel left the Russian port area on May 8 and headed south.</p><p>On May 19, the U.S. Treasury Department <a href="https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sb0502">sanctioned</a> the tanker — not for transporting Russian oil, but for carrying Iranian crude. According to the U.S. government, the vessel was owned by Marshall Islands-registered Ocean Marvel Shipping Company Limited and since early 2026 had transported hundreds of thousands of barrels of Iranian oil. The company was likewise placed under U.S. sanctions.</p><p>The tanker was renamed <i>Midag</i> in July. <i>The Insider</i> found that since July 2026, the S&P Global database has listed the vessel as falsely claiming the flag of Zimbabwe. The tanker’s registered owner and operator are now listed as the Liberian company Xuanyue Shipping & Trading Co. The database contains no information about the vessel’s protection and indemnity insurer, which normally covers a shipowner’s liability.</p><p>An analysis of the tanker’s movements showed that from July 16 to Oct. 22, it remained almost continuously off Sri Lanka’s southern coast near Galle. It then sailed through the Gulf of Aden and the Red Sea toward the Suez Canal, leaving Egypt’s Port Said for the Mediterranean on Nov. 10. Its current destination and the cargo on board are unknown.</p><p>The EU naval mission IRINI has operated in the Mediterranean since 2020. Its original task was to enforce the U.N. arms embargo on Libya.</p><h3>Why European forces do not detain the tankers</h3><p>On Oct. 9, 2026, the Council of the EU extended IRINI’s mandate through the end of March 2029 and added measures aimed at countering Russia’s “shadow fleet” to its list of responsibilities. According to a Nov. 9 <a href="https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/eunavfor-med-irini-activity-report-october-2026_en">mission report</a>, military personnel are expected to carry out that task primarily by monitoring vessels, collecting information, and verifying their nationality. Since May, IRINI personnel have carried out six boardings to verify vessel flags.</p><p>As international maritime law experts previously <a href="https://theins.press/en/news/287009">explained</a> to <i>The Insider</i>, under existing international rules European countries have limited legal authority to detain and confiscate “shadow fleet” tankers. Even when a vessel can be detained, authorities face questions over the legal grounds for continuing to hold it, which party will bear the cost of maintaining the ship, and what should happen to its cargo and crew.</p><aside class="related-posts"><ul><li><a href="https://theins.press/en/news/287009">EU drafts new sanctions targeting Moscow’s “shadow fleet,” aiming to block flag states from registering Russian vessels</a></li><li><a href="https://theins.press/en/news/298405">Egypt tightens Suez Canal transit rules for aging ships, affecting Russia’s “shadow fleet”</a></li><li><a href="https://theins.press/en/news/297534">More than 100 “shadow fleet” oil tankers have switched to the Russian flag since the start of 2025, report finds</a></li><li><a href="https://theins.press/en/opinion/vladimir-milov/272913">Ghost ships: Vladimir Milov explains why Putin&#039;s “shadow fleet” defies sanctions and what can be done about it</a></li><li><a href="https://theins.press/en/inv/294884">Crewing the shadows: The Insider exposes the firms staffing Russia’s sanctions-busting fleet of oil tankers and explains why they matter</a></li><li><a href="https://theins.press/en/inv/299072">Oil on the water: How Russia avoided accountability for the Black Sea tanker disaster caused by its sanctions evasion efforts</a></li></ul></aside>]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Mon, 16 Nov 2026 08:20:32 +0000</pubDate>
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      <title><![CDATA[Chinese bearings imported to Russia for the Admiral Kuznetsov cruiser have also been found in military radars]]></title>
      <link>https://theins.press/en/news/299621</link>
      <guid>https://theins.press/en/news/299621</guid>
      <dc:creator><![CDATA[The Insider]]></dc:creator>
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      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Executives from Russia’s Samara-based SPZ-4 plant, which plays a prominent role in the country’s military-industrial complex, had already been <a href="https://theins.press/en/news/294099">charged</a> with supplying Chinese-made bearings to customers, disguising them as Russian-made products. It was already known that St. Petersburg’s Proletarsky Zavod, which contributed to the repair of the aircraft-carrying cruiser Admiral Kuznetsov, received mislabeled bearings. Now, according to a <a href="https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/9109186">report</a> from Kommersant citing court materials, it turns out that other companies did as well. Supplies of Chinese bearings to Russia’s defense industry are known beyond the SPZ-4 case. In 2024, such parts were <a href="https://theins.press/en/inv/282869">imported</a> into the Alabuga special economic zone, where Russian versions of Shahed drones are assembled.<i> The Insider</i> identified another buyer — the Nizhny Novgorod Machine-Building Plant — in materials from a separate case on defense procurement in 2012–2013.</p><h4>Nizhny Novgorod Machine-Building Plant: bearings for military radars</h4><p>In 2012–2013, the Nizhny Novgorod Machine-Building Plant <a href="https://kad.arbitr.ru/Document/Pdf/a542b840-f581-4d02-8a3a-3b525124f62c/e7c96e97-1465-4ccb-a163-943a59f1215f/A55-20705-2014_20160322_Postanovlenie_kassacionnoj_instancii.pdf">bought</a> 19 bearings from Samarskiye Tekhnologii for 25.45 million rubles ($310,000). The certificates listed SPZ-4 as the manufacturer. Fourteen bearings were installed in equipment that the plant produced under a state defense order. The arbitration court ruling names two indexes, 55Zh6M and 55Zh6UM. The first of them is <a href="https://ivms.mil.gov.ua/wp-content/uploads/2025/12/dovidka-08.12-14.12.2025.pdf">known to belong</a> to the Nebo-M radar system, according to Ukraine’s Odesa Maritime Academy (Institute of Naval Forces of the National University).</p><p>In late 2013, the Nizhny Novgorod Research Institute of Radio Engineering informed the plant about an issue in the rotational mechanism of the antenna in one of the radars. A commission linked the defect to a bearing. After an inspection, the plant replaced all 14 installed bearings and estimated the work at 6.33 million rubles ($77,000). In 2015, the arbitration court <a href="https://kad.arbitr.ru/Document/Pdf/a542b840-f581-4d02-8a3a-3b525124f62c/83a2de36-8e65-425b-bb73-dba9f6204eb3/A55-20705-2014_20150828_Reshenie.pdf">ordered</a> the supplier to cover the cost of the entire batch.</p><p>Experts who examined one of the bearings concluded that its parts were most likely made in China. Later, in the criminal trial, the head of company Eurotrade said that he had supplied the components in question to Samarskiye Tekhnologii and had visited the Chinese manufacturer before placing the order. According to him, Samarskiye Tekhnologii’s CEO, Alexander Abramov, told him that the parts were needed for an overhead crane.</p><p>The court established that the bearings were assembled by Samarskiye Tekhnologii employees on Abramov’s orders. He marked them as SPZ-4 products and presented forged certificates to the Nizhny Novgorod plant. According to the testimony of an SPZ-4 employee, Samarskiye Tekhnologii was the plant’s official dealer at the time. In 2017, Abramov was <a href="https://sudact.ru/regular/doc/s4qq514tEHJT/">sentenced</a> to two years and six months in a penal settlement. That case concerned Samarskiye Tekhnologii’s supplies in 2012–2013. In the current case, investigators are charging the executives of SPZ-4 itself.</p><h4>Proletarsky Zavod: 225 bearings for cruiser repairs</h4><p>According to investigators, in 2023–2024 SPZ-4 supplied Proletarsky Zavod with 225 large-size Chinese bearings, passing them off as its own products. They were ordered for an arresting gear (a system that slows aircraft landing on a carrier deck).</p><p>Proletarsky Zavod estimated the damage at 306 million rubles ($3.7 million). Andrey Ivanov, the lawyer for SPZ-4 CEO Denis Kotov, <a href="https://oboz.info/rukovodstvo-spz-4-prishlos-obnovlyat-v-razgar-borby-protiv-kontrafaktnyh-podshipnikov/">said</a> that the contract was worth approximately 63 million rubles ($770,000). According to the defense, SPZ-4 bought components abroad and assembled and tested the bearings at its own plant. Kotov and two other defendants in the case have pleaded not guilty.</p><p>It is unknown who received the bearings in the second episode. Before the arrest, SPZ-4 executives named the Ural Automotive Plant, Kurganpribor, and the Tactical Missiles Corporation among their buyers. The published materials do not indicate the origin of the parts that these enterprises received.</p><h4>Alabuga: bearings from China brought in by Drake</h4><p>In 2024, Drake, a company owned through several firms by the Alabuga special economic zone, imported bearings from China’s Shandong Xinyilu into the zone. This follows from customs data that <i>The Insider </i>examined for an investigation into supplies of components for Shaheds. The bearings were among equipment, parts, and consumables worth a total of $6.5 million that Drake imported into Alabuga over the year. The customs data do not specify which products the bearings were intended for.</p><h4>Who else bought SPZ-4 products</h4><p>SPZ-4 has <a href="https://kad.arbitr.ru/Document/Pdf/e75028c7-c149-4284-a21d-d27e216a0f82/dead37b4-32b0-4d54-9da5-bd5c22c69548/A55-19332-2026_20260819_Opredelenie.pdf">named</a> the Ural Automotive Plant as its customer under the state defense order in a dispute with the tax authorities. The plant <a href="https://eur-lex.europa.eu/TodayOJ/index.html">produces</a> trucks for the Russian army. The local outlet Samarskoye Obozreniye also <a href="https://oboz.info/rukovodstvo-spz-4-prishlos-obnovlyat-v-razgar-borby-protiv-kontrafaktnyh-podshipnikov/">reported</a> that SPZ-4 received a letter of appreciation from the Kurganpribor design bureau, which <a href="https://eur-lex.europa.eu/TodayOJ/index.html">develops</a> sensors for missiles.</p><p>Before the arrest, the owners of SPZ-4 also <a href="https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/9109186">named</a> the Tactical Missiles Corporation and the Belarusian truck manufacturer BelAZ among their buyers. The investigation has not yet disclosed the name of the enterprise that received the bearings in the second episode of the current case.</p><p>Chinese bearings are <a href="https://theins.press/en/inv/284017">sold</a> under the brands of Russian manufacturers outside the state defense order as well. According to an estimate by the Union of Bearing Manufacturers, Russian products accounted for about 23% of the domestic market. Market participants surveyed noted that after the introduction of sanctions, bearings from Western manufacturers rose in price by an average of 2.5 times, and delivery times grew to six to nine months.</p><aside class="related-posts"><ul><li><a href="https://theins.press/en/inv/282869">A shot from Captain Morgan: Russian firms named after English pirates are sourcing Chinese parts for Shahed kamikaze drones</a></li><li><a href="https://theins.press/en/inv/284017">Bottlenecked: Nine choke points where Russian industry remains critically dependent on imports</a></li></ul></aside>]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Mon, 16 Nov 2026 07:42:28 +0000</pubDate>
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      <title><![CDATA[Reaping what they sow: The “grain war” between Russia and Ukraine is once again threatening global food security]]></title>
      <link>https://theins.press/en/politics/299605</link>
      <guid>https://theins.press/en/politics/299605</guid>
      <dc:creator><![CDATA[Veaceslav Epureanu, Ekaterina Mereminskaya]]></dc:creator>
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      <description><![CDATA[<p>Since the beginning of summer, the Russian and Ukrainian armed forces have been conducting campaigns to restrict one another’s shipping in the Sea of Azov and the Black Sea. In October, the attacks shifted to the previously safe corridor in the territorial waters of Romania and Bulgaria. Navigation in the Black Sea today is more dangerous than anywhere else in the world —&nbsp; including the Middle East. Systematic strikes on merchant ships and port infrastructure have effectively halted exports of agricultural products, primarily grain, from both Russia and Ukraine. International intermediaries are trying to negotiate a truce, but for now, the Kremlin is pursuing its strategy to win a war of attrition.&nbsp;</p>]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3 class="outline-heading">The Russian campaign of strikes on ships and ports</h3><p>In a conversation with journalists on Sept. 1, 2026, Vladimir Putin <a href="http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/80665">stated</a> that Russian forces had generally not obstructed civilian shipping through Ukrainian ports:</p><blockquote><p>“Essentially, we did not touch any civilian vessels. True, we carried out pinpoint strikes on a few ships, but they were truly pinpoint. We never once made a mistake, and struck only the vessels that were delivering weapons or ammunition to Ukraine. There was not a single mistake. How do we know? Because the strikes were followed by secondary explosions and detonation, meaning we had always hit the target. But this, I repeat, was selective work.”</p></blockquote><p>Russian attacks on Ukrainian ports and on the ships traveling to and from them have been carried out more or less regularly since the fall of 2025. According to <a href="https://t.me/ampu_uspa/437">statistics</a> from the Ukrainian Sea Ports Authority, 36 strikes on port infrastructure were recorded in 2024, and in 2025, the figure was 96. Of the 651 port infrastructure facilities damaged from 2022 through 2025, 325 came under attack in 2025, but by mid-August 2026, the total figure had <a href="https://mininfra.gov.ua/news/mykola-kalashnyk-zvernuvsia-do-imo-shchodo-postiinykh-atak-rosiianamy-suden-u-chornomu-mori-ta-zahrozu-prodovolchii-bezpetsi-svitu">ballooned</a> to 1,090 facilities. In other words, the first eight months of this year saw far more damage to ports than in the first few years of the war combined.</p><blockquote>The first eight months of 2026 saw far more damage to ports than in the first few years of the war combined 
</blockquote><p>Calculations by the BlackSeaNews monitoring group (part of Ukraine’s Institute of Black Sea Strategic Studies) <a href="https://www.blackseanews.net/read/240196">show</a> that in 2025, the intensity of missile and drone raids on ports and related infrastructure in Ukraine’s Odesa Region did not exceed 14 attacks per month until October of last year, when 16 incidents were recorded. That was followed by 29 in November and 36 in December. In the first months of 2026, the rate <a href="https://www.blackseanews.net/read/243655">never dipped</a> below 20 attacks per month.</p><p>The same trend has been observed with merchant ships. At least 30 vessels were hit from January through December 2025, according to <a href="https://www.blackseanews.net/read/240196">estimates</a> by BlackSeaNews; 14 in October, November, and December of last year. To compare, in all of 2024, attacks were recorded on seven vessels working in Ukraine’s export corridor in the western part of the Black Sea.</p><div>https://t.me/theinsru/3264
</div><p>According to <a href="https://mininfra.gov.ua/news/rosiia-prodovzhuie-ataky-na-transportnu-infrastrukturu-ta-tsyvilne-sudnoplavstvo-ukrainy">information</a> from Ukraine’s Ministry of Restoration, Infrastructure and Transport, July 2026 alone saw 67 attacks on port facilities, 35 on civilian ships in ports, and 22 on ships in Ukraine’s export corridor. In the third quarter of this year, more than 200 Russian attacks on merchant ships in the Black Sea <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/8c874f60-0041-476d-9c53-8524c374443f?syn-25a6b1a6=1">were recorded</a>; from Oct. 1-15 this figure exceeded 40. Ukraine has responded in kind, but in total, since the beginning of September 2026, about 90% of all attacks on ships in the Black Sea were carried out by the Russian armed forces.</p><p>According to <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/8c874f60-0041-476d-9c53-8524c374443f?syn-25a6b1a6=1">assessments</a> by Ambrey and the International Maritime Organization, more than 570 vessels were struck in the Black Sea in 2026, and at least 40 sailors were killed. In the Strait of Hormuz over the same period, the deaths of 24 sailors have been confirmed, making the Azov–Black Sea basin the most dangerous region in the world for shipping.</p><blockquote>The Azov–Black Sea basin has become the most dangerous region in the world for shipping
</blockquote><p>In early October, drones and uncrewed boats <a href="https://theins.ru/news/298651">began attacking</a> ships off the coast of Romania and Bulgaria, including in the exclusive economic zones of NATO countries previously considered protected from external threats. At least ten vessels were damaged, and more than 30 sailors were killed or are listed as missing.</p><p>The sharp escalation forced NATO to <a href="https://www.reuters.com/business/aerospace-defense/nato-send-planes-drones-black-sea-after-attacks-shipping-2026-10-20/">announce</a> that it was sending additional forces to the Black Sea, as well as specialists to determine the types and origin of the munitions used in the attacks on ships.</p><h3 class="outline-heading">The Ukrainian campaign of strikes on ships and ports</h3><p>The Ukrainian Unmanned Systems Forces began systematic strikes on merchant ships in the Sea of Azov and the Black Sea as part of their operation MoLoChKa (an acronym for “Moscow will fall via Crimea” in Ukrainian) in July 2026. According to the most recent available <a href="https://t.me/robert_magyar/2838">estimates</a>, as of late September 300 vessels in total have been hit, with the majority of strikes — 215 — coming in July.</p><p>On July 10, <a href="https://theins.ru/news/294715">restrictions were imposed</a> on shipping in the Sea of Azov, and in August traffic came to a complete <a href="https://t.me/oko_gora/20210">halt</a>, with Azov ports suspending their operations. The waters of the Black Sea were later <a href="https://ru.themoscowtimes.com/2026/07/23/rossiya-obyavila-svoi-vodi-v-chyornom-more-opasnimi-dlya-sudohodstva-iz-za-atak-bespilotnikov-a201636">declared</a> unsafe as well. While the Unmanned Systems Forces conducted a generally indiscriminate campaign of strikes on vessels, the Navy and Security Service of Ukraine target the tankers of Russia’s “shadow fleet” (<a href="https://t.me/SBUkr/18043">1</a>, <a href="https://t.me/SBUkr/18099">2</a>, <a href="https://t.me/SBUkr/18128?single">3</a>).</p><div>https://t.me/theinsru/3963
</div><p>Since August, Ukrainian forces have been attacking grain export terminals at Russian Black Sea ports and grain carriers on the open sea. A large-scale combined raid on Novorossiysk <a href="https://theins.ru/news/295941">knocked out</a> southern Russia’s largest agricultural export hub, and several grain carriers <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2026-08-18/five-grain-ships-struck-near-russian-black-sea-ports">were hit</a> at sea. By late August, the Armed Forces of Ukraine had <a href="https://agrotochka.org/post/ataki-bespilotnikov-povredili-126-agrarnyh-sudov-24248">damaged</a> more than 100 vessels involved in transporting Russian agricultural products.</p><p>While attacks on ships are decreasing because of the overall drop in traffic, strikes on ports remain at a high level. According to calculations by the Ukrainian OSINT resource Oko Hora ✙ News and Analytics, more than 50 attacks on ports were recorded from January through October 2026, compared to <a href="https://t.me/oko_gora/17907?single">only 15</a> such incidents in all of 2025.</p><h3 class="outline-heading">Consequences for shipping in the Black and Azov Seas</h3><p>Assessing the results of Ukraine’s campaign in the Azov–Black Sea basin, Vladimir Putin <a href="http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/80665">acknowledged</a> on Sept. 1, 2026, that the AFU had inflicted “real damage,” affecting 40 ships in the first two weeks alone:</p><blockquote><p>“They were not destroyed — only damaged. But overall, over these 40 days, they damaged approximately 100 of our ships. People died, sailors, including foreign ones: there were Azerbaijani and Turkish citizens among the dead sailors. The total damage, by our preliminary estimates, was, in general, considerable — about one percent of GDP, which is not critical damage for us.”</p></blockquote><p>However, according to information from monitoring resources, shipping in the Sea of Azov has been almost completely halted, and in the Black Sea a regime of heightened military risk is in effect. Notably, Putin once <a href="http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/70046">said</a> that turning the Sea of Azov into a Russian “inland sea” was one of the most important achievements of the “<span class="termin" data-id="6017">special military operation</span>,” particularly given that Peter the Great had fought for access to the body of water in the 18th century.</p><p>Ukrainian strikes hampering grain exports through Novorossiysk, Taman, and the ports of the Sea of Azov in August and September have left agricultural products locked inside Russia. By mid-September, exports through the Black Sea had practically stopped. The Azov–Black Sea basin has traditionally accounted for 80% of Russian wheat exports.</p><blockquote>Russian grain exports through the Black Sea have almost stopped
</blockquote><p>Of the 38 ports previously used for grain exports, only 15 <a href="https://www.interfax.ru/russia/1124013">are operating</a> (with most shipments going through the northern ports of Ust-Luga, Vysotsk, and St. Petersburg). According to <a href="https://grun.ru/press_service/news/?ELEMENT_ID=12048">statistics</a> from the Russian Grain Union, 1.7 million tons of grain were shipped this past September — a fourfold drop year-on-year — and the situation did not improve the following month. Year-on-year, shipments for the first 20 days of October were down to 1.1 million tons in 2026 after 4.5 were <a href="https://www.interfax.ru/russia/1124013">shipped</a> over the same period in 2025. The resulting supply glut has caused storage facilities to overflow and pushed down domestic grain prices. The heavily agricultural <a href="https://theins.ru/news/296544">Rostov Region</a> and <a href="https://admkrai.krasnodar.ru/upload/iblock/dae/p08uof21g9d653x90xah7irh8fg7hs4i.pdf">Krasnodar Territory</a> declared a state of emergency.</p><p>Over the past year, the geography of Russian grain exports has <a href="https://www.interfax.ru/russia/1124013">shrunk</a> from 29 buyer countries to 15. Egypt remains the largest customer (326,700 tons), followed by Algeria (114,800 tons) and Kenya (113,900 tons). Additionally, only 25 out of 46 companies that used to ship wheat were still operating as of October.</p><p>The damage has been done not only to grain shipments but also to the seaborne delivery of containers and other exports. Because of security risks, Kazakh oil is now <a href="https://theins.ru/news/296168">shipped</a> through Novorossiysk, while Baltic port capacity <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2026-10-20/russia-ships-the-least-oil-in-a-month-as-major-baltic-port-halts">is being used</a> for exporting Russian oil. Freight rates for Russian oil <a href="https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/9044073">have risen</a> to all-time highs, and exports of <a href="https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/9042233">steel billets</a>, <a href="https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/8957451">rolled steel</a>, and <a href="https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/9024937">coal</a> from Black Sea ports have almost completely stopped.</p><p>Russian shipowners <a href="https://xn--e1alid.xn--p1ai/journal/publication/sudovladelcy-azovo-chernomorya-prosyat-priznat-blokadu-portov-fors-mazhorom">are demanding</a> that the situation in the Sea of Azov be recognized as a force majeure. As of September 2026, damaged vessels occupied 85% of the berth frontage of the Azov ports, and almost half of the disabled fleet remained at sea with cargo on board, carrying some 300,000 tons of export products. Market participants estimated the direct costs of idling, maintenance, and future repairs at 6.7 billion rubles ($83 million). Losses of Russian ports on the Black and Azov Seas <a href="https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/9043593">are estimated</a> at 200 billion rubles ($2.5 billion) per month. Cargo handling fell by 95–100% in September 2026, and passenger traffic fell by 85%.</p><blockquote>Losses of ports in southern Russia have reached $2.5 billion per month
</blockquote><p>As for Ukraine, cargo handling through the ports of the Odesa Region and the Danube area remained the main channel for agricultural exports. In the first half of 2026, 42.4 million tons of cargo passed through Ukrainian ports — 6% more than in the same period in 2025.</p><p>By mid-July 2026, 208 million tons of cargo, including 124 million tons of grain, had <a href="https://mininfra.gov.ua/news/komanda-oleksiia-kuleby-kliuchovi-rezultaty-u-sferi-transportu-ta-infrastruktury">passed</a> through the Ukrainian export corridor. According to a <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/ukraines-black-sea-ports-lose-third-grain-export-capacity-farmers-union-says-2026-07-15/">statement</a> by the All-Ukrainian Agrarian Council, in July Russian strikes knocked out up to one-third of the country’s grain export capacity. This past September, Odesa ports <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/8c874f60-0041-476d-9c53-8524c374443f?syn-25a6b1a6=1">received</a> only ten ships (compared with 400 in July), and total agricultural exports <a href="https://forbes.ua/ru/news/ukrayina-u-veresni-eksportuvala-46-vid-potenciinogo-obsiagu-agroprodukciyi-visockii-02102026-42599">amounted</a> to less than half the potential volume.</p><p>As of Oct. 5, Ukraine <a href="https://prodgrup.ru/ukraina-s-nachala-sezona-2026-27-mg-na-05-10-2026-eksport-zernovyh-i-zernobobovyh-sostavil-53-mln-tonn/">has exported</a> 5.4 million tons of grain since the start of this year’s harvest, down from the 7.2 million tons on the corresponding date of the previous season.</p><p>In past years, Ukraine used the Danube as a backup route, Maria Belikova, an expert on the global and Ukrainian grain markets, told<i> The Insider</i>:</p><blockquote><p>“In 2022, the Danube was perceived as relatively safe; it was not yet being bombed. But now boats, terminals, and logistics there are also being hit with precision strikes. Over the past month there have been several official reports that even parking areas for vehicles at the border with Moldova are being attacked. Additionally, this year the water level in the Danube is the lowest in 30 years, making it physically impossible to move significant volumes along it. There are huge queues for entry and exit.”</p></blockquote><p>Another major change since 2022, when all European countries rushed to help Kyiv, is that the EU has reinstated quotas on imports of wheat and barley from Ukraine, limiting them to 1 million tons of wheat and 600,000 tons of barley a year.</p><p>Additionally, the mutual attacks have hiked up the cost of insurance and freight. Belikova explained that:</p><blockquote><p>“Since mid-July, the Black Sea has been considered dangerous by shipowners both in Ukraine and in Russia. And the issue is not even the insurance costs, but the crews refusing to go there. There is a real risk of getting killed, and no amount of money can fix that. So neither Ukraine nor Russia can really use the Black Sea. Individual ships do come in, but those are exceptional cases.”</p></blockquote><h3 class="outline-heading">Global food security at risk</h3><p>According to Oxford Economics, losses to the global market from strikes on ships and ports in the Azov–Black Sea basin have <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/91f17b0f-9c31-483e-b828-d90dad931a2f?syn-25a6b1a6=1">reached</a> 86 million metric tons, equivalent to 17% of global exports. Of that, 52 million tons are Russia’s share and 34 million tons Ukraine’s.</p><p>Until recently, Ukraine accounted for roughly 7% of global wheat exports (14 million metric tons), 8% of barley exports (2.3 million tons), and 11% of corn exports (23 million tons). Alternative routes by rail and the Danube can handle exports of only 17 million tons of grain. Combined wheat exports from Russia and Ukraine in July–September are the <a href="https://sovecon.ru/blog/sovecon/2026/09/16/%d1%8d%d0%ba%d1%81%d0%bf%d0%be%d1%80%d1%82-%d0%bf%d1%88%d0%b5%d0%bd%d0%b8%d1%86%d1%8b-%d0%b8%d0%b7-%d1%80%d0%be%d1%81%d1%81%d0%b8%d0%b8-%d0%b8-%d1%83%d0%ba%d1%80%d0%b0%d0%b8%d0%bd%d1%8b-%d0%b2-%d0%b8/">lowest</a> since 2010, totaling only 8 million tons, versus the five-year average of 18.2 million tons. Belikova continued:</p><blockquote><p>“Russia is the world’s top wheat exporter. Together with Ukraine, they cover 90% of Egypt’s wheat market. And, of course, its departure strongly affects the market. In the first month, wheat prices rose, but not so much for grain overall. It felt as if buyers were waiting for the situation to resolve itself quickly. But there is no indication that it could happen. And whereas before the blockage [the shipping cost] was $230 per ton <span class="termin" data-id="6121">FOB</span> from Russia, now it is $280 per ton from Baltic ports. And other suppliers are asking $300 plus the price of the grain.”</p></blockquote><p>Still, Belikova is confident that in the next six months the world will not face a global food shortage:</p><blockquote><p>“Prices will be much higher than they would have been if the Black Sea were working normally. But Turkey and Egypt have had abundant local harvests this year. Egypt plans to cover all of its state procurement with domestic supply. Turkey has even allowed exports of its wheat. It all comes down to price: some countries can pay $350 per ton from an alternative source, but the poorest countries — most notably Eritrea, Ethiopia, Ghana, and Congo — cannot buy at such a price.”</p></blockquote><p>In September, the FAO Food Price Index <a href="https://www.fao.org/worldfoodsituation/foodpricesindex/en/">rose</a> to its highest level since 2022, and wheat futures on the Chicago Board of Trade hit highs in September not seen since 2023. However, they then began to <a href="https://ukragroconsult.com/en/news/wheat-futures-fall-for-eighth-consecutive-week-for-first-time-since-1997/">decline steadily</a> amid news of alternative export routes for grain from Russia and Ukraine, as well as expectations of increased supplies from Argentina and Australia.</p><p>Nevertheless, combined with climate factors and the rising cost of fertilizer (that one a consequence of the war in Iran), the disruption of grain exports from the Azov–Black Sea basin is expected to <a href="https://www.csis.org/analysis/how-do-latest-black-sea-attacks-affect-global-food-security">cause</a> a drop in global wheat exports. This, in turn, <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/americas/global-food-inflation-is-expected-intensify-supply-shocks-pile-up-2026-10-19/">threatens</a> a sharp rise in food inflation in developing countries. The resulting price shock <a href="https://www.gisreportsonline.com/r/food-crisis-africa/">could</a> destabilize the sociopolitical situation in conflict-prone regions of the world, in particular in North Africa.</p><h3 class="outline-heading">What comes next</h3><p>The Russian Ministry of Agriculture has set up an operational headquarters for redirecting agricultural exports, <a href="https://www.reuters.com/business/russian-grain-exports-shift-baltic-black-sea-trade-disrupted-2026-08-31/">seeking</a> to redirect grain to Baltic ports. According to <i>Reuters</i>, export terminals for coal and fertilizers at Arctic and Baltic ports are being <a href="https://www.reuters.com/business/russia-adapts-fertilizer-coal-terminals-baltic-arctic-ports-export-black-sea-2026-09-21/">converted</a> for grain exports.</p><p>In particular, the Ultramar terminal in Ust-Luga near St. Petersburg, which specializes in transshipping mineral fertilizers, now handles grain. In addition, grain cargoes have begun to be handled at two terminals in St. Petersburg.</p><p>If current trends continue, wheat exports from Russia in the current agricultural year will total 39.4 million tons, versus 50 million tons a year earlier, the International Grains Council <a href="https://www.interfax.ru/business/1122958">forecasts</a>. The problem is that delivering grain to Russia’s Baltic ports by rail is becoming increasingly <a href="https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/9027611">difficult</a>. </p><blockquote>Wheat exports in October will remain at the September level, with about 65% of shipments going through Baltic ports
</blockquote><p>As <i>Reuters</i> <a href="https://www.reuters.com/business/russia-adapts-fertilizer-coal-terminals-baltic-arctic-ports-export-black-sea-2026-09-21/">reports</a>, Russian Railways will prioritize government-subsidized rail transport of grain to northern ports. The state has already allocated 9.7 billion rubles ($120 million) to support rail grain shipments. Russia’s inability to export at the usual volumes has driven down domestic wholesale prices, forcing farms to sell grain to large traders at a loss. Wheat prices inside Russia have plummeted to a ten-year low: 9,000 rubles ($112) per ton against a production cost of <a href="https://www.interfax.ru/business/1111073">at least</a> 12,000 rubles ($149). The total loss to the grain industry from the price drop <a href="https://www.zol.ru/n/42403">is estimated</a> at between 810 billion and 980 billion rubles ($10.1 billion to $12.2 billion).</p><p>The government intends to offer relief measures to farmers, firstly by abolishing export duties on grain until the end of the year: “The measures will support producers and exporters of grains and oilseeds and vegetable oil producers who have faced difficulties exporting their products,” explained Deputy Minister of Economic Development Vladimir Ilyichev.</p><p>These are not direct costs for the government but do represent lost budget revenue. In total, the budget provides for 136 billion rubles ($1.7 billion) in grain export duties — almost 1.8 times more than in 2025. The budget will incur losses in any case because of the decline in exports.</p><p>Second, the State Duma is considering a bill banning agricultural producers from declaring bankruptcy, meaning the problems of farmers could become the problems of their banks, leasing companies, and other counterparties.</p><blockquote><p>“We are now looking at the possibility of working out a moratorium on farm bankruptcies for the duration of the season and preserving their status as agricultural producers, which may probably be relevant for the southern regions in light of temporary setbacks in selling grain,”  Agriculture Minister Oksana Lut <a href="https://www.interfax.ru/business/1113247">said</a> in September.</p></blockquote><p>These costs are hard to express in monetary terms, but the economy is looking at a corresponding rise in bankruptcies in adjacent sectors.</p><p>In addition, the state may buy 1-3 million tons of grain as part of so-called procurement interventions, but that is not enough. To halt the collapse of prices, at least 10 million tons must be bought. Russia’s state intervention program for 2026–2027 provides for purchasing up to 3 million tons of grain at fixed prices. At the same time, according to an <a href="https://ru.themoscowtimes.com/2026/09/30/rf-ne-smozhet-vyvezti-do-20-mln-t-zerna-v-sezone-2627gg-iz-za-zakrytykh-portov-prozerno-a207379">estimate</a> by ProZerno, the shortfall in grain exports could reach 14–20 million tons, meaning interventions could cover only about 15–20% of the overall volume. And carryover grain stocks by the end of the year will rise to 34.8 million tons.</p><p>Producers in Ukraine are also losing money, but so far they are not announcing reductions in planted area. Belikova notes that:</p><blockquote><p>“I remember in 2022 and later, when for a while there were no exports at all, everyone also said they would stop sowing wheat and corn. As a result, sowing did decline, but not all that dramatically. Partly, oilseeds were planted instead of wheat because they can be processed and somehow shipped out. The margin was better. But it is not 30–50% of the area; it is within 10–15%.”</p></blockquote><p>Additionally, Ukraine <a href="https://www.eeas.europa.eu/delegations/tanzania/russias-war-ukrainian-trade-war-global-food-security_en">could run out of</a> grain storage capacity. Russia has been striking grain elevators, and the destroyed capacity is estimated at around one million tons. Exports across the western border by rail and road, as well as through Danube ports, <a href="https://ukragroconsult.com/ru/news/ukraina-eshhe-ne-ispolzovala-potenczial-zapadnoj-graniczy-dlya-agrarnogo-eksporta-mnenie/">can cover</a> 3.5–4 million tons per month, whereas about 5 million tons need to be shipped out.</p><p>At the end of August, Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/turkey-says-it-has-black-sea-grain-plan-is-contact-with-russia-ukraine-2026-08-31/">proposed</a> concluding a new agreement along the lines of the UN-mediated “grain deal” of 2022, which allowed agricultural products to be exported from Ukrainian ports. In 2023, the Russian side refused to extend the agreement, but Ukrainian forces managed to ensure uninterrupted operation of the “export corridor” by defending it militarily.</p><p>However, Russia has since increased its attacks, and the grain war is having a disproportionately greater effect on the Ukrainian economy than on Russia’s. Agricultural exports from Russia in 2025 <a href="https://www.vedomosti.ru/business/news/2026/04/17/1191122-eksport-produktsii-apk">brought in</a> $41 billion, or 10% of total exports. For Ukraine, the corresponding figure <a href="https://www.unian.net/economics/agro/eksport-iz-ukrainy-padaet-chto-proishodit-v-torgovle-s-es-13247679.html">exceeds</a> 50% ($22.5 billion).</p><aside class="related-posts"><ul><li><a href="https://theins.press/en/economics/294370">Courts vs. ships: Ukraine is trying to stop illegal wheat exports from Russian-occupied territories</a></li><li><a href="https://theins.press/en/society/296494">Food for naught: The effects of Russia&#039;s war have left its grain producers on the verge of bankruptcy</a></li><li><a href="https://theins.press/en/politics/292726">Grain of discord: How the grain scandal complicated relations between Ukraine and Israel</a></li><li><a href="https://theins.press/en/news/251983"> Grain hypocrisy: Russia keeps on destroying Ukrainian grain export routes as Putin pledges assistance and corridors</a></li></ul></aside>]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Sun, 15 Nov 2026 11:27:29 +0000</pubDate>
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      <title><![CDATA[IOC says athletes should not be held responsible for the actions of their governments]]></title>
      <link>https://theins.press/en/news/299601</link>
      <guid>https://theins.press/en/news/299601</guid>
      <dc:creator><![CDATA[The Insider]]></dc:creator>
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      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>The International Olympic Committee opposes restricting athletes’ access to international competitions on the basis of their citizenship or their country’s participation in a war, an <strong>IOC press office representative</strong> told <i>The Insider</i> in response to an inquiry about Finland’s decision to tighten entry rules for Russian athletes, including those competing under neutral status. The IOC stressed, however, that decisions regarding the issuance of visas remain within the competence of national governments:</p><blockquote><p>“Athletes’ access to international competition should not be limited by the passport they hold or affected by the involvement of their government in a war or conflict. This principle should be applied consistently for all athletes from all National Olympic Committees. The IOC will always uphold its mission to preserve a values-based and truly global sporting platform that provides hope to the world.”</p></blockquote><p>The IOC also recalled the <a href="https://www.olympics.com/ioc/news/ioc-provisionally-lifts-suspension-of-russian-olympic-committee-recommendations-to-ifs-with-regard-to-russian-athletes-participation-no-longer-applicable">decision</a> of its Executive Board dated July 7, which revoked the 2022 and 2023 recommendations restricting the participation of Russian athletes and teams in international competitions. At the same time, the committee provisionally reinstated the membership of the Russian Olympic Committee, which had been suspended in October 2023 over the inclusion of sports organizations from occupied Ukrainian territories.</p><p>The IOC also emphasized that international competitions outside the Olympic Games are run by the relevant sports federations, which set their own eligibility rules. The decision to hold competitions in Russia, to invite Russian government officials, and to use Russian national symbols at such events also rests with the federations and organizers:</p><blockquote><p>“While visa decisions remain the sovereign responsibility of individual governments, the IOC works within its remit to support International Sports Federations and National Olympic Committees in their efforts to facilitate athletes’ participation in international sport, including for visa-related matters.”</p></blockquote><p>The IOC did not say whether it intends to approach the Finnish government directly.</p><p><i>The Insider</i> also requested comment from<strong> </strong>the<strong> Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS)</strong>. In a response, the court’s press office said it does not have jurisdiction over national governments. The court also recalled the recent proceedings between the Russian Ice Hockey Federation and the International Ice Hockey Federation, after which Russian teams were allowed to return to international competitions. CAS told <i>The Insider </i>that the reasoning behind the decision will be published shortly.</p><h4>Finland restricts entry even for neutral athletes</h4><p>On Nov. 12, the Finnish government <a href="https://valtioneuvosto.fi/en/-/restrictions-placed-on-entry-of-russian-athletes-into-finland">announced</a> tighter restrictions on the entry of Russian citizens. The new rules will apply to visa applications reviewed from Nov. 16 and will cover professional athletes, including those who have been granted neutral status and cleared to compete by international federations.</p><p>The Finnish authorities believe that the entry of Russian citizens for short-term work that is not of significant importance to the country’s national interests may pose a threat to its foreign relations. The restrictions may also affect holders of Schengen visas issued by other countries. Finland’s Ministry for Foreign Affairs explained the decision by saying that Russia uses international sport to promote propaganda and the aims of the war against Ukraine. As Foreign Minister Elina Valtonen stated:</p><blockquote><p>“As long as Russia’s war of aggression continues, Russian athletes have no business in Finland. Their entry into the country would be a threat to Finland’s international relations. The same is true of other short-term work under visas that is not essential to Finland’s national interests.”</p></blockquote><p>The decision directly affects international competitions scheduled in the country. A cross-country skiing World Cup stage will take place in Ruka from Nov. 27 to 29, and Tampere is due to host the World Figure Skating Championships in March 2027.</p><p>In addition, seven Russian skaters are entered in the Finlandia Trophy figure skating Grand Prix, scheduled for Nov. 20 to 22 in Helsinki. Skating Finland Oy CEO Salla Mäkelä <a href="https://yle.fi/a/74-20256810">told</a> the Finnish outlet <i>Yle</i> that the organizers have approached the International Skating Union (ISU) because they do not know which countries have issued visas to the Russian participants. As of the time of publication, the organizers had not specified whether the Russian athletes would be able to take part in the event.</p><p>The International Skating Union has already <a href="https://www.isu.org/en/news/isu-statement-november-12-2026">stated</a> that it is examining the implications of the Finnish restrictions for holding the event:</p><blockquote><p>“ISU believes that athletes should not be punished for the actions of their governments in a world where, sadly, many conflicts are ongoing.”</p></blockquote><p>The organization has asked the Finnish Figure Skating Association and the organizers of the World Championships for further clarification.</p><h4>Norway and Estonia also oppose admitting Russians as Sweden is preparing restrictions</h4><p>On Nov. 12, the Norwegian government also <a href="https://www.regjeringen.no/no/aktuelt/regjeringen-vil-hindre-russiske-og-belarusiske-profesjonelle-idrettsutovere-i-a-komme-til-norge-for-a-konkurrere/id3192790/">announced</a> its intention to bar Russian and Belarusian professional athletes, as well as accompanying personnel, from entering the country. Unlike in the Finnish case, the exact date when the measures will take effect has not yet been announced.</p><p>Estonia’s Ministry of Culture <a href="https://news.err.ee/1610194999/estonia-to-ski-federation-russian-athletes-will-not-compete-on-our-snow">notified</a> the International Ski and Snowboard Federation that competitions involving athletes from Russia and Belarus should not be held on Estonian territory. The ministry believes this would contradict Estonia’s position of supporting Ukraine and would instead create opportunities for Russia to spread its propaganda.</p><p>Sweden is also considering denying entry to Russian athletes, including holders of visas issued by other countries. Minister for Social Affairs Jakob Forssmed <a href="https://www.thelocal.se/20261114/sweden-wants-to-block-russian-athletes-from-competing-in-country-minister-to-afp">said</a> that the government is developing a corresponding mechanism and expects to introduce it before the World Ski Championships, which will take place in Falun in February and March 2027. No final decision has yet been made.</p><aside class="related-posts"><ul><li><a href="https://theins.press/en/news/298532">Russia permits Olympic, Paralympic and Deaflympic titles for sports schools in occupied Ukraine under special rules</a></li><li><a href="https://theins.press/en/news/295516">Ukraine appeals to Court of Arbitration for Sport over lifting of restrictions on Russian Olympic Committee</a></li><li><a href="https://theins.press/en/inv/291614">Olympic deception: Russia’s doping program is run by the same FSB team that poisoned Navalny</a></li><li><a href="https://theins.press/en/society/289246">Olympic calm: Russian athletes’ return to the international stage is producing remarkably little controversy</a></li><li><a href="https://theins.press/en/society/271126">Olympic Substitution: How Russian athletes cope with sanctions and international isolation</a></li></ul></aside>]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Sun, 15 Nov 2026 08:25:09 +0000</pubDate>
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      <title><![CDATA[Tethered to Starlink: There are reasons why it&#039;s not so easy for Ukraine to quit using Elon Musk&#039;s services]]></title>
      <link>https://theins.press/en/politics/299508</link>
      <guid>https://theins.press/en/politics/299508</guid>
      <dc:creator><![CDATA[Anna Kuragina]]></dc:creator>
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      <description><![CDATA[<p>Since the spring of 2026, Ukrainian forces have steadily expanded their strikes against targets in the area of Russia's operational rear. Thanks to SpaceX’s satellite communications, Ukrainian drones have been able to hit moving objects dozens or even hundreds of kilometers behind the front line. Thousands of Russian military vehicles, supply routes, crossings, and air defense systems have come under attack, in part enabling Ukrainian offensives like Operation Vivaldi. However, in October sudden restrictions on satellite communications exposed Ukraine’s critical dependence on American infrastructure for its mid-range strike capabilities: on the first day of the disruption, the number of recorded hits on Russian equipment fell by 71%. Although the restrictions were lifted on Oct. 24, Volodymyr Zelensky announced on Nov. 12 that they had been reimposed along the entire front line and in Russian-occupied Ukrainian territories. Ukraine currently has no full-fledged alternative to SpaceX’s military satellite service, Starshield, and building an independent satellite network would take years. The most realistic alternative, therefore, is to combine different communications channels with the development of autonomous drone systems.</p>]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p> </p><h3 class="outline-heading">Starlink and Starshield: Ukraine&#039;s dependence has become a vulnerability</h3><p>Ukrainian drone strikes against Russian vehicles deep behind the front line fell sharply on Oct. 14. The disruption was linked to restrictions on SpaceX’s <span class="termin" data-description="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">Starshield</span> military satellite service, primarily affecting drones that rely on satellite communications for in-flight control.</p><p>According to <a href="https://t.me/oko_gora/20932">figures</a> compiled by the <span class="termin" data-description="PHA+PHNwYW4gc3R5bGU9ImJhY2tncm91bmQtY29sb3I6cmdiKDI1NSwyNTUsMjU1KTtjb2xvcjpyZ2IoNTEsNTEsNTEpOyI+PHN0cm9uZz5PU0lOVDwvc3Ryb25nPiBtZWFucyBPcGVuIFNvdXJjZSBJbnRlbGxpZ2VuY2U8aT4mbmJzcDs8L2k+PC9zcGFuPjwvcD4=">OSINT</span> project Oko Gora, the number of recorded hits on Russian equipment on the first day of the disruption was 71% below the average for the previous month. Ukrainian drone operators <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2026/10/24/world/europe/ukraine-starshield-drone-speed.html">described</a> the extent of the problems, with a representative of the 414th Separate Unmanned Systems Brigade, known as Magyar’s Birds, saying that units had to constantly test the speeds at which they could maintain communications and adjust their tactics accordingly. Slower drones mean greater vulnerability to Russian <span class="termin" data-description="PHA+TW9iaWxlIGZpcmUgZ3JvdXBzICg8c3Ryb25nPk1GRzwvc3Ryb25nPnMpIOKAkyBtb2JpbGUgYWlyIGRlZmVuc2UgdW5pdHMgZXF1aXBwZWQgd2l0aCB2ZWhpY2xlLW1vdW50ZWQgYXJ0aWxsZXJ5IGFuZCBtYWNoaW5lIGd1bnMuIFRoZXkgYXJlIGRlc2lnbmVkIHRvIGRlcGxveSByYXBpZGx5IGFsb25nIHRoZSBmbGlnaHQgcGF0aHMgb2YgZW5lbXkgZHJvbmVzIGFuZCBpbnRlcmNlcHQgdGhlbS48L3A+">mobile fire groups,</span>and another Ukrainian commander said his unit had lost more than $1 million worth of drones during the first night of the restrictions alone.</p><p>Starlink, developed by Elon Musk’s SpaceX, provides broadband internet access through a constellation of low-Earth-orbit satellites. Its relatively compact terminals, high data-transfer speeds, and low latency make it suitable for use in the field, including in areas without terrestrial communications infrastructure.</p><p><span class="termin" data-description="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">Starlink</span> became widely used in Ukraine in the first days of Russia’s full-scale invasion. The first batch of terminals supplied by SpaceX <a href="https://x.com/FedorovMykhailo/status/1498392515262746630">arrived</a> in Ukraine on Feb. 28, 2022. By December 2023, around 47,000 terminals <a href="https://t.me/zedigital/4034">were operating</a> in the country, according to Ukraine’s Ministry of Digital Transformation, after being supplied under agreements with international partners.</p><p>In early 2025, the total number of Starlink terminals in Ukraine was <a href="https://t.me/fediienko_oleksandr/3101">estimated</a> at around 160,000. Up to 100,000 of them may have been used by the Ukrainian Defense Forces, <a href="https://defence-ua.com/minds_and_ideas/chi_gotovi_zsu_do_vidkljuchennja_starlink_ta_na_skilki_virogidno_te_scho_ilon_mask_tse_zrobit-18057.html" target="_blank">according</a> to <span class="termin" data-description="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">Serhiy “Flash” Beskrestnov</span>. By the fall of 2025, Ukraine had around 200,000 terminals, according to <a href="https://theins.ru/politika/289530"><i>The Insider</i></a>, making it Starlink’s largest European market by number of users. However, only half of those terminals had been paid for and supplied through official channels.</p><blockquote>Ukraine is Starlink’s largest European market by number of users</blockquote><p>In October 2026, the head of Adaptis, a Ukrainian company involved in supplying Starlink equipment, <a href="https://www.rbc.ua/ukr/news/chi-zalishitsya-ukrayina-suputnikovogo-zv-1791538636.html">said</a> that tens of thousands of new terminals were arriving in the country every month. Satellite communications have become central to Ukraine’s military command-and-control system, as units use Starlink to relay intelligence, receive live video feeds from drones, coordinate artillery fire, and maintain communications between command posts.</p><p>One Ukrainian artillery serviceman <a href="https://epravda.com.ua/rus/tehnologiji/chto-proizoydet-esli-vyklyuchat-starlink-803580/">said</a> that having access to a live feed from a reconnaissance drone enabled his unit to begin observing a target and open fire within 3–5 minutes. Without such a link, artillery crews would have to rely on coordinates relayed to them, increasing response times and reducing targeting accuracy.</p><p>However, commercial Starlink was not originally designed to control attack drones, and in February 2023, SpaceX President Gwynne Shotwell <a href="https://www.defensenews.com/battlefield-tech/space/2023/02/08/spacexs-shotwell-says-ukraine-weaponized-starlink-network/">said</a> the company was restricting the use of its satellite network for that purpose. To meet military requirements, SpaceX <a href="https://apnews.com/article/starlink-starshield-ukraine-russia-war-shahed-spacex-pentagon-385eb944f6c34990bdf21f624416b820">launched</a> a separate service: Starshield. It uses Starlink technology but is provided under government contracts, primarily with the Pentagon. The service offers secure data transmission and other capabilities required by military users.</p><p>In December 2024, <a href="https://theins.ru/news/276990">it emerged</a> that the Pentagon had signed a new contract with SpaceX to connect an additional 2,500 Starlink terminals already in Ukraine to Starshield. Together with the 500 terminals covered by an earlier agreement, this brought the total to 3,000. The value of the new contract was not disclosed; the previous one was estimated at around $40 million.</p><figure><img src="https://theins.press/storage/content_image/display/6af/6af5e2b2b71d68.50551182/AJHTnrCE0TabJxQSpwY1u02QCM5BvY4QpMWpGNMY.jpg" alt="A Ukrainian serviceman sets up a Starlink terminal near the front line in the Donetsk region, October 2026  "/><figcaption>A Ukrainian serviceman sets up a Starlink terminal near the front line in the Donetsk region, October 2026  </figcaption></figure><p>The Ukrainian military’s dependence on SpaceX’s decisions was already apparent in 2022. While preparing an attack on Russian ships in Sevastopol that September, Ukrainian forces <a href="https://theins.ru/politika/289530">found</a> that there was no Starlink coverage around annexed Crimea to control its unmanned surface vehicles. As Elon Musk’s biographer Walter Isaacson later <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2023/09/07/elon-musk-starlink-ukraine-russia-invasion/">explained</a>, the restrictions were already in place before the operation, and Musk refused a request from Ukrainian authorities to activate the connection. During Ukraine’s counteroffensive in the fall of 2022, Kviv's troops advanced into territories previously occupied by Russia, they encountered Starlink outages — primarily in the Kherson and Zaporizhzhia regions and, to a lesser extent, along the front line in the Kharkiv, Donetsk, and Luhansk regions. <i>Reuters</i> later <a href="https://www.reuters.com/investigations/musk-ordered-shutdown-starlink-satellite-service-ukraine-retook-territory-russia-2025-07-25/">found</a> that at least some of the restrictions had been imposed as a result of Musk’s personal orders.</p><blockquote>Musk was already restricting Starlink’s capabilities for Ukrainian forces in 2022</blockquote><p>In February 2025, the possibility of a Starlink cutoff resurfaced during negotiations with the United States over a deal on Ukraine’s mineral resources. U.S. negotiators were reportedly <a href="https://www.reuters.com/business/us-could-cut-ukraines-access-starlink-internet-services-over-minerals-say-2025-02-22/">considering</a> restricting Ukraine’s access to satellite communications as a pressure tactic, even if Musk <a href="https://kyivindependent.com/musk-denies-us-threat-to-cut-starlink-over-ukraine-minerals-deal/">denied</a> reports that such threats had been made. Ukrainian military personnel were already <a href="https://epravda.com.ua/rus/tehnologiji/chto-proizoydet-esli-vyklyuchat-starlink-803580/">warning</a> that although a complete shutdown would not deprive the military of all communications, it would significantly slow the transmission of intelligence, target acquisition and coordination of fire.</p><p>On Oct. 14, 2026, restrictions <a href="https://theins.ru/news/298266">affected</a> Starshield’s operation on moving platforms. According to <a href="https://theins.ru/news/298354">Ukrainian military personnel</a>, connections on various types of drones dropped out at speeds ranging from 72 to 161 km/h. The precise threshold depended on the type of platform on which the terminal was mounted. For drones relying on Starshield as their primary control link, this meant having to change their flight speed or abandon certain missions, as a high-speed kamikaze drone cannot carry out its mission as planned if it loses contact with its operator when accelerating.</p><p>The reasons behind the imposition of the restrictions were unclear from the outset. On Oct. 15, <i>Reuters</i> <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/order-limit-starshield-ukraine-came-inside-white-house-sources-say-2026-10-15/">reported</a> that the order to restrict Starshield had come from the White House and that the relevant instructions were subsequently passed on to the Pentagon. The Trump administration did not officially accept responsibility for the decision. Musk, for his part, <a href="https://x.com/elonmusk/status/2110445577184133456">said</a> that the military Starshield service was regulated by U.S. authorities, while the commercial Starlink network was controlled by SpaceX.</p><blockquote>The US administration has not accepted responsibility for the decision to restrict Starshield</blockquote><p>On Oct. 20, <i>The Wall Street Journal </i><a href="https://www.wsj.com/world/ukraine-starlink-elon-musk-trump-dbc49193">reported</a> that Musk himself had ordered the restrictions. However, whether the decision was coordinated with the Trump administration remains unclear. Four days later, Musk publicly <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2026/10/24/world/europe/ukraine-starshield-drone-speed.html">explained</a> the restrictions for the first time, <a href="https://x.com/elonmusk/status/2114063986744275011">accusing</a> Ukrainian forces of using commercial Starlink for offensive drone strikes in violation of the platform's terms of service. In a letter to Congress, SpaceX claimed that it had only changed Starlink’s settings, making no changes to Starshield.</p><p>Ukraine rejected Musk’s accusations. As former Defense Ministry adviser Serhiy Sternenko <a href="https://theins.ru/news/298706">explained</a>, since February 2026, satellite terminals operating on moving platforms had required a connection to the military Starshield service, making it technically impossible to use commercial Starlink to control kamikaze drones. As of Oct. 19, SpaceX equipment at various points along the front line <a href="https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/21435">was ceasing to function</a> at speeds of 130–161 km/h, hampering frontline logistics and limiting the use of drones, particularly for <a href="https://theins.ru/politika/290817">mid-range strikes</a>.</p><p>Military analyst Michael Kofman <a href="https://x.com/KofmanMichael/status/2112167662789030368">clarified</a> that even with a nominal speed limit of 160 km/h, the connection remained unstable and could drop out at speeds as low as 130–140 km/h. Then, on Nov. 12, Volodymyr Zelensky <a href="https://theins.ru/news/299477">announced</a> that Ukrainian units had been experiencing Starshield outages for several days along the entire front line. According to Zelensky, the connection was again failing at speeds above 161 km/h. Ukrainian military personnel determined that these were not random disruptions but a systematic speed restriction. They were introduced around the time of trilateral talks between Russia, Ukraine, and the United States, held in Abu Dhabi on November 10–11.</p><figure><img src="https://theins.press/storage/content_image/display/6af/6af5e3514ed433.11505903/za8yucIPPD2DIrR0Hr6HW7gSmo0TG6ddmPHvD0xf.jpg" alt="Ukrainian troops prepare to launch a Zozulya mid-strike drone, 2026  "/><figcaption>Ukrainian troops prepare to launch a Zozulya mid-strike drone, 2026  </figcaption></figure><p>The restrictions also affect Ukraine’s defensive capabilities. Back in October, according to <a href="https://t.me/serhii_flash/7819">Serhiy Beskrestnov</a>, Starshield’s speed limit prevented Ukrainian forces from using jet-powered interceptor drones against fast-moving Russian Shaheds. The disruptions also affected one of the key channels for relaying information to Ukrainian combat helicopters, which also help repel drone attacks. Since helicopters fly at speeds exceeding 160 km/h, the satellite communications restrictions hampered their ability to carry out combat missions. This did not, however, mean that all drone interception capabilities had been disabled or that helicopters could no longer engage UAVs.</p><blockquote>Starshield restrictions hampered the use of Ukraine’s jet-powered interceptor drones</blockquote><p>Of course, not all Ukrainian drones use Starshield — those equipped with autonomous navigation, conventional radio links, or fiber-optic controls can operate without a direct connection to SpaceX’s service. Nevertheless, satellite communications have become a key factor in enabling the large-scale use of remotely controlled drones deep behind Russian lines.</p><h3 class="outline-heading">Starlink and Ukraine’s mid-strike capabilities</h3><p>Starlink has enabled Ukrainian forces to control drones from hundreds of kilometers away, making it possible not only to <a href="https://theins.ru/politika/290817">strike</a> targets deep inside Russia, but also to hit targets whose locations are not known in advance. Operators can monitor the situation through a drone’s onboard camera, change its course, and select a target while the UAV is in flight. This is particularly important when targeting moving vehicles, mobile air defense systems, and other assets that can change location.</p><p>Previously, the range of communications links was one of the factors limiting the use of Ukrainian drones deep behind enemy lines. The reliability of conventional radio signals depend on terrain and the positioning of antennas and repeaters, and can also be jammed by electronic warfare systems. Starlink makes it possible to control drones beyond direct radio line of sight by relaying data through its satellite constellation (even if satellite signals can also be jammed, disrupting a drone’s navigation with the use of electronic warfare).</p><p>In 2025, Ukrainian forces began building a drone-saturated “<span class="termin" data-id="5888">kill zone</span>,” but even heavy Russian losses failed to halt their advance. Russian assault groups continued to infiltrate gaps in Ukraine’s thinly spread defensive lines, while Russian ammunition depots, command posts, drone crews, and major supply routes remained largely beyond the reach of mass-produced, low-cost strike weapons.</p><p>Changing this situation required extending the range of Ukrainian strikes and targeting not only assault units but also the logistical infrastructure supporting them. Conventional weapons for striking operational rear areas, primarily HIMARS and ATACMS, could not accomplish this task on the necessary scale. However, mass-produced, relatively inexpensive drones made it possible to attack a much wider range of targets. Satellite communications were one of the factors that made it possible to combine relatively long flight ranges with remote control.</p><blockquote>Satellite communications enabled Ukraine to deploy drones on a large scale against targets deep inside Russia</blockquote><p>Unlike long-range drones programmed to follow a predetermined route to a fixed point, drones with reliable video and command links can search for targets within a designated area and adapt to changing circumstances. Since the beginning of 2026, Ukrainian forces have stepped up their use of mid-strike drones, including the <a href="https://t.me/firepointofficial/417">FP-2</a>, <a href="https://t.me/in_factum/48624">RAM-2X</a>, <a href="https://t.me/MiliTJournal/35768">Bulava</a>, <a href="https://t.me/ButusovPlus/33240">Darts</a>, <a href="https://t.me/in_factum/48775">Baton</a>, and <a href="https://t.me/ButusovPlus/34114">Hornet</a>. Not all of these drones are equipped with Starlink, with some relying on other communications systems or autonomous targeting.</p><div>https://t.me/theinsru/4279</div><p>In May 2026, Ukrainian forces launched a large-scale campaign against Russian logistics deep behind the front line, dubbing it <a href="https://theins.ru/politika/293937">“Logistics Lockdown.”</a> According to <a href="https://x.com/clement_molin/status/2107881525970633168">figures</a> compiled by French OSINT researcher Clément Molin, who analyzes strike footage published by Ukrainian military units, in May 214 Russian trucks and other vehicles were <a href="https://t.me/clement_molin/976">hit</a> at distances more than 20 km from the front line. The figure rose to 586 in June, <a href="https://t.me/clement_molin/1359">reached</a> 656 in July, and fell to 630 in August before <a href="https://threadreaderapp.com/thread/2107881501925024166.html">hitting</a> a record 770 in September. In October, however, only 537 strikes were recorded, a decline Molin <a href="https://t.me/clement_molin/1936">attributes</a> to a nine-day disruption of Starlink and Starshield services. (It should be noted that these figures cover only strikes documented in publicly available footage, not the full number of operations carried out.)</p><blockquote>Disruption to Starshield operations led to a 30% drop in strikes against Russian vehicles</blockquote><p>According to reports by Unmanned Systems Forces commander Robert “Magyar” Brovdi, the number of tactical and mid-range targets hit across all categories rose from 44,100 <a href="https://sbs-group.army/subdivision/usf_grouping?period=monthly_5">in May</a> to 64,800 <a href="https://sbs-group.army/subdivision/usf_grouping/?period=monthly_10">in October</a>, while the number of strike sorties increased from 113,300 to 151,500. Over the same period, strikes against vehicles, specialized equipment, and fuel tankers rose from 2,356 to 3,297, while attacks on depots increased from 443 to 574.</p><p>The main target of “Logistics Lockdown” was the land corridor running from Russia’s Rostov region through Mariupol, Berdiansk, and Melitopol to Crimea. The heaviest attacks were concentrated along the R-280 Novorossiya highway and surrounding roads.</p><p>Ukrainian drones primarily targeted trucks carrying fuel, ammunition, and other supplies. Bridges and railway infrastructure also came under attack. By the end of June, <a href="https://theins.ru/politika/293937">hundreds of attacks</a> on transport had been recorded, causing <a href="https://threadreaderapp.com/thread/2071568117851910528.html">damage</a> to several key bridges, including those on routes linking Crimea with the mainland part of occupied Ukraine. Russian authorities, for their part, repeatedly announced that traffic had been restored. </p><p>One notable incident occurred in late July, when Yevgeny Balitsky, the Russian-installed head of the occupied part of Ukraine's Zaporizhzhia region, <a href="https://theins.ru/news/295128">told</a> Vladimir Putin that the R-280 highway was under full control. Russian military blogger Vladimir Romanov <a href="https://t.me/romanov_92/54871">accused</a> Balitsky of submitting a false report, pointing out that the highway was subjected to regular strikes from “Ukrainian kamikaze drones.” Magyar responded by <a href="https://t.me/robert_magyar/2636">publishing</a> footage showing a Hornet drone striking Russian trucks and a vehicle used by a mobile fire group.</p><div>https://t.me/theinsru/3975</div><p>By August, Russian forces had reorganized their transport operations. Trucks increasingly traveled in convoys escorted by mobile fire groups (MFGs) armed with antiaircraft weapons. A typical convoy <a href="https://x.com/clement_molin/status/2107881518391558623">consists</a> of three to five trucks and two to three escort vehicles. Russian forces also use electronic warfare (EW) systems and interceptor drones to counter Ukrainian UAVs.</p><p>In early October, Russia's Rubicon Center <a href="https://t.me/icpbtrubicon/2815">claimed</a> that its units had intercepted around 7,000 Ukrainian drones since the beginning of 2026, including 1,800 in September. Although Molin <a href="https://x.com/clement_molin/status/2107881541116235987">cautions</a> against taking these figures at face value, their sheer scale is striking. Meanwhile, Ukrainian forces have <a href="https://theins.ru/news/297643">stepped up</a> their use of decoy drones.</p><p>The Russian MFGs themselves have <a href="https://x.com/clement_molin/status/2107881537710542918">become</a> targets in their own right. According to <a href="https://x.com/clement_molin/status/2104255672309211196">Molin’s estimates</a>, footage published by the end of September showed hundreds their personnel killed or wounded. However, he <a href="https://x.com/clement_molin/status/2085433681577959829">identifies</a> Starlink jammers as being Russia's most effective means of countering Ukraine’s mid-strike drones, noting that such systems are very expensive and cannot be deployed everywhere.</p><p>Attacks on bridges also forced Russian forces to reroute their supply lines. In August, Molin <a href="https://threadreaderapp.com/thread/2085433651253203390.html">identified</a> 15 locations where pontoon bridges and new crossings had been established along the Henichesk–Melitopol–Mariupol–Taganrog route. Some were set up near bridges previously targeted by Ukrainian forces. Trucks have to slow down when crossing pontoon bridges, making them easier targets for drones.</p><p>In July, the Ukrainian campaign expanded to include Crimea’s energy infrastructure, along with <a href="https://ru.krymr.com/amp/krym-news-paromkaya-pereprava-25-procentov/33806922.html">ships</a>. On July 6, Ukraine’s Unmanned Systems Forces launched Operation MoLoCHka (an acronym based on the Ukrainian phrase “Moscow Will Fall Through Crimea”), targeting Russian vessels in the Black and Azov seas.</p><p>By July 22, Brovdi had <a href="https://t.me/robert_magyar/2641">reported</a> 196 maritime targets struck, and the Unmanned Systems Forces’ final July figures <a href="https://sbs-group.army/subdivision/usf_grouping/?period=monthly_7">listed</a> 206 vessels hit. In total, 309 vessels had been struck between the start of the campaign and the end of October. By August, shipping in the Sea of Azov had <a href="https://theins.ru/politika/297546#2">ground to a halt</a>, and the region’s ports subsequently ceased operations as well.</p><p>At the same time, a large-scale campaign titled Operation Crimean Switch-Off began targeting the peninsula's energy infrastructure. After reporting no strikes against energy facilities in May, Ukraine's Unmanned Systems Forces claimed 181 in <a href="https://sbs-group.army/subdivision/usf_grouping/?period=monthly_7">July</a>, 168 in <a href="https://sbs-group.army/subdivision/usf_grouping/?period=monthly_8">August</a>, and 105 in <a href="https://sbs-group.army/subdivision/usf_grouping/?period=monthly_10">October</a>.</p><div>https://t.me/theinsru/4037</div><p>It is important to note that these figures do not represent the number of vessels or energy facilities permanently put out of service. Still, attacks on electrical substations in Crimea have visibly caused periodic <a href="https://t.me/Crimeanwind/107608">blackouts</a> and <a href="https://t.me/Crimeanwind/111521">widespread power outages</a>. An Oct. 24 <a href="https://theins.ru/news/298780">strike</a> on the 500 kV Taman substation led to an energy crisis worse than the one the peninsula experienced over the summer. However, Ukrainian forces have yet to switch off the “Crimean power switch” completely.</p><p>Despite efforts by the occupation authorities, living conditions in Crimea <a href="https://mxstat.me/channel/@crimeaenergy/post/AaF9vp0ZRYY">continue to deteriorate</a>. Even the announced schedules for power cuts are not being followed. Meanwhile, the Unmanned Systems Forces were conducting a parallel campaign against Russian air defense systems, radar installations, communications equipment, and electronic warfare systems.</p><p>According to the Ukrainian reports, <a href="https://sbs-group.army/subdivision/usf_grouping?period=monthly_5">36 systems</a> across three designated categories were hit in May as part of Operation PPopad (a play on the Ukrainian abbreviation PPO, which is short for for "air defense"). The figures were <a href="https://sbs-group.army/subdivision/usf_grouping/?period=monthly_6">32 in June</a>, <a href="https://sbs-group.army/subdivision/usf_grouping?period=monthly_6">35 in July</a>, <a href="https://sbs-group.army/subdivision/usf_grouping?period=monthly_8">32 in August</a>б and <a href="https://sbs-group.army/subdivision/usf_grouping?period=monthly_9">43 in September</a>. The number of radar, electronic intelligenceб and communications systems hit increased particularly sharply, from 12 in May to 28 in September.</p><p>The geographical scope of the strikes also expanded. On August 24, Molin <a href="https://t.me/clement_molin/1630">noted</a> that footage was beginning to appear of attacks on airfields, air defense systemsб and radar installations inside Russia itself — “in places where Starlink cannot be used.” Previously, similar strikes involving live video feeds had been recorded mainly in occupied Ukrainian territory and along the coast. According to Molin's estimates, Ukrainian drones have damaged or destroyed more than 250 Russian air defense systems, radar installationsб and electronic warfare systems since the beginning of 2026.</p><blockquote>Ukrainian drones have damaged or destroyed more than 250 Russian air defense systems, radar installations and electronic warfare systems since the beginning of 2026</blockquote><p>Gradually, mid-strike operations came to cover virtually the entire Russian-occupied territory of Ukraine. While the campaign initially focused on southern supply routes, by the fall, footage of strikes deep inside the Russian-occupied part of the Donetsk region was appearing with increasing frequency. In October, Molin <a href="https://x.com/clement_molin/status/2109278036411466170">noted</a> that hundreds of vehicles had been targeted on roads connecting the main cities of the Donbas. Back in August, however, the analyst <a href="https://t.me/clement_molin/1665">acknowledged</a> that, despite the significant impact of the strikes on Russian logistics and energy supplies, their intensity was still insufficient to substantially alter the course of Moscow's offensive in the Donetsk region.</p><h3 class="outline-heading">Vivaldi: Satellite communications amid the offensive</h3><p>By the fall, Ukrainian forces had begun using mid-strike drones not only to maintain pressure on Russian logistics but also to support ground offensives, most notably Operation <a href="https://theins.ru/news/297159">Vivaldi</a>, conducted on the Lyman axis by the Ukrainian Armed Forces’ 3rd Army Corps. The offensive unfolded in northern Donetsk region, where Russian forces were seeking to advance toward Lyman and Sloviansk.</p><p>According to the <a href="https://t.me/ab3army/7575">Ukrainian command</a>, Russian forces planned to outflank the Sloviansk–Kramatorsk urban agglomeration from the north and seize the Kharkiv–Sloviansk highway, a key supply route for Ukrainian forces. To thwart these plans, the 3rd Corps, commanded by Brigadier General Andriy Biletsky, <a href="https://t.me/ab3army/7468">launched</a> Operation Vivaldi, which unfolded in four stages (or “seasons,” taking inspiration from the famous cycle of Italian composer Antonio Vivaldi).</p><p>One of the main objectives was to disrupt Russian logistics before the ground assault began. In the first phase, Ukrainian drones <a href="https://t.me/ab3army/7474">targeted</a> transport and infrastructure up to 50 kilometers behind the front line, extending their range to 120 kilometers in the next. Targets <a href="https://t.me/ab3army/7492">included</a> trucks carrying ammunition and fuel, depots, crossings, command posts, and communications hubs belonging to Russia’s 20th and 25th Combined Arms Armies.</p><p>According to Serafym “Falko” Hordiienko, an officer with Ukraine's Unmanned Systems Forces, the sustained strikes forced support units of Russia’s 144th Motor Rifle Division to relocate some of their supply facilities to the Voronezh region, increasing the distance Russian forces had to transport damaged equipment for evacuation by around 250 kilometers.</p><p>The 3rd Corps <a href="https://t.me/ab3army/7495">said</a> that artillery and drone units struck Russian positions in the rear, while air defense and electronic warfare systems protected advancing troops. Drones and unmanned ground vehicles (UGVs) operated ahead of the infantry. Satellite communications played a key role, with John Roberts, an American adviser to the 3rd Corps, <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2026-10-17/spacex-starlink-cuts-hobbled-ukraine-before-russian-bombardment">telling</a> <i>Bloomberg</i> that Starlink was used to maintain communications, relay reconnaissance footage, and coordinate strikes. It also enabled UGVs to be controlled over considerable distances.</p><blockquote>Starlink enabled Ukrainian forces to control ground robots during Operation Vivaldi</blockquote><p>Notably, the Ukrainian Defense Forces were able to convert Soviet-era BTR-60 armored personnel carriers into explosive-laden kamikaze vehicles controlled via Starshield. They also deployed small Hyena robots, which were delivered behind Russian lines by heavy-lift quadcopters that could be remotely controlled after landing.</p><p>To protect advancing troops from Russian drones, the 3rd Corps also integrated its electronic warfare equipment into a unified defense system, mounting some of the equipment on UGVs. According to the corps, the operation <a href="https://t.me/ab3army/7471">prevented</a> more than 20,000 Russian drone sorties.</p><div>https://t.me/theinsru/4154</div><p>The 3rd Corps announced the first results of the operation in mid-September. On Oct. 14, the day restrictions on Starlink and Starshield were imposed, Biletsky <a href="https://theins.ru/news/298308">announced</a> the completion of the operation’s fourth and final phase. According to the corps, Ukrainian forces had regained control of 277 square kilometers of territory and 16 settlements.</p><p>Military expert Kirill Mikhailov believes Starshield enabled the 3rd Corps’ drone units to strike Russian logistics as far away as Luhansk. An expert with the Conflict Intelligence Team (CIT), who asked to remain anonymous, also considers satellite communications essential primarily for mid-strike operations, which played an important role in Operation Vivaldi. However, he believes conventional Starlink was sufficient for communications between military positions and command posts, as well as for controlling unmanned ground vehicles (including the aforementioned kamikaze armored personnel carriers).</p><p>Experts believe that a complete shutdown of Starshield would not prevent Ukrainian forces from conducting ground offensives but would significantly reduce their effectiveness. According to Mikhailov, conventional Starlink can still be used for communications at fixed positions, for controlling UGVs, and for operating heavy multirotor drones such as the Vampire (Baba Yaga).</p><p>In theory, conventional Starlink could also provide communications links for mid-strike drones and interceptor UAVs, but this would require the widespread use of airborne relays and a substantial overhaul of the system. The CIT expert stresses that without systematic strikes against Russian operational rear areas, it would become harder for Ukrainian forces to isolate the area of operations, disrupt supply routes, and prevent the movement of reinforcements, slowing their advance and increasing casualties. . This could slow the advance of Ukrainian units and increase their casualties, although the impact would depend on the circumstances of each operation.</p><h3 class="outline-heading">How Ukrainian forces can fight without Starlink and Starshield</h3><p>The Starshield restrictions primarily affected drones that require a constant connection to their operators. However, a substantial part of Ukraine’s long-range arsenal does not depend on satellite communications. UAVs programmed to fly to predetermined coordinates can strike stationary targets without the need for continuous remote control, while cruise missiles and drone missiles <a href="https://theins.ru/politika/297813">use</a> their own navigation systems.</p><p>As a result, disruptions to satellite communications do not prevent Ukrainian forces from striking Russian defense industry facilities, airfields, drone bases, and other targets in the operational and deep rear. Oil industry facilities remain among the main targets of Ukraine’s long-range strikes, with drones regularly attacking refineries, oil storage facilities, and pumping stations, causing fires and damaging equipment.</p><p>In October and early November, strikes against oil infrastructure were reported in Russia's <a href="https://theins.ru/news/298354">Ryazan</a>, <a href="https://theins.ru/news/297849">Volgograd</a>, <a href="https://theins.ru/news/297849">Samara</a>, and <a href="https://theins.ru/news/299068">Nizhny Novgorod</a> regions. In late September, successful strikes on refineries <a href="https://theins.ru/news/297543">forced</a> four facilities to shut down. Such attacks have a direct impact on the Russian economy and were among the main <a href="https://www.forbes.ru/biznes/566843-benzina-snova-net-rossiu-nakryla-vtoraa-volna-toplivnogo-krizisa">causes</a> of Russia’s summer fuel crisis.</p><figure><img src="https://theins.press/storage/content_image/display/6af/6af5e66b47db33.59815608/EVySEyXdXxYRh4FzTuM8YP38hOBeCzKy34cptdwc.jpg" alt="Aftermath of a Ukrainian drone strike on the Kstovo oil refinery in the Nizhny Novgorod region, November 1, 2026"/><figcaption>Aftermath of a Ukrainian drone strike on the Kstovo oil refinery in the Nizhny Novgorod region, November 1, 2026</figcaption></figure><p>Meanwhile, attacks on oil refineries were <a href="https://t.me/stanislav_osman/11191">halted</a> between <a href="https://theins.ru/news/298399">Oct. 16</a> and <a href="https://theins.ru/news/298946">30</a>, reportedly under <a href="https://www.wsj.com/world/ukraine-pauses-strikes-on-russian-refineries-after-pressure-from-u-s-a9e512f8?mod=hp_lead_pos1">pressure</a> from the Trump administration. Instead, Ukrainian forces shifted their focus to chemical plants. In late October, synthetic rubber plants in Tolyatti, Omsk, and Voronezh came <a href="https://theins.ru/news/298780">under attack</a>. Their products are used, among other things, to manufacture rocket propellant. The main objective for the Ukrainian Defense Forces is to hit polybutadiene production units at these plants, which are particularly difficult to repair. One such unit was <a href="https://t.me/kiber_boroshno/13646">hit</a> at the Voronezhsintezkauchuk plant on Oct. 26.</p><p>The campaign against Russia’s defense industry is also expanding. On Sept. 25, drones <a href="https://theins.ru/news/297537">attacked</a> the Iskra plant in Ulyanovsk, part of the Almaz-Antey conglomerate, which manufactures electronic components for radio equipment and communications systems.</p><p>In October, Ukrainian forces also <a href="https://theins.ru/news/298780">reported</a> strikes on the Energiya plant in Yelets, which produces power supplies for missiles and guided bombs, and the Proton-Elektrotex facility, which manufactures components for Russian cruise and ballistic missiles.</p><div>https://t.me/theinsru/4152</div><p>In addition to fixed-wing drones, Ukraine also uses domestically developed cruise missiles — including the Flamingo, upgraded versions of the Neptune, and several types of drone missiles — for these missions. In June, Russia's <a href="https://theins.ru/news/294174">Titan-Barrikady plant</a> in Volgograd, which manufactures missile launchers, came under attack.</p><p>In late September, Ukrainian forces also used several types of long-range weapons to strike the <a href="https://theins.ru/news/297574">Azov Optical-Mechanical Plant</a> in the Rostov region. The main limitation remains the relatively small number of such weapons and their inconsistent effectiveness.</p><p>Military equipment storage facilities have also been targeted. On the night of Oct. 22, Ukrainian drones <a href="https://theins.ru/news/298632">attacked</a> the 75th Arsenal of Russia's Main Missile and Artillery Directorate (GRAU), now known as the 75 Arsenal facility, in Serpukhov, near Moscow. Reports indicated <a href="https://t.me/kiber_boroshno/13645">hits</a> on repair workshops and a storage hangar. According to OSINT analysts, as of 2024 the facility was Russia’s largest known storage facility for ground-based air defense equipment.</p><p>A massive missile and drone strike on the headquarters of Russia’s Center Group of Forces in Donetsk on Aug. 26, 2026, <a href="https://theins.ru/news/298131">killed</a> at least 20 officers, whose identities were <a href="https://zona.media/news/2026/10/09/20_oficzerov">established</a> by <i>Mediazona</i>. Among those killed was Colonel Andrey Romanchuk, head of the engineering troops of Russia’s Central Military District. Storm Shadow / SCALP-EG missiles were reportedly used in the attack. According to <i>Mediazona</i>, this was single deadliest known incident for Russian officers over the course of the war. </p><p>Since July, Ukrainian long-range strikes have also <a href="https://theins.ru/news/295077">targeted</a> Russian commercial infrastructure. Between July 18 and Aug. 5, drones attacked at least 21 Wildberries logistics facilities in Russia and Crimea. Experts <a href="https://theins.ru/ekonomika/296695">estimated</a> that 17–22% of the company’s warehouse space had been damaged, with combined losses for the marketplace and its sellers <a href="https://www.forbes.ru/biznes/566547-kassovyj-razryv-80-menedzerov-sokratili-sellery-isut-zasity-u-gosudarstva">estimated</a> at 600–800 billion rubles ($7.2 billion to $9.7 billion).</p><p>Since Aug. 22, Ozon warehouses have also come under drone attack. The company <a href="https://corp.ozon.ru/ru/sth/ozon-obyavlyaet-finansovye-rezultaty-za-tretiy-kvartal-2026-goda-58924955">estimated</a> its losses from strikes on 11 logistics centers at 30 billion rubles ($362.2 million). Russian data centers have also <a href="https://theins.ru/news/298231">come under long-range attack</a>. After a strike on a Yandex data center in Vladimir on Oct. 11, the company reported that the facility had ceased operations, causing disruptions to its cloud services.</p><div>https://t.me/theinsru/4059</div><p>Meanwhile, Ukrainian attacks on the most obvious targets — Russian Shahed launch sites — have achieved relatively little. Despite repeated strikes on drone bases at Donetsk airport (<a href="https://theins.ru/news/286578">1</a>, <a href="https://theins.ru/news/290117">2</a>, <a href="https://theins.ru/news/291475">3</a>) and near the village of Tsymbulova in the Oryol region (<a href="https://theins.ru/news/296627">1</a>, <a href="https://theins.ru/news/297394">2</a>, <a href="https://theins.ru/news/297803">3</a>, <a href="https://theins.ru/news/297926">4</a>), both within range of Ukraine’s mid-strike drones, the facilities remain operational and continue to <a href="https://theins.ru/news/297130">expand</a>.</p><p>Donetsk airport, less than 50 kilometers from the front line, was struck with ATACMS and Storm Shadow missiles in <a href="https://theins.ru/news/290117">March</a> and <a href="https://theins.ru/news/291475">April</a> 2026. Some of the drone shelters were destroyed or damaged. By June, however, the airport <a href="https://www.radiosvoboda.org/a/donetskiy-aeroport-baza-rf-shakhedy/33816808.html">had</a> seven launch installations and more than 130 shelters, while Russian forces continued building fortified storage facilities.</p><p>A similar situation has developed at the drone base near Tsymbulova. According to <a href="https://oboronka.mezha.ua/zvidki-vorog-zapuskaye-tisyachi-shahediv-dronoporti-315502/">estimates</a> by Ukrainian OSINT analysts, the site has 23 launch installations, 387 shelters, and 26 underground storage facilities. Ukrainian strikes in <a href="https://theins.ru/news/296627">late August</a> and <a href="https://theins.ru/news/297394">September</a> damaged several structures, but most of the infrastructure remained intact. Attacks intensified in October. Following strikes on <a href="https://theins.ru/news/297803">Oct. 1</a>, <a href="https://theins.ru/news/297926">Oct. 3</a> and <a href="https://theins.ru/news/298231">Oct. 10</a>, satellite imagery revealed further damage to bunkers, a launch installation, and the drone storage area. Nevertheless, there were no reports that the facility had been put out of operation for any extended period. Analysts at the Conflict Intelligence Team (CIT) <a href="https://notes.citeam.org/ru-dispatch-sep-21-24-2026">suggest</a> that the relatively infrequent attacks give Russian forces enough time to repair the infrastructure and replace their losses.</p><blockquote>Long-range strikes have had little impact on Russian drone launch sites used to attack Ukraine</blockquote><p>The Hvardiiske airfield in Crimea has <a href="https://t.me/DniproOfficial/8312">become</a> one of Russia’s main launch sites for long-range drones. It first <a href="https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/22467">appeared</a> in Ukrainian General Staff reports as a launch site for loitering munitions in March 2025. By the fall of 2026, launches from the airfield were taking place almost daily. Almost all manned aircraft previously stationed at Hvardiiske had been withdrawn by the summer of 2024. Nevertheless, Ukrainian sources have periodically <a href="https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/22467">reported</a> strikes on helicopters there. The airfield has effectively been repurposed for drone operations, making it difficult to put out of action for any length of time.</p><p>The drone infrastructure is dispersed across the airfield: launch sites, maintenance facilities, and storage areas are located in different sections, while individual launch positions can be restored relatively quickly. Notably, drones are launched not from fixed installations but from mobile platforms mounted on vehicles that drive onto the runway. Moreover, Hvardiiske lies deep inside the peninsula, forcing Ukrainian drones to fly upwards of 100 kilometers over land, where they are more vulnerable to interception.</p><p>The Ukrainian Defense Forces have repeatedly attempted to strike this hub. On Aug. 7, the General Staff <a href="https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41792">reported</a> an attack on a facility near Hvardiiske that is used to store, prepare, and launch UAVs. Following another strike on the night of Oct. 12, NASA satellites <a href="https://t.me/Crimeanwind/110954">detected</a> a fire near the southeastern end of the runway.</p><p>The Conflict Intelligence Team <a href="https://notes.citeam.org/ru-dispatch-aug-13-17-2026#proJ">argues</a> that, given Ukraine's shortage of air defense missiles, it would be more effective to follow the principle of “shoot the archer, not the arrows” — prioritizing the destruction of launch installations and related infrastructure. Even facilities protected by air defense systems, mobile fire groups, and electronic warfare equipment can have their defenses overwhelmed by a mass attack.</p><p>Analysts question why Wildberries warehouses and similar facilities appear to take priority over drone bases as Ukrainian targets. Meanwhile, the authors of the Ukrainian OSINT project Dnipro Osint ⟨ Harbuz ⟩, <a href="https://t.me/DniproOfficial/8347">note</a> that Ukrainian forces have repeatedly attacked Russia's drone base near Tsymbulova, sometimes successfully hitting warehouses and launch installations. However, in their assessment, most strikes failed to reach their targets because of the site's extensive electronic warfare defenses.</p><p>Satellite images published by the project show numerous craters and traces of crashed drones around the facility. The authors suggest that medium-range ballistic missiles, particularly the FP-7, might be more effective against such targets.</p><figure><img src="https://theins.press/storage/content_image/display/6af/6af5e772525c75.31029831/M76XoGKYvl5YCOUmIzSyr9z8CASkSheBb2Ylgozq.jpg" alt="A satellite image showing impact sites from Ukrainian drone strikes near the Tsymbulova drone base in the Oryol region, November 2026  "/><figcaption>A satellite image showing impact sites from Ukrainian drone strikes near the Tsymbulova drone base in the Oryol region, November 2026  </figcaption></figure><p>Large industrial facilities protected by layered air defenses are even harder to strike. According to <a href="https://www.svoboda.org/a/chislo-pozitsiy-pvo-vokrug-osoboy-ekonomicheskoy-zony-alabuga-dostiglo-33-h/33880930.html"><i>Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty</i></a>, satellite imagery from Oct. 21 showed 33 air defense positions and installations around the Alabuga Special Economic Zone in Tatarstan, where Russia manufactures Shahed-type drones. In addition to towers and sites housing antiaircraft systems, the area is equipped with machine-gun positions and anti-drone netting. The last recorded Ukrainian drone attack on the facility took place in <a href="https://theins.ru/news/282181">June 2025</a>.</p><p>Ukrainian strikes against airbases inside Russia have been more successful. In October 2026 alone, the Russian Aerospace Forces lost seven Su-34 fighter-bombers: one at Khanskaya airbase in Adygea on <a href="https://theins.ru/news/297926">Oct. 4</a>, four at Borisoglebsk airbase in the Voronezh region on <a href="https://theins.ru/news/298354">Oct. 15</a> and two at Marinovka airbase on <a href="https://t.me/ukrainian_navy/22898">Oct. 29</a>.</p><p>Thus, even without Starshield, the Ukrainian Defense Forces retain the ability to strike Russian operational and deep rear areas. However, satellite communications restrictions limit their ability to locate and engage moving targets. Maintaining the scale of the mid-strike campaign therefore requires alternative drone control links.</p><h3 class="outline-heading">What could replace Starlink, and how long would it take?</h3><p>The October 2026 restrictions on satellite communications have forced the Ukrainian Defense Forces to look for independent providers. However, existing alternatives are not yet capable of fully replacing Starlink, particularly when it comes to controlling drones tens or hundreds of kilometers away. </p><p>Europe's Eutelsat OneWeb satellite system is already available in Ukraine. The Ukrainian Defense Forces <a href="https://ain.ua/2026/10/22/jevropa-ta-velika-britaniia-maiut-alternativu-starlink-ale-ukrayina-cim-ne-koristujetsia-poiasniujemo-comu/">use</a> it primarily for communications between headquarters and command posts, as well as to serve as a backup link (including on naval drones). However, there is no confirmation that OneWeb has been used to control UAVs during long-range strikes.</p><p>Unlike Starlink, which operates a constellation of more than 11,000 satellites, OneWeb has around 650. Its overall network capacity is considerably lower, while its equipment is more expensive than Starlink's and designed primarily for corporate and government customers.</p><p>Back in March 2025, Eutelsat <a href="https://www.reuters.com/technology/space/eutelsat-committed-boosting-europes-satellite-autonomy-continued-support-ukraine-2025-03-03/">reported</a> that several hundred terminals were operating in Ukraine — far too few to replace the tens of thousands of Starlink terminals in the country. Whether OneWeb can also support the control of fast-moving UAVs remains an open question.</p><p>As OSINT researcher Jakub Janovský has <a href="https://fronts.co/article/governments-are-scrambling-for-a-starlink-alternative-does-one-even-exist/">explained</a>, SpaceX's advantage lies not only in the number of satellites it has deployed but also in its ability to manufacture its own equipment, launch satellites using its own reusable rockets, and continually expand network capacity. European competitors, by contrast, have to rely on different contractors to manufacture and launch their satellites. In Janovský's assessment, even a substantial increase in government funding would not be enough to allow them to catch up with SpaceX quickly.</p><blockquote>Competitors will struggle to catch up with SpaceX, even with a substantial increase in government funding</blockquote><p>Another European alternative is the satellite terminals of Swedish company SatCube, which have been <a href="https://militarnyi.com/en/news/ukraine-will-receive-satcube-terminals-for-satellite-communications/">supplied</a> to Ukraine since 2023 (thanks to German financial support). They provide satellite internet via geostationary satellites operated by U.S. company Intelsat. However, their high signal latency and relatively bulky equipment make them better suited to stationary and field communications than to drone control.</p><p>A potentially promising option for long-range UAVs is the compact terminals developed by Israeli company HiSky. In late October 2026, Russia’s Coordination Center for Aid to Novorossiya <a href="https://t.me/kcpn2014/4551">reported</a> that it had obtained a SmartLITE SIRIUS 16×16 terminal recovered from a Ukrainian fixed-wing drone for examination. Unlike Starlink, HiSky uses satellite networks operated by third-party providers, potentially allowing communications to be maintained over Russian territory.</p><p>HiSky terminals are designed to transmit commands, telemetry, and other data via satellite. Their bandwidth <a href="https://hiskysat.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/12/Smartellite%E2%84%A2-Dynamic-KU-16x16_v1_3db.pdf">depends</a> on the satellite network used, while their ability to transmit video and support remote drone control has yet to be fully assessed. </p><p>Another potential competitor to Starlink is Amazon Leo, the U.S. satellite system formerly known as Project Kuiper. By October 2026, Amazon had <a href="https://www.aboutamazon.com/news/innovation-at-amazon/project-kuiper-satellite-rocket-launch-progress-updates">launched</a> nearly 400 satellites into orbit and expected to begin providing limited internet access by the end of the year. The constellation is ultimately <a href="https://www.aboutamazon.com/news/innovation-at-amazon/what-is-amazon-project-kuiper">expected</a> to comprise more than 3,000 satellites. Unlike SpaceX, however, Amazon has no launch vehicles of its own and thus <a href="https://fronts.co/article/governments-are-scrambling-for-a-starlink-alternative-does-one-even-exist/">relies</a> on external providers, including <a href="https://www.aboutamazon.com/news/innovation-at-amazon/amazon-project-kuiper-spacex-launch">SpaceX itself</a>. Its satellite constellation has also yet to reach the necessary scale. Moreover, switching from one American commercial system to another would not resolve Ukraine’s dependence on U.S. government decisions.</p><p>In the longer term, Europe plans to develop its own secure satellite communications system, IRIS², which is closer in purpose to the military Starshield service than to commercial Starlink. The project is being developed by the SpaceRISE consortium, comprising Eutelsat, SES, and Hispasat.</p><p>IRIS² is more expensive to deploy than Starlink because of its military-grade security and its resistance to electronic warfare, its complex multi-orbit architecture, the drive for technological independence, and the lack of a comparable manufacturing scale. The EU project envisages a constellation of 348 satellites, including those dedicated to military and government communications. Commercial services are also planned.</p><p>In August 2026, the European Commission <a href="https://defence-industry-space.ec.europa.eu/european-union-accelerating-and-reinforcing-iris2-2026-08-07_en">approved</a> an accelerated deployment schedule, with the first launches <a href="https://www.euspa.europa.eu/newsroom-events/news/commission-accelerates-iris2-deployment-enhanced-security-and-expanded">planned</a> for 2029 and secure services expected to begin in 2030. Even after the system becomes operational, however, expanding the network and deploying compatible equipment will take time. IRIS² could eventually become a strategic alternative to SpaceX, but it will not solve the Ukrainian Defense Forces’ immediate problems.</p><blockquote>Europe’s Starshield alternative is scheduled to become operational in 2030</blockquote><p>Ukrainian developers are also working to build an independent satellite network. On Oct. 1, Ukrainian company Himera and Denmark’s GomSpace <a href="https://oboronka.mezha.ua/ukrajinskiy-suverenniy-suputnik-vzhe-pracyuye-na-orbiti-316593/">launched</a> the first test satellite, OBRIA NANO, which is intended to form the basis of a future Ukrainian secure communications system.</p><p>In addition, conventional radio links, ground-based and airborne relays, and mesh networks could help the Ukrainian Defense Forces reduce their dependence on Starlink. Mesh networks route data through multiple interconnected devices, so the loss of an individual node does not necessarily disrupt communications. For example, the American <a href="https://silvustechnologies.com/products/streamcaster-radios">Silvus StreamCaster</a> and Ukrainian <a href="https://himeratech.com/en/">HIMERA</a> systems are designed to maintain communications between military units without a constant satellite internet connection. However, extending such networks over hundreds of kilometers is more difficult and requires relay stations that the enemy can jam or destroy.</p><p>Another option is 4G/LTE cellular networks, which are already used in military drones. As early as 2023, <a href="https://t.me/serhii_flash/1667">modems and SIM cards</a> from mobile operators were found in Russia's Shahed drones. Cellular networks allow data transmission without satellite terminals, but coverage may be unavailable in occupied territories. Network operators and the military can also restrict access for specific devices. Mobile internet can therefore supplement other control links but cannot guarantee a reliable connection throughout a drone’s flight.</p><p>Ukraine's dependence on Starlink creates vulnerabilities that are about more than just the whims of Donald Trump's White House — Russian military countermeasures are also playing a role. In 2026, Russian forces began making more <a href="https://theins.ru/news/296638" target="_blank">extensive use</a> of Volna Kupol Garant systems to jam Starlink signals. Deployed around Donetsk, Mariupol, Berdiansk, and Crimea, they make it harder for Ukrainian forces to strike Russian rear areas. However, their powerful radio emissions also make them easier to detect, and some have already been <a href="https://theins.ru/news/295880">destroyed</a> by Ukrainian drones.</p><p>A fundamentally different approach is to <a href="https://theins.ru/politika/295796">develop</a> autonomous drones that do not require a constant connection to an operator. For example, Hornet drones developed by Eric Schmidt’s Perennial Autonomy use <span class="termin" data-description="PHA+PHN0cm9uZz5Db21wdXRlciB2aXNpb248L3N0cm9uZz4sIGluIHRoZSBjb250ZXh0IG9mIHRoZSBSdXNzaWHigJNVa3JhaW5lIHdhciwgZ2VuZXJhbGx5IHJlZmVycyB0byB0ZWNobm9sb2d5IHRoYXQgZW5hYmxlcyBhIGRyb25l4oCZcyBvbmJvYXJkIGNvbXB1dGVyIHRvIGlkZW50aWZ5IHRhcmdldHMsIGVpdGhlciBhdXRvbm9tb3VzbHkgb3Igd2l0aCBvcGVyYXRvciBhc3Npc3RhbmNlLCBhbmQgYXV0b21hdGljYWxseSBndWlkZSB0aGUgVUFWIHRvd2FyZCBhIHRhcmdldCB3aXRob3V0IGZ1cnRoZXIgaHVtYW4gaW50ZXJ2ZW50aW9uLiBUaGUgdGVjaG5vbG9neSBpcyBhbHNvIGtub3duIGFzIHRlcm1pbmFsIGd1aWRhbmNlIG9yIGF1dG9tYXRpYyB0YXJnZXQgYWNxdWlzaXRpb24uPC9wPg==">computer vision</span> to identify vehicles and to track targets. If satellite navigation is lost, they can navigate autonomously using images of the terrain. Once a target has been acquired, a drone can complete its attack independently, even if communications are lost. Germany’s <a href="https://t.me/MiliTJournal/35244">HX-2</a> drones can also perform part of their flight autonomously and use computer vision for terminal guidance.</p><p>Autonomous control is also being introduced into unmanned ground vehicles. In October 2026, the Lava Unmanned Systems Regiment of the Ukrainian National Guard’s 2nd Khartiia Corps <a href="https://militarnyi.com/uk/news/ukrayinskyj-nrk-iz-shi-samostijno-19-km/">announced</a> tests of an autonomously controlled UGV in the Kharkiv sector. The vehicle completed 93% of a 20-kilometer route on its own, with an operator taking control only for a 1.4-kilometer stretch.</p><p>Before a mission, the terrain is scanned using a lidar to create a three-dimensional map. The UGV then navigates using this map, while cameras and artificial intelligence help it identify obstacles and maneuver independently. The system, developed by Apex AI, reduces the need for continuous communication with an operator, including through Starlink.</p><p>However, current autonomous systems cannot yet fully replace human operators in complex missions, particularly in rapidly changing environments. According to Ukrainian military personnel interviewed by <a href="https://oboronka.mezha.ua/yak-ukrajina-stala-zaruchnikom-starlink-alternativi-316572/">Oboronka</a>, the widespread availability of inexpensive, easy-to-use Starlink terminals has slowed the development of domestic communications systems. </p><p>Building relay networks and other backup channels requires considerably more time, funding, and specialized personnel. Major Ihor Bohdan, head of the Center for Innovation and Technology of Ukraine's 7th Air Assault Corps, argues that rather than seeking a single replacement for Starlink, the military should focus on integrating different technologies into a decentralized network that can remain operational even when individual nodes are lost.</p><p>In the near term, Ukraine can reduce its dependence on SpaceX by combining different communications channels with the development of autonomous guidance systems. Replacing Starshield for high-speed drones, however, remains a much more difficult challenge. Building an independent satellite communications infrastructure would take several years at the very least.</p><aside class="related-posts"><ul><li><a href="https://theins.press/en/politics/289800">No connection: Blocking Starlink for the Russian military has changed the situation at the front in Ukraine</a></li><li><a href="https://theins.press/en/politics/291528">Ukraine’s “middle strike”: How Kyiv’s forces learned to hit targets up to 300 kilometers behind the front — and why Russia can’t stop them</a></li><li><a href="https://theins.press/en/politics/294084">Roads of death: Ukrainian strikes on transport corridors are disrupting Russia’s military logistics</a></li></ul></aside>]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Sat, 14 Nov 2026 07:13:29 +0000</pubDate>
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      <title><![CDATA[EU loses court battle over sanctions against convicted Moldovan oligarch Vladimir Plahotniuc but keeps him on an updated blacklist]]></title>
      <link>https://theins.press/en/news/299582</link>
      <guid>https://theins.press/en/news/299582</guid>
      <dc:creator><![CDATA[The Insider]]></dc:creator>
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      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>The <span class="termin" data-description="PHAgc3R5bGU9Im1hcmdpbi1sZWZ0Oi01cHg7Ij5UaGUgQ291cnQgb2YgSnVzdGljZSBvZiB0aGUgRXVyb3BlYW4gVW5pb24gKENKRVUpIGlzIHRoZSBqdWRpY2lhbCBicmFuY2ggb2YgdGhlIEV1cm9wZWFuIFVuaW9uLCBzZWF0ZWQgaW4gTHV4ZW1ib3VyZywgdGFza2VkIHdpdGggZW5zdXJpbmcgdGhhdCBFVSBsYXcgaXMgaW50ZXJwcmV0ZWQgYW5kIGFwcGxpZWQgdW5pZm9ybWx5IGFjcm9zcyBhbGwgbWVtYmVyIHN0YXRlcy48L3A+">Court of Justice of the European Union</span> has rejected an appeal by the Council of the EU, upholding a ruling that annulled sanctions imposed in May 2023 on Moldovan oligarch Vladimir Plahotniuc, who was sentenced in April to 19 years in prison for bank fraud. Despite the Council’s defeat in court, Plahotniuc remains on the sanctions list under an updated decision adopted in April 2026. The restrictions have been extended through April 29, 2027, with the justification expanded to include allegations that he met with Kremlin representatives with the aim of interfering in Moldovan elections.</p><p>The <a href="https://infocuria.curia.europa.eu/tabs/document/C/2024/C-0897-24-00000000PV-01-P-01/ARRET_NP/329187-EN-1-html">ruling</a> was issued by the court’s Sixth Chamber and saw the judges uphold an October 2024 judgment by the EU’s <span class="termin" data-description="PHAgc3R5bGU9Im1hcmdpbi1sZWZ0Oi01cHg7Ij5UaGUgR2VuZXJhbCBDb3VydCBpcyB0aGUgbG93ZXIgb2YgdGhlIHR3byBjb3VydHMgdGhhdCBtYWtlIHVwIHRoZSBDb3VydCBvZiBKdXN0aWNlIG9mIHRoZSBFdXJvcGVhbiBVbmlvbiAoQ0pFVSksIGJhc2VkIGluIEx1eGVtYm91cmcuPC9wPg==">General Court</span>, which found Plahotniuc’s original inclusion on the sanctions list unlawful. The Council of the EU had <a href="https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:62024CN0897">challenged</a> that decision since December 2024.</p><p>The court found that when Plahotniuc was added to the sanctions list, the Council had failed to verify whether his right to effective judicial protection had been respected in the criminal proceedings opened against him in Moldova. European authorities had relied on materials from those investigations to justify the sanctions.</p><p>In its original <a href="https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/dec/2023/1047/oj/eng">decision</a> of May 30, 2023, the Council said Plahotniuc was implicated in several criminal cases involving the embezzlement of public funds, illegal capital transfers, and bank fraud. Moldovan investigators also suspected him of bribing a former president in exchange for political favors. The Council argued that the criminal investigations were only one of several sources of information it had relied on.</p><p>The court also rejected the Council’s argument that the alleged bribery of a Moldovan president could serve as an independent basis for sanctions because it amounted to interference in the democratic process. The judges said that even under that reasoning, the Council was still required to verify that Plahotniuc’s procedural rights had been respected when the criminal case was opened.</p><p>As a result of the proceedings, the Council of the EU was ordered to cover both its own legal costs and Plahotniuc’s.</p><h3>Despite the ruling, Plahotniuc remains under EU sanctions</h3><p>The annulment of the original sanctions decision does not mean Plahotniuc has been removed from the current list of designations. In April 2026, the Council of the EU <a href="https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/dec/2026/897/oj/eng">adopted</a> a new measure extending restrictions on individuals accused of destabilizing Moldova, and those measures will remain in place through April 29, 2027.</p><p>The Council also updated the justification for the sanctions by adding allegations that he interfered in Moldova’s 2025 parliamentary elections. In particular, the document says Plahotniuc held meetings with Kremlin representatives to seek support for interfering in the Moldovan vote. Those allegations were not included in the original 2023 sanctions decision that he challenged in court.</p><h3><i>The Insider</i> previously uncovered Plahotniuc’s secret trips to the Kremlin</h3><p>Plahotniuc <a href="https://theins.press/en/inv/283588">held</a> secret talks with senior Russian officials. Flight records and copies of documents obtained by <i>The Insider</i> showed that he regularly traveled to Moscow using a passport issued under the false name Mikhail Taushanov. Passports bearing that name were later found when he was detained in Greece.</p><p>Recordings of conversations involving Vladislav Darvai, Russia’s former trade representative in Moldova, indicated that Dmitry Kozak, then deputy head of the Russian presidential administration, had been holding talks with Plahotniuc since June 2024. The discussions included the oligarch’s possible return to Moldovan politics and a potential meeting with Vladimir Putin. Plahotniuc last traveled to Moscow in late April 2025.</p><h3>A 19-year sentence and allegations of laundering billions of dollars</h3><p>In spring 2026, a court in Chisinau <a href="https://theins.press/en/news/291837">sentenced</a> Plahotniuc to 19 years in prison on charges of bank fraud, participation in a criminal organization and money laundering. The case stemmed from the theft of about $1 billion from three of Moldova’s largest banks in 2014. Prosecutors accused Plahotniuc of receiving $39 million and €3.5 million in stolen funds through affiliated companies. Plahotniuc denied the allegations, characterizing the verdict as political revenge. The trial court ruling has been appealed, and hearings on the appeal began in October 2026.</p><p>Plahotniuc also appeared in investigations into the so-called Moldovan Laundromat, a massive money-laundering scheme <a href="https://www.occrp.org/en/project/the-russian-laundromat/the-russian-laundromat">uncovered</a> by the international investigative journalism network OCCRP. According to the investigation, around $20 billion was moved out of Russia between 2010 and 2014 through a network of fictitious loans, offshore companies, Moldovan courts, and banks.</p><p>Plahotniuc left Moldova in 2019 after a change of government. He was detained in Greece in July 2025 and was extradited to Chisinau in September. Russia had also sought his extradition in connection with a money-laundering case opened against him there.</p><aside class="related-posts"><ul><li><a href="https://theins.press/en/news/291837">Kremlin-linked Moldovan billionaire Vladimir Plahotniuc handed 19-year prison term in Chisinau</a></li><li><a href="https://theins.press/en/inv/283588">The Kremlin’s laundromat: Billionaire Moldovan fraudster Vladimir Plahotniuc repeatedly flew to Moscow for secret high-level talks</a></li></ul></aside>]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Fri, 13 Nov 2026 19:00:09 +0000</pubDate>
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      <title><![CDATA[U.S. intelligence previously identified Moscow bombing target Sergei Zavorotny as a Russian foreign intelligence officer]]></title>
      <link>https://theins.press/en/news/299580</link>
      <guid>https://theins.press/en/news/299580</guid>
      <dc:creator><![CDATA[The Insider]]></dc:creator>
      <enclosure url="https://theins.press/storage/post_cover/display/299/299580/Q4gX278uWFAbwWkr2DD3EbILFiVpsgYjetNAcZYn.jpg" length="0" type="image/jpeg"/>
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      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Sergei Zavorotny, a pro-Russian Ukrainian who was <a href="https://theins.press/en/news/299576" target="_blank">targeted</a> in an assassination attempt in Moscow earlier today, is an officer of Russia’s Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR), according to an August 2020 <a href="https://docs.house.gov/meetings/JU/JU00/20230621/116122/HHRG-118-JU00-20230621-SD012.pdf">report</a> from the U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence on Russian interference in the 2016 U.S. election. Zavorotny is a former spokesman and adviser to former Ukrainian Prime Minister Mykola Azarov who later worked on a series of pro-Russian media projects after fleeing from Kyiv to Moscow in 2014.</p><p>The Russian investigative outlet <i>Important Stories</i> <a href="https://t.me/istories_media/14259">drew attention</a> to the report in a post on Telegram:</p><blockquote><p>“Azarov’s press secretary — both while he served as prime minister of Ukraine and when he announced from Moscow the creation of a government in exile — was Sergei Zavorotny, an SVR officer involved in influence operations.”</p></blockquote><p>The report said the conclusion was based on Zavorotny being identified as a serviceman assigned to Military Unit 33949, which is linked to the SVR. <i>The Insider</i> has repeatedly <a href="https://theins.press/en/inv/292740">reported</a> on the unit’s ties to Russia’s foreign intelligence service.</p><p>A person who knows Zavorotny told <i>The Insider</i> that he had previously served in the Soviet KGB and had been its resident intelligence officer in Argentina, working under journalistic cover as a correspondent for the Russian newspaper Komsomolskaya Pravda. The source also said Zavorotny had been involved in Russian intelligence propaganda operations in Europe before the start of the war in Ukraine.</p><p>The assassination attempt on the 72-year-old Zavorotny took place on the morning of Nov. 13 on Kirovogradskaya Street in Moscow. An explosive device detonated inside his car. Russia’s Investigative Committee <a href="https://t.me/sledcom_press/33135">said</a> Zavorotny was driving the vehicle and was taken to a hospital after being wounded by the blast. Komsomolskaya Pravda <a href="https://www.kp.ru/daily/277833.5/5328198/">reported</a> that its former Latin America correspondent suffered shrapnel wounds to his chest and back, as well as severe injuries to his legs and one arm.</p><p>Zavorotny fled from Kyiv to Moscow after Ukraine’s 2014 Maidan revolution removed Viktor Yanukovych from the presidency, and he continued working on pro-Russian information projects in his new home. Zavorotny was <a href="https://www.trud.ru/article/26-10-2026/1848351_bozhestvennaja_komedija_ottsa_i_syna.html">described</a> as editor-in-chief of the “Antifascist” website, and in 2018, he and Alexei Berdnikov published a book titled <i>Yanukovych Gave Up. The State Department Took Over. How Russia Lost Ukraine. Notes of Mykola Azarov’s Adviser</i>. At a <a href="https://kmbook.ru/sergey-zavorotnyiy-02-04-2018-v-td-biblio-globu/">book presentation</a> in Moscow, the authors presented their own account of the events of the Euromaidan protests.</p><aside class="related-posts"><ul><li><a href="https://theins.press/en/news/299576">Moscow’s latest car bombing targets pro-Russian propagandist from Ukraine</a></li><li><a href="https://theins.press/en/inv/292740">Grabbing him by the “Beard”: The Insider identifies the FSB, GRU, and SVR agents Russia sent to Armenia to take on PM Nikol Pashinyan</a></li></ul></aside>]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Fri, 13 Nov 2026 18:41:50 +0000</pubDate>
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      <title><![CDATA[Moscow’s latest car bombing targets pro-Russian propagandist from Ukraine]]></title>
      <link>https://theins.press/en/news/299576</link>
      <guid>https://theins.press/en/news/299576</guid>
      <dc:creator><![CDATA[The Insider]]></dc:creator>
      <enclosure url="https://theins.press/storage/post_cover/display/299/299576/8Nqa3r46WdGL1a6wxjjFGB6SPXLo5IwmCULXJgZM.jpg" length="0" type="image/jpeg"/>
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      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>On the morning of Nov. 13, a Toyota Fortuner SUV exploded in Moscow’s Chertanovo district. According to Russian media, the vehicle belonged to 72-year-old Sergei Zavorotny, a former press secretary and adviser to former Ukrainian Prime Minister Mykola Azarov. The injured driver was hospitalized.</p><p>As <i>The Insider</i> found, after moving to Moscow in 2014, Zavorotny went on to work on a series of pro-Russian information projects. As recently as the end of October, he was <a href="https://www.trud.ru/article/26-10-2026/1848351_bozhestvennaja_komedija_ottsa_i_syna.html">referred to</a> as the editor-in-chief of the pro-Kremlin website Antifashist.com.</p><figure><img src="https://theins.press/storage/content_image/display/6af/6af75376b4eda2.23480792/KzI76Bp5czfOlHPHEnmm14KTCOCaIxhyNytHzNCd.jpg" alt="Sergei Zavorotny "/><figcaption>Sergei Zavorotny </figcaption></figure><p>The explosion <a href="https://t.me/shot_shot/102044">occurred</a> on Kirovogradskaya Street. According to the Telegram channels SHOT and Mash, the SUV drove out of the courtyard of a residential building and traveled about 200 meters before the explosive device went off, blowing out the doors on the left side of the car and throwing the driver onto the roadway.</p><p>An eyewitness who was driving toward the Toyota <a href="https://auto.rambler.ru/roadaccidents/57409614-postradavshiy-pri-vzryve-v-moskve-eks-press-sekretar-premer-ministra-ukrainy/">told</a> Moskovsky Komsomolets that after the explosion, the SUV lost control and came to a stop about a meter from his car. The man approached the victim, checked his pulse, and called an ambulance.</p><figure><img src="https://theins.press/storage/content_image/display/6af/6af753a0383256.70952977/1YRPsa8jjUrXZiHu0Tgm2z4g6PTt49lyot3qvZRT.jpg" alt="Shot / Telegram"/><figcaption>Shot / Telegram</figcaption></figure><p>As SHOT reports, Zavorotny <a href="https://t.me/shot_shot/102050">suffered</a> shrapnel wounds to the chest and back as well as severe leg and arm injuries. The improvised explosive device is believed to have been placed under the driver’s seat.</p><p>Russia’s Investigative Committee dispatched a team to examine the crime scene and <a href="https://t.me/sledcom_press/33133">opened</a> a criminal case, without specifying the charges. Law enforcement authorities have not yet confirmed the identity of the injured driver.</p><figure><img src="https://theins.press/storage/content_image/display/6af/6af753bfd7bbd8.55202260/SOF3Fg7tdEbKj1gSJkTyLNUDJDghr0wUu3YRYp5a.jpg" alt="Shot / Telegram"/><figcaption>Shot / Telegram</figcaption></figure><h4>From advising PM Azarov to running a pro-Russian publication</h4><p>Sergei Zavorotny is an international affairs journalist and commentator with a Ph.D. in history. In 2010, he worked as an adviser to Mykola Azarov, who was then Ukraine’s prime minister. In May 2010, Zavorotny took part in a foreign information campaign staged by the Party of Regions, the political vehicle of then-president Viktor Yanukovych. As <i>Ukrainska Pravda</i> <a href="https://www.pravda.com.ua/rus/articles/2010/05/13/5037675/">wrote</a> in 2010 shortly after Yanukovych was sworn in, Zavorotny accompanied a group of Party of Regions lawmakers and Yanukovych acolytes on trips to Israel and France in an effort to promote the positions of Ukraine’s new government.</p><p>After the Euromaidan protests of 2013-2014, which ended in Yanukovych’s flight to Russia, Zavorotny continued to work with Azarov, moving to Moscow along with several key figures in the old Party of Regions apparatus. In July 2015, Zavorotny <a href="http://gazeta.ru/politics/news/2015/07/29/n_7418113.shtml">announced</a> the creation of the Committee for the Salvation of Ukraine, effectively an alternative Ukrainian government in exile. Former Verkhovna Rada lawmakers Volodymyr Oliinyk, Ihor Markov, and Oleh Tsaryov took part in the project. The committee intended to put forward its own candidate for president of Ukraine, but its efforts never led to any notable political success.</p><p>In 2018, Zavorotny and Aleksei Berdnikov published the book “Yanukovych Gave Up. The State Department Accepted. How Russia Lost Ukraine. Notes of Mykola Azarov’s Adviser.” At a <a href="https://kmbook.ru/sergey-zavorotnyiy-02-04-2018-v-td-biblio-globu/">presentation</a> of the book in Moscow, the authors offered their own version of the events of the Euromaidan.</p><p>During his time in Moscow, Zavorotny also became editor-in-chief of the pro-Russian information resource Antifashist. In February 2022, shortly before the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion, the outlet <a href="https://antifashist.com/item/anons-segodnya-v-pryamom-efire-v-1900-udalos-li-makronu-zastavit-zelenskogo-otkazatsya-ot-planov-atakovat-yugo-vostok-i-soblyudat-minskie-soglasheniya.html">presented</a> him in that capacity during a discussion of Ukrainian politics. In late October of this year, a <a href="https://www.trud.ru/article/26-10-2026/1848351_bozhestvennaja_komedija_ottsa_i_syna.html">piece</a> in the newspaper Trud identified Zavorotny as Antifashist’s editor-in-chief.</p><h4>What <i>The Insider</i> previously found about Azarov’s Moscow affairs</h4><p>In April 2017, <i>The Insider</i> <a href="https://theins.ru/korrupciya/49411">established</a> that the office of Azarov’s Committee for the Salvation of Ukraine was located on the 47th floor of the Naberezhnaya Tower in the Moscow City business center. Neighboring premises were occupied by entities of Ukrainian businessman Serhiy Kurchenko, who also moved to Russia after the Euromaidan. Former Verkhovna Rada lawmaker Volodymyr Oliinyk and journalist Yuriy Kot, who was in charge of media support for the organization, were regularly present at the committee’s office.</p><p>Today’s explosion follows a similar incident in St. Petersburg one day earlier. On the morning of Nov. 12, the car of an unnamed Russian colonel <a href="https://theins.press/en/news/299513">exploded</a> in the Shushary district, killing the target at the scene. Investigators opened a murder case. According to the local outlet <i>Fontanka</i>, the explosive device was planted under the vehicle’s underbody.</p><p>No link has been reported between the two explosions. </p><aside class="related-posts"><ul><li><a href="https://theins.press/en/news/299513">Russian colonel killed in St. Petersburg neighborhood’s second military car bombing since August</a></li><li><a href="https://theins.press/en/news/296553">Russian officer killed in St. Petersburg car bombing identified as Sergei Sechkov, whose unit Ukraine accuses of strikes on civilians</a></li><li><a href="https://theins.press/en/news/280979">Russian general killed in car bombing outside Moscow prepared war briefings for Putin</a></li></ul></aside>]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Fri, 13 Nov 2026 18:17:18 +0000</pubDate>
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      <title><![CDATA[Hatemonger: What does Trump&#039;s appointment of Stephen Miller as chief of staff mean for the next two years?]]></title>
      <link>https://theins.press/en/politics/299525</link>
      <guid>https://theins.press/en/politics/299525</guid>
      <dc:creator><![CDATA[The Insider]]></dc:creator>
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      <description><![CDATA[<p>U.S. President Donald Trump has appointed trusted ally Stephen Miller to serve as White House chief of staff. Miller has been a key advocate of several controversial Trump initiatives, most prominently the policy of separating migrant children from their parents and of carrying out mass deportations. Although nearly half Trump's age, Miller has had an enormous influence on his development as a politician and was one of the key figures accompanying his rise to power. He is now set to take on even greater duties at a time when Trump faces a newly constituted U.S. Congress that is deeply hostile to him.</p>]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>“He acted as if he wanted people to hate him,” recalled Stephen Miller's former classmate Justin Brownstone, <a href="https://lamag.com/politics/stephen-miller-samohi-oral-history/">telling journalists</a> how the future Trump loyalist was remembered by those who knew him in high school.</p><h3 class="outline-heading">Sadist or reactionary?</h3><p>Brownstone and many others who went to school with Miller in Santa Monica, California, describe him as a conservative and reactionary whose rhetoric not merely borderline racist, but often openly so.</p><p>Miller was born in 1985 and graduated from high school in 2003. Given Santa Monica High School's liberal <a href="https://www.latimes.com/politics/la-na-pol-trump-speechwriter-santamonica-20170117-story.html">image</a> and Miller's own background (he was born into a prosperous Jewish family), his anti-immigrant rhetoric often seemed downright outrageous.</p><p>Miller was probably drawn into the Republican Party's right-wing camp by his classmate and closest high school friend, Christopher Moritz. Today, Moritz is known as an <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=T7MQOq1D4Lc">opponent</a> of transgender rights and as the author of <a href="https://www.simonandschuster.com/authors/Christopher-Moritz/238532305">books</a> portraying liberalism as the path to America's destruction. He served as a senior adviser at the U.S. Department of Commerce during Trump's first presidency.</p><p>Miller's parents also held reactionary views, but accounts differ as to how they came to support the Republicans. Some say Stephen's father had always leaned conservative, while others say his parents changed their political views under their son's influence. What is certain is that the elder Millers attended the 2016 Republican National Convention, where Donald Trump was nominated as the party's candidate for president. Their son was already working on the campaign.</p><p>In the relatively short time between his high school graduation and that fateful convention, Miller had already made his mark. He first attracted widespread attention while studying at Duke University, where he was among the first to defend members of the university's lacrosse team who had been accused of raping a Black female student.</p><p>Miller argued that the wealthy white athletes had been the victims of a “witch hunt” orchestrated by Democrats seeking political gain by portraying themselves as defenders of minorities, and his resulting television appearances brought him to the attention of Republican Party officials. He also acquired a reputation as a lucky charm: the rape case collapsed before reaching trial, and all charges were dropped.</p><p>It was hardly surprising, then, that after graduating, Miller joined the staff of Republican Congresswoman Michele Bachmann. He later worked for Alabama Senator Jeff Sessions, first as press secretary, then as communications director, and eventually as a senior adviser.</p><p>Sessions relied on on hard-line anti-immigration rhetoric, and he was close to political strategist and conspiracy theorist Steve Bannon. The Senator introduced his young aide to Bannon, who was then developing a new ideology aimed at uniting American conservatives, whose political standing had been badly weakened by the election (and re-election) of Barack Obama. </p><p>Bannon and Miller began working together in 2013, quickly agreeing that the Republicans should focus not on winning new voters but on mobilizing their existing base. They concluded that fear would be the most effective mobilizing force, with uncontrolled immigration serving as the ideal bogeyman.</p><p>This became the basis of a new Republican strategy: portraying Democrats as intent on flooding the United States with undocumented immigrants who would take Americans' jobs and government benefits. The strategy was in place even before the party found a candidate capable of serving as the face of the campaign.</p><blockquote>The Republican Party's new strategy rested on the claim that Democrats wanted to flood the United States with undocumented immigrants</blockquote><p>That candidate emerged in 2015 in the form of Donald Trump. Sessions personally asked Miller to join Trump's campaign, believing the young adviser could strengthen the team. Miller wrote speeches, crafted messaging, and spoke at campaign rallies, where he laid out Trump's planned immigration policy. After Trump's victory in 2016, he appointed Miller as a political adviser, and when he returned to the White House in 2025, Miller was named as deputy chief of staff and homeland security adviser.</p><p>The title translated into concrete policy. During Trump's first term, Miller helped devise the family separation policy under which adults who crossed the border without authorization were jailed, while their children were taken to separate facilities. Internal correspondence published by the watchdog group American Oversight shows that Miller discussed the policy with senior Justice Department officials and coordinated with the agency responsible for the children's custody.</p><figure><img src="https://theins.press/storage/content_image/display/6af/6af62173221b22.54059588/TuFaXQ31x11wHsyF1WkbI6dkC73mjFHbp3pmq4G9.jpg" alt="During Trump&#039;s first term, Miller helped devise the policy of separating migrant families."/><figcaption>During Trump&#039;s first term, Miller helped devise the policy of separating migrant families.</figcaption></figure><p>After returning to the White House in 2025, Miller demanded a sharp increase in migrant arrests. In late May of that year, he set a target for Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) of at least 3,000 arrests a day. According to <i>Reuters</i>, he urged agents to detain anyone without legal status. To meet the target, raids spread well beyond border areas, with federal agents showing up at restaurants and workplaces and making arrests outside courthouses. Those targeted included people who had lived in the United States for decades and had no criminal records.</p><h3 class="outline-heading">Students not welcome here</h3><p>Another focus of Miller's work was education. According to CNN, he was one of the architects of the administration's pressure campaign against universities, ostensibly aimed at combating antisemitism. University representatives held private talks with May Mailman, a member of Miller's team, seeking to find out what concessions they would have to make to avoid losing federal funding.</p><p>The scale of the pressure is most evident from the case involving Harvard. In the spring of 2025, the administration demanded changes to the university's admissions and faculty hiring policies, the closure of its diversity and inclusion programs, and an external audit of “viewpoint diversity” on campus. Harvard refused, and the authorities in Washington responded by freezing $2.2 billion in grants and $60 million in contracts. In May, the Department of Homeland Security tried to strip the university of its right to enroll international students, but a court blocked the move.</p><p>Columbia University, by contrast, reached a deal with the White House. After its federal funding was suspended, it agreed to tighten disciplinary rules and change oversight of its Middle East studies programs.</p><p>In July 2025, Columbia agreed to pay the federal government $200 million over three years to settle investigations into alleged discrimination. In return, the authorities agreed to restore most of its grants. The agreement also stipulated, however, that the government could not dictate admissions or hiring policies or influence the content of academic speech.</p><p>Miller is now poised for another promotion — the biggest of his career. Following the Republicans' defeat in the midterm elections, his boss, Susie Wiles, lost her position (officially, Trump merely reassigned her to another post on his team). Miller has taken her place. White House insiders see the change as entirely predictable, <a href="https://www.axios.com/2026/11/06/susie-wiles-trump-stephen-miller-chief-of-staff">describing</a> Miller as a “wartime” adviser — an apt description given the challenges the Republican Party faces after its crushing defeat in the midterms.</p><blockquote>White House insiders describe Miller as a “wartime” adviser</blockquote><p>Officially, the White House chief of staff is an administrative rather than a political position. The job carries no authority to shape legislation, interfere with government agencies, or submit documents to Congress. Yet the chief of staff controls access to the president, decides which messages and news briefings reach his desk, and is often the last person America's commander-in-chief consults before making a decision.</p><p>In effect, Stephen Miller is becoming one of the most powerful figures in American politics, giving him who will  a key hand in shaping the president's worldview. It is not hard to guess what that worldview will look like. A 2020 biography of Miller was aptly titled <a href="https://www.amazon.com/Hatemonger-Stephen-Miller-Donald-Nationalist/dp/0062986724"><i>Hatemonger</i></a>.</p><aside class="related-posts"><ul><li><a href="https://theins.press/en/politics/299356">Making America democratic again: How Trump&#039;s poor performance led to a rout of his Republican party</a></li><li><a href="https://theins.press/en/society/299028">The taming of the elephant: How the Democrats could shape Trump’s agenda if they win both the House and the Senate</a></li><li><a href="https://theins.press/en/politics/293567">The loyalty test: Trump’s purge of moderate Republicans is an electoral gift to the Democrats</a></li><li><a href="https://theins.press/en/politics/298340">First among ladies: How Trump aide Natalie Harp came to wield extraordinary influence in the White House</a></li></ul></aside>]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Fri, 13 Nov 2026 15:49:59 +0000</pubDate>
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      <title><![CDATA[Russia’s MoD uses footage from other locations to show alleged demining of Kostiantynivka as Putin proposes a ceasefire in the town]]></title>
      <link>https://theins.press/en/news/299529</link>
      <guid>https://theins.press/en/news/299529</guid>
      <dc:creator><![CDATA[The Insider]]></dc:creator>
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      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>On Nov. 10, Russia’s Defense Ministry <a href="https://tass.ru/armiya-i-opk/28301407">said</a> service members from the 3rd Army Corps and the 11th Separate Engineering Brigade of Russia’s Southern Group of Forces were clearing houses and roads in what it called “liberated Kostiantynivka.” However, at least two of the segments were filmed in other settlements — occupied Toretsk and Pivnichne. </p><p>Open source intelligence (OSINT) researcher Bielitz <a href="https://x.com/Bielitzling/status/2120274628610527686">established</a> the locations by geolocating footage published by the Russian side. The sites he identified are each located around 20 kilometers away from Kostiantynivka, a town that Moscow claimed to have fully captured in July even though fighting for the city is ongoing.</p><div><blockquote class="twitter-tweet"><p lang="en" dir="ltr">Russian soldiers from the 3rd Army &amp;amp; the 11th Separate Engineering Brigade show claimed mine clearing in Kostiantynivka, however its Toretsk/Pivnichne, Donetsk Oblast

@GeoConfirmed @UAControlMap

48.392569,37.853516 (1:14)

48.393930,37.902723 (1:31)

s: https://t.co/1c35CNFa6T https://t.co/gZtjCjjhNB</p>&mdash; Bielitz (@Bielitzling) <a href="https://x.com/Bielitzling/status/2120274628610527686?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw">November 10, 2026</a></blockquote>

<script async src="https://platform.x.com/widgets.js" charset="utf-8"></script></div><p>The <a href="https://vk.ru/wall-121828295_119492">video</a> put out by the Ministry of Defense shows Russian combat engineers who are said to be clearing mines from roads and buildings in Kostiantynivka. Bielitz, however, determined that footage at the 1:14 mark was filmed in Toretsk at coordinates 48.392569, 37.853516. Another segment, at 1:31, was geolocated farther east in Pivnichne at coordinates 48.393930, 37.902723. Both settlements are in territory controlled by Russian forces. The geolocation of those segments does not establish where the rest of the video was filmed.</p><div><iframe src="https://vk.ru/video_ext.php?oid=-121828295&id=456257927&hd=4" width="1920" height="1080" allow="autoplay; encrypted-media; fullscreen; picture-in-picture; screen-wake-lock;" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen></iframe></div><p>“We are working successfully in Kostiantynivka, clearing roads of explosive hazards so people can be evacuated and supplies and personnel rotations can take place. There is a lot of work for our unit in Kostiantynivka,” said a combat engineer using the call sign Korshun (lit. “Kite”). The footage was also <a href="https://rutube.ru/video/6d36dea372295212ec0bbb65d48294ea/">broadcast</a> by the Russian television channel Pervy Sevastopolsky, which presented it as video of demining operations in Kostiantynivka.</p><p>Two days later, on Nov. 12, Vladimir Putin <a href="https://tass.ru/armiya-i-opk/28311721">proposed</a> carrying out a joint humanitarian mission in Kostiantynivka modeled on the <a href="https://theins.press/en/news/298841">recent evacuation</a> of civilians from Russian-occupied <a href="https://theins.press/en/news/299060">Oleshky</a>, located in Ukraine’s Kherson Region. Putin said Russian troops would need five days to clear mines from approaches to Kostiantynivka, again claiming that the town was under Russia’s control.</p><p>Russian forces, however, continue offensive operations around Kostiantynivka. According to <i>The Insider</i>’s <a href="https://theins.ru/news/299463">Nov. 11 battlefield summary</a>, Russian units expanded the area under their control southeast of the city. On the morning of Nov. 12, Ukraine’s General Staff <a href="https://suspilne.media/donbas/1441931-najgaracisa-dilanka-pokrovskomu-front-doneccini-ta-lugansini-12-listopada-2026-roku/">reported</a> 14 Russian attacks in the Kostiantynivka sector over the previous 24 hours. There is no independent confirmation that Russia has full control of the city.</p><p>Russian forces have previously used footage from other settlements to illustrate purported battlefield gains. In early November, Bielitz <a href="https://x.com/Bielitzling/status/2116287409323466953">found</a> that a video claiming to show Russian marines in Dobropillia had actually been filmed in occupied Myrnohrad, behind Russian lines.</p><aside class="related-posts"><ul><li><a href="https://theins.press/en/news/274102">Russia’s MoD publishes new batch of “successful strikes on Ukrainian forces in Kursk” — which were actually filmed in Ukraine </a></li><li><a href="https://theins.press/en/news/273776">Russian MoD videos claim “successful strikes” against Ukrainian forces in Kursk Region — but the footage is old and filmed elsewhere</a></li><li><a href="https://theins.press/en/news/273878">Russian MoD and propagandists present footage originally filmed in Kharkiv as “strikes against Ukraine in Kursk”</a></li><li><a href="https://theins.press/en/news/288166">Russian military’s TV channel passes off footage of troops withdrawing from Kupiansk as evidence of them capturing the city</a></li><li><a href="https://theins.press/en/news/274346">Russian Defense Ministry again portrays Ukraine combat footage as “strikes on AFU in Kursk” despite partially blurred video exposing terrain</a></li></ul></aside>]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Thu, 12 Nov 2026 22:53:38 +0000</pubDate>
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      <title><![CDATA[Poland marks Independence Day with a massive march for President Nawrocki — and against PM Tusk]]></title>
      <link>https://theins.press/en/news/299527</link>
      <guid>https://theins.press/en/news/299527</guid>
      <dc:creator><![CDATA[The Insider]]></dc:creator>
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      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Warsaw marked Poland’s Independence Day with a march that city authorities say drew upwards of 250,000 participants. As <i>The Insider</i>’s Warsaw correspondent<strong> Witold Reszka</strong> reported, the procession ultimately turned into a rally in support of President Karol Nawrocki and against current Prime Minister Donald Tusk. According to the organizers’ estimates, half a million people took to the streets of the Polish capital on Nov. 11.</p><h4>Hundreds of thousands of conservatives took to the streets</h4><p>Every Independence Day, Warsaw holds a march that draws a variety of right-wing forces. In recent years, it has been attended by several tens of thousands of people. For example, in <a href="https://www.pap.pl/aktualnosci/marsz-niepodleglosci-w-stolicy-jeszcze-polska-nie-zginela-56-osob-zatrzymanych-nasze">2023</a> the authorities put the number of participants at 40,000, in <a href="https://www.pap.pl/aktualnosci/wielkiej-polski-moc-my-marsz-niepodleglosci-w-warszawie-ratusz-podal-szacunki-zdjecia">2024</a> at 90,000, and in <a href="https://www.pap.pl/relacja-na-zywo/obchody-narodowego-swieta-niepodleglosci-ulicami-stolicy-przeszedl-marsz">2025</a> at 100,000. The 2018 march, when Poland <a href="https://www.pap.pl/aktualnosci/news%2C356361%2Cruszyl-bialo-czerwony-marsz-dla-ciebie-polsko.html">celebrated</a> the 100th anniversary of its regained independence, was the largest, with 250,000 participants. However, <i>The Insider</i>’s correspondent who witnessed the Nov. 11 march believes that in 2026 the number of participants may have exceeded the figures from eight years ago.</p><p>The march organizers <a href="https://www.rmf24.pl/regiony/warszawa/news-ile-osob-szlo-w-marszu-niepodleglosci-w-warszawie-sa-pierwsz%2CnIdn%2C1025748">claim</a> that more than 500,000 people walked the streets of Warsaw on Wednesday, while city authorities put the figure at half that much. However, even if the organizers’ figures are exaggerated, participation in the event still represents a record.</p><figure><img src="https://theins.press/storage/content_image/original/6af/6af640f2e03977.83596861/vRmvWoPo3aPaH5hjaMVmg8HUjLyh3qil3FJwDG4E.jpg" alt="Witold Reszka/The Insider"/><figcaption>Witold Reszka/The Insider</figcaption></figure><figure><img src="https://theins.press/storage/content_image/original/6af/6af640f4205290.97763543/sm2PyacQ2Vb5OVGDUNaukqzemb4VvOFIuHukXXwn.jpg" alt="Witold Reszka/The Insider"/><figcaption>Witold Reszka/The Insider</figcaption></figure><p>In the past, such Independence Day processions mainly attracted nationalists and football hooligans, but today the nature of the event has changed markedly, with many families choosing to spend their day off at the rally. However, the political content of the march — a reflection of Poland’s right-wing patriotic landscape — has remained the same.</p><figure><img src="https://theins.press/storage/content_image/original/6af/6af6411ebfe4c3.17962549/ujGB8GbEGWVWj6ffPInjA5z5cNsW05w5PsOJgubF.jpg" alt="Witold Reszka/The Insider"/><figcaption>Witold Reszka/The Insider</figcaption></figure><p>As Jan, a law student at one of the capital’s universities, told <i>The Insider</i>:</p><blockquote><p>“Over the years, the march has attracted more and more families with children and ‘normal’ people in general. I would also say that more and more young people take part from year to year. There are football fans and all kinds of radicals, but not in great numbers. The makeup of the participants does not change; the proportions do.”</p></blockquote><p>This year’s Independence Day procession turned into a rally in support of the country’s conservative President Nawrocki, who is currently in a state of open conflict with the liberal Prime Minister Tusk.</p><p>At the end of October, Poland <a href="https://www.rp.pl/polityka/art45423911-policja-w-trybunale-konstytucyjnym-kaczynski-apeluje-do-karola-nawrockiego">saw</a> another round of confrontation between its president and government when Constitutional Tribunal judge Anna Korwin-Piotrowska suspended the tribunal’s president, Bogdan Święczkowski, and his deputy, Bartłomiej Sochański, from their duties. Tusk’s government does not recognize the tribunal’s rulings because the tribunal still includes judges who, in the government’s view, were appointed illegally under the rule of the Law and Justice party. Nawrocki and Święczkowski, for their part, do not recognize the judges elected by the Sejm in 2026, including Korwin-Piotrowska. After the tribunal’s president was suspended, Nawrocki even spoke of an attempted coup d’état.</p><p>In this context, the Nov.11 march acquired additional meaning, with the dispute between the government and the president over the composition of the Constitutional Tribunal becoming the key topic of conversation among the participants. In the demonstrators’ view, Poland has indeed been confronted with a “creeping coup d’état” headed by the prime minister.</p><p>Fears were voiced that the crowd gathering on the capital’s streets would at some point storm the Constitutional Tribunal, but this did not happen. Moreover, protesters reined in some especially active participants who tried to disturb public order. When one activist tried to climb the <a href="https://pl.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pozdrowienia_z_Alej_Jerozolimskich">Palm</a> at the Charles de Gaulle Roundabout, the others began shouting at him:</p><blockquote><p>“Do you want us to be seen as savages?”</p></blockquote><figure><img src="https://theins.press/storage/content_image/original/6af/6af64150ecd2b6.14426538/m8KwFhzEnxhCEZwRhHHhn43BX3XRB1cWukLgIvoo.jpg" alt="Witold Reszka/The Insider"/><figcaption>Witold Reszka/The Insider</figcaption></figure><figure><img src="https://theins.press/storage/content_image/display/6af/6af64150a8d170.30719579/TW2qlJu1qKA2zlfMiGvyjiLr9lzT4eUW8mQGArjs.jpg" alt="Witold Reszka/The Insider"/><figcaption>Witold Reszka/The Insider</figcaption></figure><p>On the whole, as police noted, very few incidents were recorded during the march, apart from the mass disregard of the ban on flares and firecrackers.</p><h4>No place for leftists and liberals</h4><p>The hundreds of thousands of conservatives who had gathered did not hold back from harsh words about members of the government. Also in attendance were Catholic prayer circles, whose members pray in time with their steps “for the well-being of the Fatherland.” Between prayers, they shouted: “F*** Tusk!”, “God, honor, and fatherland!” and “Honor and glory to the heroes!”</p><p>Other anti-government statements were heard as well. Participants in the procession said that “the country is being plundered” and reminded one another that “Poland is not Brussels.” The latter fit well with the official slogan of the march: “A Pole is the master in Poland.”</p><figure><img src="https://theins.press/storage/content_image/display/6af/6af64191ef5ac8.39774764/SAdGnlfRx1Cxw8FNtSMA7O1ODOBL6SsybV0G4Ufq.jpg" alt="Witold Reszka/The Insider"/><figcaption>Witold Reszka/The Insider</figcaption></figure><figure><img src="https://theins.press/storage/content_image/original/6af/6af64192891ef4.46833747/RXcgDwndwJbky9inFKlTrRU1PSlYArRTKRtFMojn.jpg" alt="Witold Reszka/The Insider"/><figcaption>Witold Reszka/The Insider</figcaption></figure><p>The event took place against the backdrop of two days of national mourning — Nov. 8 and 9 — following a terrorist attack in Kraków that saw a man open fire in the square, killing six random passersby and wounding at least 15, after earlier killing his own family. For that reason, representatives of the Tusk government also decided to address the crowd. However, when Deputy Prime Minister and Defense Minister Władysław Kosiniak-Kamysz wanted to tell the citizens gathered in Piłsudski Square about the importance of unity, he was booed off the stage.</p><p>By contrast, the speech by Nawrocki, who called on Poles to unite in the face of the tragedy, was received with enthusiasm.</p><p>The left-wing movement Antifa organized its own counterdemonstration. As Antoni, a rock band drummer who took part in the parallel protest in the ranks of Antifa, explained to <i>The Insider</i>, the need for such an action arose because of the large number of radicals who use the Independence Day march for their own purposes. He said:</p><blockquote><p>“The Independence March is exploited by far-right organizations: ONR (National Radical Camp), All-Polish Youth, and other fascist and even neo-Nazi groups. People on the left are aware of this problem, which is why they are protesting. I would take part in the march if xenophobia and nationalism could be eradicated from it. An independent Poland does not mean a Poland exclusively for Poles, and nationalism is not patriotism.”</p></blockquote><p>Janek, a participant in the march, believes that for many years the event has actually suffered from “negative coverage in the press,” which mainly drew attention to disorder and racist slogans. He assured <i>The Insider</i> that:</p><blockquote><p>“The march has changed. It is no longer as vocal as it used to be, but many people still believe the media’s manipulations.”</p></blockquote><p>In previous years, racist and antisemitic symbols did often appear at such processions, along with slogans about a “pure race” and “white blood.” In 2017, representatives of the organization Forza Nuova (New Force), which glorifies the Italian dictator Benito Mussolini and holds antisemitic and extreme Italian nationalist views, took part in the march, with its leader even speaking during the procession.</p><p>Outbreaks of violence have also occurred. In 2020, a group of hooligans with white-and-red flags clashed with police.</p><p>However, as <i>The Insider</i>’s correspondent observed, lately such incidents have been rare, and the presence of radical groups in the procession is often condemned by other participants. At the same time, the Celtic cross is still a common symbol.</p><p>The Independence March has divided Poles for many years. According to SW Research, 42% of Poles believe that the march unites the country, while 37% are convinced that it deepens divisions in society. At the same time, 62% of Poles currently consider Nov. 11 the country’s most important national holiday, whereas in 2014 only about 30% held that view.</p><aside class="related-posts"><ul><li><a href="https://theins.press/en/opinion/pavel-reshka/296125">To Putin’s delight: Politicians in Poland and Ukraine are stoking mutual hostility for the sake of their ratings</a></li><li><a href="https://theins.press/en/news/294997">Poland creates new military formation to protect border with Russia and Belarus</a></li></ul></aside>]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Thu, 12 Nov 2026 22:47:50 +0000</pubDate>
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      <title><![CDATA[Germany, France and the UK demand Russia release three Ukrainian former OSCE staff members imprisoned since 2022]]></title>
      <link>https://theins.press/en/news/299530</link>
      <guid>https://theins.press/en/news/299530</guid>
      <dc:creator><![CDATA[The Insider]]></dc:creator>
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      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Germany, France, and the United Kingdom have demanded that Russia immediately release three former employees of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), who were arrested in 2022 after serving in the group’s monitoring mission in Ukraine. In a joint <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/russias-unlawful-detention-of-former-osce-officials-e3-statement-to-the-osce">statement</a> delivered Nov. 12 at a meeting of the OSCE Permanent Council in Vienna, representatives of the three countries called for the release of Vadym Golda, Maksym Petrov, and Dmytro Shabanov, expressing particular concern about Golda’s health. He was reportedly transferred from the occupied Donetsk Region of Ukraine to a medical correctional facility in Russia’s Tambov Region, around 300 miles northeast of Kharkiv.</p><blockquote><p>“They are not bargaining chips. They are our colleagues, and they should be at home with their families.</p><p>Russia’s treatment of them is a direct affront to the OSCE and every participating State represented around this table. It also sets a dangerous precedent for those serving in international missions on our collective behalf. Personnel deployed under an international mandate must be able to perform their duties without fear of arbitrary detention, politically motivated prosecution or imprisonment,” the statement read.</p></blockquote><p>According to the Ukrainian Legal Advisory Group, which <a href="https://ulag.org.ua/resources/osce-smm-staff-member-vadym-golda-deported-to-russia/">cited</a> Golda’s relatives, he had been transferred to Medical Correctional Facility No. 7 of Russia’s Federal Penitentiary Service. The facility is in the settlement of Polevoy in the Kirsanovsky District of the Tambov Region and is used to hold and provide outpatient treatment to prisoners who suffer from alcohol and drug dependence or who have active cases of tuberculosis.</p><p>The reason for Golda’s transfer to the facility remains unknown. His relatives said he had never had tuberculosis and had not suffered from alcohol or drug dependence. Golda last contacted his family on Oct. 15; his transfer was expected on Oct. 19. There has been no official information about his condition.</p><p>In their statement, representatives of Germany, France, and the UK stressed that at the time of their arrest the OSCE employees had been carrying out their duties as part of an international mission established with the consent of all participating states, including Russia. The three countries called on Moscow to disclose the detainees’ whereabouts and health conditions, provide them with medical care, and allow them to contact their relatives.</p><h3>Russia has transferred all three OSCE staff members from the occupied territories of Ukraine to prisons inside Russia</h3><p>Golda was the third OSCE mission employee to be transferred from occupied Ukrainian territory to Russia. In 2025, Dmytro Shabanov was <a href="https://ulag.org.ua/cases/ua-osce-staff-members/">transferred</a> to Penal Colony No. 9 in Russia’s Omsk Region, while Maksym Petrov was sent to Penal Colony No. 1 in the Chelyabinsk Region.</p><figure><img src="https://theins.press/storage/content_image/original/6af/6af655d08cb969.63724879/JIPrV3amRUxK24LszaVR5qfPUsuJNbWkCk24phhb.jpg" alt="Maksym Yuriyovych Petrov, interpreter with the Luhansk office of the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission"/><figcaption>Maksym Yuriyovych Petrov, interpreter with the Luhansk office of the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission</figcaption></figure><p>On Nov. 11, leaders of the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly <a href="https://www.oscepa.org/en/news-a-media/press-releases/2026/osce-parliamentary-assembly-leaders-raise-concern-over-whereabouts-of-vadym-golda-reiterate-calls-to-release-all-three-unlawfully-detained-osce-officials">expressed</a> concern over Golda’s transfer. The organization noted that Articles 49 and 76 of the Fourth Geneva Convention prohibit the forcible transfer and deportation of protected civilians from occupied territories.</p><figure><img src="https://theins.press/storage/content_image/original/6af/6af655e4df0188.16686480/goSywzNzKWaIOBYqCZ3xdikYnfH8jVVAjfFuemsA.jpg" alt="Dmytro Pavlovych Shabanov, security assistant at the Stakhanov forward patrol base of the OSCE mission"/><figcaption>Dmytro Pavlovych Shabanov, security assistant at the Stakhanov forward patrol base of the OSCE mission</figcaption></figure><p>The OSCE also said there is still no reliable, independently verified information about the detention conditions or health of any of the three men. The organization demanded that its representatives and the International Committee of the Red Cross be granted unhindered access to the former mission employees.</p><h3>Why Russia imprisoned the OSCE staff members</h3><p>Vadym Golda, who worked as a security assistant for the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission, was detained in April 2022. In July 2024, a Russia-installed court in the occupied part of the Donetsk Region <a href="https://apnews.com/article/russia-ukraine-donetsk-osce-d0e95897d42a1dbf9e038ae2f0ba26d9">sentenced</a> him to 14 years in a strict-regime penal colony on charges of espionage.</p><p>According to the Russian Prosecutor General’s Office, in 2021 Golda had collected information about industrial facilities in the Donetsk Region on behalf of an unnamed foreign intelligence service. Russian authorities claimed the facilities were later targeted by missile strikes that caused nearly 100 million rubles in damage. The court also ordered the confiscation of 43 armored vehicles belonging to the OSCE mission.</p><p>In September 2022, Dmytro Shabanov and Maksym Petrov were each <a href="https://www.politico.com/news/2022/09/20/osce-ukrainian-staff-russian-court-00057715">sentenced</a> to 13 years in prison. Russia-backed separatists in the so-called “Luhansk People’s Republic” accused them of treason and of passing information to U.S. intelligence agencies.</p><p>The OSCE has rejected the accusations against its employees and repeatedly demanded their release. In July 2024, the organization’s leadership <a href="https://www.osce.org/chairpersonship/572758">condemned</a> Golda’s sentence, describing the prosecution as a violation of Russia’s international commitments.</p><p>Russia was among the states that approved the creation of the OSCE monitoring mission in Ukraine in 2014. In March 2022, however, Moscow blocked an extension of its mandate. The mission ceased operations in April of that year.</p><aside class="related-posts"><ul><li><a href="https://theins.press/en/confession/270824">“Dying isn’t as bad as being a Russian POW”: Freed Ukrainian soldiers speak out about their time in Russian captivity</a></li><li><a href="https://theins.press/en/confession/299400">“We cooked over open fires but were afraid to go outside”: Evacuated residents of Oleshky describe life under siege</a></li><li><a href="https://theins.press/en/news/299060">Evacuees from Russian-occupied Oleshky reach Ukraine — recounting hunger, disappearances, and life under Moscow’s rule</a></li><li><a href="https://theins.press/en/news/298554">Moscow and Washington are discussing possible prisoner releases through intelligence channels, Russia says</a></li><li><a href="https://theins.press/en/news/295932">Russia frees seriously ill former U.S. Marine Robert Gilman without prisoner swap</a></li><li><a href="https://theins.press/en/confession/295004">“He was burning in the hallway, and they laughed”: Inside Russia’s systematic torture apparatus for Ukrainian POWs</a></li><li><a href="https://theins.press/en/news/293638">Released defenders of Mariupol report on torture and deaths of Ukrainian POWs at detention facility in Russia’s Kamyshin</a></li></ul></aside>]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Thu, 12 Nov 2026 22:45:06 +0000</pubDate>
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      <title><![CDATA[Russian authorities seek to expand military training for children, hiring war veterans as instructors]]></title>
      <link>https://theins.press/en/news/299526</link>
      <guid>https://theins.press/en/news/299526</guid>
      <dc:creator><![CDATA[The Insider]]></dc:creator>
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      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Russia is expanding its system of military training for schoolchildren. In 2026, the Ministry of Education made basic military training a separate course and issued national guidelines on military training camps for eighth graders. Under these guidelines, children are sent to specialized centers and military bases, where they undergo drill and firearms training, learn how weapons work, and master tactical medicine and drone operation. The ministry has proposed hiring veterans of the war against Ukraine to serve as instructors.</p><p>The state is allocating millions of dollars to develop the program. The 2026 federal budget set aside 3.72 billion rubles ($45 million) for the Voin military-sports training center and another 1.05 billion rubles ($12.7 million) for activities related to the Yunarmiya (Young Army) movement.</p><h4>Military training in Russian schools before and after 2022</h4><p>Military training for schoolchildren existed in Russia even before the start of the full-scale invasion of Ukraine. In particular, training camps for high school students were provided for in a 2010 joint order of the Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of Education and Science.</p><p>After February 2022, the authorities began steadily expanding the infrastructure and content of the training. In 2022, the Voin center was created, and Sakhalin introduced the Military Affairs course for eighth graders. In 2023, the Ministry of Education approved changes to high school programs to include elements of basic military training. Since September 2024, the compulsory school course Basics of Safety and Defense of the Motherland (OBZR) has replaced Basics of Life Safety (OBZh). In 2025, the ministry issued guidelines for organizing military camps for students in grades 8 and 9. The latest documents outline the authorities’ efforts to develop a network of specialized centers and extend hands-on training to younger age groups.</p><h4>What the federal documents prescribe</h4><p>In 2026, the Ministry of Education amended the content of OBZR. By an order dated Aug. 19, 2026, the ministry <a href="http://publication.pravo.gov.ru/document/0001202610130011">split</a> OBZR into two distinct courses: Basic Military Training and Life Safety. According to the ministry’s guidelines, 34 hours are allotted to basic military training at both the basic and secondary levels of general education.</p><p>In August 2026, the ministry also distributed national <a href="https://edsoo.ru/wp-content/uploads/2026/08/obzr-1.pdf">guidelines</a> on organizing military training camps for eighth-grade students. The three-day extracurricular program includes 17 hours of training, replete with drills, first aid, survival basics, and other practical classes. A visit to a military base or similar facility is also envisioned. One version of the program includes studying the AK-74 assault rifle.</p><p>In addition to school grounds, the sessions may be held at military bases or branches of the DOSAAF (Volunteer Society for the Assistance to the Army, Aviation, and Navy). Classes may be organized during school breaks.</p><p>The program is aimed primarily at boys. Girls can participate on a voluntary basis but have to meet several requirements.</p><h4>Can schoolchildren refuse to attend military camps?</h4><p>It depends on the form of the classes and the students’ age. OBZR is part of the compulsory school curriculum, so in effect military subjects are taught as part of a compulsory school subject, with practical camps supplementing mandatory courses. However, different rules apply to practical camps and additional courses.</p><p>In particular, under the 2010 joint order, students who skip such camps without a valid reason receive a failing grade, while those who miss classes for a valid reason are supposed to study the theory independently and pass a knowledge check.</p><h4>How the camps work in the regions</h4><p>Authorities in Russia’s Primorye Territory have provided for longer camps than those described in the federal guidelines. According to a <a href="https://prim-pravo.ru/postanovlenie/2026/08/24/n-73-pg/">resolution</a> by the governor dated Aug. 24, 2026, the regional Ministry of Education must organize five-day camps for students in grades 8 and 10, making extensive use of branches of the DOSAAF’s Avangard training and methodological center.</p><p>The document provides for the use of military base infrastructure for the practical training of schoolchildren, though schools must submit requests to the command of the relevant bases. Municipal authorities are instructed to organize and fund the camps. The resolution also provides for cooperation with military enlistment offices, visits to military academies, and career guidance for schoolchildren to promote military occupations.</p><p>The regional government program for 2026 has set a target: 5,790 students in grades 8–11 are expected to complete a full five-day camp session.</p><p>Sakhalin Region introduced its own course, Military Affairs, as early as 2022. Initially, the program was intended for eighth graders, but it was later extended to grades 9 and 10. The curriculum includes training in drill, firearms, tactics, engineering, and basic medicine, along with instruction focusing on military topography and protection against weapons of mass destruction.</p><p>Over three years, the program is expected to reach 8,000 schoolchildren. All schools teaching grades 8–10 must take part in a themed week devoted to military service, the oath, and the performance of military duty.</p><p>In October 2026, five-day camps for tenth graders took place on Sakhalin. The program included drone classes, tactical medicine, and practical training.</p><p>In the Chelyabinsk Region, students attend camps at the Avangard center. Reports from educational organizations describe classes on assembling and disassembling the AK-74 rifle, operating drones, providing military medicine, and driving trucks. In particular, such a course was reported by a school in Troitsk, whose students took part in several camps in the fall of 2026. A published <a href="https://457100.ru/sbory-v-avangarde/">report</a> lists practical classes involving weapons, drones, and motor vehicles.</p><p>In Mari El, schoolchildren attend camps that include tactical and firearms training, military medicine, and drone classes, according to regional media <a href="https://newsmariel.ru/news/v_tsentre_avangard_startovali_sbory_dlya_shkolnikov/">reports</a>.</p><p>In Tatarstan, military camps for eighth and tenth graders are provided for in a <a href="https://base.garant.ru/414844825/">resolution</a> of the republic’s government for the 2026/27 school year. The Kazan Higher Tank Command School is listed among the organizations participating in the training.</p><h4>War participants are brought in to teach</h4><p>One of the main participants in the military training system is the Voin center (created in 2022), which organizes classes in firearms, tactical, and engineering training, tactical medicine, and drone operation. Its programs are designed for teenagers and young people but also offers training for school teachers wishing to teach OBZR. According to official reports, by September 2026 more than 165,000 people had completed the center’s programs.</p><p>In March 2026, Deputy Prime Minister Yury Trutnev said that by the end of 2027, all of the center’s instructors must gain combat experience in the war in Ukraine. According to the figures he cited, more than 200 of the center’s instructors had already taken part in combat operations by that time.</p><p>Regional authorities also hire war veterans to teach. On Sakhalin, the Military Affairs course is taught by combat participants, including those who fought in the war against Ukraine. In 2024, Governor Valery Limarenko emphasized the need to bring in specialists with combat experience. By his estimate, the region needed about 170 such instructors. Under the new program, the relevant authorities are expected to offer training to ten combat veterans to teach the compulsory subject Basics of Safety and Defense of the Motherland.</p><h4>Millions of dollars allocated for military training</h4><p>Russia’s system of military-patriotic education and pre-conscription training is funded from both federal and regional budgets. Regional pre-conscription training centers are funded separately, while the regions pay for Avangard centers, military-patriotic events, and practical camps for schoolchildren themselves.</p><p>In Primorye Territory, the Avangard center received 470,067,818 rubles (5.7 million) in 2026, double the 234.1 million rubles (2.8 million) of the year before, according to regional budget documents.</p><p>The scale of funding for such centers was previously <a href="https://vot-tak.tv/93147824/voennye-sbory-dla-shkolnikov-rassledovanie">examined</a> by <i>Vot Tak</i>. The outlet estimates that since 2020, Russian regions have allocated at least 36.5 billion rubles ($442 million) to build and operate Avangard centers. Federal spending on the Voin center since September 2022 has come to almost 15 billion rubles ($181 million).</p><aside class="related-posts"><ul><li><a href="https://theins.press/en/news/294286">Russian schoolgirls in Izhevsk tasked with sewing underwear for frontline soldiers taking part in the invasion of Ukraine</a></li><li><a href="https://theins.press/en/news/288668">Russian school curriculum to include training in assembling and operating drones</a></li><li><a href="https://theins.press/en/society/283794">“Men in uniform watched us fill out tests”: How Russia “re-educates” Ukrainian schoolchildren in the occupied territories</a></li><li><a href="https://theins.press/en/inv/283351">“We must not say it’s for the war”: Hundreds of thousands of Russian schoolkids are building drones that kill Ukrainians</a></li><li><a href="https://theins.press/en/confession/282037">“Even if you feel opposition inside, you have to demonstrate support”: Confessions of teachers in Belgorod schools</a></li></ul></aside>]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Thu, 12 Nov 2026 22:36:33 +0000</pubDate>
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      <title><![CDATA[Russian activist who declined to cooperate with German intelligence banned from entering the Schengen Area]]></title>
      <link>https://theins.press/en/news/299524</link>
      <guid>https://theins.press/en/news/299524</guid>
      <dc:creator><![CDATA[The Insider]]></dc:creator>
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      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Immediately after clearing passport control in Germany, a Russian activist was approached by officers of the country’s Federal Intelligence Service, who asked her if she suspected any of her acquaintances of harboring ties to Moscow’s intelligence services. At the end of the conversation, she was offered a cooperation agreement, according to a <a href="https://t.me/pivovarov_team/13809">post</a> by Andrei Pivovarov, a Russian opposition politician and coordinator of the Consuls project for the Anti-War Committee.</p><p>The activist refused to sign the document German authorities had offered her. As a result, she was deemed a possible threat to Germany’s national security and was added to the list of persons barred from entering the Schengen Area.</p><p>Pivovarov reminded readers that in Russia, confidential cooperation with representatives of foreign states constitutes a serious crime, and may be classified as treason under certain circumstances. He added that an invitation to a conversation does not in itself mean that a person is in danger or that cooperation will necessarily be offered. However, it is important for anti-war Russians and those who have faced political persecution to be aware of such risks, advising:</p><blockquote><p>“If you are invited to such a conversation, clarify who is conducting it and on what grounds, whether participation is voluntary, and, if possible, decline to take part in the conversation.”</p></blockquote><p>Earlier, the independent outlet <i>Holod</i> <a href="https://holod.media/2026/11/06/rossiian-nachali-vyzyvat-na-politicheskie-besedy-v-aeroportu-berlina/">reported</a> on two Russian women who, after clearing passport control at Berlin airport, were taken for additional conversations. They were asked about the war in Ukraine, mobilization, and rising prices in Russia. One of the women answered questions for about an hour; the other declined to talk and was released.</p><aside class="related-posts"><ul><li><a href="https://theins.press/en/news/296480">Antiwar Russian asylum seeker faces deportation from U.S.</a></li><li><a href="https://theins.press/en/news/297929">Russian activist deported from U.S. sentenced to six years in prison</a></li></ul></aside>]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Thu, 12 Nov 2026 20:23:59 +0000</pubDate>
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      <title><![CDATA[Prominent Russian lawyer who defended political prisoners sentenced to 12 years on treason charge]]></title>
      <link>https://theins.press/en/news/299521</link>
      <guid>https://theins.press/en/news/299521</guid>
      <dc:creator><![CDATA[The Insider]]></dc:creator>
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      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Earlier today, Kaliningrad Regional Court Judge Alexander Marochkin sentenced 66-year-old lawyer Maria Bontsler to 12 years in prison after finding her guilty of treason, according to a <a href="https://t.me/endoflaw/4160">report</a> by independent media and legal rights advocacy project Slovo Zashchite (lit. “Word to the Defense”). The court also ordered her phone to be reset to factory settings and to be confiscated by the state; her SIM card is to be destroyed.</p><p>The case was heard behind closed doors, with the judge excluding Bontsler herself from the proceedings. She was allowed to appear only to deliver her final statement; the court denied her request to make that statement publicly. Bontsler’s lawyers were removed from the case over a dispute about access to classified materials, even though Bontsler has said the case contains no state secrets. She is now represented by court-appointed lawyer Anastasia Rikhter.</p><p>Bontsler, herself a lawyer, is known for her representation of clients facing politically motivated charges — <a href="https://ovd.info/en/persons/igor-baryshnikov">Igor Baryshnikov</a>, <a href="https://www.rferl.org/amp/31979134.html">Vadim Khairullin</a>, and <a href="https://ovd.info/en/how-they-taught-us-fear-protests#20-17">Evgenia Fedulova</a> prominent among them. She was detained in May 2025 under Russia’s law on “confidential cooperation with a foreign state,” and the charge was later upgraded to treason. Bontsler said she suffered cardiac arrest and hypertensive crises while in pretrial detention. Lawyer Roman Morozov said her health worsened because of a noise-generating device used during court hearings, but his lawsuit against the judge was rejected.</p><p>Bontsler’s son, Vyacheslav Medkov, previously <a href="https://theins.ru/news/286223">told</a> Slovo Zashchite that security officers had demanded that his mother testify against a fellow lawyer, threatening to upgrade the case against her to treason if she refused. In exchange, he said, they offered her a sentence of around 2.5 years instead of the 15 prosecutors were asking for. Bontsler refused.</p><aside class="related-posts"><ul><li><a href="https://theins.press/en/news/293126">Number of politically motivated criminal cases against lawyers in Russia doubled in 2025, Memorial reports</a></li><li><a href="https://theins.press/en/news/278002">Three of Alexei Navalny’s lawyers handed prison sentences of up to 5.5 years on “extremism” charges</a></li><li><a href="https://theins.press/en/news/269185">Evidence in case against Navalny lawyer suggests Russian investigators violated attorney-client privilege </a></li><li><a href="https://theins.press/en/society/266481">The devil and the advocate: The rationale behind the Kremlin&#039;s crackdown on attorneys and the new “rules of the game”</a></li></ul></aside>]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Thu, 12 Nov 2026 18:26:17 +0000</pubDate>
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      <title><![CDATA[Bomb used to kill army colonel in St. Petersburg was smuggled into the country by balloon, Russian media claim]]></title>
      <link>https://theins.press/en/news/299519</link>
      <guid>https://theins.press/en/news/299519</guid>
      <dc:creator><![CDATA[The Insider]]></dc:creator>
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      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Russian publication <i>Fontanka</i> has <a href="https://t.me/fontankaspb/113838">published</a> a photograph of the suspected perpetrator in the <a href="https://theins.press/en/news/299513">killing</a> of an unnamed Russian army colonel, who died in a car explosion in St. Petersburg early this morning. According to the outlet, an improvised explosive device was planted under the vehicle by a 31-year-old native of Pskov named Yan, who had lived in St. Petersburg for the past several years. The outlet 47news <a href="https://47news.ru/articles/295627/">identified</a> the suspect’s last name as “Bashkirev.”</p><p><i>Fontanka</i> reported that about a month ago, Yan took a job as a general laborer at a Lenta supermarket on Kolpinskoye Highway, where the late colonel regularly parked his car. Investigators believe that Yan monitored the 51-year-old officer in order to establish his daily routine and determine the best time to plant the bomb. The explosive was later detonated remotely.</p><p>According to investigators, Yan attached the explosive device to the underside of the officer’s car at 1 a.m. Moscow time on Nov. 12, then took a taxi to Pulkovo Airport and flew to Turkey. He landed in Istanbul at 6:05 a.m. and immediately traveled on to Chisinau, Moldova. As previously reported, the explosion on Kolpinskoye Highway near the Lenta hypermarket occurred at around 7 a.m. The officer, whose identity has not yet been disclosed, died at the scene.</p><p><i>Fontanka</i> and 47news also reported that the explosives used in the attack were transported into Russia’s Leningrad Region from one of the Baltic states by balloon. Near the border, an unidentified person allegedly retrieved the package and hid it in a dead drop — a concealed location used to pass items without a face-to-face meeting. Yan later collected the bomb from the cache, according to the reports.</p><aside class="related-posts"><ul><li><a href="https://theins.press/en/news/299513">Russian colonel killed in St. Petersburg neighborhood’s second military car bombing since August</a></li></ul></aside>]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Thu, 12 Nov 2026 17:57:50 +0000</pubDate>
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      <title><![CDATA[Russian colonel killed in St. Petersburg neighborhood’s second military car bombing since August]]></title>
      <link>https://theins.press/en/news/299513</link>
      <guid>https://theins.press/en/news/299513</guid>
      <dc:creator><![CDATA[The Insider]]></dc:creator>
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      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>On the morning of Nov. 12, a car driven by a Russian military officer exploded in southern St. Petersburg. The local outlet <i>Fontanka</i> <a href="https://www.fontanka.ru/2026/11/12/76760363/">reported</a> that a Russian army colonel was killed. Russia’s Investigative Committee has <a href="https://max.ru/id7838454421_gos/AaHOVSG6Zqw">opened</a> a criminal investigation into the car bombing — the second involving a military officer in the same St. Petersburg neighborhood in less than three months.</p><p>The explosion occurred at around 7 a.m. on Kolpinskoye Highway in the Slavyanka neighborhood, near a supermarket and a Tatneft gas station, according to a report by local broadcaster <a href="https://max.ru/news78/AaHOKNDTAuA">Channel 78</a>, citing witnesses. The blast was captured by a building intercom camera. According to <a href="https://www.fontanka.ru/2026/11/12/76760385/"><i>Fontanka</i></a>, an explosive device had been attached to the underside of the vehicle and was detonated remotely as the colonel drove out of a courtyard.</p><div>https://t.me/theinsru/4290</div><p>The officer died at the scene. <i>Fontanka</i> initially reported that a relative had been in the vehicle with him and was injured. The outlet later <a href="https://www.fontanka.ru/2026/11/12/76760407/">clarified</a> that the colonel had been alone in the car. His name has not been released.</p><p>Security service personnel were working at the scene, and Kolpinskoye Highway was closed. Traffic police shut the road between Polotskaya and Turovskaya streets. Five bus routes were altered as a result, according to the Dorozhny Kontrol SPB | LO Telegram channel. Buses Nos. 179, 254, 325 and 374 were rerouted via Rostovskaya and Turovskaya streets, while Route 388 was temporarily shortened. According to <a href="https://www.fontanka.ru/2026/11/12/76760388/?utm_source=chatgpt.com"><i>Fontanka</i></a>, traffic jams stretched for about 1.5 kilometers in both directions.</p><div>https://t.me/theinsru/4291</div><p>On Aug. 27, a car carrying another Russian officer <a href="https://theins.press/en/news/296505">exploded</a> on the same stretch of Kolpinskoye Highway in the Slavyanka residential neighborhood in the southern outskirts of the city. <i>Fontanka </i>described the deceased in that incident as a lieutenant colonel in the Russian Aerospace Forces. The man was killed and his wife was injured and hospitalized. The victim was believed to be 43-year-old Sergei Sechkov, who served in the 332nd Separate Guards Helicopter Regiment. Sechkov’s father <a href="https://theins.press/en/news/296553">confirmed</a> to the independent Russian investigative outlet <i>Agentstvo </i>that his son had died in the explosion. In May 2022, Ukrainian military intelligence accused members of Sechkov’s regiment of carrying out missile and bomb strikes against Ukrainian civilians in the Slobozhansky sector (a Russian and Ukrainian military term for an operational area in northeastern Ukraine).</p><p>According to <a href="https://www.fontanka.ru/2026/08/28/76611899/"><i>Fontanka</i></a>, the explosive device under Sechkov’s car was planted by a 24-year-old Russian woman who flew to Turkey several hours before the blast and later moved to Moldova. The outlet said she acted with the involvement of representatives of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, but provided no evidence to support the claim. Ukrainian authorities have not confirmed their involvement in the bombing.</p><aside class="related-posts"><ul><li><a href="https://theins.press/en/news/296505">Russian army lieutenant colonel killed in car bombing in St. Petersburg</a></li><li><a href="https://theins.press/en/news/296553">Russian officer killed in St. Petersburg car bombing identified as Sergei Sechkov, whose unit Ukraine accuses of strikes on civilians</a></li><li><a href="https://theins.press/en/news/296765">Commander of strategic bomber division responsible for Russian strike on children’s hospital in Kyiv shot near air base</a></li></ul></aside>]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Thu, 12 Nov 2026 09:41:42 +0000</pubDate>
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      <title><![CDATA[Russian missile ship damaged in Ukrainian drone attack in Gulf of Finland]]></title>
      <link>https://theins.press/en/news/299489</link>
      <guid>https://theins.press/en/news/299489</guid>
      <dc:creator><![CDATA[The Insider]]></dc:creator>
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      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>A Russian missile ship was struck by Ukrainian drones in the Gulf of Finland overnight into Nov 11. The attack was first <a href="https://t.me/evilsailor2/1693">reported</a> by the Russian Telegram channel Zloy Moryachok (lit. “Angry Little Sailor”) and was later <a href="https://t.me/SBUkr/19036">confirmed</a> by the Security Service of Ukraine (SBU).</p><p>The vessel targeted was the <i>Naro-Fominsk</i>, classified by the Russian Navy as a “small missile ship,” a category of compact warships equipped with long-range missiles. It was hit during a <a href="https://theins.press/en/news/299486" target="_blank">drone attack on Russia’s Leningrad Region</a> that also sparked a major fire at the port of Ust-Luga and reportedly damaged several Russian helicopters.</p><div>https://t.me/exilenova_plus/34469</div><p>The extent of the damage to the vessel is currently unknown. Zloy Moryachok reported that the ship was near Gogland Island — around 180 kilometers west of St. Petersburg — when it was attacked. The channel said the vessel then began heading toward Kronstadt under its own power. And unstated number of people were killed and wounded in the attack, according to the report.</p><p>The <i>Naro-Fominsk</i> <a href="https://rg.ru/2022/12/12/rakety-na-plavu.html">launched</a> in late 2022, the 11th vessel built under Russia’s Project 21631, known as the Buyan-M class. It can carry Kalibr and Oniks cruise missiles. Since the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion, Russian forces have repeatedly used missiles of these types to strike Ukraine (typically <a href="https://24tv.ua/ru/raketa-kalibr-pletenchuk-rasskazal-iz-kakih-akvatorij-rossijane_n2631692">launching</a> them from the Black Sea and Sea of Azov).</p><p>The SBU also confirmed the overnight strike on Ust-Luga, one of Russia’s largest oil-export hubs. Several petroleum-product storage tanks were damaged in the attack.</p><aside class="related-posts"><ul><li><a href="https://theins.press/en/news/299486">Drone strike on key northern port of Ust-Luga sparks major fire as Russian military bloggers report three helicopter crews killed</a></li></ul></aside>]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Wed, 11 Nov 2026 23:38:25 +0000</pubDate>
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