The tanker identified in the General Staff’s statement sails under the flag of Guinea-Bissau. At the time of the reported incident, the ship was in the Black Sea, though its exact location is difficult to track.

According to data from the ship tracking platform Starboard Maritime Intelligence reviewed by The Insider, the vessel had been traveling with its transponder turned off since at least June 8. The transponder, if active, would have allowed its location to be determined in real time. It was turned on only briefly at about 5:40 a.m. on June 10. The tanker’s route is also difficult to trace, likely due to interference distorting its coordinates, making its path appear on the map as unnatural straight lines.

Ukraine’s General Staff said the attack damaged the vessel’s propeller-rudder system, which controls maneuverability and helps keep the ship on course.

There has been no other confirmation of the attack. Russian authorities have not commented on the incident.

In May, three tankers included on various sanctions lists were attacked by drones in the Black Sea near Turkey’s northern coast. At the time, the crews were carrying out a ship-to-ship transfer at sea. Last week, Azerbaijan’s Foreign Ministry reported a strike on two other vessels that had  Azerbaijani crew members on board. Those cargo ships were traveling from Turkey to Rostov-on-Don to load grain. Ukraine said at the time that it had targeted vessels carrying stolen grain.

According to the investigators, two minors, a boy and a girl, allegedly placed the bomb on instructions from unidentified “handlers.” The girl retrieved an explosive device from a dead drop, while the boy attached it to the car along with a GPS tracker.

Both suspects were detained at the scene, and criminal cases were opened against them on charges of attempted murder and the illegal possession of explosives.

The Investigative Committee did not identify the alleged target of the planned attack. In its news release, the agency described the person only as “an employee of one of the research and production enterprises.” The explosion occurred in a parking lot at the intersection of Vvedensky and Butlerov streets in Moscow’s southern Konkovo District.

The closest institution to that location is the M.F. Stelmakh Polyus Research Institute, which specializes in laser technology. Its developments are also used in the military sphere, including laser target designators and rangefinders for Orion drones, as well as navigation systems and laser gyroscopes for Iskander missiles.

The institute is part of the Shvabe holding of the state defense corporation Rostec.

Also on June 9, a BMW X3 exploded in Balashikha, a city just outside Moscow, killing Lt. Gen. Damir Davydov, the Russian Defense Ministry officer responsible for supplying missiles and artillery ammunition to the front. He was the second Russian general assassinated in that neighborhood in just over a year. On April 25, 2025, Lt. Gen. Yaroslav Moskalik, deputy head of the Main Operations Directorate of the Russian General Staff, was killed in a car bombing 350 meters away from where Davydov’s BMW detonated yesterday.

The explosion occurred early in the morning of June 9 in the Aviatorov neighborhood. Explosives had been planted under a BMW and detonated shortly after the driver began leaving the parking lot. Davydov lived in Balashikha at 6 Kozheduba St., Apt. 21, in the Aviatorov neighborhood, a few hundred meters from the blast site. According to data obtained by The Insider, Davydov used a BMW X3 SUV with the license plate У028ЕР750.

The Insider understands that the operation was carried out by the Security Service of Ukraine (SBU). 

Davydov was born Feb. 4, 1969, in the closed city of Penza-19, now Zarechny, where his father worked at the Start production association, which until 2002 produced nuclear missiles. The late General Davydov received specialized military-technical training and registered several patents related to rocket engines and artillery ammunition.

In 2009, Davydov headed the Central Testing Technical Bureau, Military Unit 63341, at the 51st Arsenal. In 2017, he was appointed head of the Missile and Ammunition Supply Directorate of the Main Missile and Artillery Directorate of the Russian Defense Ministry, known by its Russian acronym GRAU, Military Unit 64176.

Davydov had long been a target of Ukrainian authorities due to his alleged participation in war crimes. According to the Ukrainian database “Book of Executioners,” Davydov was directly involved in planning and organizing Russia’s military invasion on Feb. 24, 2022. His duties included supplying the army with ammunition.

Yesterday’s assassination was the second such incident in the Aviatorov neighborhood. In April 2025, Lt. Gen. Yaroslav Moskalik, deputy head of the Main Operations Directorate of the Russian General Staff, was killed in an explosion in the same area. The June 9 blast site was about 350 meters from the place where Moskalik's car was blown up.

Over the past decade, Donald Trump has achieved something no Republican politician before him managed to do: return to the White House after a failed reelection bid. In the process, Trump established near-total control over the Republican Party, becoming its undisputed leader.

When former Democrat Donald Trump announced in 2015 that he would run for president as a Republican, many politicians treated it as a publicity stunt — or even as a joke. However, as he pushed aside the frontrunners, winning one primary after another, the laughs gave way to anxiety, panic, and even an attempted revolt at the Republican National Convention. When the party officially nominated Trump as its presidential candidate, some Republicans openly declared that they could not support him and would rather sit out the election or vote for Democratic candidate Hillary Clinton.

After Trump’s victory, his opponents and critics faced a difficult choice. Some, like former Florida Governor Jeb Bush and Senator Mitt Romney, chose to end their political careers after finding no place for themselves in the transformed party, but only a few — like Liz Cheney — tried to openly oppose the new president. In 2022, she lost her primary race to Trump-backed Harriet Hageman.

Mike Pence, who served as Trump’s vice president during his first term, also became an outcast within the party after refusing to block the certification of the 2020 presidential election results. As a result, his own attempt to challenge Trump in the 2024 Republican primaries failed miserably.

Most Republicans chose to reconcile themselves with Trump and accept him as their party’s leader despite two impeachments and a string of criminal cases. Among the Republicans who came over to Trump’s side after criticizing him back in 2016 are current Secretary of State Marco Rubio, Vice President J.D. Vance, and South Carolina Senator Lindsey Graham.

Trumpists against Trump

Having brought the Republican Party under his control, Trump transformed it from an ideological project rooted in Reagan-era conservatism into a right-wing populist force. The key factor in today’s Republican Party is no longer ideology, but personal loyalty to the leader. This means demonstrating the ability to quickly adapt to the president’s position, which on major political issues can shift with remarkable speed. Yet even within the MAGA that Trump created as a counterweight to the traditional Republican establishment, not everyone accepted — or even understood — the new rules of the game.

Some MAGA Republicans, having believed Trump’s campaign promises, quickly became disillusioned. After America experienced its highest levels of inflation since the 1970s during Joe Biden’s presidency, the sweeping tariffs imposed by Trump and the consequences of his foreign policy only accelerated price growth, and his promises to focus on solving domestic problems while abandoning the practice of “regime change wars” abroad were broken with an operation to abduct Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro and the decision to carry out extensive strikes on Iran. The latter led to the closure of the Strait of Hormuz and a spike in fuel prices in the United States that only put further upward pressure on inflation.

And of course, there is also the matter of the Epstein files. The publication of the files from the criminal case involving the late financier and convicted sex offender had become something of an obsession for conservatives, yet their release was initially blocked by the Trump administration. Publication was only secured through a joint effort by Democrats and MAGA Republicans, a coalition that House Speaker Mike Johnson ultimately proved unable to stop.

One of the first Republicans to draw attention to this shift was conspiracy theorist turned Georgia Congresswoman Marjorie Taylor Greene, one of Trump’s most loyal supporters until their very public parting of ways. MTG, who had always called for the release of the Epstein files, accused Trump of breaking his promises  and criticized his administration for failing to respond to rising healthcare costs. In response, Trump declared her a traitor and promised to support a challenger against her in the upcoming primaries. Greene did not wait for the election and resigned from the House of Representatives in January 2026. As a result of her conflict with the president, she began receiving death threats — and according to Greene, Trump told her in private messages that she deserved them.

For voting in favor of releasing the Epstein files, Trump branded Greene a traitor and promised to back her opponent in the primaries

In addition to Greene, one of the leading Republican critics of Trump’s policies in Congress has been Indiana conservative Thomas Massie, another politician fond of conspiracy theories and long seen as friendly to Moscow. Massie co-authored the bill calling for the publication of the Epstein files, which Trump initially opposed only to switch sides after realizing its passage was inevitable. Massie was one of just two Republicans who voted against Trump’s One Big Beautiful Bill, as he was unwilling to support an increase in the national debt resulting from tax cuts. The congressman has also criticized Trump’s foreign policy — from regime change efforts in Venezuela to the war with Iran — accusing Trump of indulging Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu.

The president himself made no effort to hide his irritation with Massie’s disloyalty, calling him “the worst congressman in history,” “an idiot,” and “a sleazebag,” while urging Republicans to throw him out of the party.

To put an end to Massie’s political career, Trump backed his primary challenger: retired Navy special operations captain Ed Gallrein, who barely campaigned, skipped every debate, and spoke to the press only occasionally. Nevertheless, he managed to defeat Massie by nearly 10%, as Trump’s supporters, together with pro-Israel groups, provided Gallrein with unprecedented financial backing. The race became the most expensive congressional primary in history, and of the $34 million spent on campaigning, nearly $20 million went toward ads attacking Massie.

Purges in the Senate

The cases of Greene and Massie demonstrated that Republican politicians unhappy with Trump’s policies and willing to criticize him publicly are left with only two options: leave the Republican Party or prepare for a brutal primary battle against a well-resourced Trump-backed challenger.

A similar story unfolded in the Senate. Republican Thom Tillis of North Carolina refused to support the One Big Beautiful Bill due to the fact that the legislation’s cuts to Medicaid funding could leave more than 600,000 residents of his state without health insurance. Trump responded by calling Tillis “a talker and complainer” and threatened to back a primary challenger against him. Realistically assessing his chances, Tillis ultimately decided not to seek reelection.

Trump called Senator Thom Tillis “a talker and complainer” and pressured him into abandoning his reelection bid

Democrats are now hoping to flip the seat in November by nominating former North Carolina Governor Roy Cooper. Republicans, meanwhile, will field former Republican National Committee chairman Michael Whatley, who was appointed to the position at Trump’s urging. Polls, however, show Cooper leading Whatley comfortably, meaning Republicans could ultimately lose the seat as a result of Trump’s political maneuvering.

Trump has also sought revenge against Louisiana Senator Bill Cassidy. In recent years, Cassidy had established himself as a fairly loyal Republican and Trump ally, consistently supporting the president’s positions in Senate votes. Cassidy, a former physician who supports the science behind vaccines, even conceded to vote to confirm Robert F. Kennedy Jr. as Secretary of Health and Human Services. Even so, Trump accused the senator of disloyalty and brought up Cassidy’s vote in favor of removing Trump from office during his second impeachment trial in February 2021 — after Joe Biden had already been sworn in as president. The North Carolina senator was one of seven Republicans to break ranks at the time; today, only three of them still hold their seats.

In the primary race Trump ultimately backed Congresswoman Julia Letlow, who advanced to the runoff against Louisiana State Treasurer John Fleming while Cassidy finished third with just 25% of the vote. In his concession speech, Cassidy avoided mentioning Trump directly, though he could not resist making an oblique reference to the 2020 election. “When you participate in democracy, sometimes it doesn't turn out the way you want it to, Cassidy said, “but you don't pout, you don't whine, you don't claim the election was stolen.”

Trump also dealt a blow to the career of Republican Senator John Cornyn, who has represented Texas in the Senate since 2002. Cornyn was seeking a sixth term and advanced to a primary runoff against state Attorney General Ken Paxton. A few days before the vote, Trump publicly endorsed Paxton, saying Cornyn had not been sufficiently loyal to him despite the senator having voted in favor of every major Trump-backed bill. Cornyn lost by more than 25 percentage points.

Paxton’s victory was welcomed not only by Trump, but also by Democrats, who now hope Texas could elect a Democratic senator for the first time since 1988. Their candidate is state legislator and seminary graduate James Talarico, who has actively campaigned in Republican districts, espousing a progressive interpretation of Christianity focused not on the issues of abortion or same-sex marriage, but on helping one’s neighbor, ensuring access to healthcare, and combatting inequality and corporate power.

Democrats believe Talarico has an even stronger chance of winning thanks to Paxton’s scandal-ridden reputation (his wife recently filed for divorce over his infidelity). Paxton has also faced a series of investigations into fraud and abuse of office, which previously led to a failed impeachment effort by fellow Texas Republicans. Under these circumstances, even if Republicans manage to hold on to the Senate seat, the party will be forced to deploy enormous financial resources that could otherwise have been spent in other states.

The RINO faction

By alienating Republican senators and branding them “RINOs,” Trump risks losing the support he needs to push through his legislative agenda. Senators who lost their primaries will remain in office until the new Congress convenes in January 2027 and may begin acting far more independently now that they are no longer bound by loyalty to Trump. Republicans currently hold 53 out of 100 Senate seats, which means losing the support of even four senators would be enough to block legislation or prevent confirmation of presidential nominees for executive branch posts and federal judgeships.

The first signs of this shift are already visible. Senator Tillis publicly criticized Homeland Security Secretary Kristi Noem during congressional hearings — a few days later, she was fired by Trump. Tillis also blocked the confirmation of Kevin Warsh, Trump’s nominee for Federal Reserve chair, because of a Justice Department investigation into his predecessor Jerome Powell. Trump had accused Powell of refusing to cut interest rates and of wasteful spending. In the end, the Justice Department was forced to back down and closed the investigation.

Senator Cassidy, meanwhile, supported resolutions aimed at prohibiting the use of military force against Iran, despite having consistently voted against such measures before his primary defeat. Yet in the coming months, the confirmation of nominees for labor secretary, as well as the heads of the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention and the Food and Drug Administration, both of which were left vacant after recent resignations, will depend in part on Cassidy’s support.

Over the past few weeks, Tillis, Cassidy, and several other senators have also blocked a vote on approving the budget for federal immigration agencies. They opposed the inclusion in the bill of a $1 billion allocation for the construction of a ballroom on the site of the demolished East Wing of the White House.

Finally, senators criticized the Justice Department’s decision to create a $1.776 billion compensation fund for people allegedly persecuted for political reasons during Biden’s presidency, a group prominently including participants in the January 6 Capitol riot who were later pardoned by Trump.

Renegades in the states

Trump’s fight against opposition within the Republican Party is not limited to Washington. The president has been actively pressuring state governments to redraw congressional district boundaries. Normally, redistricting takes place at the beginning of each decade following the census. However, the White House has been pushing Republicans to engage in gerrymandering ahead of the 2026 House elections.

Many Republican-controlled states complied and carried out unscheduled redistricting, catching Democrats off guard and leaving them unable to respond with similar measures of their own. Republicans were also aided by the Supreme Court, which allowed the elimination of majority-minority districts, which were created after the passage of the 1965 Voting Rights Act — such districts had mostly been represented by Democratic lawmakers. As a result, Republicans could gain an extra 9 to 10 House seats simply because the lines in certain states have been redrawn.

Not all “red” states, however, yielded to pressure from the White House. In Indiana, the proposed redistricting effort failed because of resistance from Republican state senators. Twenty-one of them — a majority of the 40-member Republican caucus — crossed party lines and voted against the plan, despite Trump warning beforehand that he would back primary challengers against disloyal lawmakers. He also published a list of nine Republican senators who, in his words, “needed help making the right decision.” Three of them said they began receiving threats and false reports of bombs targeting their homes. Police SWAT teams were also repeatedly dispatched to their addresses under false pretenses.

Only 19 of the 40 Republican members of the Indiana State Senate supported Trump’s redistricting plan

Trump ultimately followed through on his threat and endorsed challengers against the dissenting lawmakers. As a result, only two of the “dissidents” managed to survive the May primaries, while six lost to Trump-backed candidates. Organizations linked to the president spent around $13.5 million on the campaigns — tens of times more than is normally spent on races at that level.

Republicans in South Carolina also resisted the president’s demands. Governor Henry McMaster initially said he would not even convene lawmakers for a special session to redraw district boundaries. Under pressure from Washington he reversed his position, but the gerrymandering efforts were nevertheless blocked in the state Senate, where twelve Republicans joined Democrats in voting against the proposal. They are now likely to face highly competitive primaries in 2028.

The 2028 committee

The president is making no secret of the fact that he is drawing up a list of Republican politicians he may target for insufficient loyalty when primary season begins again two years from now. The list reportedly includes both House members and senators.

One possible target is Colorado Congresswoman Lauren Boebert. Like Marjorie Taylor Greene, she had been a staunch Trump ally but split with him over the White House’s reluctance to publish the Epstein files. She also publicly backed Thomas Massie’s candidacy, after which Trump urged fellow Republicans to run against her.

Another congressman in Trump’s crosshairs is moderate Brian Fitzpatrick, who was elected from a swing district in Pennsylvania. Together with Massie, he voted against the One Big Beautiful Bill and opposed allocating federal funds for the construction of the White House ballroom. Trump has already begun threatening him as well.

Storm clouds are also gathering over some Republican senators who will come up for reelection in 2028. Kentucky Republican Rand Paul voted against the One Big Beautiful Bill because of its impact on the national debt, prompting Trump to call him a “sick psycho.” Paul also co-authored a number of resolutions seeking to bar Trump from using military force against Venezuela and Iran without congressional approval.

Those same resolutions were supported by moderate Alaska Senator Lisa Murkowski, drawing Trump’s anger as well. Trump already tried to unseat her in 2022 by endorsing a more conservative challenger and demanding that the Alaska Republican Party censure her. Murkowski nevertheless managed to win reelection.

Several establishment Republicans will also face reelection in 2028, including Indiana’s Todd Young, Louisiana’s John Kennedy, North Dakota’s John Hoeven, and Senate Republican leader John Thune of South Dakota. It is entirely possible that Trump will attempt to purge some of them as well for failing to advance his agenda with sufficient zeal.

For Trump, maintaining personal control over the Republican Party appears to matter more than securing a congressional majority. He sees the legislative branch as too slow and unwieldy, which is why he has sought to implement his key initiatives primarily through the executive branch, where he has already carried out sweeping purges and consolidated control.

On June 8, Telegram channel Krymsky Veter (lit. “Crimean Wind”) published a photograph of a military Ural truck disguised as a civilian dump truck. Black military license plates are visible on the vehicle. The channel said the photo was sent by a subscriber, who also reported that the driver was wearing civilian clothes.

Ruslan Leviev, founder of the Conflict Intelligence Team research group, commented on the post, writing that “here Russian troops really are disguising military equipment as civilian, which is definitely a war crime. The photo shows a military Ural with black military plates, repainted and disguised as a civilian dump truck.”

Under international humanitarian law, parties to a conflict must clearly distinguish between military and civilian objects. Using civilian transport, or imitations of it, to conceal military activity may violate that principle and create additional risks for civilians.

Also on June 8, the Telegram channel Exilenova+ published a video showing the trunks of two passenger cars filled with gasoline canisters. The people in the recording say they are transporting about a ton of fuel from Kizilyurt, in Dagestan, to occupied Tokmak in Ukraine’s Zaporizhzhia Region.

Leviev was one of the first to notice and draw attention to the post, noting that the case likely does not involve Russian troops disguising themselves as civilians, because the carriers in the video appear to be civilians.

“Maybe, strictly legally, there is no war crime here, because the people in the video do not appear to be soldiers; they really seem to be civilians, meaning they are not disguising themselves as civilians,” Leviev said. “But videos like this could provoke new drone strikes against any civilian passenger cars on roads in the south of the occupied territories.”

The Telegram channel Supernova+ also published a video that shows large fuel tanks in the back of a civilian truck at a filling station in the Krasnodar Region. The post also included several statements from locals complaining about the shortages. 

According to AFU spokesperson Voloshyn, the development was the result of successful Ukrainian strikes on Russian military logistics. He said that Russian forces planned to use civilian trucks seized from transport companies, postal services, and other organizations to carry fuel. The vehicles include bread trucks, trucks used to transport food and medicine, and other vehicles that outwardly look no different from ordinary civilian transport.

Voloshyn said the vehicles would be loaded with canisters and containers ranging from 20 to 1,000 liters, and drivers would be banned from wearing military uniforms.

“That is, this is yet another violation of the rules of warfare,” Voloshyn added.

Witnesses said drivers were filling both their cars and fuel canisters as a precation.

Residents said gasoline was especially difficult to find on the outskirts of Krasnodar and along the road toward Anapa and the village of Blagoveshchenskaya.

Some drivers were forced to buy AI-92 grade gasoline and then search for the higher-grade AI-100. Local residents suggested the situation may also have been affected by the fuel crisis in annexed Crimea, as residents of the peninsula may have begun traveling to neighboring regions to refuel where gasoline is still freely available.

Krasnodar Region governor Veniamin Kondratyev agreed with that version of events, claiming there was no gasoline shortage in his region. According to Kondratyev, the reports of disruptions appeared amid a “difficult situation” in neighboring regions, with local residents deciding to stock up on fuel as a precautionary measure, apparently creating an “artificial rush.”

Kondratyev added that temporary supply problems were mainly observed at small private filling stations, while gasoline remained available at most large chain stations. Suppliers were already “optimizing logistics” to avoid long-term disruptions, he said.

The Krasnodar Region emergency response headquarters also said fuel was available at gas stations run by major chains, and that disruptions at private stations occurred as a result of the fact that they buy gasoline in small wholesale batches and do not have long-term contracts.

In early June, restrictions on the sale of gasoline began to be rolled out in several Russian regions, as well as in annexed Crimea and the occupied Luhansk Region of Ukraine. Limits were also introduced in Moscow and the Moscow Region, St. Petersburg, and the Belgorod and Kursk regions. In some cases, gasoline sales were capped — at between 20 an 60 liters per customer — while some filling stations also restricted sales into canisters.

The sharpest disruptions were reported in annexed Crimea, where AI-95 gasoline sales were capped at 20 liters per customer per day. The shortage fueled a “shadow” market, with resellers charging up to 250 rubles per liter, well above the standard retail price of around 70 rubles. Reports later emerged of shortages of staple goods including sugar, grains, flour, pasta, and vegetable oil. An overnight attack on June 8 against the locomotive of a Moscow-Simferopol passenger train also disrupted scheduled rail service.

Total damages for 2025 were estimated at €160 million. In addition to €60 million lost as a direct result of cancellations, airport closures force airlines to reroute flights, adding expenses such as extra fuel, while airports lose fee revenue.

The largest incident in 2025 involved unidentified drones entering the airspace of Munich Airport on two consecutive days: Oct. 2 and 3, a Thursday and Friday. As a result, 81 flights were canceled and another 46 were delayed or rescheduled, affecting about 10,000 passengers.

Authorities were unable to determine who launched the drones, what type of UAV they were, or what their purpose was. A police representative quoted by Die Zeit said the “drones flew away before they could be identified.”

“The vulnerabilities are within the elite of the regime, which is the traditional way in which such regimes weaken, because there is no trust between the different people that are at the top of the regime,” Zourabichvili told The Insider. “The leader, Mr. Ivanishvili, does not trust anyone around him and is thinking that everybody is plotting against him. They have taken this propaganda of a ‘deep state’ too seriously, and now they think that they are threatened. So there is this inbuilt vulnerability of the regime.”

That fear has led the regime to introduce new repressive measures. Still, when speaking about the prospects for a change of power, Zourabichvili allowed for several scenarios — from a consolidation of the opposition to the regime itself miscalculating by calling for early elections that it could ultimately lose. She emphasized that the Georgian Dream government is weaker than it appears, while society is stronger.

“I think they are worried,” she explained. “They're essentially worried because they cannot do anything about the protests in the population and the discontent. They are the only ones who are able to fully measure how much of the discontent exists, and they cannot do anything about it. They have been adding repressive measures one to the other, and it doesn't change anything. So that's what they are concerned about.”

Under the circumstances, Zourabichvili says, “everything is possible — the fall of this government, a consolidation of the opposition and of civil society. There is the possibility of elections, because the regime may think that they are stronger today than they will be tomorrow, and that it's better for them to try it now. And they might make the wrong assessment. The only thing one can say is that the current situation is one of a regime that is weaker than it looks, and a society that is stronger than it feels.”

Zourabichvili also addressed the issue of Russian oil transit through Georgia. She said that a recent report containing specific data on ships transiting Georgian ports was the first tangible confirmation of her long-held suspicions that the regime is acting as a conduit for the trade in sanctioned Russian goods.

“There was a tripartite mission of the European Union, the UK and the United States in Georgia two or three years ago. It came and said that they didn't find any smoking gun at that time, but since then, things have changed a lot. We know that there have been luxury cars that were transiting supposedly towards Central Asia, but in fact they were going to Russia. So once that's one thing that we know is happening. The second one is this oil and tankers. We don't have the means to assess it, and so if our outside partners do not do their job, it's difficult,” Zourabichvili explained. “We always had the idea that there was some work of circumvention of sanctions, but a few weeks ago was the first time that it came out with actual facts and the names of the vessels that were transiting through the port in Georgia, along with the possibility that the port of Kulevi might be on the list of sanctions. I think it's very interesting, but the means to assess that really are in the hands of others of the European Union and our partners, and they should be probably more interested in what is happening than they have been until now.”

Zourabichvili also criticized her European partners for their insufficient response to the situation and called on them to openly describe what is happening in Georgia as a retreat from democracy.

“I always recommend that they express their policy towards Georgia more firmly. I think that the expression of the policy is as important as any decision that they can take to limit this or that, and what has been happening is that this is really a case of Georgia moving from a democracy to an autocracy. This is unacceptable for the European Union, but it has never been expressed in such terms. They're just saying they have a non-engagement policy, but it’s not made clearly,” she cautioned.

Zourabichvili characterized the 2024 elections as a "special operation" employing a full arsenal of fraud — from ballot stuffing to call centers and "troll farms" repurposed for the election campaign. She stated that no real investigation into the events has been conducted.

“These elections were completely controlled, and there was an extensive influence operation using Russian technology. They used all the old methods of rigging the elections that exist — traditional ballot stuffing, things that everybody knows — added to new ones like the use of call centers and the use of social networks and troll farms in a way that, for a small country, made it what I called immediately a ‘special operation.’ What has been missing since then is a real investigation supported by our partners in Europe as to  what happened. I, even as president, did not have any executive means, and the opposition had no means to really investigate. It should be done, because that should be a concern for all democratic countries — to see how they can preventively protect their elections, be it in Armenia, in Romania, in Moldova or in any other country,” Zourabichvili concluded.

Zourabichvili has repeatedly said she does not recognize the legitimacy of Georgia’s most recent parliamentary elections. She left the presidential palace on Dec. 29, 2024, saying she was “taking legitimacy” with her. Georgian Dream won a coalition majority and introduced a new presidential election format through an electoral college, in which most votes belong to members of the party.

Analysts with Frontelligence Insight had previously estimated that Russia could produce about 20 military Mi-8 helicopters a year at aircraft plants in Kazan and Ulan-Ude. However, according to the minutes of the Industry and Trade Ministry meeting, a much larger number is planned — all at a single plant. There is no precise data on production at the Ulan-Ude plant, but because component supplies for Mi-8 helicopters are usually split roughly evenly between the two sites, the investigation’s authors say the two plants together could produce up to 160 helicopters over two years.

Even if only the Kazan Helicopter Plant fulfills the production plan, that would be enough to effectively compensate for Russia’s losses in this segment of aviation during the war against Ukraine, the investigation’s authors said. In their assessment, by 2027 such efforts could restore the Russian army’s ability to conduct large airborne operations at a level close to what it possessed before the full-scale invasion.

Russia’s expansion of transport and assault aviation could pose a threat to NATO countries. Given their proximity to Russia, any potential ground invasion would almost inevitably include a significant airborne component. Dallas Analytics noted, however, that the minutes also point to problems inside Russia’s military-industrial complex, including a lack of finalized contracts, shortages of advance financing, and the risk of supply disruptions due to long production cycles.

Production also depends on cooperation among dozens of enterprises, making the system vulnerable to external pressure and sanctions. The investigation’s authors separately note that United Engine Corporation will be able to begin supplying engines for the Mi-8 only in September 2026, while deliveries of onboard electronics and avionics from the Radio-Electronic Technologies Concern depend on the receipt of advance payments.

The minutes also refer to the need to calculate how many helicopters can actually be built in 2026, meaning even the stated plan for 37 aircraft remains uncertain. The document indicates that money from Russia’s National Wealth Fund could be used to support production.

The Mi-8 remains one of the Russian army’s key multipurpose helicopters. At the start of the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, such aircraft were heavily used in airborne operations, including at Antonov Airport in the Kyiv suburb of Hostomel. However, after taking serious losses the role of the aircraft changed. Mi-8 helicopters are now more often used for evacuations, search-and-rescue missions, unguided rocket attacks from a pitch-up maneuver, and operations against both aerial and naval drones.

The ministry said the drone entered Latvian airspace as a result of Russia’s use of electronic warfare. It did not say who launched the drone or what type it was. The ministry noted that Latvia’s armed forces had strengthened their air defenses along the country’s eastern border by deploying additional units.

Local media said a French aircraft intercepted the drone between the cities of Rēzekne and Kārsava, near the border with Russia’s Pskov Region. Residents in several districts received air threat alerts urging them to take shelter.

“Immediately take shelter indoors and follow the two-wall principle,” the warning said, referring to sheltering in a place separated from the outside by at least two walls. “Follow official reports. If you notice a low-flying or suspicious object, do not approach it and call 112. The end of the threat will be announced separately.”

Preliminary information indicated that the explosion caused no injuries or damage.

Latvian territorial defense troops were involved in the search for debris, with Defense Minister Raimonds Bergmanis saying the decision to shoot down the drone was made after authorities confirmed it would not endanger people or civilian infrastructure.

In early May, two Ukrainian drones that had veered off course due to the effects of Russian electronic warfare systems damaged four empty tanks at an oil depot in Rēzekne. A fire broke out but was quickly extinguished, and no one was injured. Ukrainian Foreign Minister Andrii Sybiha issued an official apology for the incident. The drone incident later led to the resignation of Latvia’s government.

In mid-May, NATO aircraft shot down a drone over Estonia for the first time. It turned out to be a Ukrainian-made UAV flying toward Russian territory.

A drone also entered Moldovan airspace on the same day, with Moldova’s Foreign Ministry saying it exploded in Orhei, in the country’s east. Authorities speculated that it may have been Ukrainian.

According to the Security Service of Ukraine (SBU), the strike was carried out at 2:05 a.m. by a Geran-2 type drone. Investigators discovered elements of the drone at the scene and opened criminal proceedings on charges involving the violation of the laws and customs of war. The SBU stated that the explosion damaged the building used for the reception and reloading of spent nuclear fuel, along with an IAEA administrative building.

Energoatom reported that the strike hit the container reception building at the spent fuel facility site at 02:10. Following the attack, a 40-square-meter fire broke out, but it was promptly contained and fully extinguished. The nuclear operator published photographs of the damaged building. They show a destroyed section of the facade, blown-out windows, and nearby debris.

The IAEA reported that Ukraine had informed the international agency of the attack on the central spent fuel storage facility in the Chornobyl exclusion zone. According to the agency, the strike caused serious damage to the fuel reception building — its facade, windows, and doors. Neighboring buildings were also damaged by the blast wave. The IAEA team at the Chornobyl Nuclear Power Plant is expected to visit the facility and assess the consequences of the strike.

IAEA Director General Rafael Grossi described the incident as “deeply concerning,” as it occurred at a facility containing large volumes of nuclear material that was located just a few meters from the damaged building. According to Grossi, attacks on nuclear facilities are “completely unacceptable” and contradict key principles of nuclear safety and security during an armed conflict.

Zelensky stated that the Russian strike had been carried out using a Shahed-type UAV against “an object of extremely critical infrastructure” and that Moscow “deliberately targeted precisely this nuclear infrastructure facility.” The Ukrainian Ministry of Energy called the very fact of a strike on a spent nuclear fuel handling facility “an unprecedented threat to nuclear and radiation safety” and urged the IAEA to urgently dispatch a mission to document the consequences of the attack.

Russia’s Ministry of Defense did not mention the strike on the storage facility near the Chornobyl NPP in its June 7 report. It stated only that Russian forces had struck patrol boats, fuel depots, long-range drone assembly and launch sites,  temporary deployment sites of Ukrainian and foreign military personnel, and infrastructure facilities involved in the spheres of transportation, shipping, and energy. 

The protesters’ cause was then taken up by Archbishop Bagrat Galstanyan, whom the authorities described as “Moscow’s protégé.” Galstanyan himself denies receiving support from Russia, and there is no confirmed evidence proving direct political influence by the Kremlin over the archbishop’s “Sacred Struggle” movement. Nevertheless, the label stuck due to Galstanyan’s ties to opposition blocs loyal to Moscow and support from businessman Samvel Karapetyan, who is indisputably close to the Russian authorities.

The 2023 protests did not lead to any political changes. Confrontation between the Armenian authorities and the opposition intensified in June 2025, when Yerevan’s security forces arrested Galstanyan and Samvel Karapetyan, accusing them of attempting a coup and seeking to overthrow the Pashinyan government.

Despite Armenia’s effective suspension of its membership in the CSTO and efforts to foster closer ties with the European Union, until recently Yerevan continued its economic cooperation with Moscow without major difficulties. However, the situation changed in late May when Russia banned the import of a number of Armenian goods — flowers, Jermuk mineral water, wines and brandies, as well as herbs, strawberries, vegetables, and dried fruit. In addition, it was reported that Russian border guards had begun conducting strict inspections of trucks with Armenian license plates at the Upper Lars checkpoint on the Georgian border, the only overland trade route between the two countries. As a result, demand for road freight transportation from Armenia to Russia fell by 15%.

Beyond that, Moscow has threatened to terminate the 2013 bilateral agreement guaranteeing Armenia duty-free supplies of gas, oil, and diesel fuel. The final element of this campaign is the demand by Russia and other members of the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) that Armenia hold a referendum on leaving the organization, as the Kremlin continues to insist that Armenia’s path towards European integration is incompatible with EAEU membership.

Elections and sanctions

Nevertheless, Armenian experts are not rushing to conclude that economic cooperation between Yerevan and Moscow is headed for a final rupture. Political analyst Alexander Iskandaryan told The Insider that Moscow’s recent moves were part of the election struggle, while the real test in relations between the two countries will begin only after the vote:

“First, Moscow is irritated by Yerevan’s behavior. Russia is in a state of acute conflict with the West that it perceives as existential. Therefore, any interaction with Europe by countries within its sphere of interest is viewed as something unpleasant. Second, this is an attempt by the Kremlin to influence the outcome of the elections in Armenia – to change the composition of the future parliament in some way so that forces more loyal to Russia end up there.”

Iskandaryan believes that Moscow has not yet decided on its post-election policy toward Armenia and says that the process will begin only a couple of weeks after the results are announced. “In that sense, it is already more or less clear how this will unfold. Pashinyan has already announced that he will travel to Russia to meet with Putin. This by no means implies that after the elections everything will become wonderful and bacteria will disappear from vegetables. The relationship will remain problematic, but it will be a political relationship,” Iskandaryan says.

A similar opinion was expressed by political analyst David Stepanyan, a member of the “Eurovote” initiative, which collected signatures to place the law “On the Launch of the Process of Armenia’s Accession to the European Union” on the parliamentary agenda:

“In reality, everything will only begin after the elections. Pashinyan has already announced a meeting with Putin, and during that meeting the Russian president will raise the issue of who will build the new nuclear power plant. The future of the railway project will also be discussed. One should expect attempts by the Russian side to get involved in the TRIPP project [an Armenian-American strategic initiative aimed at diversifying Armenia’s logistical dependence on Russia], as well as into the process of delimitation and demarcation of the border with Azerbaijan.”

What explains the escalation?

The Kremlin’s rhetoric urging Armenia to choose between the EU and Russia is merely a pretext, experts say, given that Armenia is not making any real move toward Brussels beyond declarations of intent. As Iskandaryan noted:

“Putin understands that Armenia has no prospects of joining the European Union in the coming decades, so he is unlikely to take such statements seriously. Incidentally, this lack of seriousness is clearly demonstrated by the gap between what is being said and what is being done. Take, for example, remarks by Sergei Shoigu, in which Armenia is portrayed almost as a mortal enemy. Yet the actual measures we are seeing amount to a ban on flower imports.”

Putin understands that Armenia has no prospects of joining the European Union in the coming decades

Additionally, Stepanyan believes that rapprochement with the EU is far from the main factor irritating Moscow:

“Armenia is now actively developing relations with the United States and, more broadly, looking for ways to diversify its trade, economic, and energy ties with the outside world, including reducing dependence on Russia. All of this deeply concerns Putin. But since he cannot openly say so, he tries to explain his outrage by pointing to Armenia’s movement toward the EU, which in reality is practically nonexistent at this point.”

Stepanyan adds that, paradoxically, Moscow’s behavior is actually the main factor driving Armenia closer to the EU: “If the Kremlin continues in the same vein, it will instead contribute to accelerating Armenia’s European integration.”

Scenario of a rupture

In short, there is the very real possibility that after the elections Armenia and Russia will fail to reach a compromise. In that event, the sanctions imposed by Moscow will only intensify.

Such a development would inflict significant damage on the Armenian economy. Economist Grant Mikaelyan believes that the €50 million in aid announced by the EU to help cover the losses resulting from the import restrictions is insufficient: “Russia said the restrictions would remain in place for one month. But in reality, this EU assistance would only last for several weeks, as the volume of sales should be measured in the hundreds of millions.”

Mikaelyan was also rather skeptical about Armenia’s ability to reorient itself toward other markets: “I am convinced there will be no real access to the European market. There is the example of Georgia and its attempt to reorient toward other markets. That effort proved unsuccessful, and Georgian agriculture suffered heavily after 2006. Some degree of reorientation is certainly possible, but it will be minimal. The European market is highly competitive and heavily regulated, so I doubt it can replace post-Soviet markets.”

Stepanyan takes a more optimistic view:

“If one market closes, another opens. For some reason, everyone talks only about the European market, but there are also the markets of Arab countries. In reality, the world is large, and broadly speaking there are no major logistical problems today. The issue of subsidies at the initial stage is already being addressed. The European Commission has provided €50 million – and this is only the beginning. If Russia tries to raise gas prices, alternatives can undoubtedly be found there as well. It is a matter of time. We can receive gas from Turkmenistan, Azerbaijan, or Iran. In other words, any economic move will be met with a response, but after that Russia will lose its ability to influence Armenia. So this is a two-way street.”

Mikaelyan, however, believes that finding alternative markets for Armenian goods beyond Europe will not be so easy, and replacing Russian commodities in the energy sector could prove costly:

“The problem is that Armenian fruit is more in demand in northern countries, where it does not grow. Southern countries have their own fruit, so it is difficult to enter those markets without anything unique to offer. Of course, alternative export markets need to be found, but it is a major question whether the government will be able to handle that task. Additionally, if Russia raises gas prices, Armenia currently has no alternative sources. Most importantly, even if Armenia finds alternatives in the future, there is no guarantee they will be cheaper.”

Consequences of leaving the EAEU

In late April 2026, National Assembly speaker Alen Simonyan stated that if Russia raises gas prices, Armenia could leave the Eurasian Economic Union. He immediately added, however, that he did not think “it would come to that.”

Although prime minister Pashinyan has taken a much more cautious position in his public remarks, saying that his government is not preparing to leave the union, the issue has continued to develop. On May 29, the leaders of Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan demanded that Armenia hold a referendum in order to determine whether the populace wants to remain in the EAEU or join the European Union. In response, Pashinyan stated that Armenia would continue working within the framework of the EAEU “until the choice between the European Union and the Eurasian Economic Union becomes unavoidable.”

Commenting on the potential costs of Armenia leaving the EAEU, Mikaelyan said that “during the first years of membership in the Eurasian Union, the Armenian economy grew by as much as 10%, after which growth stopped.” He added that against the backdrop of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, “the Armenian market became more attractive to Russia in every respect, because Russian opportunities narrowed due to sanctions,” a confluence of events that added an extra 10–15% to Armenia’s GDP.  “Withdrawal would probably cost a comparable amount — around 20–25% of GDP,” Mikaelyan concluded.

Leaving the EAEU could cost Armenia an amount comparable to 20–25% of its GDP

Stepanyan, for his part, noted that since 2018 Armenia’s trade turnover with EAEU member states has increased fivefold: “At this point, there really is a genuine dependency. The question is whether it will be possible to diversify all of this, because the trade turnover is enormous. There will be problems and losses in any case – that is inevitable.”

At the same time, Stepanyan added that Russia is also interested in trade with Armenia and, in his view, this interest could actually grow in the future thanks to scientific and technological projects being implemented in Armenia.

Will economic pressure lead to a political crisis?

Mikaelyan suggests looking at the experience of neighboring Georgia. In 2006, after Mikheil Saakashvili had already set Tbilisi on a course toward integration with the West, Moscow imposed a harsh economic embargo. Mikaelyan warns that similar economic pressure could lead to a political crisis in Armenia:

“On the one hand, economic changes did not have any immediate effect on politics, but in the long term socio-economic tensions led to dissatisfaction with the government and its defeat in elections. On the other hand, given that Armenia in 2026 is more economically integrated with Russia than Georgia was in 2006, the impact of such losses could be even more substantial. After the pre-election restrictions, there were already small spontaneous protests by farmers, because it is currently peak season — trucks are being turned back, and these are perishable fruits. In other words, the damage is felt very quickly, especially since Armenian farmers do not have the profit margins that would allow them to endure a single unprofitable season. So dissatisfaction will certainly grow.”

Mikaelyan believes another important factor could also affect Armenia’s political situation: “The most acute phase of protests could begin if conditions for Armenian labor migrants in Russia deteriorate sharply.” Speaking at the Eurasian Economic Union summit in Astana, Vladimir Putin stated that if Armenia leaves the union, its labor migrants would lose all of their current privileges inside Russia. In that event, they would be required to obtain work permits under the standard procedure, while access to Russia’s compulsory health insurance system would only become available after five years of residence in the country.

Mikaelyan believes that if such measures are introduced, up to 100,000 Armenians who lose their jobs in Russia could return home: “Most likely, they would blame both Putin and Pashinyan for what is happening, but social tensions would rise regardless.”

At the same time, according to Iskandaryan, it is still far too early to speak about such a scenario: “I assume Putin is unlikely to have a positive attitude toward Pashinyan simply because, biographically, they came to power by very different paths, and that cannot appeal to Putin. Still, the Kremlin has always known how to separate things: Pashinyan is one thing, Armenia is another.”

In this sense, Iskandaryan argues, assuming that the Kremlin will immediately sever ties with Yerevan following the victory of Civil Contract is just as implausible as imagining the reverse scenario — that the country’s more pro-Kremlin opposition comes to power and immediately breaks off relations with Europe.

The Strong Armenia bloc of Russian-Armenian billionaire Samvel Karapetyan came in second with  23.3% of the vote, while the Armenia alliance of former President Robert Kocharyan gained around 10%. The question of whether businessman Gagik Tsarukyan’s Prosperous Armenia party will clear the 4% threshold necessary for securing representation in parliament will remain open until the vote recount is complete.

The remaining 14 parties and blocs failed to clear the threshold, and their votes will be redistributed among the parties that cleared the 4% barrier. As a result, Pashinyan’s Civil Contract will retain a majority in the National Assembly.

On June 8, the Armenian service of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty reported that none of the three largest opposition forces had recognized the official election results as of Monday at noon local time. The opposition pointed to numerous alleged violations during the voting and vote-counting process, as well as to the ongoing detentions of opposition supporters on charges of vote-buying.

Electoral analyst Roman Udot notes that certain anomalies working in favor of Pashinyan do exist, but they are minor. “In my personal assessment, there are distortions in favor of Pashinyan — they are not quite what we are used to seeing in Russia’s mass falsifications, but they exist in both high and low turnout areas. And instead of 49%, he should have gotten 47–48%,” wrote Udot.

Pashinyan himself declared that his party had “crushed” its main rivals, whom he once again called the “three-headed war party.” The prime minister promised to pursue criminal prosecution of their leaders.

As noted by the News.am portal, Pashinyan’s Civil Contract party gained the right to form the country’s government unilaterally. It will receive 61 seats in the new National Assembly of Armenia, while Karapetyan’s Strong Armenia bloc will receive 28 seats, Kocharyan’s Armenia will receive 11, and Tsarukyan’s Prosperous Armenia will take 5 (provided that the final results keep it above the 4% threshold).

Political scientist Ivan Preobrazhenskiy explained to The Insider that Pashinyan managed to avoid a second round in which his party would have competed one-on-one against Karapetyan’s pro-Russian party. However, Pashinyan’s party did not achieve the two-thirds majority of seats required to adopt the constitutional changes demanded by Azerbaijan as part of the settlement to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. The draft of the new constitution, prepared by the Armenian Ministry of Justice, must first be approved by the National Assembly of Armenia before being put to a referendum. As Preobrazhenskiy explained:

"Azerbaijan demands, as a condition for signing a peace treaty, that the reference to the Declaration of Independence, which mentions Nagorno-Karabakh, be removed from Armenia’s Constitution. Unless Pashinyan’s government holds a referendum and reaches an agreement with one of the three pro-Russian parties that entered parliament, it will have to continue operating under laws that were partly inherited from the 'Karabakh clan,' which attempted to usurp power.”

Political scientist Narek Sukiasyan, a research fellow at the Center for Culture and Civilization Studies, emphasized in a conversation with The Insider that delays in amending the Constitution threaten a new escalation of the conflict:

“Constitutional amendments will remain the key issue in diplomatic relations with Azerbaijan, along with the search for ways to circumvent this demand and efforts to lift the border blockade imposed by Turkey and Azerbaijan. A lengthy procedure of amending the constitution may give Baku and Ankara the desired pretext to continue stalling the process, maintain the blockade of Armenia, and keep the conflict in a state of limbo. The international community must urgently intensify its efforts to conclude a peace treaty and restore interaction among the three countries, otherwise the current peace momentum will face a serious risk."

Sukiasyan added that polarization within the new National Assembly will be just as intense as in the previous one – or even more so.

During the day on June 6, the VIIRS instrument aboard the Suomi NPP satellite detected a point with fire radiative power of 6.31 megawatts. On the morning of June 7, the Suomi NPP and NOAA-20 satellites detected several more points with fire radiative power ranging from 0.37 to 1.79 megawatts. The data confirms sources of heat radiation in the area of the site but does not make it possible to assess the size of the fire or the scale of the damage it has caused.

Open source intelligence (OSINT) researcher “blinzka” also published a Sentinel-2 image from June 6 — using false color urban mode, it shows bright thermal signatures near the Navy’s 15th Arsenal. A comparison with a Google image shows the points fall on the territory of the site along Primorskoye Highway between Bolshaya Izhora and the village of Lebyazhye. This matches NASA FIRMS data showing thermal anomalies in the area on June 6 and 7.

The Security Service of Ukraine (SBU) said, working together with Ukraine’s Defense Forces and HUR military intelligence agency, it had jointly struck the Russian Navy’s 15th Arsenal in the Leningrad Region. It also said strikes hit the Kronstadt naval base and an oil depot in Ust-Labinsk in Russia’s Krasnodar Region. According to the SBU, a fire and secondary detonations began after the attack on the 15th Arsenal warehouses. The SBU said the site stores missiles and ammunition that support Russian naval operations in the Baltic Sea.

Russian authorities officially describe the attacked site in the Lomonosov district as a “Defense Ministry facility” but have not disclosed what is located there. Leningrad Region governor Alexander Drozdenko said on June 6 that crews were still dealing with the aftermath of a fire at a Defense Ministry facility in Bolshaya Izhora after the drone attack there. He said four local residents had sought medical help: one was hospitalized, and three others, including a child, were treated at the scene.

Drozdenko also said more than 600 people were evacuated from the security zone. Of those, 390 were in temporary accommodation centers, while the rest went to relatives. Authorities said evacuees were provided with food and water, and medical workers were on duty at the shelters.

According to the Russian corporate database SPARK, JSC “15th Arsenal of the Navy” had been registered at 14 Primorskoye Highway in the village of Bolshaya Izhora, Lomonosov District, Leningrad Region. Its main listed activity involved the production of weapons and ammunition. The legal entity was liquidated on Feb. 1, 2024 after declaring bankruptcy. However, that development does not in itself mean the military site at the location ceased to exist or stopped being used. On Wikimapia, the territory is marked as the Russian Navy’s 15th Arsenal.

The Ukrainian OSINT project Oko Hora ✙ News and Analytics, citing new satellite images, said 12 hangars of various types detonated on the arsenal’s territory. A day earlier, the project reported that around 10 open and enclosed storage sites were ablaze after the attack.

On June 7, the Leningrad Region administration announced that entry into the forest belt between Bolshaya Izhora and Lebyazhye had been restricted from June 6 “until further notice.” Residents and visitors to the Lomonosov District were asked not to go beyond the barriers, to avoid walks and mushroom or berry picking, and to warn children and elderly relatives that they are forbidden from entering the area.

Demining work is also continuing near Bolshaya Izhora. Drozdenko said on June 7 that crews were working to neutralize explosive objects on a section of the 41A-007 road and the adjacent railway line between Bolshaya Izhora and Lebyazhye. He said entry to populated areas remained open, but traffic on the road would not resume until sappers finished their work.

Russian Railways said suburban trains on the Kalishche-Oranienbaum section were running on a shortened route, with buses carrying passengers traveling beyond the Oranienbaum-1 station. The Leningrad Region transport committee also changed bus routes between the settlements of Sosnovy Bor, Lebyazhye, Bolshaya Izhora, and St. Petersburg.

On June 6, Drozdenko reported that 141 drones had been shot down over the Leningrad Region. He said debris fell in the Luga, Volosovo, and Lomonosov Districts. St. Petersburg governor Alexander Beglov reported that three people were injured in the city, while Drozdenko reported four injuries in the Leningrad Region, including a child. By The Insider’s count, the June 6 attack was one of the largest on St. Petersburg and the Leningrad Region since the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine.

The trigger for the new wave of disinformation was an open letter from Zelensky to Putin published June 4.

What triggered the disinformation campaign

Almost all the new Matryoshka videos are built around the letter, portraying it either as a sign of Ukraine’s weakness or as the result of outside pressure. In one video using the logo of The Economist, the network claims Zelensky published the letter to prevent the release of evidence proving his corruption. The video includes a fabricated quote attributed to the outlet’s editor-in-chief, Zanny Minton Beddoes: “Volodymyr Zelensky is making a last-ditch attempt to prevent the publication of more than 800 files from Ukraine’s National Anti-Corruption Bureau containing evidence of his corruption offences.”

Another video, styled as a report by Spiegel TV, claims Zelensky’s letter contradicts Germany’s plans to prepare for war with Russia by 2030. The fake story claims to quote experts from the Institute for the Study of War saying that the letter was written solely to give Germany and France time to prepare for a future conflict with Russia.

Several videos try to link the letter to supposed large-scale corruption investigations into Ukraine’s leadership. A video using the USA Today logo claims the Pentagon has begun reviewing $50 billion in U.S. aid to Ukraine and suspects Ukrainian authorities of stealing the funds. It says NATO Secretary-General Mark Rutte’s visit to Kyiv was connected to the need to “devise crisis-response measures,” one of which was supposedly the fact of Zelensky’s letter.

Another group of videos focuses on alleged pressure from European countries. A video using the logo of The Wall Street Journal claims “European partners forced Volodymyr Zelensky to write an open letter to Vladimir Putin proposing peace due to the collapse of the European economy,” adding that “the European Union simply cannot afford another year of war.”

Particularly exotic versions appear in videos using the Bellingcat and Euronews logos. The first claims the letter is linked to preparations for a coup in Ukraine. The fake attributes a statement to  Bellingcat founder Eliot Higgins claiming that Ukrainian elites have been preparing for months to remove Zelensky from power. The second video falsely attributes to former Romanian Foreign Minister Oana Țoiu a statement that “if Zelensky wants peace, he should shoot himself.”

Another widespread narrative involves the idea that Ukraine is militarily weak compared with that of Russia. Videos styled as content produced by the Institute for the Study of War tell viewers that “Moscow has shown only 5% of its capabilities in Kyiv, and Volodymyr Zelensky is already writing an open letter to Vladimir Putin.” The authors also claim the letter is an attempt to buy time for France and Germany.

The posts contradict one another. One video claims Germany and France want to drag out the war as long as possible and are using Zelensky’s letter to prepare for a future confrontation with Russia. Another says Europe is so exhausted by the war and crisis that Brussels has effectively forced Zelensky to ask Putin for negotiations.

In the videos, Zelensky is variously called a “corrupt official,” a “drug addict,” and a “murderer of the Ukrainian people.”

Matryoshka is a Kremlin-linked network of bots, trolls, and coordinated anonymous media resources that specializes in mass disinformation campaigns. Its signature tools are short vertical videos made to look as if they were produced by authoritative Western media outlets, universities, government agencies, and international organizations. The videos are launched simultaneously on the social networks X (formerly Twitter), Telegram, Bluesky, and in closed group chats. The network’s preferred tactic is to seize on a real news event and build a fictional narrative around it using real names, brands, and organizations.

Georgia’s Interior Ministry reported the arrest in a public statement released on June 5, saying that officers from the Central Criminal Police Department and the Georgian Prosecutor General’s Office carried out the operation in close coordination with the FBI under a cooperation agreement between Georgian law enforcement agencies and the U.S. State Department.

“Law enforcement officers detained this individual at Tbilisi International Airport as a result of an investigation. She was wanted at the request of the U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) for various crimes, including charges of aiding and abetting criminal activity, criminal conspiracy, and money laundering. Extradition proceedings against the detainee are currently underway,” the statement read.

Lawyer Beka Nemsitveridze told TV Pirveli that the U.S. investigation involves several charges, including money laundering and taking part in criminal activity. He said the case is connected to supplies of aircraft parts to Russia.

The identity of Tatyana Kurashkevich was confirmed by Eva Merkacheva, a member of Russia’s Presidential Human Rights Council. Merkacheva said Kurashkevich is an entrepreneur, a postgraduate student at the Diplomatic Academy of the Russian Foreign Ministry’s MGIMO university, and an expert on international trade. Citing documents provided by Kurashkevich’s husband, Merkacheva wrote that the charges include “several counts, all economic, involving sanctions evasion and so on,” with prison terms listed as “three episodes of 20 years each and one of 10 years. 70 years in total.”

Merkacheva claimed that Kurashkevich’s extradition to the United States “would violate international law.”

Researchers have recorded at least 75 incidents since 2019 across a territory ranging from Iceland to Italy. In three cases, the scientists reliably identified Russian military satellites designed to give early warning of missile launches as the source of the interference. In the remaining cases, the collected data was insufficient for a definitive attribution, but the signal type was identical across all incidents. Each disruption lasted less than ten seconds and did not lead to serious consequences, as most devices normally switch to a backup signal or the last known location. Nevertheless, the interference has affected the GPS systems of the United States, China, and the European Union, while Russia’s GLONASS is unaffected.

The three satellites that the researchers identified as sources of interference belong to the EKS constellation — Russia’s early-warning system for missile launches and nuclear explosions. The first incident was recorded in October 2019, exactly one month after the launch of the first active satellite in this series.

Researchers and retired military officials warn that the very existence of such a threat ought to fundamentally change the assessment of critical infrastructure vulnerability. Dana Goward, head of the Resilient Navigation Foundation, noted that GPS is a critical tool that is used for  synchronizing power grids and cellular towers in addition to its utility in consumer applications.

Satellite jamming is not the only threat vector. As study co-author Todd Humphreys, director of the Radionavigation Laboratory at the University of Texas, told The Insider, the scale of GPS interference depends significantly on its carrier. For a source installed on an aircraft, the effective range can reach 450 kilometers, while ground-based sources can affect a radius of no more than 50 kilometers. According to Humphreys, Russia can change its strategy from month to month, targeting individual aircraft with precision before switching over to block entire sectors of airspace or create broadband interference. Attributing the source is technically possible to within approximately 100 meters and is generally carried out from space.

Lithuania's telecommunications regulator previously recorded an increase from three spoofing antennas along the border of Kaliningrad Oblast to 36. It warns that Russia is now capable of falsifying GPS signals up to 450 kilometers deep into European territory.

In recent months, the global energy transition has encountered new difficulties. After the outbreak of the war in Iran, the effective closure of the Strait of Hormuz affected the delivery of nearly one-fifth of global seaborne oil and liquefied natural gas (LNG) supplies.

Asian countries suffered the most, and to conserve fuel, governments across the continent shortened the workweek, introduced remote work policies, and temporarily shifted schools to remote learning.

In the long term, this crisis has only accelerated the transition to renewable energy. After all, solar, wind, and hydroelectric power plants do not require fuel in order to operate. In the short term, however, there is a risk that the energy transition could slow down as countries turn to coal as a temporary substitute.

The war disrupted supplies not only of fossil fuels but also of aluminum needed for solar panels. It also accelerated inflation and forced some countries to partially replace gas-fired power generation with more polluting coal-fired generation, since coal supplies generally do not pass through the Strait of Hormuz. In addition, some fossil fuel producers that do not depend on the Strait were tempted to take advantage of high prices by increasing production.

Because of the crisis in Iran, faint calls in support of coal could also be heard in Europe, although the continent has suffered far less from the current energy crisis than Asia has. For example, the Italian parliament approved postponing the country’s coal phaseout to 2038 (though coal accounts for only about 1.5% of electricity generation in the country).

German Chancellor Friedrich Merz did not rule out the possibility that some German coal-fired power plants would have to remain in operation for longer than planned but did not call into question the country’s target date of 2038 for phasing out coal entirely. Coal generation still makes up about one-fifth of electricity production in Germany.

At the global level, the statistics are far from alarming. In March and April 2026, coal-fired power generation worldwide was only 1% higher than during the same period in 2025. At the same time, wind and solar generated more electricity than gas for the first time ever. Gas-fired generation in March and April remained at the same level as during the corresponding periods last year, while wind and solar generation increased by nearly 8%.

In its report last year, the International Energy Agency (IEA) projected that coal demand would peak before the end of this decade even if current energy policies remain unchanged. Additionally, according to the agency’s estimates, demand for oil and gas could begin to decline after 2030 and 2035, respectively, if countries implement their announced energy policy measures.

So far, there appears to be little reason so far to revise these expectations. Moreover, over the past month, two significant developments have occurred that could weaken the position of fossil fuels in the medium and long term and, consequently, bring forward peak demand: the world’s first global conference on phasing out fossil fuels, held in Santa Marta, Colombia, and the adoption of a UN resolution supporting countries’ obligation to protect the environment from greenhouse gas emissions, appear to signal the the future course of global energy consumption.

What was achieved in Santa Marta

At the end of April, Santa Marta hosted the first conference on phasing out fossil fuels. Representatives from 57 countries took part. The four largest polluters — China, the United States, India, and Russia,  which together accounted for more than 53% of all global greenhouse gas emissions in 2024 — were neither invited nor present at the conference. They are also the world’s largest producers and consumers of fossil fuels.

The four largest polluters – China, the United States, India, and Russia – did not attend the conference

However, using data from the Energy Institute, it is easy to calculate the significant role that the countries represented in Santa Marta collectively play when it comes to international energy policy and global energy consumption. Together, they consume more than a quarter of the world’s oil, more than one-fifth of its gas, and nearly one-tenth of its coal. These countries also carry considerable weight in the global economy, accounting for roughly one-third of global GDP. This is not surprising given that the participants included the UK, along with some of the largest economies of the EU. Some major fossil fuel producers were also represented, including Canada, Norway, Brazil, and Nigeria.

Ending the use of coal, oil, and gas is the most important condition for overcoming the climate crisis. In 2024, the burning of fossil fuels accounted for 74.5% of global greenhouse gas emissions (excluding land use, land-use change, and forestry).

Even before the official part of the conference began in Santa Marta, around 400 scientists from around the world discussed how countries could phase out fossil fuels by supporting and retraining workers in the fossil fuel sector during the transition, banning the construction of new coal and oil-and-gas infrastructure, and ending fossil fuel subsidies. The document also proposes imposing levies on fossil fuels in order to help finance the green energy transition.

The document places major emphasis on justice. For example, it notes that local communities should be involved in planning and that countries of the Global North should compensate countries of the Global South for the damage caused by emissions in previous decades. The measures it proposes include debt relief, the expansion of international climate financing, and technology transfers.

Countries of the Global South are especially important for the transition, as they are home to 78% of the world’s fossil fuel reserves. For many of them, the extraction of coal, oil, and gas remains an extremely attractive economic prospect.

The next conference on phasing out fossil fuels will take place in Tuvalu, one of the countries most at risk of flooding before the end of this century. When Australia launched a visa program in 2025 to relocate residents of Tuvalu to Australia, more than 3,000 people applied to move within the first four days. The country’s population is only around 10,000.

Green transition in Latin America

The first countries to organize the conference on phasing out fossil fuels were Colombia and the Netherlands. Colombia ranks 13th in the world in coal production and 5th in coal exports while also producing enough oil and gas for fossil fuels to account for 35% of the country’s exports and around 10% of fiscal revenues.

Nevertheless, Colombia’s fossil fuel industry is clearly in decline. Production in the country’s main coal-producing region, La Guajira, peaked in 2012, and buyers from Chile to the EU are already moving away from the fuel. Efforts to redirect Colombian coal exports toward Asia are constrained by high transportation costs. Without the discovery of new deposits, oil production is expected to cease in roughly 30 years, while gas reserves could be depleted in as little as 6.5 years.

Hydropower forms the backbone of electricity generation in Colombia. Since the year 2000, hydroelectric plants have consistently accounted for between 50% and 80% of generation. At the same time, the share of electricity generation from solar and wind energy rose from zero to 5% in less than five years.

In general, Latin America is rarely mentioned in discussions about the future of the energy sector, yet many countries in the region are demonstrating remarkable success in the green transition. For example, a little over a decade ago, Uruguay suffered from frequent power outages and was forced to ration electricity consumption due to the country’s heavy reliance on hydroelectric power plants, which are highly dependent on El Niño – the periodic warming of surface waters in the equatorial Pacific Ocean, which brings abundant rainfall to Uruguay. In dry years, domestic generation is insufficient, while imported fuel is not always available in adequate quantities. However, this problem was resolved through the large-scale development of wind and solar generation. Today, these renewable sources account for 46% of all electricity production in the country, while the remainder comes from hydropower and biofuels.

Chile is not far behind, with solar and wind power already generating 38% of the country’s electricity. Coal mining has almost completely ceased, and many coal-fired power plants have shut down. The remaining plants are scheduled to close by 2040 under voluntary agreements between the Chilean government and plant owners.

The reason for these changes is purely economic: domestically produced coal has become too expensive, while imported Colombian coal is increasingly unable to compete on price with solar and wind. Electric transport is also expanding rapidly in the country. Nearly two-thirds of Santiago’s buses are now electric. With oil prices remaining high, as they did after the outbreak of the war in Iran, each electric bus in Santiago saves about $26,000 per year on fuel costs.

With oil prices high, each electric bus in Santiago saves about $26,000 per year on fuel costs

In the region’s larger economies, solar and wind generation also account for significant shares of electricity production — for example, 27% in Brazil and 13% in Mexico. It is worth noting that all of these countries – Chile, Uruguay, Brazil, and Mexico – took part in the conference in Santa Marta.

At the global level, however, the green transition depends less on Latin America than on developments in Asia, which has become the world’s leading region for both the production and consumption of fossil fuels. At the same time, China not only produces and consumes more coal than any other country, but also leads the world in installed renewable energy capacity, electricity generation from solar and wind power, and the manufacturing of renewable energy equipment. Until now, renewables have not fundamentally altered the structure of China’s energy system but have instead largely helped meet growing energy demand.

However, signs of coming changes are now beginning to emerge. In 2025, China and India jointly recorded a decline in coal-fired electricity generation for the first time in decades amid record growth in renewable energy capacity. At the same time, every fifth kilowatt-hour in China is already generated either by solar or wind power. For comparison, in 2010 these energy sources accounted for only 1% of electricity generation. In India, the corresponding figures are 14% and 2%, respectively.

Fighting climate change is becoming a legal obligation

On May 20, the UN General Assembly published a resolution that endorsed the advisory opinion issued by the International Court of Justice last July stating that countries have an obligation to protect the environment from greenhouse gas emissions. According to the same opinion, if countries violate these obligations, they bear legal responsibility and may be required to cease unlawful actions, provide guarantees that such violations will not recur, and pay compensation for damages.

The debate surrounding the resolution was intense. A total of 141 countries voted in favor, while 8 voted against (including the United States and Russia, which rank second and fourth in the world respectively in greenhouse gas emissions). Another 28 countries abstained, including India, which ranks third in emissions.

Of course, the opinion from the International Court of Justice is not legally binding. However, it is already being used in climate-related lawsuits around the world. The resolution also sends an additional signal: combating the climate crisis is becoming a legal obligation for countries rather than a matter of political preference.

As the Financial Times reports, the U.S. is discussing the possibility of expanding the deployment in Europe of aircraft that can carry either conventional or nuclear weapons. According to the outlet, Poland and several Baltic states have expressed interest. Lithuania’s Defense Minister Robertas Kaunas later confirmed that Vilnius is in negotiations with Washington about the possible deployment of American nuclear weapons.

Military expert David Sharp believes that in practical military terms, the possible appearance of American nuclear weapons in Lithuania would hardly make a difference. According to Sharp, the main impact of such a deployment would be the political message saying that Lithuania's security is directly linked to the United States:

“In practical terms, little changes for Russia and NATO from nuclear weapons appearing in Lithuania. The moment American nuclear weapons appear in a given country, the possibility of attacking it — whether through hybrid or non-hybrid means — becomes questionable due to the presence of U.S. nuclear weapons. Whether or not there are tactical nuclear components in Lithuania does not matter much.

Does this increase real deterrence capabilities? It is more of a political gesture. The point is that if they deploy [nuclear weapons], ‘Lithuania is out of reach because our nuclear bombs are there and we will stand up for Lithuania.’

The deployment of U.S. nuclear weapons would theoretically expand strike capabilities, but only if we are talking about a large-scale nuclear war. The United States and NATO have so many ways to wipe Russia off the map that having something closer is not particularly necessary. Taking off from Lithuanian airfields with nuclear bombs does not offer much of an advantage; the proximity to Russia even creates an inconvenience. Technically, it does not expand any particular capabilities.

All this talk is more about Lithuania’s and Poland’s desire to secure American backing — to show Russia that the Americans are very close to them, that they are now untouchable, and that if anything happens, Russia will be dealing with the Americans. This is done for the security of these countries.”

Pavel Podvig, a researcher at the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR), also says that the military rationale for American nuclear bombs in Europe is limited. According to Podvig, this practice has existed since the Cold War, but the appearance of U.S. weapons in the Baltic states or Poland would represent a new political step:

“The practice of stationing American weapons in Europe has existed since the 1950s. In the early 1990s, almost all of this weaponry was taken back to the U.S. under presidential initiatives, leaving around 200 gravity bombs — and even those were subsequently withdrawn. There are now six countries in which American nuclear weapons are stationed. For a long time, there were five, but the United Kingdom recently reclaimed these U.S. nuclear weapons. And these weapons have been in those countries since time immemorial.

So the idea is not new. What is new is that countries in Eastern and Central Europe periodically raise the question of extending this practice, volunteering to host U.S. nuclear weapons. Poland still has many enthusiasts of this idea. The Baltic states have made no explicit calls, but ideas have been expressed along the lines of ‘It would be nice.’ I have not heard of any concrete discussions; so far they all come down to expressions of readiness. I think the probability of any actual deployment in the Baltic states, Poland, and so on, is minimal. I do not think this will happen.

Even if nuclear weapons were to appear in Lithuania, it would not change NATO's military capabilities in any way. The military rationale for having all these U.S. bombs in Europe is practically non-existent. There are almost no military tasks that these bomb-equipped aircraft could perform. In this sense, the primary purpose is symbolic, as acknowledged by both the Americans and their allies. American warheads on a country's territory ostensibly place this country under greater protection. That is the main idea. It is hard to call this initiative entirely useless, because it is still nuclear weaponry and can cause damage. But in terms of actual use, it makes almost no difference whether the weapons are in Germany or in Lithuania. Perhaps the biggest difference is that in the Baltic states or Poland, these storage sites are more vulnerable to strike operations, reachable by a figurative ‘Iskander,’ unlike in Germany or Belgium.”

Podvig emphasizes that deploying dual-capable aircraft is not the same as deploying nuclear warheads themselves. Such aircraft may be certified to carry nuclear bombs, but they do not normally fly with them on board.

“Dual-capable aircraft can carry nuclear bombs, and they are certified to do so. Some aircraft cannot, simply because there is nowhere to mount the bombs, but these can. To carry a nuclear warhead, a jet needs a special wire running to the warhead and a corresponding electronic device to send commands. The presence of such components is implied by the certification.

Take an F-15 and an F-16: they are essentially the same, but one is certified and the other is not. Having the certification means having a wire and a panel on the console, which provides the only connection between the aircraft and the warhead. You can have 10,000 aircraft and 150 warheads. I remember discussions about some dual-capable aircraft flying to Estonia and causing a lot of fuss, but there was nothing on the plane except a wire and a device on the console. They never fly with warheads. In this sense, the deployment of dual-capable aircraft [without nuclear warheads] in the Baltic states or in Poland is an empty gesture. There is no practical purpose to it.”

Maxim Starchak, a researcher at the Centre for International and Defence Policy at Queen’s University (Canada), draws attention to a different risk: if American nuclear weapons were to appear closer to Russian borders, such facilities themselves could become the first targets in the event of a crisis:

“There have been no U.S. nuclear weapons under NATO arrangements in Lithuania. Should the United States deploy nuclear weapons there, it will undoubtedly be a new factor in European security. What matters is whether this would be a relocation of U.S. nuclear weapons from other European countries or an additional deployment. The latter would push Moscow even more strongly toward retaliatory measures — but not an in-kind response. What is being deployed in Belarus is Russian nuclear weaponry that was already in the European part of Russia. If the United States were to deploy new nuclear bombs, it would be a transfer from the United States to Europe, closer to Russia's borders. Meanwhile, Russia cannot move nuclear weapons closer to U.S. borders.

By contrast, a transfer from one European country to Lithuania would not significantly change the situation. On the one hand, nuclear weapons would be closer and the time available for their use could be reduced; on the other hand, such a forward deployment is risky, since in a crisis this base would be the first to come under attack. Understanding these risks, the military could operate under a ‘use it or lose it’ strategy whereby using the nuclear weapons deployed in Lithuania first would be the only way to preserve them. In other words, the risks of nuclear escalation could increase.

U.S. nuclear capabilities could increase because Lithuania is closer to Russia and Belarus, meaning that a faster nuclear strike becomes possible. However, the risks also increase. If new nuclear weapons were to be deployed in Lithuania in addition to those already stationed in Europe, U.S. capabilities would be enhanced through an increase in the number of warheads. Formally, there would probably be a small number of bombs in Lithuania. The increase would not be significant, but it would certainly inflate the potential for nuclear escalation. Russia might respond by abandoning formal compliance with New START and deciding to increase its nuclear stockpiles. Or it could carry out a demonstrative deployment of nuclear weapons in Kaliningrad, strengthen its military presence in Belarus, and so forth.”

Currently, American nuclear weapons under the nuclear sharing program are deployed in six NATO countries: Belgium, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Turkey, and the UK. As Starchak explains, these are primarily B61 gravity bombs. In peacetime they are stored separately from their delivery aircraft in specialized vaults guarded by American military personnel. For nuclear missions, the host countries are expected to use their own F-16 or F-35 aircraft, while the decision to use them remains with the United States. At the same time, according to Starchak, the “dual key” principle applies. The host country can withhold its consent to the use of the bombs stored on its territory or its own aircraft for such a mission.

“You are assigned as your place of service the Church of the Holy Apostles Peter and Paul in Santa Rosa, Brazil, as well as the Church of the Holy Apostle and Evangelist John the Theologian in Campina das Missões, Brazil, where you are to reside,” the decree stated.

Until recently, Hilarion, also known by his secular name Grigory Alfeyev, served as the head of the Russian Orthodox congregation in Karlovy Vary, a spa town in the western part of the Czech Republic that is home to a large Russian diaspora.

On May 24, police in Karlovy Vary stopped Hilarion’s car after an anonymous tip and found in the trunk four small containers holding a white substance. Hilarion and his videographer were detained and released two days later without charges. Hilarion said forensic tests confirmed the substance was a banned narcotic but maintained he had been framed.

Hilarion denied involvement in drug trafficking, called the arrest a politically motivated “setup,” and soon left for Russia, saying he feared being detained again. “The mere discovery of a prohibited substance does not answer the key question: how those items ended up in the vehicle in the first place,” he wrote on Telegram.

Late last week, Hilarion told the Russian state-controlled news agency RIA Novosti that he planned to live in Moscow for the foreseeable future.

Until June 2022, Hilarion headed the Russian Orthodox Church’s foreign relations department — effectively serving as the church’s foreign minister — and was part of Patriarch Kirill’s inner circle. He was then removed for unclear reasons, excluded from the Holy Synod, and sent to serve in Hungary. While leading the church’s Budapest and Hungary Diocese, Hilarion was accused of sexual harassment by his cell attendant, Georgy Suzuki.

Suzuki later told The Insider that Hilarion regularly met with then-Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán and lobbied for sanctions on Russia to be lifted. Hilarion denied the harassment allegations and later accused Suzuki’s mother of extortion.

Santa Rosa and Campina das Missões are small cities in Brazil’s Rio Grande do Sul state, far from the country’s main political and religious centers. For the Russian Orthodox community in South America, however, the locations have historical significance: The Church of John the Theologian in Campina das Missões was founded by emigrants from the Russian Empire and is considered the first Russian Orthodox church in Brazil. The Church of Peter and Paul in Santa Rosa appeared later, after part of the community moved to the larger neighboring city.

The trigger topics for Matryoshka were Russia’s recent ban on imports of Armenian fruits and vegetables, as well as Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan’s statement that supplies would be redirected to other countries, including many in the EU. The main narrative of the disinformation operation is that Armenia has no friends except Russia.

How Russia launched a trade blackmail campaign against Armenia

One video falsely quoting Queen Mary University of London professor Philip Cowley claims that “European leaders outmaneuvered Nikol Pashinyan brilliantly by luring him in.” The video claims the Armenian prime minister expected to receive billions of euros from the EU for visa liberalization but in fact received a “mere” 2 million.

Another fake video claims Pashinyan “literally had a meltdown” after learning the size of European funding. It cites a nonexistent comment by Timur Olevsky, the head of The Insider’s newsroom, falsely attributing to him a statement that such projects should cost at least 50 million euros.

A separate series of videos focuses on Armenian exports to Europe. One claims that France’s food authority, DGAL, found unacceptable pesticide levels in Armenian fruits and vegetables and that such products supposedly cannot be sold in any EU country.

The video about strawberries appears to be the most absurd. It claims French Foreign Minister Jean-Noël Barrot was forced to deny reports that France had purchased Armenian strawberries. The video’s authors fabricated a statement in which he allegedly says that “there are no agreements in place regarding Armenian strawberry imports to France” and accuses the Armenian authorities of spreading false information.

There is no evidence that any of these quotes, statements, or reports are authentic.

What is Matryoshka?

This is far from Matryoshka’s first attack on Armenia. As The Insider previously found, a large-scale pro-Kremlin influence campaign is unfolding ahead of the country’s parliamentary elections. In recent months, the network has spread hundreds of fake videos about Pashinyan and Armenia’s European course.

An investigation by The Insider showed that the propaganda newspaper Wyoming Star, distributed in Armenia, is backed by Alexander Ionov, a professional denunciation activist linked to the FSB. Part of the Russian information operation is coordinated by political strategist Andrei Perla of the Social Design Agency, a Kremlin contractor previously seen in disinformation campaigns in Europe, the United States, and Latin America. According to Antibot4Navalny, by early June, Matryoshka’s Armenia campaign had become the largest in the project’s history, surpassing even its operation against Moldova. 

The letter was published on the evening of June 4 on the website of the President of Ukraine. In the document, Zelensky accuses Putin of unleashing the ongoing war against Ukraine and states that Russia is suffering significant human and economic losses as a result of the conflict.

Full text of the letter

The Ukrainian president proposed transitioning to a direct negotiation format between Kyiv and Moscow by holding talks in one of the third countries that have traditionally served as venues for negotiations on issues of war and peace, including Switzerland, Turkey, and various Arab states.

Zelensky also stated that Ukraine is ready for a full ceasefire for the duration of negotiations. According to the Ukrainian president, the monitoring mission to ensure compliance with the ceasefire regime along the front line could be performed by the United States.

Further on, Zelensky proposed conducting an “all for all” prisoner exchange and taking measures to return civilians and children who were removed from occupied territories during the war.

The Ukrainian president emphasized that his country does not intend to abandon its fight for independence, but considers it necessary to seek a path toward ending the war and developing long-term security guarantees with the participation of international partners, including the United States and European countries.

In closing, Zelensky called on Putin to “stop his war” and stated that the choice of how events unfold going forward lies with the Russian president.

Putin, commenting on the letter from the Ukrainian president, said he “briefly glanced at this scrap of paper with elements of rudeness that [Kremlin spokesman] Peskov slipped to me this morning.” He stated that he sees no point in a personal meeting with the Ukrainian president at the current stage.

“I have never refused a meeting with Zelensky, but I have no desire to go around in circles,” he said. According to Putin, a summit can only be meaningful after specific agreements have been reached, whereas Kyiv, in his view, needs such a meeting primarily to halt the advance of Russian forces.

In addition, Putin again raised the question of the Ukrainian president's legitimacy, stating that Zelensky “should not be afraid to hold elections and act within the framework of the constitution.” According to Putin, remaining in the presidency without elections constitutes a “usurpation of power.” The Russian dictator did not make note of the fact that the Ukrainian constitution provides for the suspension of elections during times of martial law.

Commenting on the potential for international guarantees backing any hypothetical agreements between Russia and Ukraine, Putin stated that “guarantors never hurt,” but expressed puzzlement that Kyiv allegedly does not consider U.S. President Donald Trump to be appropriate for that role. Putin  also said that Trump “was educating Zelensky in full view of the entire world,” but added that the American president “still has work to do.”

In closing, Putin addressed Russian servicemembers with the words: “Comrade soldiers and sailors, sergeants and warrant officers, generals. The entire country is watching you and placing its hopes in you. Keep at it, brothers!”

Putin stated that Russia remains ready for peace negotiations — but insists on the so-called “Anchorage formula.” According to Putin, the compromise reached with Trump at their summit in Alaska on Aug. 15, 2025, should form the basis of any future agreements. Putin said that a ceasefire prior to negotiations is unnecessary, recalling that in 2022 the parties conducted talks in parallel with combat operations.

When an American journalist asked what matters more — the Donbas or the deal — Putin responded with a counter-question: “What makes you think these are mutually exclusive?” He urged the EU not to supply weapons to Kyiv, insisting that Europe, too, accept his purported compromise proposal. Putin also added his opinion that Ukraine's “ruling circles are not yet ready for this.”

On the question of Zelensky’s legitimacy, Putin took an evasive stance. The main thing, he said, is “to have the will.”

While Putin was speaking with journalists, Zelensky sent him an open letter proposing a personal meeting organized in line with a ceasefire and the participation of the United States and Europe in negotiations.

The Oreshnik and the course of the war

Putin “confidentially” told journalists that there had effectively been no combat use of the Oreshnik against Ukraine. The most recent launch was ostensibly carried out for training purposes in a location where “it was convenient to observe the results.” He named the targets as Bila Tserkva in the Kyiv Region and a certain fortified AFU position in the Donetsk Region. Putin did not rule out full-scale combat use of the Oreshnik, including against urban areas, emphasizing that “tests” like the one in late May are conducted specifically to assess the likely results of such a strike. The Insider has previously explained why the Oreshnik is, in fact, a low-precision weapon and cannot be used for targeted strikes.

As for the situation on the front, Putin claimed that Russia controls the entire territory of the so-called “Luhansk People’s Republic,” more than 85% of the “Donetsk People’s Republic,” and around 80% of Ukraine’s Zaporizhzhia region. He added that over the past month the Russian Armed Forces, according to his figures, have seized approximately 2,400 square kilometers. Putin stated that the Armed Forces of Ukraine are losing around 40,000 personnel per month. He described Ukraine's mobilization as “grabbing people like dogs.”

European affairs

Putin used the question of Germany's role in the negotiations to explain why Europe cannot serve as a mediator in the conflict, claiming it is allegedly directly involved in the war as a supplier of weapons to Ukraine. He called former Chancellor Gerhard Schröder “an excellent negotiator,” but complained that he is viewed in Europe as an impermissible mediator because of his ties to Russia.

As for the Nord Stream pipelines, the Russian president stated that one line of Nord Stream is intact and ready to operate at any time. “All it takes is to press a button,” he said, adding that Gazprom is ready to resume deliveries. The pipeline, according to Putin, is under sanctions, so it is necessary to negotiate with “partners” in order to reach a solution. Additionally, Putin claimed that it was Europe that had refused to purchase Russian energy, allegedly as part of a plan to effect economic collapse in Russia.

According to Putin, the reason why the Alternative for Germany has surpassed other German parties in popularity is that its leaders “can clearly articulate the interests of the German people and the German economy.” Russia, he said, welcomes all German political forces — the AfD or any other party — that wish to restore and develop relations with Moscow.

AfD politicians — most notably Bundestag member Markus Frohnmaier, the chairman of the party's branch in the state of Baden-Württemberg — are participating in the SPIEF.

Armenia, Iran, Kazakhstan

Putin presented Armenia with a choice when it comes to the EU accession process, reiterating that Armenia is still  a member of the Eurasian Economic Union, whose standards are “incompatible with European ones.” “We want the Armenian leadership to determine sooner which side it is on,” he said.

On Iran, Russia's position as voiced by Putin is “not straightforward from a political standpoint.” He described Russia as a potential mediator that is “ready to lend a hand” in resolving the conflict. Putin characterized the notion that Moscow is the main beneficiary of the war in Iran as “speculation.”

As for Kazakhstan, he said Russia shares “constructive relations” and a common history with the country, promising to continue the joint extraction of Kazakh uranium.

Economy

Putin commented on the state of the Russian economy by quoting Mark Twain: “The report of my death was an exaggeration.” He claimed that real household incomes have grown by more than 25%, real wages by a quarter, that the poverty rate has fallen to 6.7%, and that the national debt stands at 15.6% of GDP, noting that France's is over 100%. Inflation, in Putin’s telling, is returning to its target of 5.4% thanks to the central bank's tight monetary policy.

When asked about the 2030 presidential elections, Putin replied that it is “far too early” to talk about this, adding that “only God knows whether I'll have the health for it.”

Scopes made by the Czech company Meopta Optika were supplied to Russia by the Turkish firm Av Doga Av Ve Deniz Gerecleri. The buyer was the Russian intermediary company Alliance LLC (ООО «Альянс»), a longtime supplier to the Federal Penitentiary Service (FSIN). Alliance has appeared several times in The Insider’s investigations. After the start of the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the company imported 2,000 Czech Česká Zbrojovka hunting rifles and over 100 Austrian Glock pistols into Russia.

Similar products made by Germany’s Kilic Feintechnik GmbH and Croatia’s Rusan-Mikron were purchased by Nord LLC (ООО «Норд»), a reseller that has long supplied the Federal Security Service (FSB). The Turkish exporter in that case was listed as Algo Lojistik Limited Sirketi.

Micrometers, outside calipers, and vernier calipers made by the U.S. company Fowler were shipped through Turkey to the Alabuga special economic zone, where the Shahed drones Russia uses to attack Ukraine almost daily are produced. 

Other critical equipment that entered Russia through Turkey included high-precision oscilloscopes, crosstalk meters, and absorbed-power sensors made by Germany’s Rohde & Schwarz GmbH & Co. KG and the U.S. companies Keysight Technologies and Ametek Advanced Measurement Technology. The equipment is used to develop and tune electronic warfare systems.

Rangefinders made by well-known European optical equipment manufacturers also entered Russia from Turkey. The list of companies included Germany’s Lase Industrielle Lasertechnik GmbH and Zoller+Frohlich GmbH, Switzerland’s Leica Geosystems AG, the U.S.-Japanese company Omron Automotive Electronics Co. Ltd., and Canada’s Hermary Opto Electronics Inc. Rangefinders are indispensable on the front line, where they are used to measure distance to a target. In this case, however, the shipments involved higher level technologies of the sort that are used by weapons factories to measure products, calibrate equipment, and control the quality of manufactured parts.

Machine tools, welding machines, and other metalworking equipment sought by military plants are also supplied to Russia through Turkey. They include German welding units, computerized automatic metal machining centers, and a laser system made by LAP GmbH Laser Applikationen for high-speed, high-precision cutting, welding, cladding, and heat-treatment systems.

Equipment for microchip production reaches Russia by the same route. A German backscattered electron diffraction analyzer made by Staib Instrumente GmbH is designed for vacuum installations that apply coatings through layer-by-layer deposition, which is essential in microchip manufacturing. The Italian company Seica S.p.A. is a world-renowned maker of printed circuit board testing equipment. Its products are used, for example, to produce the electronics inside ballistic missiles.

Another type of equipment imported into Russia through Turkey is not directly linked to the military-industrial complex but is in high demand among fuel exporters: flow meters and level sensors that allow operators to determine with high precision how full a tanker or oil reservoir is. They are produced by prominent Western companies including Endress+Hauser, Krohne Ltd., Pietro Fiorentini S.p.A., Dinel s.r.o., and Heinrichs Kobold Group.

The article of Russia’s Criminal Code under which Sosonkin is being prosecuted has not been publicly disclosed, and the court’s press service has declined to clarify the charge. Sosonkin’s phone is unavailable, his wife has deleted her social media accounts, and she did not respond to Mediazona’s question about her husband’s arrest.

Sosonkin appeared in The Insider’s investigation into how Russia’s GRU military intelligence agency and the Federal Security Service (FSB) have used private companies in their overseas work. One of these entities was the Yekaterinburg-based Bureau Legint, which had an annual budget of 100 million rubles ($1.36 million) and was founded by Viktor Boyarkin, a former GRU naval intelligence officer, together with his wife. Sosonkin was listed on the company’s website as its “director of international relations.”

Data obtained by The Insider also showed that Sosonkin served as executive director of the Business Advisory Council on Libya, an entity that a source described as having been created “at the FSB’s insistent request” due to the fact that the agency urgently needed to expand its resident network in the Middle East as a counterweight to Turkish intelligence.

Bureau Legint was involved in projects in Cuba and Mexico, while its affiliated organization — the Association for Economic Cooperation with African States (AECAS) — operated in Madagascar, Congo, Senegal, and Mali. In Africa, the groups held propaganda events, including with Wagner Group mercenaries and the Russkiy Mir Foundation, a Kremlin-backed organization used to promote Russian language, culture, and influence abroad.

The phone number listed on Bureau Legint’s website is registered to Anastasia Samarkina, a relative of Boyarkin’s wife. A woman who answered the number when contacted by Mediazona said the journalist had the wrong number.

Sosonkin’s place of service is Military Unit 26047. It belongs to the FSB’s Fifth Service, which oversees “international cooperation.”

Ukraine had sought the vessel’s arrest and transfer as part of an international legal assistance request. Ukrainian investigators say the Caffa was involved in the illegal export of products from Russian-occupied territories. The ship’s captain and almost the entire crew were Russian citizens.

Ukrainian Prosecutor General Ruslan Kravchenko said it was the first case in which a foreign court approved the arrest of a vessel linked to the export of Ukrainian goods from Russian-occupied territory at the request of Ukrainian prosecutors. Kravchenko said the Prosecutor General’s Office contacted Sweden’s Justice Ministry on March 12, asking the authorities to search the vessel, question its captain and crew, and seize the Caffa.

Swedish Justice Minister Gunnar Strömmer, commenting on the ruling, linked the Caffa case to broader efforts aimed at countering Russia’s “shadow fleet.”

“It is clear that measures against the Russian shadow fleet are important for Sweden and for all countries around the Baltic Sea,” he told Trelleborgs Allehanda.

The Caffa was detained on March 6 off Sweden’s southern coast near Trelleborg. The vessel was traveling from Casablanca to St. Petersburg and was transmitting a Guinea flag through AIS, the Automatic Identification System used by ships to broadcast their identity and location. Swedish authorities, however, described the vessel as stateless, meaning it was operating under a false flag. In the Equasis shipping database, the Caffa’s flag was listed as “Guinea False.” Until June 2025, the cargo ship had sailed under the Russian flag.

After the ship was detained, the Caffa’s captain, a Russian citizen, was arrested on suspicion of using forged maritime certificates. He was released in April after arguing that he did not know the documents were fake, a claim investigators could not disprove. The Russian Embassy in Sweden previously said 10 of the Caffa’s 11 crew members were Russian citizens. In May, TV4 reported that the crew had been taken out of Sweden, while the ship remained “empty and locked” in the port of Trelleborg pending a decision on its transfer to Ukraine.

The Caffa has been designated on Ukraine’s sanctions list since November 2025. Ukrainian authorities link the vessel to the transport of grain from occupied Sevastopol in Crimea to the Syrian port of Tartus in summer 2025. Kravchenko said investigators believe a false registration scheme was used to conceal the activity. 

The concept of “triangular diplomacy” was first put forward by Henry Kissinger during the Cold War as a way to exploit weaknesses in the relationship between China and the Soviet Union. In that framework, Washington balanced Beijing against Moscow and Moscow against Beijing in an effort to create a more predictable and balanced strategic order. The United States sat at the top of the inverted triangle, while the other two powers were often compelled to cooperate with America, even if they did not exactly compete for Washington’s favor.

Over the past week, that geometry appeared to have been turned upside down. Donald Trump and Vladimir Putin are, in effect, adversaries. They boast of close relations and mutual understanding, yet they are involved in conflicts across several theaters, from Ukraine to Iran. Nevertheless, both leaders felt compelled to make a “pilgrimage” to Beijing, creating a striking image for Chinese newspapers: the Middle Kingdom was becoming truly central, the site where superpower diplomacy takes place and the fate of nations is decided.

Donald Trump and Vladimir Putin both felt compelled to make a “pilgrimage” to Beijing

The timing of the meetings, one after the other, looked symbolic and raised suspicions that Xi Jinping might have managed to arrange some kind of behind-the-scenes deals among the powers.

Of course, the symbolism should not be overstated, no matter how elegant it may appear. Trump’s visit had been postponed from late March because of the war in Iran, while Putin’s visit had been planned in advance to mark the 25th anniversary of the signing of the Treaty of Good-Neighborliness between Moscow and Beijing.

Two summits, no news

Xi treated his guests differently, but the results of the two meetings were broadly comparable.

With Trump, Xi was formal, distant, and generally restrained. He gave the U.S. president a lavish reception replete with a red carpet, honor guard, and choir, even showing Trump around Zhongnanhai, the seat of power for the Chinese Communist Party. During the walk, Trump asked the general secretary how often foreign leaders visited the compound. Xi replied: “Very rarely. For example, Putin has been here.” The remark seemed intended to remind his guest that Xi’s relationship with the Russian leader is much closer and more trusted than his ties to Washington.

The summit’s outcome was even colder. The two sides did not quarrel, but they did not reach any substantive agreement. Each side issued its own account, and the two versions of events differed completely. The U.S. summary emphasized trade councils, commitments on rare earth elements, and “discussions” of the Strait of Hormuz. The Chinese side did not mention those issues, instead focusing on Taiwan and efforts to achieve “constructive strategic stability.”

Trump left Beijing without even holding a news conference, ignoring reporters’ questions during his final press appearance.

Beijing also nearly came away with nothing, but it got lucky. After the visit, Trump openly “warned” Taiwan not to seek independence and said he could ultimately decide not to sell weapons to Taiwan. Although there is no indication of any concrete change in U.S. policy, Trump’s statement could be seen as a concession to China.

Putin’s visit, at first glance, carried a different energy. Putin and Xi exchanged warm words and pledges of friendship several times and signed a joint declaration in which Xi again carefully criticized the United States as a “tide of unilateral hegemony.”

The two leaders also signed 20 minor agreements covering cooperation in education, trade, and the extension of visa-free travel for Russians in China. It must be stressed that most  of those documents are relatively insignificant and appear to have been signed mainly as part of an effort to give the summit weight.

Critically, the most important deal for the Russian president, Power of Siberia 2, was not reached. The pipeline would significantly expand Russian gas exports to China, and the two sides said they had reached a “general understanding of the parameters,” with Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov adding that there had been “progress.”

That “progress,” however, has been stuck in the same place for more than a decade. Promises from Chinese diplomats of “more detailed studies and analysis” often amount to a polite “no thanks, not interested for now.”

That is hardly surprising. Putin arrived in Beijing perhaps weaker than ever. For the first time since August 2024, Russia lost more territory in Ukraine than it captured, and sources connected to the U.S. president’s visit to Beijing said Xi allegedly told Trump that Putin “may yet regret starting this war.” Both the U.S. and Chinese sides denied that, of course, but the account may not be far from the truth. Support ratings for the Russian president at home continue to fall, while the state is introducing increasingly unpopular censorship measures.

Xi allegedly told Trump that Putin “may yet regret starting this war”

Beijing is also not especially interested in more raw materials from Russia. China already buys cheap Russian oil and gas and has become their largest importer, but the leadership in Beijing is seriously focused on diversifying its energy infrastructure and continues to invest heavily in alternative and green energy sources. The “green transition” is described in China’s latest five-year plan. In addition, for reasons of strategic security, Beijing prefers not to become overly dependent on any one supplier. Power of Siberia 2 does not fit very well into that policy.

Deals reached, not reached, and imagined

As usual, the most intriguing rumors around the Beijing summits concerned the possibility that this three-way diplomatic dance might ultimately lead to major deals on today’s biggest crises: Ukraine and Iran. For example, might the United States compromise on Taiwan in exchange for Chinese pressure on Russia to begin negotiations over Ukraine? Or could China help secure a cease-fire in Iran in exchange for some easing of U.S. technology restrictions?

None of the participants announced any concrete large-scale deals, let alone signed them publicly, but there has still been plenty of speculation of varying plausibility. Some sources familiar with the contents of Russia-U.S. talks said Putin had allegedly proposed to Trump that Russia stop providing Iran with intelligence in exchange for similar steps by the United States toward Ukraine, a question that was actively discussed in March. At the time, Putin’s special envoy Kirill Dmitriev called the report false, but in May, it could have become an element in one of those behind-the-scenes deals.

Beijing was not directly mentioned in those rumors, but Chinese companies often become the main sources of satellite data that reaches Iran. That means Beijing would have to be included in any such arrangement, even if only informally.

Putin allegedly proposed to Trump that Russia stop providing Iran with intelligence in exchange for similar steps by the United States toward Ukraine

Xi, in turn, would also benefit from such a “deal” by strengthening his image as the world’s chief diplomat and mediator. China also supports Iran, but repeated fuel supply disruptions caused by the closure of the Strait of Hormuz have created significant problems for Beijing.

Another potential diplomatic maneuver that observers actively speculated about was a softening of U.S. policy toward Taiwan in exchange for some service from Beijing, whether mediation to open the Strait of Hormuz or concessions in the trade war.

China is indeed concerned about another pending U.S. arms shipment to Taiwan, and that is likely to become a key issue during Xi’s visit to the United States this fall. In this case, however, it is difficult to present the deal as mutually beneficial to the entire “triangle.” Weapons not sent to Taiwan could sooner or later end up in Ukraine, creating a major risk for Russia and weakening Iran, one of Moscow’s main military suppliers in recent years.

For now at least, it appears that no one has signed on to any mysterious plans — and apparently will not in the foreseeable future. That is not surprising given that the three sides have almost no points of overlap that could form the basis for reliable agreements.

On Ukraine, Xi most likely has neither the leverage to quickly and significantly push Putin toward negotiations nor a reason to do so even if he could. Beijing may, of course, be concerned about the war’s effects on the global economy and the risk of secondary sanctions, but it continues to benefit from extremely cheap Russian energy, expects to profit from postwar reconstruction contracts, and is understandably drawing lessons from the war itself.

On Iran, Trump said directly during his return flight that he did not “need Xi’s services” and did not actually expect help from China — completely contradicting his earlier remarks and later statements. Just a day later, the U.S. president said Xi was, in fact, ready and even happy to help.

Russia, as the third party, is not especially interested in ending the war in Iran. The closure of the Strait of Hormuz has raised the price of Russian oil, strengthened the ruble, and distracted the unpredictable Trump from a possible decision to resume support for Ukraine.

In the end, the meetings in Beijing were not about grand behind-the-scenes deals but rather highlighted just how fragile any mutual understanding among the three powers really is. Unfortunately, life as part of the triangle comes down to accepting mutual grievances and contradictions that none of the three leaders currently plans to resolve. Each side received enough — stability, image enhancement, and continuity — to maintain relations without settling any of the larger problems.

Just watching

At the same time, China still believes that the best — and least risky — diplomatic position is often simply to be the player with whom others are forced to talk, while taking on no irreversible obligations itself.

This is not quite the same as Kissinger’s triangle, in which one power actively plays between two rival countries. China’s position is far more passive and perhaps even more sustainable in the short term. The problem is precisely that it is focused on the short term: elegant visits and the image of the world’s main political capital cannot resolve the real contradictions and problems in these relationships, which sooner or later will make themselves felt for China, the United States, and Russia alike.

Musallam is a 32-year-old doctor living in western Nuseirat, near the Mediterranean Sea. His house survived the war. “I’m one of the few lucky ones. There were airstrikes in western Nuseirat, but no ground invasion. In that sense I was fortunate. If the war had continued, we would have ended up in a very bad situation.” According to Musallam, unlike in Israel, Gaza has neither bomb shelters nor warning systems.

Trump’s plan and its failure

The war in Gaza began after Hamas attacked Israel on October 7, 2023, in what was the deadliest massacre of civilians in Israel’s history. The terrorists killed more than 1,200 people and took approximately 250 hostages. In response to the attack, Israel declared war on Hamas, and tens of thousands of people were killed in the resulting conflict. A ceasefire agreement between Israel and the Palestinian terrorist group Hamas only came into effect in the Gaza Strip this past October.

Under the terms of the agreement, Israel withdrew its troops from roughly half of the areas where fighting had taken place and released around two thousand Palestinian prisoners. Hamas, for its part, handed over the last surviving hostages, along with the bodies of those who had died.

In November, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 2803, approving U.S. President Donald Trump’s peace plan for Gaza. It provides for the reconstruction of the enclave, the disarmament and removal from power of Hamas, the deployment of international stabilization forces, and the creation of a temporary Palestinian administration under the supervision of a special body: the “Peace Council,” to be headed by Trump himself.

A formal “truce” with periodic violations is currently in effect in Gaza, and the Strip is divided by the so-called Yellow Line — the boundary between the area under Israel Defense Forces (IDF) control in the east and the area controlled by Hamas in the west. No Palestinians live in the “yellow” zone.

Implementation of the peace plan stalled after Hamas refused to lay down its arms. The group said it would disarm only after the Israeli army withdrew from the enclave and on the condition that the plan promised to lead to the creation of a Palestinian state.

According to Israeli military expert David Sharp, there are currently no international stabilization forces inside Gaza, nor is there a temporary Palestinian administration as envisioned under Trump’s plan. Civilian administration remains in the hands of Hamas.

The Yellow Line: what the IDF is doing in Gaza

As Sharp notes, by the end of May the IDF controlled just over 60% of Gaza, and the Israeli army had advanced roughly 10% deeper into the enclave since the start of the ceasefire, destroying tunnels, weapons depots, and potentially dangerous buildings in the territory it controls while also eliminating Hamas militants and carrying out limited strikes on the group’s military infrastructure in other parts of Gaza.

Sharp emphasizes that in the “yellow” zone, the Israeli army demolishes only buildings designated as part of the terror group’s infrastructure. “AMAN [Israel’s Military Intelligence Directorate] and Shin Bet [Israel Security Agency] gather intelligence very carefully – evidence is required before a building can be demolished,” he explains. According to Sharp, such measures are necessary in order to prevent militants from resuming any activity in this part of the enclave after the IDF withdraws.

Local residents say the intensity of the fighting has declined significantly since the ceasefire, although they still occasionally hear gunfire, artillery fire, and airstrikes. Interviewees confirmed that such incidents occur, even if they are isolated. They target specific groups of people, police stations, and police officers themselves.

Under such conditions, residents do not feel safe. The tension is constant, and the danger remains that full-scale fighting could resume.

Life in tents and among the ruins

On May 21, the Peace Council’s chief representative — Nikolay Mladenov, who is respected by both the Israeli and Palestinian sides — said in a report to the UN Security Council that around 80% of buildings in the enclave had been damaged or destroyed and that upwards of 70 million tons of rubble were scattered across the territory. According to his estimates, more than a million people are living in tents or partially destroyed buildings.

The Insider’s interviewees speak of displaced residents in western Khan Younis and central Gaza living in small tents, schools, and partially destroyed homes, with a lucky few moving in with relatives whose homes remain intact. They say conditions for refugees remain extremely harsh: people suffer from overcrowding and exposure to the elements, lack of privacy, mice and insects, as well as problems accessing electricity, water, and medical care.

Shahad, a 30-year-old resident of Gaza City who lost both her home and her handmade accessories business during the war, says destroyed homes are not being rebuilt. “Some families try to carry out temporary repairs, but there is a shortage of construction materials, and restrictions on their import make reconstruction almost impossible,” she explains. Restrictions on imports of certain materials were introduced to prevent Hamas from building new tunnels, but in practice they have also made civilian construction impossible.

In addition to residential buildings, civilian infrastructure across the enclave has also suffered: “for example, Al-Shifa Hospital in Gaza City and the hospital in Khan Younis,” Musallam says. “Some facilities were completely destroyed because airstrikes hit the buildings directly, while others are inaccessible because the area is under the control of the Israeli army.”

Access to food, water, medicine, and the internet

After the October 7, 2023 attack, Israel tightened its control over access to the Gaza Strip, and in March 2025 it completely halted humanitarian aid deliveries before later resuming them under the supervision of new operators. Israeli authorities now say that Gaza is not facing a shortage of humanitarian assistance. In his March 21 report to the UN Security Council, Peace Council representative Nikolay Mladenov said that the number of Palestinians receiving humanitarian aid had risen from 400,000 to 2 million.

At the same time, according to residents interviewed, the enclave continues to face shortages of basic food products and medicines. “Food aid is distributed by UNRWA and charitable organizations. However, the available volumes are insufficient to meet needs consistently,” Shahad says. Musallam adds that the hospital where he works currently has only two of the eight vital medications needed for epilepsy patients, while medicines for cancer patients and people with various chronic illnesses are also in short supply.

Local residents say prices for basic food products have risen sharply in recent months. According to Naji, a 38-year-old industrial engineer, a new class of traders profiting from shortages has emerged in Gaza since the start of the ceasefire. “They wait for any border closure in order to raise prices many times over. Only the wealthy segment of society benefits,” the engineer claims.

Humanitarian organizations deliver water to camps for displaced people – around 20 liters per family. “People are constantly waiting for these trucks. But the water is not always clean: sometimes there is sand or insects in it,” Musallam says.

“There are only the very rich and the very poor in Gaza”

According to Peace Council chief representative Mladenov, around 80% of Gaza’s working-age residents remain unemployed. Locals interviewed by The Insider say economic life in the enclave has yet to recover after the ceasefire. Many businesses have been destroyed, commerce functions only partially, a significant share of residents depend on humanitarian aid, and prices remain high.

Musallam says that only a small number of people are currently able to work – mainly doctors, nurses, and employees of humanitarian organizations. Naji describes a situation in which there are “two layers” in the social structure of the enclave: the very rich and the very poor. He places traders, NGO employees, and people who managed to raise money through private GoFundMe campaigns in the first category. The second consists of people with no income whatsoever — these are “simply waiting for their turn to receive a food package, water, or cash assistance.”

The education system is functioning only partially. Shahad says many schools have either been destroyed or are being used as shelters for displaced families. According to her, some educational institutions are trying to continue operating, but access to their services remains limited. Naji says small private schools and improvised educational centers have appeared in refugee camps, but most people cannot afford to send their children there.

“Many are looking for ways to leave”

Despite the ceasefire, it remains extremely difficult to leave the Gaza Strip. All three interviewees spoke of strict restrictions on departures.

According to Musallam, only a very small number of people have managed to leave through the Rafah crossing on the border with Egypt. Most of them were patients who had long been waiting for permission to evacuate.

“For example, my sister is engaged to an Egyptian man who is currently in Saudi Arabia, and after the ceasefire we tried very hard to find a way for her to leave Gaza and reunite with her husband. We failed,” he says.

Naji says that among those who managed to leave the enclave, some eventually returned, although there are not many of them. “Very, very, very many people are looking for opportunities to leave. Those who return are people who could not find work, housing, or support outside the enclave.”

Frustration and no future

Local residents describe the mood in Gaza as one of exhaustion, frustration, depression, anxiety, and disappointment. “We were constantly promised that infrastructure reconstruction would begin soon and that new funding for Palestinians would be unlocked, but we have seen nothing of the sort,” Musallam sighs. Shahad says that for now residents are not dreaming of anything more than simply returning to the situation that existed before October 7. “At least back then we had a life,” she says with a shrug.

Musallam holds a similar view, stressing that very few residents support war with Israel. “Most people simply want to live their lives. They want political and economic independence. These conflicts and wars do not benefit anyone,” he concludes.

Inequality in Russia has been rising for a third consecutive year. In 2025, the incomes of the richest 10% exceeded those of the poorest 10% by nearly 17 times. Meanwhile, the main indicator – the Gini coefficient – reached 0.422, pointing to deep social stratification.

Rosstat did not publish this result immediately. In March, it removed the Gini index from its annual report without explanation. Then, a month later, it announced a new methodology while releasing both indicators at once. The new figure turned out to be much lower – 0.375 – and, incidentally, almost exactly at the target that a decree issued by Vladimir Putin in 2024 had set for 2030 (0.37).

Until now, Rosstat had calculated the Gini coefficient using the classical methodology employed worldwide. The principle is simple: the pre-tax incomes of all citizens are taken into account, people are ranked from the poorest to the richest, and the degree of income inequality is then calculated mathematically. This method does not consider how much tax a person actually paid – even though the wealthy in Russia now pay more even in percentage terms – nor does it account for the fact that the same amount of money can buy more in one region than in another.

Under the Kremlin’s new version, on the other hand, taxes are taken into account. Instead of gross income, the calculation uses the amount remaining after taxes, pensions, and social benefits are taken into account. Since Russia introduced a progressive tax system in 2025 and low-income groups receive various deductions, the gap narrows mathematically.

Regional prices have also been added to the calculation, meaning that the purchasing power differences between, for example, Moscow and Lipetsk, are factored in. In short, incomes in wealthier regions are “brought closer” to the average.

The result is a gap of 0.047 points between the two methodologies for the same year. Under the classical methodology, the coefficient increased by 0.012 points between 2024 and 2025. However, the new calculation method made it possible to “improve” the indicator by an amount that would have taken upwards of four years to achieve via actual efforts to decrease the level of inequality nationwide.

Rosstat has not abandoned the classical calculation, and it continues to publish both figures. The question is which number will be used in official reports and in assessing the implementation of the May Decrees.

The origins of the new methodology can be found at Moscow’s Higher School of Economics. In April, its experts presented their calculation method in a report titled “Regional Estimates of Income Inequality Based on Tax Statistics and Microdata from Income Surveys.” They proposed combining Rosstat’s sample survey data with regional Federal Tax Service data on income from employment, self-employment, and property.

As expected, the new formula produced a lower result: in 2023, according to HSE calculations, the Gini coefficient stood at 0.38, whereas Rosstat’s official figure under the classical Gini methodology was 0.405. Of course, the internationally recognized Gini coefficient has a strict calculation algorithm, and by altering it, Rosstat is effectively producing a different indicator.

The Gini coefficient has a strict calculation algorithm, and by changing it, Rosstat is effectively producing a different indicator

Why does this matter? Putin’s May 2024 decree explicitly sets a goal of reducing the Gini coefficient to 0.37 by 2030. Under the classical calculation, that goal appears unattainable, as the index for Russia is not only high, but has been rising since 2023.

The new methodology solves the problem elegantly: without changing reality, the authorities can change the measuring stick. Under the revised data, the figure of 0.375 is already almost at the target level of 0.37. The task is practically achieved.

By contrast, under the classical methodology, the coefficient rose from 0.405 to 0.422 over the past three years. If that trend continues, it would reach 0.458 by 2030 – far above the target.

Why the new methodology does not reflect reality

As with poverty statistics, changing the methodology for calculating the Gini index makes it possible to show “improvement” without any real change in citizens’ wellbeing. At first glance, taking taxes and regional prices into account may seem like a step forward, but the wealthy earn many times more than the poor do before taxes, and no progressive tax scale, however steep, can eliminate that gap.

According to Rosstat’s own data, the average monthly income of the richest 10% of Russians in the fourth quarter of 2025 was 289,800 rubles. The average income of the poorest 10% was 16,700 rubles — a 17-fold difference. After taxes are paid and transfers are received, the gap narrows, but it still remains enormous.

Changing the methodology for calculating the Gini index makes it possible to show “improvement” without any real changes in citizens’ incomes

Taking into account regional prices is also a questionable innovation. The prices of bread, milk, and medicines do not differ across most regions as dramatically as the adjustment implies. More importantly, poor people already live in low-income regions, and taking regional prices into account does not increase their purchasing power. The formula that “the same amount of money buys more in a village than in Moscow” works only for those who actually have the money to spend on luxuries. Poor people simply do not, meaning that in all regions they can afford roughly the same minimal basket of goods and services.

Again, the methodology has changed, but people have not become richer. If someone earned 20,000 rubles a month before, they still earn 20,000 after the new calculation was introduced. Neither the tax reform nor the “regional coefficient” has put additional money in their pocket.

Thus, the new methodology is not an “improvement in statistics” but a change in the measuring instrument itself, one that makes it possible to present target indicators without altering the real state of affairs. This is exactly the same logic that was applied to the “poverty line” in 2021: change the definition and the desired result appears.

Contrary to official claims that inequality is declining, an analysis of Rosstat data shows the opposite. In 2025, wealthy Russians were getting richer much faster than the poor, and the gap between them continued to widen.

If one looks at the distribution of all monetary income in the country, it becomes clear that income is shifting toward the wealthy. In 2025, the richest 10% of Russians accounted for 30.8% of all income, up from 30.3% a year earlier. At the same time, the share received by the poorest 10% remained unchanged at just 1.9%.

Experts point to two main reasons for the accelerating stratification. The first factor is high interest rates. The Central Bank’s tight monetary policy has boosted income from bank deposits and financial assets, benefiting primarily those who already have savings – that is, more affluent citizens. Second, wage growth has been uneven across sectors, and salaries in high-paying industries are rising faster than those in the public sector, where many of Russia’s poorest work.

How else can inequality be measured?

The income-based Gini index is not the only way to measure inequality. There is also consumption data, which measures how much money different population groups actually spend. These figures show lower levels of inequality. According to a Bank of Russia survey conducted in 2024 – the most recent study it published – median monthly spending per person among the poorest 10% of households amounted to 13,094 rubles, compared with 52,633 rubles among the wealthiest 10% — a fourfold gap. In terms of income, the gap for the same groups is sixfold.

The difference is easy enough to explain: wealthy people save a significant share of their income. In 2024, only one in four households in the poorest group had savings; in the middle-income group, every second household did; and among the wealthiest 10%, three out of four households had savings. This means that three-quarters of the poorest households live without any financial cushion – any unexpected expense, illness, or job loss immediately becomes a crisis. The smaller gap in consumption is not evidence of lower inequality, but evidence that the rich have choices while the poor do not.

This reality is visible in the structure of spending itself. In the bottom six income groups, spending on food and utilities exceeds all other categories. Only in the group comprising the wealthiest 10% of households does spending on other services and non-food goods increase substantially. In other words, for six out of ten income groups, household budgets are structured in much the same way: food and utilities are the main expenses, leaving little for anything else. Only the wealthiest spend heavily on transportation, leisure, restaurants, and services.

Moreover, in the third year of the war, the poorest households began spending an even larger share of their budgets on essentials. Rosstat data show the same pattern, although using older figures: the poorest 10% spend 47.8% of all expenditures on food and another 13.9% on housing and utilities. In absolute terms, the wealthy spend 42 times more on transportation than the poor, 30 times more on leisure activities, but only three times more on food.

There is also a third dimension that is entirely absent from official Russian statistics: disparities in real estate holdings, bank deposits, and stocks. The Gini coefficient for income and consumption captures current cash flows, but not accumulated wealth. Yet assets are what determine long-term opportunities — who can afford to educate their children, who can withstand a period of unemployment, who will leave an inheritance.

According to Central Bank data for 2024, among the least affluent households median financial assets amounted to 7,000 rubles, while among the wealthiest 10% they reached 100,000 rubles — and this covers only bank accounts and deposits, without factoring in real estate and without including the super-rich, who generally do not appear in such surveys.

According to the UBS Global Wealth Report 2025, Russia and Brazil ranked first in the world for wealth inequality with a Gini coefficient for assets of 0.82 – approaching the value of 1 that represents “absolute inequality.”

How the war affects inequality

Contract servicemen receive at least 200,000 rubles a month, pushing wage benchmarks upward across the labor market. As noted by Dmitry Belousov, head of the Center for Macroeconomic Analysis and Short-Term Forecasting, “there is no doubt that after the end of the special military operation this factor will persist: military personnel and employees of the defense industry who were earning 200,000 rubles a month or more simply will not return to their previous jobs paying 50,000–60,000 rubles a month and will obviously look for work corresponding to their new social status.” Employers are already being forced to raise wages in order to retain employees who might otherwise leave for jobs at military-industrial enterprises.

Military personnel earning 200,000 rubles a month or more will not return to their “old” jobs paying 50,000–60,000 rubles a month

However, wage growth driven by non-market mechanisms comes without gains in labor productivity and increases pressure on the economy in the form of inflation. Moreover, military payments are received only by those willing to fight. Pensioners, public-sector employees, and mothers with children must all get by on their previous incomes. More importantly, where will these “veterans” go after the war ends? Most likely into the same security structures or the defense industry, rather than into education or agriculture, where wages are unlikely to rise substantially.

What does this mean for inequality? It creates an additional driver widening the gap between those benefiting from the war economy and those far removed from it. Rosstat’s new methodology, which takes the progressive tax into account – a tax that was itself introduced in 2025 in order to help fund the war – masks this growing stratification.

“It feels like serfdom”

What do Russians themselves think about the dynamics of inequality? The answer depends on who is asking the question and how it is phrased. Official polls conducted by FOM, frequently cited by state media, paint a fairly optimistic picture.

According to a survey conducted in July 2025, 87% of Russians believe the income gap between rich and the poor is large, down from 94% in 2019. Back then, 78% of respondents were convinced that the gap was widening, but by 2025 that share had fallen to 64%. At first glance, Russians themselves seem to feel that income inequality in society is gradually declining.

However, studies by independent organizations paint a much more alarming picture. For example, a survey conducted in June 2024 by the Platform Social Design Center and OnIn research group (sample size: 1,200 people) show that 53% of Russians believe social inequality in the country has increased significantly over the past five years, while only 13% said they had noticed a decline. Moreover, 37% of respondents believe the highest level of inequality in the country’s history exists in the current decade. This figure even exceeds how Russians assess social inequality during serfdom in imperial Russia in the 18th and 19th centuries (33%) and during the turbulent 1990s (23%).

The Platform study made it possible not only to measure the level of inequality, but also to understand its nature. The main cause of social stratification, according to 76% of respondents, is the inheritance of social status and privileges from generation to generation. This suggests that society views social mobility as broken and wealth not as the result of personal effort, but as an unearned advantage acquired by birth. Additionally, 57% of citizens consider the very existence of social inequality to be abnormal and something that must be fought against. Only 38% regard it as an unavoidable fact of life.

Notably, just 17% of respondents expect inequality to decline in the coming years. They believe this could be achieved through social programs, indexed payments, modernization of primary healthcare, and tax reform. At the same time, 43% believe social inequality will only intensify. They view the current situation in Russia and the instability of the global political and economic environment negatively, leading them to form a pessimistic vision of the future.

The main accusation concerns Pirelli’s Kirov plant, which, according to Grizzly, shares territory and infrastructure with a neighboring Russian state-owned enterprise that produces tires for Russian military equipment, including wheel platforms for nuclear warhead launch vehicles and armored vehicles used in the invasion of Ukraine. The enterprise is managed by the Research Institute of Rubber and Polymer Products, which is fully owned by sanctioned defense conglomerate Rostec. Rostec also holds a 25.005% stake in Pirelli Tyre Russia, the entity that controls the plants in Kirov and Voronezh. According to Grizzly, this stake and the proximity of the facilities has allowed Russia to gain access to Pirelli technologies critical to the country’s defense industry.

The report’s authors claim that the plants are effectively interdependent: the neighboring research institute enterprise purportedly receives heat through pipes from Pirelli’s premises, and in one official document from Kirov authorities, the two plants are listed together under a single line for electricity consumption. As part of the investigation, a Grizzly analyst posing as a soldier fighting in Ukraine contacted Pirelli’s hotline requesting to purchase tires for their unit; he was given an internal email to place an order.

In addition, a Grizzly analyst contacted the HR department of the Kirov plant, posing as a Russian contract soldier who was looking for a new job following the impending end of his service. According to the report:

Our undercover analyst called HR at Pirelli’s Kirov factory posing as a member of the Russian military currently fighting in Ukraine whose contract would end soon and who wanted to move to Kirov for work. The analyst several times emphasised that they have a criminal conviction in Ukraine for the Bucha massacre, referring to the killings in Bucha, Ukraine where Russian forces committed some of their worst atrocities during the full-scale invasion.

It did not seem to bother Pirelli’s HR.

HR then told us Pirelli has recently hired veterans of the Russian invasion of Ukraine and that, despite the conviction in Ukraine, the usual hiring procedures would apply. They then listed the documents needed to apply for and shared the latest vacancies.

Additionally, Pirelli lists a dealer on its website operating out of occupied Donetsk, in violation of EU sanctions.

The report also mentions Pirelli’s ties to the Kremlin. In May 2014, two months after Russia’s illegal annexation of Crimea, Rosneft CEO Igor Sechin bought a 13% stake in Pirelli for €552.7 million, signing the documents in the presence of Vladimir Putin. Grizzly notes that Anastasia Ignatova, stepdaughter of Rostec chief Sergei Chemezov, appeared in Pirelli's 2017 calendar. According to the analysts’ assessment, the longer Pirelli remains in Russia, the more the current status quo “could turn into a liability” for the company’s reputation.

Pirelli rejected the report, Bloomberg writes. In a statement, the company called it inaccurate, emphasizing that “it does not produce tyres for military use, as is already known and was communicated long ago to the relevant Italian authorities.” Pirelli has instructed its lawyers to “take action in all jurisdictions against those who have spread this false information.”

Grizzly notes that Pirelli is the only Western tire manufacturer to maintain operations in Russia: Nokian, Michelin, Continental, Goodyear, and Bridgestone all wound down their businesses in the country after the start of the full-scale invasion of Ukraine. According to the Financial Times, Pirelli represents a broader trend: the management of more than 2,100 multinational corporations have reconsidered their decision to exit Russia in the years since 2022.

A billion-dollar deal

ERG announced Mutalip’s purchase of part of the company on May 22. Its news release said he had bought a 39.3% stake from businessman Patokh Chodiev and the family of the late Alexander Mashkevich. Another 40% of the shares belong to the state, while the rest are held by CEO Shukhrat Ibragimov, the son of one of the company’s founders, Alijan Ibragimov.

The 40% stake was valued at about $1.4 billion. As The Insider previously reported, Mutalip had already made a $200 million advance payment in early May, while the remaining $1.2 billion could have been covered by proceeds from bond sales by Nature Energy Solutions Ltd., a company owned by the businessman.

Nature Energy Solutions issued the bonds in mid-May. However, according to data from the Astana International Financial Centre (AIFC), no trading activity has been recorded since opening on May 20. All exchange indicators are at zero, meaning there has been no trading in the securities.

The origin of Mutalip’s money is unclear, a point previously raised by Kazakh investigative journalists at Radio Azattyq. The 35-year-old businessman appeared on the local Forbes list of Kazakhstan’s 75 richest people only in May. He was a newcomer to the ranking and its youngest member, placing 22nd.

There is also a Russian connection in Mutalip’s biography. Sources have told The Insider that he has close ties to Russian bankers, is personally acquainted with VTB President Andrey Kostin, and was “introduced” to Russian banks by the oligarch Alisher Usmanov. More details on Mutalip’s ties to Russia are available here.

Changes on the board

Shortly before the billion-dollar deal, The Insider found that Nurlan Zhakupov, chairman of the sovereign wealth fund Samruk-Kazyna, joined the board of directors of ERG Sarl in Luxembourg, the group’s main legal entity. The information appears in an extract from Luxembourg’s legal entities register obtained by The Insider.

Zhakupov replaced Madi Takiyev, Kazakhstan’s finance minister, on the board. Takiyev, however, is still listed as a board member on the company’s website, while the head of Samruk-Kazyna is not mentioned. Zhakupov joined the board on May 15.

Although Samruk-Kazyna calls itself a national welfare fund, it is not an exact equivalent of Russia’s National Wealth Fund. Instead, it is a commercial structure — an investment holding company that includes companies in the oil and gas sectors, as well as in the chemical and nuclear industries, the mining and metals sector, and the fields of energy, logistics and machine-building. Its holdings include KazMunayGas, which accounts for about a quarter of Kazakhstan’s oil production, and Kazatomprom, which handles uranium and nuclear fuel exports and imports. Kazakhstan’s Forbes has called the company a “holding of holdings.”

Samruk-Kazyna’s sole shareholder is the government of Kazakhstan. Formally, the fund can be compared to Russia’s Rostec state corporation, another large conglomerate that oversees various enterprises.

The fund describes its mission as promoting sustainable economic development and says it is committed to creating market competition. “As a co-investor, the Fund will participate only in critically important projects that cannot be implemented by private investors,” its website says.

ERG, for its part, is indeed a critically important project for Kazakhstan. The company accounts for about a third of the country’s mining and metals sector. It is also a key electricity supplier and a major railway operator across Central Asia.

The debt keeper

Still, it is notable that the fund did not receive a stake in ERG, but only a seat on its board. By contrast, Shakhmurat Mutalip, who obtained a controlling stake in the company, holds no position there at all.

A source close to ERG told The Insider that this can be explained by the state holding company’s strong interest in the asset.

It is also notable that shares in Mutalip’s company, Nature Energy Solutions, have been listed as collateral since May 20. This means the owner of the shares pledged them in order to obtain borrowed funds, and the creditor may sell them if the borrower fails to meet his obligations.

In the case of the ERG purchase, a source close to the company said the deal may have been financed by Samruk-Kazyna. That would explain Zhakupov’s appointment to the board. He became a kind of “debt keeper,” the source said.

“Mutalip has a deadline, I think until Nov. 1. He has to return the money. It appears he will not return it. It is clear he will not raise the money on the international market,” the source said.

The Insider’s source said Samruk-Kazyna could in the future receive ERG shares against the debt and become the full owner of the mining company.

“ERG will become 80% state-owned. It is, you know, a kind of quasi-nationalization,” the source said.

The Financial Times previously reported that ERG was facing de facto nationalization in Kazakhstan. At the time, this was linked to the fact that Roman Sklyar, then Kazakhstan’s deputy prime minister and now head of the presidential administration, had joined the company’s board in March. He received his new post only on May 5.

Now ERG faces the risk that nearly half of its shares could come under state control not only through the presidential administration, but also through the state holding company.

The Insider sent requests for comment to ERG, Samruk-Kazyna, and Nature Energy Solutions Ltd., but had not received responses by the time of publication.

In 2025, the price of gold rose by 44%, its strongest performance since 1980.

Inflation, oil, and war: The recipe for the 1980 gold rally

Of course, inflation since then means that the dollar-denominated price of gold has been far higher than those reached in 1980. The average price in 2025 was $3,432 per troy ounce, and in January 2026 gold hit a record high of $5,595, though Metals Focus analysts forecast that the average price seen in 2026 will be $4,920 an ounce.

Why gold keeps getting more expensive

Analysts say the price increase is not only about supply and demand. Investors are increasingly worried about rising U.S. government debt, trade conflicts, geopolitical instability, and uncertainty over U.S. economic policy.

Against that backdrop, gold is increasingly viewed as a reliable way to preserve capital. Many central banks also continue to increase the share of gold in their reserves, thereby reducing their dependence on the dollar.

Investors have become the main buyers of gold

The most notable trend in recent years is the changing structure of demand, as high prices have forced consumers to cut back on jewelry purchases. In 2025, global demand for gold jewelry fell 19%, reaching one of the lowest levels ever recorded. Buyers are increasingly choosing lighter pieces or postponing purchases altogether.

At the same time, interest is growing in gold bars, coins, and other investment products. Last year, physical investment in gold rose 16%, reaching their highest level in 12 years.

Gold purchases were especially active in China and India. In China, investment demand exceeded jewelry demand for the first time. Metals Focus forecasts that in 2026, investment demand will overtake jewelry demand globally for the first time.

Central banks continue to bet on gold

Central banks continue to be among the largest buyers of the metal. In 2025, they purchased 848 tons of gold. Although that was below the record levels of previous years, it remains very high by historical standards. Poland, Brazil, and several African countries were among the most active buyers.

Metals Focus believes central banks are unlikely to sharply raise interest rates to fight inflation, with the company's analysts saying governments are more likely to tolerate higher price growth than risk slowing the economy.

In that situation, money held in bank deposits and bonds may earn returns below inflation. Investors are therefore continuing to look for ways to protect their savings, and gold remains one of the most popular tools.

Mining is growing, but gold is still in short supply

High prices are encouraging mining companies to increase production, but supply is growing much more slowly than demand. In 2025, global gold production reached a record 3,817 tons. A new high of 3,907 tons is expected in 2026.

Even record production, however, cannot saturate the market. Owners of scrap gold are also in no hurry to sell, expecting prices to rise further.

What is happening in Russia

Russia remains one of the key players in the global gold market. According to Metals Focus, the country remained the world’s second-largest gold producer in 2025, behind China.

Russian production rose to 345 tons from 330 tons a year earlier, an increase of 5%. That puts Russia behind only China, which produced 384 tons, and well ahead of Australia, which mined 293 tons.

Analysts said the increase came despite lower production by Polyus, Russia’s largest gold miner. Overall output rose because of increased ore processing and stronger results at several deposits in different regions of the country.

Russia also remains one of the world’s largest holders of gold. Metals Focus estimates that by the end of 2025, Russia’s gold reserves stood at about 2,327 tons. That placed Russia sixth in the world after the United States, Germany, Italy, France, and the International Monetary Fund. Gold accounts for about 44% of Russia’s international reserves, one of the highest shares among major economies.

Russia sells gold to finance its war against Ukraine

The report also notes an important shift in Russia’s reserve management policy. According to Metals Focus, Russia reduced its gold reserves by 6 tons in 2025. It was the first annual decline in Russia’s gold reserves since 2005. Analysts linked the move to the need to finance rising war spending amid a growing budget deficit.

The company suspects that gold sales have continued in 2026. Metals Focus says Russia’s reserves are shrinking by an average of about 7 tons a month. Analysts expect the process to continue and say that this year Russia could be one of the largest gold sellers among central banks and state institutions.

The report does not disclose who is buying Russian gold or through which channels the transactions are taking place. It contains no data on specific buyers, intermediary banks, or destination countries. Russia, however, is mentioned among the suppliers of gold to the Chinese market.

Frohnmaier acknowledged that his trip to Russia is viewed as “a sensitive issue”: “Germany needs a policy that once again puts greater focus on [energy] supply security, competitiveness, and the interests of its own citizens,” Frohnmaier said. “My participation, however, does not mean approval of the war in Ukraine.”

At SPIEF, Frohnmaier met with Alexei Miller, CEO of Russia’s state-owned energy giant Gazprom. The news agency Interfax quoted the AfD legislator as saying Germany needs to consider “all possible options,” including resuming operations of the Nord Stream pipeline and restoring trade and economic relations with Russia.

According to German media, the participants also include Bundestag lawmaker Steffen Kotré, European Parliament member Petr Bystron, and Jörg Urban, head of the AfD branch in Saxony and a member of the regional parliament. Bystron said permission from the party’s parliamentary group was not required for the trip, but that the AfD’s federal leadership had been informed of the plans.

In addition to members of the AfD, former German Chancellor Gerhard Schröder was spotted in Moscow in recent days, according to a report by German broadcaster N-tv. It is currently unclear whether he traveled to Russia to attend the St. Petersburg forum or for another purpose.

After leaving office as chancellor in 2005, Schröder worked on projects connected to Russia’s energy sector, becoming one of the most prominent advocates of German cooperation with Russian energy companies. After Russia launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, he nevertheless traveled to Moscow and met with Vladimir Putin.

German businesspeople are also listed as participants at SPIEF. They include Globus shareholder Thomas Bruch, EkoNiva Group beneficiary Stefan Dürr and Leo Eppinger, co-owner of Masterlock, a company based near Moscow. 

Vedomosti’s source said the Russian subsidiary is seeking to recover funds that it says were withdrawn from the company as dividends shortly before its bankruptcy proceedings began in 2023. The Moscow Arbitration Court ruled that the dividend payment was made to avoid paying debts to creditors. The Russian side sought to freeze Google Belgium’s assets to prevent possible attempts to restructure or bankrupt the Belgian unit before the case is resolved.

“This is not just a bankruptcy case involving a subsidiary company in Russia. The dispute shows the limits of the moral and legal responsibility of global companies operating in the markets of sovereign countries, whether Russia, France, or Belgium. It is necessary to act wherever Google assets can be found to enforce the Russian court’s decision,” Michael de Bouck, a lawyer representing Google LLC in the Belgian court, told Vedomosti.

After the protective measures were imposed, Google LLC’s claims will be considered on the merits of the case. If the Belgian court agrees with the Russian ruling, the frozen assets could be seized and used to settle debts with creditors of Russia’s Google subsidiary.

The Russian entity has turned to the courts in more than 10 countries seeking enforcement of Russian court rulings. In December, a Paris court ordered the seizure of 100% of Google France shares at the request of the bankruptcy trustee for Google’s Russian subsidiary. The dividend payment in that case totaled 112 million euros. In October, South Africa’s Supreme Court issued a similar ruling.

MOTPUNIP was created on March 1, 2022, four days after the start of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. The idea for the tribunal is attributed to Investigative Committee head Alexander Bastrykin. A source at the Public Chamber told The Insider that “people were being called in a rush and presented with a fait accompli — many don’t even know they were included in the tribunal.”

Maxim Grigoryev, a native of St. Petersburg and a close acquaintance of Bastrykin, was appointed chairman of MOTPUNIP. In the early 2000s Grigoryev was involved in electoral schemes in St. Petersburg, and after moving to Moscow he headed the Foundation for the Study of Democracy Problems, which receives multi-million-ruble grants from the state budget. For example, in 2022 alone, Grigoryev received 8,780,680 rubles ($120,300) for a series of authored analytical programs about the special military operation — its reported title: “The Word Is Ours!” (though The Insider was unable to find any trace of these broadcasts). Grigoryev is the author of propaganda books “Anti-Maidan,” “White Helmets: Accomplices of Terrorists and Sources of Disinformation,” “Crimes of the U.S.-Led Coalition in Syria,” “History of Lithuania,” and “Ukrainian Crimes Against Humanity.”

In 2022, civic activist Grigoryev underwent assault training and a one-month advanced course at the General Staff Academy of the Russian Federation, after which he traveled — posing as a journalist — to the occupied territories of Ukraine to gather “evidence” of the “crimes” of the Kyiv regime. Still, according to a source at the Presidential Executive Office, Grigoryev primarily serves as a “talking head,” while all of the substantive work of MOTPUNIP is done by his longtime associate Denis Teleshev, head of the Institute for Analysis of Neo-Nazi and Extremist Ideologies. The two met in St. Petersburg during an electoral campaign and have been cooperating closely ever since. 

Teleshev does not like talking about his youth, as he has a criminal record for robbery: in 1997, he attacked a woman with a knife and stole her tape recorder and bags. However, the judge took pity on the 19-year-old criminal and sentenced him to three years probation with a two-year supervision period.

Teleshev has a criminal record for robbery: in 1997, he attacked a woman with a knife and stole her tape recorder and bags

Now Teleshev runs a network of volunteers who gather testimony from people in the occupied territories of Ukraine. The vast majority of witness accounts about alleged AFU atrocities are highly dubious, as they are recorded from the words of people who refused to evacuate and welcomed the invasion. In most instances, these testimonies are not backed by any documentation and contradict known facts.

Supervisor Miroshnyk and the fugitive Kot

The MOTPUNIP supervisor from the Russian Foreign Ministry is Rodion Miroshnyk, the former press secretary of fugitive Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych. In his interviews, the “ambassador-at-large on issues of crimes of the Kyiv regime” calls his compatriots “Banderites” and claims that “the West privately acknowledges that the truth is on Russia’s side, but politics comes first, and Ukraine strikes civilians for donations.”

In Ukraine, Miroshnyk is wanted on multiple criminal charges (including participation in the activities of a terrorist organization) and faces 15 years in prison. Despite his status as a government official, Miroshnyk never misses an opportunity to promote two foundations: “Helping Our Own” and “Aid to Novorossiya,” which collect private donations from Russians. His wife Olga works at the TV company R1, which produces pro-Kremlin content.

Phone billing records for Miroshnyk obtained by The Insider reveal contacts with propagandists from NTV, Tsargrad, Komsomolskaya Pravda, Rossiya-24, Zvezda, REN TV, and Life.ru. As the records show, Miroshnyk frequently calls Yuriy Kot, who provides informational support to MOTPUNIP.

In the 2000s, Kot hosted talk shows in his native language on the Ukrainian TV channel Inter. Today, however, he has switched sides and claims that “everything Ukrainian was stolen from the Russians.”

In December 2014, Kot was one of the organizers of the Kyiv Anti-Maidan movement, and Ukraine declared him wanted. In Moscow, the fugitive Kot lives in the so-called House of Resident Spies on Goncharnaya Street, where generals of the foreign intelligence service received elite apartments.

His second wife, Alexandra Reshetnikova-Kot, was previously married to career intelligence officer Vadim Anishchik, and the former couple spied together in Italy. Alexandra’s father is General Leonid Reshetnikov, the former SVR station chief in the Balkans. 

General Reshetnikov took an active part in the failed coup attempt in Montenegro that was planned for October 2016. The republic’s authorities got ahead of the conspirators — among whom were Serbian far-right nationalists tasked with storming parliament and assassinating the prime minister. As a result, Reshetnikov had to make an urgent flight to Serbia to manage the situation.

“Foreign experts”: Kremlin lobbyist, extortionist cop, and antisemite

To represent the United States, Grigoryev included Elena Chernykh-Branson on the tribunal’s roster. She is wanted by the FBI and faces 35 years in prison in her “home” country. In 1991, Elena Chernykh married Princeton University economist William Branson, who was 23 years her senior. The arrangement opened doors for Chernykh-Branson, who spent most of her time in Nice and only occasionally visited her husband. In 2006, Branson died suddenly. According to his daughter Emily, "He died in great debt. She blew through his money like crazy." Branson left her his only asset: an apartment overlooking Central Park, which she sold for $1 million.

After her husband’s death, the widow founded the Russian Center in New York and organized loud pro-Kremlin rallies for people from Russia. In addition to the Russian Center, Chernykh-Branson headed the U.S. branch of the Coordinating Council of Russian Compatriots’ Organizations (KSORS), which has been linked to Russian intelligence and was previously covered by The Insider. She also began making frequent trips to Moscow.

In 2020, the FBI took an interest in the activities of Chernykh-Branson’s and searched her home. She was charged with illegal lobbying, refusal to register as a foreign agent, and participation in a fraudulent visa scheme for Russian officials. After that, Chernykh-Branson fled to Moscow. Two years later, her assistant Nomma Zarubina was also arrested on charges of working for Russia Federal Security Service.

In addition to Chernykh-Branson, American nationals John Dougan and Charles Bausman are members of MOTPUNIP. Dougan worked as a deputy sheriff in Palm Beach and faces 21 criminal charges back home related to extortion and illegal wiretapping. 

U.S. national John Dougan faces 21 criminal charges at home related to extortion and illegal wiretapping

In Russia, Dougan closely collaborates with the Center for Geopolitical Expertise, which is led by Valery Korovin (the right-hand man of Russian fascist Alexander Dugin) and GRU officer Yury Khoroshenky (also known as Khoroshevsky, a veteran of the notorious unit 29155, which organized the poisoning of the Skripals in Salisbury and sabotage operations across Europe). However, GRU budget funds are clearly not enough for the fugitive sheriff given that he has placed his CV on a number of closed databases, advertising the following skills: “Experienced executive in developing digital solutions, AI integration, and project management entirely free from Western infrastructure. Development of influential media channels with millions of views dedicated to events in Donbas and frontline reports. Interested in leadership positions — product director, innovation manager, or strategic consultant.”

Another tribunal member, U.S. national Charles Bausman, is closely associated with far-right organizations. Bausman participated in the storming of the Capitol on January 6 and, facing criminal charges, chose to flee to Russia. Previously, this “anti-Nazi campaigner” had closely collaborated with well-known American Nazi Mike Enoch, who denied the Holocaust and had a talent for finding a Jewish conspiracy in just about anything.

In Russia, Bausman founded the news site Russia Insider, which promotes antisemitic views. In interviews with Russian TV channels, he has repeatedly stated that “it is time to lift the taboo on the Jewish topic” and that “hostility toward Putin’s Russia, especially in the U.S. and UK, comes from Jewish circles.”

Before fleeing to Russia, Bausman married Olga Zoloyeva, the daughter of former KGB-SVR spy Igor Zoloyev, who operated under cover as an oil engineer in Algeria. In 2006, Zoloyev served as acting head of the Nenets Autonomous Okrug (NAO) and was planning to lead the region; however, Putin appointed another FSB alumnus, Valery Potapenko, to the post. Zoloyev was removed from his position due to his work for commercial organizations, and Potapenko was thus tabbed to head the NAO.

Among those serving alongside the antisemite Bausman in MOTPUNIP is Israeli national Guy Sandal. Born in Kyiv, he moved to Israel with his parents in the early 1990s. In Haifa, Sandal graduated from a design university and served in the Israeli Navy. Judging by his social media accounts, Sandal had previously shown little interest in politics, focusing instead on raising children and cycling. But everything changed when one of his acquaintances brought the former naval serviceman to the Russian consulate in Haifa. There, he was asked to help organize the annual march of the Immortal Regiment and to distribute Saint George ribbons to locals. Since then, Sandal has become a regular at the Russian consulate, and lectures by political analyst Yakov Kedmi, who actively promotes pro-Kremlin narratives, appear to have definitively shaped his political views.

With the start of the full-scale war in Ukraine, Sandal created the “Israeli Anti-Nazi Front,” apparently on the advice of Russian diplomats, and began taking action: he demanded the expulsion of Ukrainian ambassador Yevgen Korniychuk from Israel and later expressed outrage that wounded Ukrainian soldiers from the Azov Battalion were receiving treatment in Israeli clinics. His events, however, rarely attract more than a dozen people.

Ex-mayor’s adviser, a Canadian registered at RT, and a former violinist

Belgium is represented in the tribunal by Valery Dvoynikov, the son of a well-known judoka champion of the USSR and Europe. Previously, the younger Dvoynikov worked as an adviser to the mayor of Liège, and in 2023, the newspaper La Meuse even named him its Person of the Year. However, the Belgium branch of Ukrainska Domivka activist group suspected the adviser of facilitating the acquisition of Schengen visas for wealthy Russians and succeeded in getting him dismissed.

Indeed, Dvoynikov is a frequent guest at the Russian embassy in Belgium. He collaborates with the Russkiy Mir (Russian World) Foundation and participates in roundtables with prominent pro-Kremlin propagandists. As his flight records show, in addition to Russia and Belarus, Dvoynikov visited occupied Luhansk in July 2022 — something Belgian authorities are apparently unaware of.

Eva Bartlett, a close acquaintance of Chairman Grigoryev, fled to Russia in 2019. She represents Canada in MOTPUNIP. During the Syrian civil war, the Canadian lavishly praised Bashar Assad’s dictatorial regime and gained notoriety for a video in which she claimed that the rescue operations of the White Helmets were staged.

The registered Moscow address of the “independent journalist and human rights defender,” as she calls herself, is the Russia Today office on Borovaya Street. The TV company also provides her with corporate cars. 

The registered Moscow address of the “independent journalist and human rights defender,” as she calls herself, is the Russia Today office

France’s representative in the tribunal is Christelle Néant, a French-born Russian citizen. Néant created the pro-Kremlin project “Donbas Insider” and organizes trips for “friends of Moscow” to the territory of the unrecognized Donetsk and Luhansk “people's republics.”

Serbia is represented by Dragana Trifković, a member of the Friends of Crimea international association and an author for pro-government publications Izvestia and Regnum. Meanwhile, Cyprus is represented by Mikis Filaniоtis, Secretary General of the International Russophiles Movement, and Mali by Umar Sidibe, a resident of a student dormitory at the Peoples’ Friendship University of Russia.

Indonesia’s representative on the tribunal, Fauzan Al-Rasyid, was a student at a Jakarta university when he performed the Russian WWII-era hit Katyusha on the violin while wearing a Russian military cap and sent the video to the Russian embassy. After a security check through intelligence service databases, Al-Rasyid was invited to fly to Moscow at the expense of the Russian budget to serve as an independent observer during the Russian presidential elections. 

The Indonesian returned from the trip a completely different person: he abandoned his violin and began telling everyone what a wonderful president Putin is, that elections in Russia are fair, and that political repression and censorship in Russian media are all fabrications of Western propaganda. Al-Rasyid was employed by Russia Today, and Russia’s Foreign Ministry presents him with medals every year for fruitful cooperation. Unsurprisingly, Chairman Grigoryev has offered him a seat in the tribunal. The Insider sent Fauzan questions about his membership in the fake tribunal, but he did not respond.

Shaheds have been one of Ukraine's main problems from the moment of their emergence on the battlefield in the fall of 2022. Together with the lighter Gerbera drones, which often act as decoys or scouts, they have become the primary means of Russian attacks on Ukrainian infrastructure, especially the country’s power grid. From February through April 2026, Russia was launching more than 200 Shahed-type drones into Ukrainian territory each day. For a long time, the Defense Forces of Ukraine (DFU) struggled to find countermeasures until cost-efficient interceptor drones came along.

The use of anti-aircraft drones has been a known practice since mid-2024, when the DFU began using modified FPV drones to intercept Russian reconnaissance UAVs, such as the Orlan-10, Zala, and Supercam. Over time, the DFU acquired special-purpose models, such as Sting, Bagnet, and later STRILA, designed first and foremost to counter Shaheds.

Today, Ukrainian interceptor drones can hit Russian UAVs at ranges of up to 30 km beyond the line of contact, comparable to the range of a short-range surface-to-air missile (SAM) system.

Air defense based on anti-aircraft drones has proved to be cheaper and more mobile than the conventional kind. Intercepting a single Shahed requires up to two interceptor drones that cost around $3000 each. Meanwhile, the cheapest single shot from a SAM system (such as the Vampire) costs approximately $30,000.

Interception with air defense drones follows a simple pattern. A signals-intelligence post detects an enemy UAV heading toward the position. Compact radars then determine its range, altitude, and speed in order to give the operator of an air defense FPV a rough understanding of where the target is. Then, as soon as the enemy drone appears in the FPV-goggles or on the screen, the operator locks it in his sights and brings his own drone into close range. Several hundred meters from the target, an aim-hold system may engage automatically, but at the final stage, the operator remains free to choose between a direct ramming, a net drop, or an airburst of the charge.

The new technology has been a game-changer at the front, notes aviation expert Valeriy Romanenko. In March 2025, Ukrainian air defense drones (mostly based on primitive quadcopters) shot down a mere 2,518 Russian reconnaissance UAVs, including one Shahed. However, after a year of tactical development, in March 2026 Ukrainian air defense drones destroyed more than 33,000 Russian UAVs of various types, doubling the February figures.

In March 2026 Ukrainian air defense drones destroyed more than 33,000 Russian UAVs

The Russian side has begun to make more active use of jet Shaheds (Geran-3), whose serial production began in 2025. Still, despite their ability to reach speeds of 400 km/h, these soon proved vulnerable to Ukrainian interceptor drones as well. Footage of the interception of Geran-3s by air defense drones in tail-chase pursuit shows that the interceptors can outfly even a jet drone.

In April 2026 Russian Telegram channels showed the use of a jet “drone-missile,” the Geran-5, against oil and gas infrastructure in Sumy Oblast. Ukrainian UAVs cannot yet catch this drone, which can reach speeds of up to 600 km/h. The shape of the new Geran resembles a small cruise missile rather than a drone, and it is fitted with a more powerful jet engine than other types. Russian sources also demonstrated the use of the Geran-4, also jet-powered, against the energy infrastructure of Chernihiv Oblast. On May 3, however, an example of this modification being intercepted was recorded.

As Ukraine’s Defense Minister Mykhailo Fedorov stressed, “jet Shaheds” have become “a key challenge,” and Ukraine is developing new technological solutions to counter them. In particular, the minister promised support for the development of high-speed interceptors capable of reaching at least 450 km/h.

Russian interceptor drones

Interception assets in the FPV segment fall into two broad types: rotor-wing and fixed-wing. Each type is suited to a specific task. With a short range of up to 20–30 kilometers, copters are used mainly against slow-moving drones.

The air defense drones Boomerang-8 and Boomerang-10 are highly maneuverable, AI-enhanced suicide drones with automatic target hold capabilities and a speed of up to 170 km/h. They are used for both interception and reconnaissance. Among the advantages of the air defense variant of the Boomerang FPV drone, Russian pro-war authors note a wide range of frequency combinations, a convenient and clear software platform, easy setup, and adequate technical support. Drawbacks include weak batteries and a stand that is not fully adapted to the tasks of air defense crews. The Boomerangs are used to intercept relatively low-speed reconnaissance drones and fixed-wing suicide drones, such as the Darts, and Baba-Yaga hexacopters.

Fixed-wing drones are used to intercept larger and faster UAVs such as the FP-1, the FP-2, or the Liutyi. As the author of the Russian Telegram channel ARKHANGEL SPETSNAZA writes, this category is largely represented in the Russian Armed Forces by the interceptor drones Sokol, Molniya-PVO, and, more recently, Lis.

The Sokol-1 and Sokol-2 interceptors possess high-quality digital video links, an airburst capability, high speed, and good maneuverability — but the use of standard control frequencies negates all these advantages.

The Molniya-PVO, a modification of the Russian FPV suicide drone of the fixed-wing Molniya family, is designed to intercept and destroy heavy drones like the Baba-Yaga. The drone can be launched by hand, reach speeds of up to 220 km/h, and is equipped with both a digital video system and an analog video link featuring conventional and thermal-imaging cameras. Notably, the digital system is usable only in daylight and at short range. The drone has a proximity sensor, which detonates the warhead when a target appears at a set distance from the bow camera. Among the Molniya-PVO's drawbacks are a weak battery and the lack of a thermal-imaging digital version for nighttime work or a standard ground control station. Users have also complained of poor technical support along with the manufacturer’s reluctance to respond to feedback.

Interceptor drones Lis and Lis-2, from the makers of the Boomerang, exist in daytime and thermal-imaging versions. Both feature the target-lock function, which noticeably eases the operator's work. However, their time in the air is limited due to a weak battery, meaning their key user scenario involves high-speed interception rather than long patrols.

The Yolka (“Fir Tree”) drone combines the characteristics of fixed-wing drones and quadcopters. It can hit a wide range of targets, from small FPV-drones and reconnaissance craft to heavy UAVs. The compact drone features a target lock-on and has an engagement range of up to 3 km while flying at speeds of up to 200 km/h. Notably, this model has no warhead and engages the target kinetically, which reduces its effectiveness while increasing its popularity in the Russian Armed Forces: after all, Russian personnel are banned from using improvised explosive devices.

Last May, it was stated that the Yolka possesses an AI-enhanced target-lock and tracking system (in effect, an electro-optical homing head). At the same time, analysts noted a significant drawback (1, 2): the target auto-lock fails in low-light conditions. These interceptors have been on the battlefield since September 2024 and are being actively used (1, 2) by mobile firing groups, air observation posts, and frontline units. In February 2026, reports emerged of mass deliveries of Yolka drones to Russian Armed Forces units.

Ukrainian interceptor drones

The Defense Forces of Ukraine have several types of interceptor drones in their arsenal. The best known is the P1-SUN, made by the Ukrainian company SkyFall. This UAV, unveiled in the fall of 2025, can accelerate to 300 km/h and climb to altitudes of up to 5 kilometers. The airframe is made using 3D-printing, which keeps its cost in the vicinity of $1,000. The warhead contains up to 800 grams of explosives — enough to shoot down a Shahed. P1-SUN destroys the target by ramming it or by detonating next to it. According to information from Ukrainian Defense Ministry adviser Anna Hvozdyar, as of late April P1-Sun drones had intercepted more than 3,000 Russian Shaheds.

The Ukrainian Sting interceptor drone, serially produced by the Wild Hornets non-profit, was designed to intercept Shaheds and has since been enhanced to counter nighttime attacks on Ukrainian cities and infrastructure objects. It has also been spotted intercepting a jet-powered Shahed while fitted with an R-60 air-to-air missile. The Sting can reach speeds of more than 340 km/h and operates at altitudes of up to 3 kilometers.

The Osminog (“Octopus”) air defense drone is a joint Ukrainian-British development created to counter Shahed-type UAVs. The drone can reach speeds in excess of 300 km/h. It is equipped with an AI-based control system for automatic terminal guidance to the target, can operate around the clock, is resistant to EW systems, and performs well at low altitudes. More than 29 private Ukrainian companies have received licenses for its serial production, and assembly in the United Kingdom is also planned. Four Ukrainian manufacturers have signed contracts to deliver 8,000 drones to the DFU, the Defense Ministry reported on April 30.

The Merops system, developed by the American defense company Perennial Autonomy, was supplied to Ukraine in 2024 and has shown high effectiveness, according to U.S. Army Secretary Daniel Driscoll. The Merops consists of a ground control station, which detects the target, launchers, and Surveyor reusable interceptor drones with a compact warhead. The interceptors are fitted with wings, typical of fixed-wing UAVs, and X-tail stabilizers. The exact technical specifications of the system are not disclosed, but the Surveyor is known to reach speeds exceeding 280 km/h. A distinctive feature of the system is its ability to work both autonomously and under an operator's remote control. Merops can function in EW conditions and uses AI for autonomous navigation when GPS and comms are jammed. The cost of a single Merops system is $14,000–15,000, but the unit price can drop significantly for large orders. It is currently known to be in use in the Middle East.

The Bagnet air defense drone, made by the Ukrainian defense company Tenebris, is 85% composed of domestically produced components. It is designed for the detection, interception, and destruction of loitering munitions at altitudes of up to 5 kilometers. Bagnet reaches speeds of up to 250 km/h and is fitted with a warhead of up to 1 kilogram. It uses an explosively-formed penetrator to destroy targets in the air and reduce the risk of falling debris. Its built-in guidance system, developed by the French startup Alta Ares, can detect the target and steer the drone toward it in the final stage of the flight. Another important feature is automatic takeoff and return in the event no target is detected.

German TYTAN Technologies interceptor drones emerged at the end of 2024 and were immediately put to the test in real combat conditions in Ukraine. These autonomous air defense drones detect, track, and destroy Shaheds and reconnaissance UAVs by direct hit — all with minimal operator involvement. This past April, TYTAN Technologies announced a special shipment of more than 1,000 METIS interceptor drones for Ukraine's National Guard. The new AI-enhanced version has a range of more than 45 kilometers, reaches speeds of up to 400 km/h, and is capable of effectively engaging targets at altitudes of up to 6 kilometers while carrying a warhead of up to 1 kilogram.

STRILA is a Ukrainian air defense missile-type UAV produced by WIY Drones. It is designed to intercept high-speed and maneuvering airborne targets. STRILA uses original WIY software and target-designation sources that allow the operator to receive data on the target's direction, altitude, and speed. The drone has an operating radius of up to 14 kilometers and a range of 28 kilometers. It operates at altitudes of up to 5 km, carries a warhead of up to 800 grams, and reaches speeds of up to 350 km/h.

This past March it was announced that Ukraine’s WIY Drones and Germany’s Quantum Systems had released the STRILA-2 modification featuring a solid-fuel rocket booster that allows the UAV to take off almost vertically and gain altitude in a matter of seconds before switching to energy-efficient flight using four electric motors. As a result, the STRILA-2 can attack targets from above, while built-in AI-driven software helps it autonomously recognize and lock onto the target even when comms are jammed by EW tools. The German government has financed an order to produce 15,000 STRILA interceptors for Ukraine's National Guard. The cooperation envisions not only procurement but also the expansion of production to Ukraine itself.

In short, air defense is undergoing substantial changes due to Russia’s ongoing war against Ukraine. Given the shortage of SAMs in the world and the growing prevalence of cheap one-way attack systems, the emphasis is shifting toward creating affordable air defense alternatives such as interceptor drones.

The more Russia launches, the more Ukraine shoots down

In February 2026, Ukrainian Defense Minister Fedorov named the protection of the country’s civilian population and critical infrastructure as his ministry’s top priorities, setting the goal of detecting 100% of airborne threats in real time and intercepting at least 95% of missiles and drones. To that end, the minister ordered the creation of a multi-layered air defense system and a ramp-up in interceptor production. As early as April 1, Ukraine’s Defense Ministry stated that in March, Ukraine’s air defense systems had destroyed or suppressed 89.9% of Russian airborne targets, compared with 85.6% in February and 80.2% in December.

The growing effectiveness of countering Shahed-type strike UAVs and their decoys has been driven at least in part by the DFU’s increased use of air defense drones, which shoot down about 45% of targets. As Fedorov reported April 28, over the first four months of 2026 the DFU had received twice as many interceptor drones as it did in all of 2025.

Interception effectiveness is growing in step with a rising number of Russian launches. In effect, the two sides are now locked in an unmanned technology race: Ukraine’s main objective is to increase kill effectiveness while producing large numbers of interceptors at low cost, while Russia is focused on producing more strike drones and adapting them to Ukraine’s new countermeasures. To accomplish this task, Ukraine must stay at least ten steps ahead of the enemy in every technological cycle and keep its lead in the war of innovation, Fedorov believes.

Both sides are now locked in an unmanned technology race

This past April, the defense minister said that Ukraine has developed interceptor drones that can be controlled remotely to engage targets hundreds — or even thousands — of kilometers away. Coupled with the Sting drone, the HORNET VISION Ctrl system forms a new air defense architecture in which mobile interceptors can effectively repel large-scale attacks of suicide drones while they are still over enemy territory. On April 4, Roman ‘Hulk’ of the BULAVA unit reportedly destroyed two Shaheds from a distance of 500 kilometers using this technology. According to Fedorov, more than a dozen manufacturers have already integrated this innovation into their systems.

In addition, the Defense Forces of Ukraine have begun using air defense drones deployed on the Magura V5 sea drone. As The Economist reported in early March, this technology was developed in response to the Russian tactic of launching drones over the sea in order to make them harder for Ukrainian EW to detect.

The first Ukrainian tests took place in the Black Sea near Odesa. According to the description of the technology, the Ukrainian unmanned vessels operate in groups, forming a common radar field. When a target is detected, an interceptor drone is launched from a special hatch on the deck of the boat and is then remotely controlled via Starlink. In mid-April, the surface unmanned systems division of the 412th Nemesis Brigade of Ukraine’s Unmanned Systems Forces reported the first successful destruction of a Shahed using an interceptor drone launched from an unmanned surface vehicle.

Another unconventional solution has involved launching interceptors from an aircraft. Ukrainian aviator Tymur Fatkullin posted a video on April 23 showing launches of P1-SUN air defense drones suspended under the wings of a PZL M28 Skytruck light transport aircraft (the Polish modification of the An-28). 

Originally, in order to intercept Shaheds the aircraft was fitted with an M134D machine gun by Dillon Aero. To hit the target, it has to fly in close, and as a result, on one of the sorties debris from a downed Shahed damaged the wing of the An-28. After this incident, the method of launching P1-SUN interceptor drones from the aircraft was tested. As a result, the aircraft acts as a delivery platform for drones — a setup that significantly expands the interceptors' range.

Ukraine’s air defense landscape notably features a number of private actors. As Mykhailo Fedorov reported on March 30, one such group created by a company in Kharkiv Region has already shot down several Shaheds and Zalas. On April 17, Fedorov noted that the same air defense group had destroyed a jet-powered Shahed flying at a speed of more than 400 km/h.

As of April 30, the private air defense project has been joined by 24 entities from all across Ukraine. The experimental framework that allows private enterprises to set up their own air defense units was approved by Ukraine's Cabinet of Ministers in November 2025, and at the beginning of March 2026 the government permitted critical-infrastructure enterprises to receive additional weaponry to strengthen their air defense capabilities. The arsenal of such groups includes air defense drones and remotely operated machine guns.

Private air defense systems ensure coverage for vulnerable areas, protecting commercial and infrastructure facilities. Ukraine is effectively becoming the first country to consistently integrate private companies into its air defense network.

Prospects for the development of air defense drones

Former Ukrainian prime minister and current chair of the expert council of the Nemesis brigade Oleksiy Honcharuk has observed the exponential growth in his country’s drone capabilities. “Every year, a drone either halves in size or price, or doubles its range,” he says.

Still, Russia continues to make modifications of its own. Shaheds may soon become not weapons but delivery vehicles carrying smaller drones. The Russian Armed Forces already use Shaheds to launch FPV-drones near the front line, and this practice will likely ultimately require Ukraine to devise a new means of defense: walls of interceptor drones, automatically launched on detection, without operator involvement. “It may sound like science fiction, but we are already preparing for it,” Honcharuk insisted.

In April 2026, former CIA director General David Petraeus returned from a trip to Ukraine, where he had spent time in a specialized drone unit in Zaporizhzhia. Petraeus sees promise in the emergence of drone swarms — truly autonomous formations that do not require operators for remote control and are virtually impossible to intercept or suppress due to their huge numbers. He believes that in response to this threat, breakthrough technologies will appear, possibly including powerful microwave systems.

Petraeus sees promise in the emergence of drone swarms, which do not require operators and will be virtually impossible to intercept using current defenses

Several companies are already working on a project to deploy interceptor swarms within the Brave1 cluster. The developers aim to get the drones working as a single system controlled by one operator in real time.

In the near future, AI capabilities will likely enable air defense drones to change course on their own in order to dodge obstacles, respond to changing conditions, and safely and effectively carry out missions. In particular, the Hornet interceptor drones by Destinus have received a combat AI system from the U.S.-based defense technology company Shield AI. During trials in Spain in early 2026, the Hornet drones with Shield AI’s Hivemind system independently corrected their flight trajectory in real time, adapting to changing conditions and tasks. Both Destinus and Shield AI are already working with Ukraine.

Ukrainian air defense drones and the Middle East conflict

After President Zelensky’s March 2026 visit to the Persian Gulf, which resulted in the signing of defense agreements with a number of countries in the region, Ukrainian UAV manufacturers have entered the spotlight as potential leaders of arms exports to the Middle East, writes The Times. However, in practice, they have run into difficulties with export licensing and have been drawn into a debate over the utility of selling interception systems abroad at a time when Ukraine itself has to repel regular attacks.

Even among drone manufacturers, there is no consensus. “If your house is on fire, you don't sell water to a neighbor,” a senior Wild Hornets representative said in a comment to The Times, and Kyrylo Budanov joined the debate by taking the position that the free sale of weapons during an active phase of war is unacceptable. Still, others believe that UAV exports will stimulate growth in domestic production by allowing companies to raise capital via sales to the Persian Gulf.

The situation is further complicated by the military dimension: Russian cruise and ballistic missiles remain out of reach for Ukrainian air defense drones, and although Moscow’s missiles are vulnerable to Western-made PAC-3 SAMs, these are in short supply in Ukraine. At a March 30 press conference, Zelensky cited a global shortage of anti-ballistic missiles, noting that only about 60 PAC-3 interceptor missiles for the Patriot SAM system are produced per month — and that most of the production output is currently being sent to the Middle East.

In January 2026, Zelensky spoke of a critical shortage of SAMs: the shipment of PAC-3 was around a month late and arrived only a day after a large-scale Russian strike caused a near-total blackout in the country. According to Zelensky, the Ukrainian side had known in advance about the launch of ballistic missiles against power infrastructure and had deployed Patriot and NASAMS systems, but Kyiv’s forces could not use them due to the lack of ammunition. For this reason, Kyiv is considering an informal arrangement with the Persian Gulf states: trading Ukrainian technology in the field of unmanned systems in exchange for interceptor missiles.

On April 28, Zelensky announced several decisions aimed at simplifying the transfer of Ukrainian weapons and expertise abroad under existing partnerships. The very next day, TAF Industries, a private Ukrainian FPV drone manufacturer, reportedly received its first request for military consulting: to send specialists with anti-drone systems to protect a vessel in the Strait of Hormuz.

A CIT expert who chose to remain anonymous explained to The Insider that Ukrainian air defense experience and technology are applicable to the Gulf states’ predicament only in part. Simply scaling up the use of Ukrainian solutions is unlikely to produce a comparable result in the Middle East due to the fundamental differences in geography and the structure of threats. Ukraine is a large country, which gives its air defense network ample time to detect threats against regions that do not border Russia. However, in areas where the time of flight is minimal, interception has remained a serious problem even after the introduction of air defense drones. 

Ukrainian air defense experience and technology apply to the Gulf states only in part

In the Gulf states, the situation is fundamentally different. Except for Saudi Arabia, most countries of the region are relatively small in size, and key infrastructure is concentrated along the coast. Therefore, their air defense systems essentially have no time buffer, as targets can reach their objectives in a matter of minutes. Accordingly, interception must take place either instantly over land, or — more logically — over the waters of the Gulf.

This is where a whole set of new questions arises. Ukrainian air defense relies on a network of acoustic sensors for threat detection and interceptor drones. But how does one deploy such infrastructure over water? To date, there is no practical solution to this problem, and the role of air defense drones in the maritime zone remains uncertain. For now, the leading role in intercepting targets over the Gulf belongs to conventional tools: aviation, including helicopters and aircraft that use inexpensive engagement munitions such as guided rockets of the APKWS class.

Military expert Kirill Mikhailov, however, draws attention to the fact that Iranian Shaheds that were fired at the Gulf states appear to have barely evolved since 2022, making them simpler targets than the Russian Gerans, which have acquired serious EW countermeasures and remote-control systems over the course of the war. In Mikhailov’s estimation, this means that the application of current Ukrainian technology and know-how could make a serious difference in the Middle East, at least until Iran improves its attack munitions. 

In turn, the CIT expert notes that Ukraine leads the world in the development of air defense drones, primarily thanks to the scale of investment and their constant combat use, which provides continuous feedback. In the Ukrainian case, shortcomings are quickly identified and fixed, and solutions are rapidly refined. At the same time, the technologies themselves are not unique and their underlying principles are well explored, meaning other countries can close the gap fairly quickly if they make it a priority to do so. The main advantage in the area of drone warfare is not secret developments, but the accumulated experience necessary to constantly improve existing systems faster than the enemy can. 

The published video appears to show at least two hits. The Russian pro-war Telegram channel Rybar wrote that the Boikiy was undergoing scheduled repairs in a dry dock at the Kronstadt Marine Plant.

“Why the corvette was in such a position without protection is a question with an asterisk,” Rybar wrote, using a Russian expression indicating that an issue is difficult or uncomfortable. “The fleet is extremely vulnerable to Ukrainian raids… As for communications, a Starlink satellite terminal was most likely used. The scheme is already well established: one of the relay drones travels through the Baltic states into international waters in the Gulf of Finland and transmits the signal to strike drones,” the channel wrote.

According to The Insider’s calculations, this is the third Baltic Fleet ship damaged during Russia’s full-scale war against Ukraine. In April 2024, the missile ship Serpukhov, Project 21631 Buyan-M, caught fire after being hit in a sabotage attack at the Kaliningrad Region’s Baltiysk base. Another ship of the same type, the Grad, was hit in October 2025 in Karelia.

In June 2025, a Russian Navy ship was reported to be escorting “shadow fleet” tankers through the English Channel for the first time. The Boikiy took part in that operation and later escorted the tanker General Skobelev and cargo ship Sparta from the Baltic Sea to the Atlantic Ocean via the English Channel. The vessels are believed to have helped remove military equipment from Russia’s base in Tartus, Syria.

The Insider previously reported that the Boikiy spoofed its signal by using a shared Maritime Mobile Service Identity (MMSI), making it appear in tracking systems as different maritime objects.

On June 3, the opening day of the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum (SPIEF), the city came under a large-scale Ukrainian drone attack. The locations hit included the St. Petersburg Oil Terminal, the city’s Kirovsky and Krasnoselsky districts, and infrastructure facilities in Kronstadt.

Moscow and the Moscow Region

On the morning of June 3, gas stations operated by the Odintsovo Regional Fuel Company (ORTK) reported limits on gasoline sales. Local outlet MSK1.RU reported that one station in Troitsk, a district within Moscow, posted a notice saying no more than 60 liters of gasoline and 100 liters of diesel fuel would be sold per customer.

ORTK said the restrictions had been introduced on May 30 and would remain in place until the situation “settles down.”

Most gas station chains did not report restrictions. However, a Gazprom station employee told the outlet that limits were nevertheless in effect in Moscow and the surrounding region for diesel and gasoline, capped at 100 to 150 liters.

St. Petersburg

According to the St. Petersburg outlet Fontanka, local residents began reporting fuel sale limits late last week. Kirishiavtoservis, a chain of gas stations operated by the Kinef oil refinery in the Leningrad Region, limited sales to 50 liters per receipt.

AI-95 gasoline appears to be in the shortest supply, Fontanka reported. A source in the oil refining market told the outlet that production of that grade had been hit hardest, but said the problem in St. Petersburg was “not exactly widespread or global” and that smaller, less popular gas stations were more likely to face a noticeable fuel shortage than larger chains.

The issue was caused less by reduced production volumes than by logistics issues, the source explained: 

“Whereas we used to bring it in from Kirishi, which was quick, now we have to bring it in, roughly speaking, from Perm. The logistics have become more complicated. In other words, the volume of shipments has remained the same, but delivery times have gotten longer. As a result, we’ve become slower at responding to requests from every gas station in the most remote corners of the country.”

The border regions of Kursk and Belgorod

On June 2, residents of the Kursk and Belgorod regions reported restrictions on gasoline sales, with gas stations run by state-owned energy giant Rosneft halting sales of AI-92 gasoline in canisters. That grade is often used to power electric generators and similar equipment. Limits were also introduced on AI-95 gasoline, including a cap of no more than 20 liters per customer in the Kursk Region.

Regional authorities confirmed the restrictions. Maxim Gusev, the Kursk Region’s Minister of Economic Development, said the limits were linked to “ensuring safety during fuel sales.”

The occupied Luhansk Region

Sales of AI-95 and AI-92 gasoline were restricted in the occupied Luhansk Region of Ukraine. The Russian-installed occupation government of the “Luhansk People’s Republic” announced the measure the previous evening. Diesel fuel sales were also capped at 20 liters per person, including for customers filling canisters.

Authorities attributed the restrictions to the risk of a shortage.

“Given the reserves that exist today in the Luhansk People’s Republic, and taking into account increased demand from the population over the past few days, there is a risk of a shortage,” said Konstantin Rogovenko, the Russian-installed energy minister of the occupied Luhansk Region.

Occupied Crimea

The Russia-installed authorities in Crimea were among the first to introduce such restrictions. Starting from May 30, sales of AI-95 gasoline across the illegally annexed peninsula were limited to no more than 20 liters per customer per day.

As The Insider reported, a “shadow” fuel market began expanding rapidly in Crimea and Sevastopol as a result. Resellers are offering AI-92 and AI-95 gasoline for up to 250 rubles per liter — more than three times the recent retail price of 75 to 82 rubles.

On the evening of June 2, Sevastopol governor Mikhail Razvozhaev wrote that overnight from June 2 to June 3, fuel of all grades would be sold “only to emergency services ensuring the functioning of the city.”

He promised that general sales would resume after 2 p.m. on June 3. In the end, authorities announced their return even earlier, reopening gas stations to all customers by 11 a.m. However, “general sales” again meant restricted sales, with no more than 20 liters per customer.

Governor Alexander Beglov said infrastructure sites in nearby Kronstadt and in the city’s Kirovsky and Krasnoselsky districts were targeted in overnight strikes. He reported several injuries but did not specify what damage had been done.

Telegram channels published videos of a fire at the St. Petersburg Oil Terminal, which is located in the city’s Kirovsky District. The terminal is used for storing and processing oil and is one of the largest oil transshipment complexes in northwestern Russia.

The terminal is located less than 20 kilometers from the Expoforum Convention and Exhibition Center, where the economic forum is being held.

Mobile internet outages were reported in the city overnight, according to data from the Detector404 monitoring service. Local residents noted that some text message alerts about the drone attack arrived late. St. Petersburg publication Bumaga later reported that mobile service had resumed after flight restrictions were lifted at Pulkovo Airport.

Available data cited by The Moscow Times shows the Taliban still has dozens of T-55 and T-62 tanks, BMP-1 and BMP-2 infantry fighting vehicles, Mi-17 and Mi-24 helicopters, several Soviet-made transport aircraft, as well as various artillery systems and small arms. The equipment is a legacy of the Soviet Union’s presence in Afghanistan before its withdrawal in 1989.

Details of the May agreement have not been disclosed. Kabulov described it as a framework document that allows for separate contracts to supply various systems.

The Taliban is still designated a terrorist organization by the United States and the European Union. In Russia, however, its status has changed. In December 2024 Vladimir Putin signed a law opening the way for the movement to be removed from Russia’s terrorist list, and in April 2025, Russia’s Supreme Court suspended the ban on Taliban activities in the country.

Ruslan Suleymanov, an expert on the Middle East and Central Asia, told The Insider that Russia may need to maintain good relations with the Taliban due to the fact that Afghanistan still presents a terrorist threat, one that Russian security agencies are “clearly not coping” with.

“There is also the threat from the Central Asian republics, for example Tajikistan,” Suleymanov said. “Recall that those who carried out the terrorist attack at Crocus [City Hall] were from Tajikistan. The Kremlin clearly wants to coordinate the fight against the terrorist threat with the Taliban.”

Suleymanov also said there is an image-building element to Moscow’s ties with the Taliban.

“The Taliban is one of the most vivid modern examples of resistance to the West,” he said. “Russian propaganda likes to hold them up as an example. And for Moscow, which claims the mantle of leader of the so-called Global South, it is important to show that it is patronizing groups such as the Taliban and Palestinian radicals represented by Hamas, who can in their own way be described as anti-Western forces.

Since Russia is unable to conduct active trade the way Iran, Pakistan, and China do, and ranks only 10th, the Kremlin, in its preferred manner, offers symbolic gestures in the form of military cooperation — sending a couple of instructors, repairing equipment, and holding exercises. Moscow is fully capable of that. These are not tens of billions of dollars in investment, as China offers. Moscow is not capable of that.”

The amendments concern Decree No. 95 of March 5, 2022, titled “On the Temporary Procedure for Fulfilling Obligations to Certain Foreign Creditors.” Originally, the decree allowed Russian authorities, companies, and citizens to settle obligations to foreign creditors in rubles through so-called Type C accounts and, in some cases, to freeze payments on loans, borrowings, and other financial instruments.

The mechanism has now been extended to obligations on bank deposits owed to foreigners from countries Russia has designated as “unfriendly.”

The decree entered into force on June 1, 2026, the day it was officially published.

Economist Sergey Aleksashenko told The Insider that access to funds held in Type C accounts is highly restricted and that, for banks, the money effectively becomes a free source of funding:

“Legally, the funds belong to whoever held them in a regular account or deposit, but access to them is extremely limited. For banks, this money becomes a free source of funding. The amount currently held in Type C accounts is secret. There is information that at Citibank, at the time of its sale, the figure was around 1 trillion rubles ($13.5 billion).”

Alexander Kolyandr, a banking analyst and visiting researcher at the Center for European Policy Analysis, told The Insider that the amendments may have been introduced in anticipation of the seizure of frozen assets linked to the Belgian depository Euroclear:

“I also cannot rule out that this was added in anticipation of the seizure of assets frozen in Russia through Euroclear. Because in addition to securities owned by foreigners through Euroclear accounts, there should also be cash deposit accounts where, over five years, various dividends, payments on matured debt securities, and so on have accumulated.”

“I am very glad [these citizens are coming] because, first, our polls show that most of them will vote for us [the ruling Civil Contract party], and second, we need these people, because military training camps are now underway. It will be very good: We will send 30,000 to 40,000 of those 100,000 to training camps, and then they can return to Kaluga [where Strong Armenia party leader Samvel Karapetyan lived for several years]. What’s the problem?”

The pro-government Telegram channel Baghramyan 26, citing its own sources, wrote that starting on June 1 the authorities began checking Armenian citizens arriving from Russia. “This applies to people who are subject to mandatory 25-day training camps. At the moment, a number of people have already received notices requiring them to appear at a military draft office to take part in training camps,” the channel wrote.

Under a plan previously approved by Armenia’s government, reservist training camps are being held seven times this year, including from March 31 through June 19.

On June 1, activist Arshak Makichyan took to Facebook to publish correspondence with Mikael Badalyan, a pro-Russian blogger and head of the Armenian office of the Eurasia Foundation. In the messages, Badalyan promised to organize a trip to Armenia to vote in the June 7 election.

The Telegram channel Ateo Breaking reported that a complaint had been filed with Armenia’s Anti-Corruption Court against Badalyan’s Eurasia Foundation over suspicions that it was involved in voter bribery.

Makichyan told The Insider he decided to write to Badalyan and publish the exchange because he considers diaspora interference in Armenia’s electoral process unacceptable:

“I had written to him once before, last time in May 2024, when they were organizing protests in Armenia. Back then, he replied that there was no money. This time, to my surprise, he asked me to send passport details to buy a ticket. I did this because I am irritated by people who pretend to be activists while in reality promoting Russia’s interests in Armenia, which is obvious to everyone. I also disagree with the current government on many issues and often speak out about it, but I believe that the diaspora, which does not live in Armenia, should not interfere in the country’s domestic and foreign policy. I believe people like him put Armenian democracy at risk, because criticism of the government is ultimately instrumentalized by pro-Kremlin actors. This obstructs discussion of real problems and harms independent candidates who do not have Kremlin support.”

“100,000 voters”

Reuters reported in late May that the Kremlin had allegedly discussed the possibility of bringing tens of thousands of Armenians from Russia to Armenia, whose total population is under 3 million, to take part in the vote. Unnamed Western intelligence officials told the agency that Russian officials estimated that transporting 100,000 people would cost $50 million. Reuters noted, however, that it could not determine whether Russian authorities were trying to carry out the plan.

Under Armenia’s election law, voting for the National Assembly takes place only inside the country. Citizens are included on voter lists according to their place of permanent registration in Armenia.

Article 11 of Armenia’s Electoral Code states: “All citizens with the right to vote who are registered in a given municipality, as well as citizens temporarily or permanently residing there and not registered in that municipality, shall be included in the voter lists if, no later than five days before voting and in the manner established by the Central Electoral Commission, they submit an application to the head of the municipality to include their surname and first name in the voter list.”

Over the first four years of Russia’s full-scale war in Ukraine, the Religion on Fire project documented at least 742 cases of religious sites being destroyed or damaged. These included Orthodox churches, Protestant houses of prayer, Catholic churches, synagogues, mosques, and theological schools and seminaries — at least 146 sites in the Donetsk region, at least 83 in the Luhansk region, at least 78 in the Kherson region, and at least 51 in the Zaporizhzhia region.

In Mariupol, which fell under Russian occupation after a months-long siege, buildings belonging to various religious communities were damaged. In May 2022, it became known that Russian troops had completely destroyed the local synagogue and the premises of the Jewish community center.

Valentyn Zahreba, pastor of the Seventh-day Adventist Church, said that both buildings belonging to his congregation in the city had also been completely destroyed. One of them was located on Mykolaivska Street, in the historic building of a former synagogue that had been transferred to the Adventist church. The second, on Shevchenko Boulevard, was also used by other Protestant communities.

In the occupied territories, religious buildings were not only shelled. They were also seized, closed, and handed over to occupation authorities for use as military and administrative facilities.

Religious buildings were not only shelled – they were seized, shut down, and handed over to the occupation authorities

In Melitopol, Russian troops appropriated the Grace Evangelical Christian Church, founded in 1910. During the Soviet era, the congregation endured repression and the confiscation of its buildings, and the premises on the city’s main street were returned to believers only in 1991. Services continued there until September 2022, when armed men in masks stormed the church.

During the takeover, they blocked the exits, led parishioners out in groups, confiscated documents, and carried out a search. Pastor Mykhailo Brytsyn and the church administrator were detained and interrogated, after which they were given an ultimatum: leave the city within 48 hours, or else. The church itself was accused of “extremism.”

According to Brytsyn, the Grace building has now been handed over to the so-called Ministry of Culture of the Zaporizhzhia Region and is now used for concerts and ceremonies honoring pro-war propagandists. The cross was removed from the building’s facade.

Not only buildings came under attack. According to an estimate by Ukraine’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, by the spring of 2025 Russian forces had killed at least 67 clergy members from a range of denominations. Some were executed for refusing to cooperate with the occupation administration or for publicly opposing Russian aggression. Others died during the shelling of churches and houses of prayer while remaining in place alongside their congregations.

Some were executed for refusing to cooperate with the occupiers or for publicly opposing the aggression, while others were killed during shelling

In February 2024, in the occupied part of the Kherson region, Russian troops took Orthodox Church of Ukraine (OCU) priest Stepan Podolchak from his home in Kalanchak, where he served. He was led away barefoot with a bag over his head. Two days later, the priest’s body was found bearing signs of torture.

Before the full-scale war, Podolchak conducted services in Ukrainian and continued to do so even after the occupation. He was repeatedly summoned for “conversations” with the FSB and pressured to join the Moscow Patriarchate. He refused.

Some religious figures in the occupied territories were subjected to arrest, interrogation, and imprisonment. In Melitopol, Russian troops detained Dmytro Bodyu, pastor of the Protestant Word of Life church, after he took part in public prayer services for Ukraine and helped believers leave the city.

In the Kherson region, Ukrainian Orthodox Church (UOC) priest Ihor Novoselsky spent 262 days in captivity. He was ordered to stop using the Ukrainian language and submit directly to the Russian Orthodox Church, but he refused and was imprisoned.

Maksym Vasin, director for international advocacy and research at the Institute for Religious Freedom, says that Ukrainian priests, pastors, imams, and other religious figures in the occupied territories were often among the first targets of the Russian occupation authorities. Then, as Russia consolidated its hold over the region, the pressure changed, as overt violence was gradually replaced by “legal” forms of repression through the imposition of Russian legislation.

“It is repressive at its core and serves as a smokescreen for the international community. Under the cover of law, the authorities are systematically destroying any form of dissent both in Russia itself and in the territories of Ukraine under its control,” Vasin says.{{ 

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From destruction to control

After the start of the full-scale invasion, most religious communities in the parts of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions controlled by Russia ceased to exist. Since 2014, Moscow had been developing its methods of repression in the occupied territories. Once Russian legislation was introduced, persecution could be formalized through administrative and criminal procedures.

Mykhailo Brytsyn, director of the religious freedom department at the international Christian organization Mission Eurasia and an elder at the Grace church, says that this legally formalized model of pressure allows the occupation authorities to portray the persecution of believers as “restoring order” or “combating extremism.” Such a system intimidates communities not only through direct violence, but also through fines, courts, paperwork, and registries. “The violence did not disappear. It was built into a bureaucratic and judicial framework,” Brytsyn says.

One of the main instruments of this pressure is the forced registration of religious communities under Russian law. According to Maksym Vasin, the occupation authorities threaten believers with the confiscation of church buildings and other property, demanding that they re-register under Russian regulations. To do so, the head of a religious community and its founding members are required to obtain Russian citizenship.

“The demand to accept Russian citizenship is part of the strategy of forced Russification and the destruction of the Ukrainian identity of the local population in the occupied territories of Ukraine, including churches and other religious communities,” Vasin says. At the same time, he adds, re-registration itself does not guarantee that property will be preserved. Moreover, the personal data of founders submitted during the registration process can later be used by the FSB for surveillance and raids on “illegal” home gatherings of believers.

In practice, the demand for registration is often presented to church leaders during summonses to military commandants’ offices for so-called preventive conversations, Brytsyn says. There, the clergy are threatened: either register in one form or another, or face bans, repression, and deportation.

Under Russian law, conducting religious activity without registration or without filing a required notice is prohibited. “Clergy are effectively faced with a difficult choice: accept the conditions imposed by the occupation authorities or go underground,” Brytsyn says. Those who continue to hold services without registration face administrative cases, followed by criminal prosecution.

Clergy are threatened: either register in one form or another, or face bans, repression, and deportation

The registration requirement functions not only as a way to legalize a religious community, but also as a mechanism of selection: some are allowed to exist officially, while others are denied that right. In the occupied Luhansk region, all Protestant communities were denied registration. Orthodox churches not affiliated with the Moscow Patriarchate were likewise unable to obtain permission to operate. Jehovah’s Witnesses, already banned in Russia, decided not to submit documents at all, fearing further persecution would follow the submission of believers’ personal data.

Refusal to register leaves a community without legal status and therefore without any formal right to use its church building. In practice, this paves the way for the forcible seizure of property: Russian troops and security services occupy church buildings, cut down crosses, and repurpose the premises for the needs of the occupation authorities. According to Brytsyn, by the summer of 2023 at least 15 churches of different denominations had been seized in Melitopol. Police officers now live in one of the buildings, while another houses the occupation “Ministry of Youth.” Several others simply stand empty.

Another instrument of pressure is Russia’s restrictions on “missionary activity.” In the ordinary sense, this means preaching and spreading religious beliefs. However, after the adoption of the “Yarovaya package” in Russia in 2016, the country began to interpret missionary work much more broadly. The amendments were introduced as anti-terrorism measures, but in practice they made it possible to punish almost any expression of religious belief outside officially authorized premises. Prayer meetings, home services, conversations about faith, and the distribution of religious literature could all be treated as violations.

In the occupied territories, this mechanism primarily targets communities that have lost their buildings or are unable to register under Russian rules. If an unregistered community gathers in private homes, the gathering itself can be declared “illegal missionary activity.”

One community subjected to such pressure in the city of Sorokyne was a congregation of Evangelical Christian Baptists (ECB). It is affiliated with the International Union of ECB Churches, which refuses state registration as a matter of principle. As a result, over the past few years Russian security forces have repeatedly carried out searches and raids during its services, while Pastor Vladimir Rytkov and other ministers were fined for “illegal missionary activity.” In March 2026, Rytkov was ordered to leave the occupied part of the Luhansk region within two weeks. The deportation order was issued ten days after yet another protocol was drawn up against him for “holding religious services without authorization.”

Went to a church service and ended up under FSB scrutiny

Even if a religious community in the occupied territories manages to retain legal status, religious services cease to be safe spaces, as Russian security forces can burst in for an inspection at any moment. “During such raids, they try to find signs of disloyalty among parishioners. First of all, they check whether people have Russian passports. Then they search phones for Ukrainian contacts, ties to the military or volunteers, subscriptions to Ukrainian social media, anti-Russian messages, and banned applications,” says Brytsyn.

If the occupation authorities begin to doubt a person’s loyalty, their home may be searched. “And very often it turns out that a Ukrainian almost always has something Ukrainian at home – and therefore something ‘prohibited,’” the pastor says.

The control does not stop at raids. After his release, Protestant pastor Dmytro Bodyu remained in Melitopol for a little while even though he understood that he would not be able to continue his ministry. To stay, he would have had to accept the occupation authorities’ terms — a concession that involved more than formal declarations of loyalty. According to Bodyu, the security forces demanded that he hand over lists of parishioners and their personal data, including places of work and income, and report on their attitudes towards the occupation.

Ukrainian churches do not collect such information, and this, the pastor says, baffled the security services. During interrogation, he was asked who in the SBU supervised him. “I told them: we don’t have anything like that. – What do you mean you don’t? That’s impossible,” Bodyu recalls his conversation with the security officers. According to him, they could not understand how a church could exist without supervision from the security services: “It’s a different way of thinking, a different view of life. For them it’s logical and understandable, but for us it isn’t.”

The Russian security services could not understand how a church could exist without supervision from the intelligence agencies

The pastor refused to cooperate with the occupation authorities and left Melitopol. Another minister remained in the city, and according to Bodyu, he was required to submit his Sunday sermons in advance for review. People who continue attending services now “walk as if through a minefield,” the pastor says. “You have to be extremely careful about expressing your opinions and think about who you are speaking to.”

In such an atmosphere, people begin to fear going to church, praying aloud, speaking Ukrainian, bringing their children to religious activities, or gathering in private homes. According to Brytsyn, there have been cases in which priests were ordered to disclose what they had heard in confession, even though the secrecy of confession forbids such disclosure. “Church life is turning from a space of trust into a space of fear and self-surveillance,” says Brytsyn.

Who is being targeted

According to Maksym Vasin, those most frequently subjected to repression are clergy and communities that the Russian security services regard as openly pro-Ukrainian: the Orthodox Church of Ukraine (OCU), which is independent from Moscow; the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church (UGCC), which is subordinate to the Vatican; and Protestant denominations, primarily Baptists, Pentecostals, and Adventists. “Evangelical churches are also stereotypically viewed as pro-American structures and ‘dangerous’ sects supposedly leading the Orthodox majority astray,” Vasin adds.

In Crimea, Vasin says, the Russian authorities have effectively destroyed the presence of the OCU and the UGCC by eliminating all of their parishes, while Protestant churches were forced to sever their spiritual and administrative ties with Kyiv.

In the newly occupied territories, the OCU’s presence remains, but in an underground format. According to Metropolitan Epifaniy, the head of the Orthodox Church of Ukraine and Metropolitan of Kyiv and All Ukraine, OCU priests still remain in the Donetsk, Luhansk, and Kherson regions, but the church does not disclose statistics or details about their activities so as not to place people at additional risk.

In the Zaporizhzhia region, the UGCC was banned by a separate order issued by the occupation administration. The document, dated Dec. 26, 2022, accused the church of operating “in the interests of foreign intelligence services,” participating in anti-Russian rallies, storing weapons and explosive devices, and engaging in the activities of “extremist organizations.” UGCC property and land plots were transferred to the military-civilian administration, lease agreements were terminated, and the registration of UGCC communities was prohibited.

The head of the UGCC, Major Archbishop of Kyiv-Halych Sviatoslav Shevchuk, reported that not a single Greek Catholic parish remains in the occupied territories of Ukraine. “This means that UGCC parishioners have been left without the sacraments of confession and communion, which can only be administered by an ordained priest. And where can one be found under occupation?” asks Brytsyn.

Before the occupation, Protestant churches in Melitopol were a visible part of city life. Pastor Bodyu says that the city once had an interfaith council, communities held joint events with the local Ukrainian authorities, and clergy could directly approach the mayor, deputies, and officials whenever help was needed.

“Our city is small, and relationships between people matter a great deal. This isn’t about supervision – it’s about living together in one city and working for the good of our community,” he says. During Bodyu’s detention, Russian security officers were surprised to find the phone numbers of the mayor, deputies, the police chief, the prosecutor, and the head of the SBU in the pastor’s phone. As he recalls, “The remarks were along the lines of: we didn’t expect churches in Melitopol to be this influential and this organized.”

Bodyu believes the security forces did not come for him by chance. Instead, they had studied local churches in advance, knew where he lived, and had monitored him for some time.

“The reason for the repression is simple: these religious communities have their own horizontal ties, authority among local people, and often do not fit into the Moscow-controlled religious vertical. They are accustomed to the basic democratic norms by which they lived in Ukraine,” Mykhailo Brytsyn says.

The “correct” religion

In the occupied territories of Ukraine, pressure affects different denominations differently. In the case of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church (UOC), which is canonically linked to the Moscow Patriarchate, congregations are often simply forcibly integrated into the hierarchy of the Russian Orthodox Church. According to Maksym Vasin, the Russian authorities demand that UOC bishops and priests abandon the Ukrainian language, sever their ties with Kyiv, and submit directly to the religious authorities in Moscow. “For the Russian authorities, local church communities and religion in general are instruments of propaganda and control over the population of the occupied territories,” he says.

The Russian authorities demand that UOC priests abandon the Ukrainian language, sever ties with Kyiv, and submit directly to the ROC

After the start of the full-scale war, the UOC declared its independence and autonomy from the Moscow Patriarchate, but the ROC did not recognize this status. As a result, several UOC dioceses in the occupied territories have already been incorporated into the ROC, while bishops and priests who opposed the move have been pushed out or persecuted.

In the Berdyansk diocese, Metropolitan Yefrem (Yarynko) opposed the transfer, but most priests petitioned Patriarch Kirill to accept their parishes into the Moscow Patriarchate. In May 2023, the diocese was incorporated into the ROC, and another bishop was appointed in place of Yefrem.

One of the priests who refused to sign the appeal to Patriarch Kirill was Kostiantyn Maksymov. Two weeks later, he was detained by the occupation authorities, and in August 2024 a court in occupied Crimea sentenced him to 14 years in a maximum-security penal colony for espionage. According to the investigation, Maksymov collected information about Russian air defense systems and passed it to an SBU officer.

At the same time, the ROC was not only integrating occupied dioceses into its hierarchy, but also giving religious meaning to Russian aggression, describing the war as “sacred.” OCU priest Andriy Dudchenko, who lived through the occupation in the Kyiv region, recounted how an ROC chaplain had convinced Russian soldiers of the morality and necessity of the war against Ukraine.

Patriarch Kirill and other representatives of the Russian clergy continue to justify the war despite the deaths of civilians and the destruction of civilian infrastructure, including of Orthodox churches. “The leadership of the ROC and other religious structures loyal to Russia legitimize the regime’s hatred and xenophobia through religious terminology: ‘spiritual struggle,’ ‘spiritual bonds,’ ‘traditional values,’ and the ‘Russian world,’” says Mykhailo Brytsyn.

Religious genocide

Brytsyn describes the Russian authorities’ repression of religious communities in the occupied territories as religious genocide. In his view, this is not a series of isolated episodes, but a systematic policy aimed at destroying the religious identity and everyday life of these communities.

“In essence, the very core of religious freedom is being destroyed — the ability to live according to one’s faith and convictions. The Kremlin regime, having merged with the Russian Orthodox Church and adopted the ideology of the ‘Russian world,’ has carried out a total purge of the religious sphere. Everyone who refuses to openly support this system is subjected to pressure and driven out,” Brytsyn says.

The very essence of religious freedom is being destroyed — the ability to live according to one’s faith and convictions

Ukrainian believers are forced to choose “between bad and even worse.” Those who have left search for new communities in other cities and countries, while those who remain must engage in only extremely cautious forms of ministry. “Communities fragment, lose their public presence, but do not always disappear. They continue to exist in small groups through dispersed support networks and personal ties,” Brytsyn explains.

Pastor Bodyu says that, in Melitopol, little remains of the local religious communities’ former public life after church buildings were seized. Elderly parishioners, who find it easier to adapt to the new conditions, now make up most of those attending services. “The church is now in survival mode. Believers need to gather, communicate, and pray so as not to completely lose heart,” Bodyu says.

Mykhailo Brytsyn reflects on what is happening — not only as a researcher, but also as a pastor. For him, the survival of communities is not dependent on the ability to hold public services in an established building. “The true Church of God knows how to survive under any conditions. Neither comfort and prosperity nor repression and killings can destroy it,” he affirms.

My name is Nadezhda Zavyalova, I am 37 years old. I worked at LLC IFK Silver Pharm from 2012 to 2014 as a junior research associate. When I joined the organization, I was told they were developing antidotes to poisoning in the event of chemical attacks.

I ended up there by chance. I’m a veterinarian by training and had previously worked as an assistant in veterinary clinics, but I quit because of the low pay. I spent some time at home, and then my husband found a listing on Avito saying the organization was looking for a secretary. When they learned about my veterinary background, they offered me a position as a junior research associate instead.

I was invited for an interview — not at the office where the secretaries worked, but at 4 Lesoparkovaya Street. I arrived after hours and was met by Mikhail Yudin. As I understood it, he was not part of Silver Pharm itself, but of the S. M. Kirov Military Medical Academy, and he supervised other military researchers.

After the introductions, Yudin gave me a brief tour of the second floor — to show me around the lab rooms and explain where the lab equipment was located, where the chromatographs were kept, and where drugs were administered. He briefly glanced at my diplomas, but he showed little interest in them. From the way he described the duties of a junior research associate, I understood I could handle them. Essentially, I was expected to work with animals, prepare drug dilutions, and perform injections. As a veterinarian, I already knew how to do all of that. The interview ended there, and he told me they were expecting me on my first day of work.

The following Monday, on my first day, I was assigned to assist Svetlana Subbotina, a senior research associate. I worked with her for some time, but senior researchers mainly focused on writing papers, so I often had nothing to do. Later on, I started working more with junior research associates who conducted experiments on animals. At first, I only assisted them by holding the animals. With time, they taught me how to prepare and dilute pharmaceutical compounds.

My direct supervisor was Alexander Nikiforov. Technically, I did not answer to anyone else, but in practice all the men on the team acted as superiors to us, the junior research associates. If one of them asked for help, we could not say no.

In addition to Alexander Nikiforov and Mikhail Yudin, several more military officers from the academy worked at the company in a separate office: Nikolai Vengerovich, Igor Ivanov, Mikhail Tyunin, and Ivan Fateev. They also wrote papers and occasionally conducted experiments, but never requested assistance.

Sometimes people who were not employees of Silver Pharm also came to the laboratory. One of those I remember seeing on multiple occasions was Vladimir Bykov. Later he married Anna Kurpyakova, a senior research associate. She appeared in subsequent publications under her married name as Anna Bykova.

As far as I knew, Bykov held a senior position at the Kirov Military Medical Academy. He mainly communicated with Alexander Nikiforov. Occasionally, other elderly men would also come in. They never introduced themselves, and no one explained who they were. They would simply walk down the corridor into Nikiforov’s office and then leave. Judging by photographs from investigations by The Insider, one of them must have been Sergei Chepur — one of the visitors looked very much like him. Being relatively young, he stood out from other visitors.

Despite its status as a pharmaceutical company, Silver Pharm did not manufacture any medications. I once saw a colleague from another team mixing substances. I asked what he was doing, and he replied that they were developing a kind of medicine. Those kinds of tasks were performed only by the team of Anna Bykova (Kurpyakova). She had two assistants, and they worked separately from us.

“You don’t need to know what’s inside the main building”

We entered the building through a shared security checkpoint with turnstiles. Access was controlled by passes. When you arrived, you handed in your pass; when you left, you picked it up again. As I understand it, there was a single checkpoint for the entire compound.

I never found out what was located in the main building, but there were always many cars outside and people going in and out. In winter, the paths leading to it were always cleared. There were large gates where some kind of special vehicles occasionally drove in. The gates were always closed, with grilles and heavy doors.

Once, I was walking together with Inna, a junior research associate, and Igor Ivanov was walking behind us. I asked Inna what was inside that building, but she said she didn’t know either. And then Igor, from behind, said something like: “You don’t need to know that.”

We worked in Building B. The first and second floors of the run-down building had very old, Soviet-era interiors in brown, green, and gray tones. The only new equipment we had was probably a chromatograph. But the third floor had been renovated and turned into a bright, clean-looking space with good ventilation systems.

The second floor housed five laboratory rooms. We mainly worked in two: a small one and a large one. Anna Kurpyakova’s team used two other labs for their experiments. The fifth room was mostly empty. There was also a lab on the third floor, and two rooms on the first floor, where we also sometimes worked.

The lab where I worked looked fairly ordinary: a small room with two fume hoods, cabinets along the walls, and tables where rats were kept. In the larger lab, we had racks for rats so we wouldn’t have to carry them over each time. That was also where the used rats were placed after experiments.

One of the wings of our building housed a vivarium with animals. Two lab technicians there handled the rats: receiving them, forming groups, and delivering them to our labs. For some reason, they always had to carry rats outside and bring them back inside, although I once saw Igor Ivanov use the internal door connecting the labs to the vivarium. The rest of the time, those doors remained closed.

Researchers in Building V worked on something related to radiology and radiation. I went in there once, though I don’t even remember why. I only remember women in white lab coats, just like ours. As for the other buildings, I was never inside them.

A couple of times, we traveled to two other laboratories. I don’t know how exactly they were connected to Silver Pharm. We didn’t get there on our own — military men drove us in private cars, so I didn’t know the exact address. Looking back, I remember that one of the laboratories was located at 65B Suvorovsky Prospect. We went there because, as I understood it, they didn’t have staff who knew how to perform inhalation procedures. They didn’t have the equipment either, so we had to bring our own inhalation devices.

I also visited the company’s registered address at 45A Industrialny Prospect, office 216, to pick up my employment record when resigning. The office, where the secretaries and accountants worked, was located in a standard four-story office building.

“The point of the experiment was for the antidote not to work”

Experiments were carried out almost every day. We worked only with rats, sourced from the Rappolovo breeding facility near St. Petersburg. I remember there were also rabbits in the vivarium, and sometimes mice, but those were for senior research associates. Someone also mentioned they had monkeys, but as far as I know, no experiments on monkeys were conducted in our building.

Experiments on rats were usually very similar. We took a specific number of animals, mostly males weighing around 200 grams, and kept them hungry for some time before the procedures.

After exposure, administered either by inhalation or intramuscular injection, the batch of rats was then divided into groups: a control group that received no treatment at all, while other groups were given antidotes or various medicinal substances. Everything was given as a single dose: first the exposure, and then 10–15 minutes later the drugs. After that, we observed clinical signs: how the animal behaved, how long it took for seizures to begin, when death occurred, and so on. The main symptoms were seizures of varying intensity and pulmonary edema — the animals began to suffocate. There were also cases of cyanosis of the mucous membranes.

Clinical presentation of poisoning by nerve agents

Other experiments tested the animals’ reaction to electric current. There were also experiments involving water: rats were placed in clean water, and researchers observed how long the animals could stay afloat. In this way, they studied how certain substances affected endurance, making animals more or less resistant. The timelines of death also varied: some rats died within a few hours, but some after about 36–48 hours — and sometimes even later.

Symptoms observed in known poisonings

Among all the repetitive experiments we conducted over the course of two years, a few were expected to yield a specific result in advance — not in the sense that the military would come in and explicitly say what exactly was needed, but instead, one of the female staff members might let slip what the client was expecting.

For example, the final group was supposed to die. The point of the experiment was for the antidote not to work. At the same time, we only had limited ways to influence the outcome. If an animal that was “supposed to die” died, no one would save it. In some experiments, such as endurance tests in water, the animal was, on the contrary, supposed to survive, so we did what we could to rescue it. When a rat started drowning, we would resuscitate it. I clearly remember that we knowingly distorted the results.

We knowingly distorted the results to keep our clients happy

By the end of the first year, we were mainly involved in processing data: describing the results of experiments, calculating figures, and preparing reports and scientific papers for publication. My name did not appear on the papers because I did not write any texts, but I sometimes helped prepare materials. I had to search for articles online and rewrite them, or I had to find English-language publications and translate them into Russian.

I mostly processed data, entering experimental results into Excel and calculating the indicators. Everything was stored on corporate flash drives. We were not allowed to bring in our own flash drives, but the corporate ones could be taken home. After I quit, I still had one of those work flash drives for some time, but eventually I threw it away.

I didn’t have any security clearance, although we once discussed the possibility of obtaining some kind of clearance — not a very high-level one. I never really understood what benefits it would offer me, and I wasn't too enthusiastic about the idea because I wanted to travel abroad.

“Military personnel would bring in ‘classified’ briefcases with new substances for us to test”

Most of the time, I didn’t even know or care what substances were being administered to the animals. I never prepared the toxic agents myself — only diluted medicinal compounds. Those were handled by junior research associates. I never saw toxic substances being prepared in front of me. Most likely, they were either stored somewhere or brought in by military personnel. They would periodically leave with their “classified” briefcases — as we called them among ourselves — and then return with new substances for us to test.

Svetlana Subbotina worked with soman, as far as I remember. That was already a different level. I also heard about sarin, but we didn’t work with it ourselves — I think that one was also handled by senior research associates.

From what I remember, we worked with chlorine, chloropicrin, phosgene, and ammonia. The chloropicrin experiments were conducted in the large laboratory, but in essence they did not differ much from the others. Almost all experiments involved the use of atropine as the antidote — we were always diluting it.

Possible case of poisoning by chloropicrin

The word “acetylcholinesterase” came up very often in our work. Papers on this topic were constantly being written. I even remember translating materials related specifically to this enzyme from English. Notably, it was the military personnel who asked me to translate these papers, which is why it seems to me that they must have been in charge of those studies.

Later I learned that, under the law, most experiments with hazardous substances of this class are supposed to be conducted by military personnel, and specifically by those who already have children. Civilian women were not supposed to be involved in this at all. That really disturbed me. Moreover, we didn’t have any proper protection — only lab coats, which we brought ourselves, along with gloves and fume hoods.

We had no proper protective equipment — only lab coats that we brought ourselves, along with gloves and fume hoods

The fume hoods worked poorly. I noticed this while working with chlorine: after exposure experiments, the smell of chlorine remained in the room even outside the hood. I was really worried about getting chlorine poisoning. And there were also more serious substances there, some with no smell at all.

At some point, I realized I had to prioritize my health. The pay there was low — only 22,000 rubles a month (around $700 at the time). I had nothing to lose, so I handed in my resignation. My boss Nikiforov tried to persuade me to stay, but I refused. I was then given a two-week notice period, as required by law. I completed my work without any issues and left.

“I did not realize I was working at a military facility”

When I resigned, I had nothing to fall back on. For a while I stayed at home, then got an odd job at an airport as an aircraft cleaner. But I only worked there for a month — the pay was even lower. After that I was unemployed for a long time, and when the [full-scale] war in Ukraine began in 2022, my husband and I left Russia.

After we moved to a new country, I needed to find additional information about my previous jobs. My husband started searching online for everything related to Silver Pharm and saw that it had been shut down in 2025. He also came across a court case involving Vladimir Bykov and Alexander Nikiforov. He asked me if I knew them. I said, “Of course. Nikiforov was my supervisor, and Bykov was his superior.”

So we gradually began reading more and realized that Silver Pharm shared an address with the State Research Testing Institute of Military Medicine, which may have been involved in the development of toxic substances, including those related to Novichok. For me, it was a shock.

I didn’t even realize that I was essentially working at a military facility, and I think my former colleagues, other junior research associates, were in the same state of ignorance. But I’m sure the senior research associates knew more — they worked with other, more serious substances, wrote papers, and did not share much with us.

Comment by physician Alexander Polupan

Alexander Polupan is a Russian anesthesiologist and intensive care specialist who participated in treating Alexei Navalny after his poisoning with a Novichok-type agent in Omsk in 2020.

Clinical presentation and antidotes

Seizures and pulmonary edema are very characteristic clinical signs of all organophosphates and all cholinesterase inhibitors. This could be Novichok, or it could be other, more widespread organophosphates — the clinical presentation will generally be the same.

Of the substances used as antidotes to nerve agents, there are essentially two main groups of drugs.

The first is atropine, which removes only part of the symptoms by blocking muscarinic (M) cholinergic receptors — the receptors responsible for the function of internal organs and glands. It helps prevent death from bradycardia (a dangerous slowing of the heart rate) and bronchorrhea (excessive secretion of fluid and mucus in the bronchi), which involves a person literally beginning to drown in their own secretions.

The second group consists of oximes, such as pralidoxime. These are cholinesterase reactivators — drugs that attempt to displace the toxic agent molecule from its bond with the enzyme and restore the enzyme’s activity.

As a result, acetylcholine stops accumulating, and the effects of disrupted neuromuscular transmission are reduced. In poisoning, this involves continuous stimulation of the neuromuscular synapses: the muscles first undergo sustained contraction and then become paralyzed. The paralysis leads to respiratory arrest, causing death of the exposed person or lab animal. If oximes are effective, they improve all symptoms — unlike atropine, which only works partially.

If they were indeed studying the effectiveness of different molecules in terms of overcoming antidote therapy, then it was most likely oximes rather than atropine. Atropine is needed as part of the treatment to relieve certain symptoms, but it does not affect neuromuscular transmission disorders, since those involve a different type of receptor. Its use mainly indicates that cholinesterase inhibitors were being studied. The effectiveness of oximes, however, depends on the specific molecule: some variants of Novichok can be displaced more easily, while others are harder to reactivate or may not be displaced at all. It is possible that what they were trying to understand was precisely this: how to design compounds against which standard oxime therapy would be less effective.

Endurance experiments

Experiments testing rat endurance in water are most likely related to studying substances that either increase stamina or, conversely, suppress willpower. Such studies were indeed conducted: researchers examined how long an animal would continue to struggle for survival before giving up and beginning to drown. These could involve either doping agents for athletes or psychotropic substances for military use. However, in my view, this is not related to nerve agents or cholinesterase inhibitors.

Chloropicrin, sarin, and soman

Chloropicrin, sarin, and soman are all relatively old and well-studied chemical warfare agents. It is not entirely clear what exactly Silver Pharm was trying to do with the animals — whether the goal was to kill them or, on the contrary, to develop methods of saving them. Therefore, it is difficult to say what new knowledge they could have been trying to obtain about these substances.

Delayed death effect

If we are talking specifically about delayed death, then it is likely that a different class of poisons was being studied, rather than organophosphates. The very idea of nerve agents is to rapidly disrupt breathing: a person stops breathing and, without immediate assistance, dies very quickly.

At the same time, from the known cases of suspected poisonings I am aware of, there are grounds to assume that Russian security services may also use other types of poisons with different mechanisms of action, such as hepatotoxic agents — that is, substances that damage the liver.

We do not know what specific compounds this might involve, but there are several cases which, based on a combination of indirect indicators, appear consistent with possible poisonings. In such situations, delayed lethality can be expected, where severe consequences and death do not occur immediately, but develop over the course of days.

In Vladivostok, the Rosgvardiya directorate for Primorsky Territory organized a celebration at the premises of the Vostok unit, which has participated in the war against Ukraine. As Vladimir Motorin, deputy chairman of the Patriot military sports club, wrote on social media, fighters of the unit and cadets from the local branch of the Far Eastern Law Institute showed children “drill maneuvers and formations used for suppressing mass unrest.” Club instructors also held basic military training workshops for the schoolchildren.

The security forces employees showed children special and armored vehicles, small arms, and riot control equipment. Judging by the photographs, a sniper rifle, assault rifles, machine guns, pistols, grenades, and drones were on display. During competitions, teenagers were invited to disassemble assault rifles. Event participants were treated to porridge and sweets from a local manufacturer.

Similar events took place in other cities as well, DOXA reports. In Novosibirsk, staff from the local FSIN directorate staged a performance simulating combat, and prison service employees and police officers dressed children in their gear and handed them riot shields. In Yakutsk, instructors from the Voin military-patriotic center held workshops for children at the “Festival of Childhood,” training participants to pilot drones, disassemble and reassemble assault rifles, and perform CPR on a mannequin.

In January, Syktyvkar’s Yuri Gagarin School No. 4 published a summary of a field trip by second-graders to the FSIN Directorate Museum, describing the event as “a fascinating and unforgettable journey.” The report noted that children were particularly impressed by the “harsh punishment cell,” and that the excursion could “awaken in them the desire to become worthy defenders of justice in the future.”

According to the SBU, in February–March 2022, Mussagaleyev commanded a reconnaissance platoon of the 104th Regiment of the 76th Guards Air Assault Division of the Russian Airborne Forces during the occupation of the Bucha district of the Kyiv Region. During one of the unit’s “cleansing operations,” his subordinates detained a 29-year-old local resident, Ivan Fitzner, at a checkpoint, after photos of construction materials were found on his phone. Following Fitzner’s detention, he was taken to a forest near the village of Dmytrovka, where he was tortured. Then, Mussagaleyev allegedly ordered Fitzner’s execution. The deceased’s body was left at the scene.

Astra reports that the SBU published footage of the interrogation of a Russian prisoner of war from Mussagaleyev’s company, who confirmed that the order to shoot had been given. In 2023, Ukraine charged Mussagaleyev under Article 438 of the Ukrainian Criminal Code (violation of the laws and customs of war by a group of persons).

In Russia, Mussagaleyev has been awarded the Gold Star of the Hero of Russia, three Orders of Courage, and a Medal of the Order “For Merit to the Fatherland,” Second Class.

In 2024, he completed an internship in the government of the Orenburg Region as part of the “Time of Heroes” program, which was created at Putin’s directive. In March 2025, Mussagaleyev became the head of the Novosergiyevsky district.

Russia has also restricted imports of Armenian flowers, mineral water, brandy, wine, vegetables, strawberries, fish, and fish products from Armenia, along with the transport of such products through Russian territory. The measures coincide with a sharp deterioration in relations between Moscow and the government of Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan. Yerevan has been steadily distancing itself from Russian-led integration structures, deepening cooperation with the European Union and the United States while discussing prospects for European integration.

On May 29, the leaders of Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan demanded that Armenia choose between membership in the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) and a path toward joining the European Union. Belarusian dictator Alexander Lukashenko then warned Yerevan of a possible repeat of what he called the “Ukrainian scenario.” Vladimir Putin has previously issued similar warnings, linking the war in Ukraine to Kyiv’s efforts to move closer to the European Union.

Pashinyan responded by saying the question of choosing between the EU and the EAEU remained “theoretical” and that holding a referendum to decide the question would be premature. He said Armenia would continue working within the EAEU while acknowledging that relations with Russia were “in a stage of transformation.”

Pressure on Yerevan is intensifying less than a week before parliamentary elections scheduled for June 7. Electoral analyst Roman Udot told The Insider that Moscow has long used import bans as a tool of political pressure on neighboring countries, noting that similar measures had previously been used against Georgia and Moldova. In both prior cases, the consequences of such restrictions ultimately affect Russian consumers by reducing the variety of products available to them while driving up prices.

The court ordered the temporary removal of the “new” leadership and returned control of the party to Kılıçdaroğlu and his team pending a final ruling by Turkey’s Supreme Court. All party decisions and congresses held after November 2023 were also automatically declared invalid, effectively paralyzing the CHP’s operations.

The following day, May 22, the court rejected an appeal filed by Özel’s team against the temporary removal of the party leadership. Ankara’s appellate chamber ruled that the earlier verdict was final in nature and could not be separately appealed.

In response, Özel stated that there were now effectively two CHPs in Turkey: the “elected” one and the “appointed” one. After the rejection of his appeal, Özel and his supporters refused to leave the party’s central headquarters in Ankara, and a standoff between Özel’s team and the court-appointed leadership continued inside the building for several days.

The situation escalated sharply after representatives of Kılıçdaroğlu appealed to the police to enforce the court ruling. On May 24, special forces stormed the party’s central office in Ankara, using tear gas and rubber bullets during the operation. 

Even within the CHP leadership “appointed” by the authorities, Kılıçdaroğlu’s actions triggered a strong backlash. Several lawmakers who had previously supported him publicly refused to join the new leadership after police were brought in to establish control over the headquarters.

Part of the genuinely opposition-minded CHP base reacted even more harshly. During protests outside the party’s central office and in other cities across the country, demonstrators were heard shouting “traitor Kemal.” Videos also spread on social media showing protesters tearing up portraits of the reappointed party leader.

For the first time since the military coup of September 1980, the CHP’s central headquarters was taken over by security forces. Moreover, the new CHP leadership headed by Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu used the police against members of its own party. For the Turkish opposition.

From “managed” opposition to a political threat

It is clear that what is happening with the CHP goes far beyond an ordinary intra-party conflict. For a significant part of the Turkish opposition, the current crisis has signaled that President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) he heads are no longer confident that they can retain power in the next elections.

The CHP had long been Turkey’s largest opposition party, but the authorities still did not view it as a genuine competitor. The party regularly criticized Erdoğan and maintained a strong presence in parliament and in the country’s largest cities, yet it consistently lost the key elections. During his 13 years as the head of the CHP, Kılıçdaroğlu failed to defeat Erdoğan in a single nationwide campaign.

For Erdoğan and the AKP, this model was quite convenient. Turkey retained formal political competition, with the opposition taking part in elections and remaining a visible political force even as the authorities remained confident that they would ultimately maintain control over the system.

The situation began to change after the 2019 municipal elections, when the CHP won the vote not only in Ankara but also in Istanbul. For Erdoğan, the defeat was especially painful: he had begun his own political career as mayor of Istanbul and repeatedly said that “whoever wins Istanbul wins Turkey.”

Particularly painful for the authorities was the nature of CHP candidate Ekrem İmamoğlu’s victory. Initially, İmamoğlu narrowly defeated the ruling party’s candidate, former Prime Minister Binali Yıldırım, after which the AKP secured the annulment of the election results. However, the repeat vote turned into an even heavier defeat for Erdoğan, as İmamoğlu won by an even larger margin.

From that moment on, İmamoğlu began transforming from a popular mayor into a politician of national stature. Unlike many CHP representatives, he managed to attract not only the party’s traditional secular electorate but also part of the country’s more religious and conservative voting base. His political style differed noticeably from that of the conventional secular opposition: less ideological, more flexible, and focused on building a broad anti-government coalition.

Nevertheless, after the 2023 elections Erdoğan’s position still appeared stable. In the second round, he received 52.18% of the vote, while Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu, backed by an alliance of six opposition parties, won 47.82%.

In the second round of the 2023 presidential election, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan won 52.18% of the vote, while Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu received 47.82%

The defeat was a heavy blow for the CHP, and it intensified the internal criticism of longtime leader Kılıçdaroğlu. Despite the popularity of the mayors of Istanbul and Ankara — Ekrem İmamoğlu and Mansur Yavaş — both chose not to compete for control of the party and instead backed Özgür Özel for the role after the 2023 defeat.

The change in the CHP leadership was one of the key consequences of the lost presidential election. After Özel took over, the party gradually moved away from the cautious opposition model associated with the Kılıçdaroğlu era, opting instead for a more aggressive electoral strategy.

The 2024 municipal elections provided a troubling signal for the ruling party. For the first time in decades, the CHP outpolled the AKP nationwide in local elections. The opposition retained control over the country’s largest cities and even succeeded in winning in parts of central Anatolia, long regarded as one of Erdoğan’s main strongholds.

The victory demonstrated that the opposition’s success was no longer confined to a few major cities or to protest voting. The CHP began to be seen as a force capable not only of serving as the main opposition party, but of taking power itself.

How government pressure strengthened opposition sentiment

After the CHP’s success in the 2024 municipal elections, pressure on the party intensified sharply. The main target was Istanbul mayor İmamoğlu, whom many in Turkey already viewed as Erdoğan’s most dangerous potential rival in future presidential elections. Unlike many traditional CHP figures, he proved capable of competing with Erdoğan for part of the conservative and religious electorate — the very constituency on which the AKP’s dominance had rested for many years.

As a result, a series of criminal investigations was launched against İmamoğlu. He was accused of corruption, abuse of office, and ties to people whom the Turkish authorities describe as being involved in terrorism. İmamoğlu and his supporters called the cases politically motivated and linked them to his growing popularity.

In the spring of 2025, the pressure on İmamoğlu escalated dramatically. First, the authorities revoked his university diploma, potentially depriving him of the opportunity to run in the presidential election, since under Turkish law a presidential candidate must possess a degree. Shortly afterward, İmamoğlu was arrested on charges of corruption and abuse of office.

İmamoğlu’s arrest triggered the largest protests Turkey had seen in years. However, the CHP’s response was not limited to street demonstrations. The party launched a large-scale nationwide campaign against Erdoğan, arguing that the pressure on the mayor of Istanbul was politically motivated and posed a threat to civil liberties nationwide.

Initially, many viewed Özgür Özel primarily as a compromise figure, but after İmamoğlu’s arrest he unexpectedly found himself at the center of the largest opposition mobilization in years. Özel began speaking regularly at rallies — twice a week and in virtually every city across the country — sharply escalating his anti-Erdoğan rhetoric and effectively turning himself into one of the opposition’s main public leaders.

There were also rumors in Turkish political circles that representatives of the state had tried to persuade Özel to adopt a more cautious line after İmamoğlu’s arrest. Instead, Özel moved in the opposite direction, launching a much harsher campaign against Erdoğan and the AKP. In response, new criminal cases were opened against opposition mayors, while the government increasingly accused the CHP of corruption and abuse of municipal resources.

At the same time, the economic situation was deepening the problems faced by Erdoğan’s party. High inflation, declining purchasing power, and the rising cost of living remained the main concerns for most Turkish voters. Even official statistics recorded inflation above 35%, while the independent ENAG group estimated it at more than 70%.

The pressure on İmamoğlu and the CHP produced the opposite of the authorities’ intended effect. Instead of weakening the opposition, the CHP managed to consolidate a significant share of the protest electorate around itself at the same time the AKP’s ratings began to decline.

By the spring of 2026, a number of Turkish polling organizations were already showing the CHP holding a steady lead over the ruling party. According to a survey by PİAR Araştırma published on May 21 — the same day as the court ruling on the CHP — the party enjoyed 35.4% support, compared with 31.7% for the AKP.

On the day of the court ruling on the CHP, the party was polling at 35.4%, compared with 31.7% for the ruling AKP

In short, the pressure on İmamoğlu failed to split the new opposition. Instead, the CHP managed to turn the arrest of its most popular politician into a tool of political mobilization, and Özel gradually evolved from a compromise intra-party figure into one of Erdoğan’s harshest public critics, capable of rallying other opposition forces around the CHP.

The logic behind these developments also largely explains the attempt to return Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu to the leadership of the party. After all, under his guidance the CHP had remained a largely non-threatening opponent. In the eyes of a significant part of Turkish society, the judicial intervention was seen as part of a broader government pressure campaign against an opposition that was steadily growing in strength.

Under Özel, the longtime strategy of Turkey’s largest opposition party had begun to change. The CHP became more active beyond its traditional electorate, intensifying street mobilization and, for the first time in many years, campaigning as if it were a political force capable not merely of criticizing Erdoğan, but of genuinely competing to replace his government.

Another source of concern for Erdoğan and the AKP was Özel’s constant calls for early presidential elections — the paradox being that early elections remained one of the few ways Erdoğan could legally run for president again after the end of his current term.

However, unlike in previous electoral cycles, an early vote no longer guaranteed Erdoğan victory. Under Kılıçdaroğlu, the CHP had for years maintained a relatively stable result (within the range of 24–28% of the vote), but after Özel took over, the party’s ratings began to rise, exceeding 30–35% in a number of polls.

Against this backdrop, the Turkish opposition increasingly discussed a scenario in which a CHP candidate could realistically defeat Erdoğan in a presidential election even if Ekrem İmamoğlu were barred from participating. Ankara Mayor Mansur Yavaş, who remains one of the country’s most popular opposition politicians, was regularly mentioned as a possible alternative.

Crisis in the opposition party — a problem for the entire political system

The struggle for control over the CHP is still far from over, and Turkish political circles are already discussing possible new steps aimed at increasing pressure on Özel’s team. In particular, media outlets and opposition figures are saying that the authorities may try to strip Özel of parliamentary immunity in order to open new criminal cases against him.

A significant portion of Özel’s supporters view Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu with distrust, fearing that the party leadership imposed through the courts will not obstruct further legal pressure on the current CHP team. Following Kılıçdaroğlu’s imposed return as the head of the CHP, pressure on Özel’s supporters will likely intensify from two directions at onceP through the judicial system and through Kılıçdaroğlu himself.

Perhaps even more importantly, if the Supreme Court upholds the decision to invalidate the CHP’s 2023 congress and the party’s subsequent decisions, it could create a dangerous precedent for Turkey’s entire political system. The issue is no longer merely a conflict within the CHP — in effect, the courts would gain the ability to intervene in the internal electoral processes of any organization and change its leadership after voting has already taken place.

In that case, not only intra-party elections but the very stability of all electoral mechanisms could come under threat — from political parties to professional associations, foundations, and other civic and business organizations whose leadership is chosen through voting. For Turkish society, which has long viewed elections as one of the last remaining pillars of civil liberties, this would be an extremely alarming development.

What is happening around the CHP is already being described as a political earthquake. Just a few years ago, direct judicial intervention in the internal leadership of Turkey’s largest opposition party would have seemed almost unimaginable. Now, however, the courts are effectively annulling the results of intra-party elections, police are storming the CHP’s central headquarters, and the struggle for control over the country’s largest and oldest opposition party has turned into one of the most severe political crises in recent years.

Virtually all opposition politicians have openly backed Özel, and the current situation is being perceived as a threat to all political parties. The court ruling also coincided with the important religious holiday of Eid al-Adha, during which political confrontation is traditionally considered unacceptable.

Against this backdrop, the traditional holiday contacts between Turkey’s various political parties was especially revealing. The pro-Kurdish Peoples’ Equality and Democracy Party (DEM Party), along with two other opposition forces (the Good Party and the Victory Party) did not include the CHP in their holiday programs. A DEM Party representative, responding to a journalist’s question about a visit by Kılıçdaroğlu to the party headquarters, openly stated that the “appointed leader of the CHP” would not be received.

At the same time, for the first time in three years the ruling AKP will hold a holiday meeting with the CHP — right after Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu’s return to the opposition party’s leadership. In short, the less predictable future elections become for Erdoğan, the more aggressively the authorities will seek to reshape the political field before the campaigning even begins.

Dodik hardly fits any of these categories. Instead, he retains the status of the Kremlin’s main ally in the Balkans, primarily thanks to his unconditional support for all Kremlin initiatives. Although Dodik has no foreign policy authority (and does not even currently hold any formal government position), he is still frequently received at the Kremlin and the Russian Foreign Ministry.

Dodik has cultivated the image of the Kremlin’s main ally in the Balkans through his unconditional support for all Kremlin initiatives

This time, he arrived for a meeting with Deputy Foreign Minister Alexander Grushko carrying a declaration adopted by the parliament of Republika Srpska (the Serb entity within Bosnia and Herzegovina) calling on the UN Security Council to abolish the post of High Representative in Bosnia, the international administrator who serves as the ultimate authority on interpreting the Dayton Accords of 1995.

The Balkans are now debating the unexpected resignation of the current High Representative: German diplomat Christian Schmidt, who announced his departure on May 11 after five years in office. Although Schmidt cited “personal reasons” for his departure, many believe he was pushed out by the Trump administration, which was dissatisfied with the German diplomat’s style and his sharp conflict with Dodik. The State Department has not formally confirmed this, but it described Schmidt’s resignation as a timely decision and promised to work actively on de-escalation.

Dodik, Russia, and the U.S. against Europe

It was Schmidt’s disputes with Dodik — along with the position of Russia and China, which never recognized his appointment — that has led to the most severe crisis since the end of the Bosnian War. In June 2025, Dodik was removed from the post of president of Republika Srpska for failing to comply with the High Representative’s decisions. A court even sentenced him to one year in prison (a penalty that was quickly converted into a fine) and barred him from holding public office for another six years.

However, the court could not strip Dodik of his political influence. In November 2025, he secured the election of his ally Siniša Karan as president of Republika Srpska and also succeeded in getting U.S. financial sanctions lifted from himself, his children, and his inner circle. Experts describe Dodik as the main beneficiary of the conflict with the international administration, as it is now much easier for him to demand an end to external oversight by exploiting the contradictions among the main guarantors of peace: the United States, Europe, and Russia.

As Vuk Vuksanović, an international security expert and lecturer in war studies at King’s College London, told The Insider, opinions on the institution of the High Representative in Bosnia and Herzegovina have always been divided. The authorities in Sarajevo and most Western countries viewed the institution as necessary for implementing the Dayton Accords and maintaining stability in the country. On the other hand, many Bosnian Serbs, some Croatian politicians, a number of Western analysts, and officials in Moscow argue that the institution of the High Representative has given international officials excessive influence at the expense of democratically elected local leaders.

“The reality is, of course, more complex than either of these positions, but politically the biggest winner in the current situation is Dodik, whose main goal is to preserve his political influence and remain in power, whether formally or informally,” Vuksanović says.

Interestingly, the United States and Russia have ended up in similar positions, albeit for different reasons. Russia has spent years criticizing the institution of the High Representative (and Schmidt in particular), while the Trump administration’s policy has shown a tendency toward more pragmatic and “transactional” relations with local political elites.

“In a sense, Dodik achieved what Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić had hoped for but failed to obtain: the ability to maintain relations with both Washington and Moscow while simultaneously weakening European influence,” Vuksanović explains.

Why sanctions against Dodik were lifted

Observers continue to debate how dramatically Washington’s Balkan policy could change under Trump — and whether this might ultimately undermine the entire settlement model in which the United States originally acted as the main financial donor and security guarantor. The Trump administration has stated that “the United States remains steadfast in its commitment to support stability and security in Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Western Balkans. We work closely with Bosnia and Herzegovina’s leaders to reinforce Dayton and encourage the pursuit of local solutions that benefit all constituent peoples.” Decisive U.S. diplomacy, according to a recent report to Congress, helped end the most severe crisis since the 1992–1995 conflict “while preserving the country’s legal cohesion and constitutional order.”

But the details of last year’s agreements between Washington and Dodik remain unknown. One of the main questions is why all sanctions against him were lifted after years of accusations of corruption, obstructing the peace settlement, and attempts to dismantle Bosnia and Herzegovina.

The United States first imposed sanctions on Dodik in 2017 and later expanded the measures several times, extending them to cover executives of companies linked to the Dodik family, Dodik’s political associates, and to his son Igor and daughter Gorica. In the American documents, Dodik was portrayed almost as a demonic figure who had robbed the public and nearly destroyed the country.

In the earlier American documents, Dodik comes across as an almost demonic figure who robbed the public and nearly destroyed the country

For example, in June 2024 the U.S. Treasury Department stated that it would “continue to expose the fraudulent schemes that allow Dodik and his family to exploit their own people for personal gain.” According to the document, Dodik was not only robbing citizens through corrupt practices, but also undermining national security via his near constant threats of Republika Srpska’s secession.

The Treasury Department explained that Dodik had used his official position to steer government contracts to private companies controlled by him and his son Igor through nominal owners and directors. Among those companies are Prointer, Kaldera, Infinity Media, K-2, Una, and Sirius, which receive lucrative government contracts in the information technology and engineering sectors.

Against all logic

As late as November 2024, the U.S. Treasury Department was claiming to have “exposed” clear attempts by Dodik’s network to circumvent the restrictions imposed on him. Nevertheless, on Oct. 29, 2025, sanctions affecting nearly 70 people and entities were lifted — yet Dodik’s team continued to harshly criticize the international administration and its opponents in Sarajevo exploiting the contentious issues of financial and state property disputes to reiterate Republika Srpska’s main ambition: breaking away.

“Dodik has always found unexpected courses of action to survive on the political stage, and even when it seemed that he was fading into the past, he would rise again against all political logic,” Husnija Kamberović, a professor at the Faculty of Philosophy at the University of Sarajevo, told The Insider.

According to Kamberović, Schmidt’s resignation is pushing Dodik toward even more active measures. Although he was removed from the post of president of Republika Srpska last summer, he remains the central political figure in Republika Srpska’s power structure. In effect, he has retained full power while shifting responsibility for its exercise onto others. Dodik will push new declarations of his own and try to encourage others into the risky venture of annulling previous decisions by the High Representative, Kamberović believes.

Schmidt’s resignation is pushing Dodik toward even more active measures

Over the entire postwar period, the Office of the High Representative has adopted hundreds of decisions on a wide range of issues that local authorities were unable to resolve themselves. These included matters related to property, the return of refugees, the state symbols of Bosnia and Herzegovina, citizenship laws, and election legislation. In addition, around 140 officials — judges, government ministers, civil servants, and members of parliament — were dismissed. Among the most recent measures were the suspension of budget financing for Dodik’s party (SNSD) and the annulment of several resolutions passed by the parliament of Republika Srpska.

The “Americanization” of Republika Srpska

In recent months, delegations from the Bosnian Serb leadership have been making frequent trips to the United States, while Republican members of Congress and other notable allies of Donald Trump have begun visiting Banja Luka. Perhaps most notably, on May 27–28 Michael Flynn’s think tank, the Gold Institute for International Strategy, hosted an international forum on economic and security issues in Banja Luka.

Politicians and “opinion leaders” from Europe, the United States, and allied countries were invited to the event. Particular attention, organizers said, was devoted to the role of Republika Srpska within Bosnia and Herzegovina “as Europe faces shifting alliances, renewed great-power competition, and evolving institutional frameworks.”

Flynn is known for serving as Trump’s National Security Advisor for only 24 days — the shortest tenure in the history of the position. He left office in February 2017 following a scandal over his undisclosed contacts with  Sergey Kislyak, then the Russian Ambassador to Washington.

Flynn pleaded guilty to lying to the FBI in the case concerning alleged Russian interference in the U.S. elections, although he later attempted to withdraw the guilty plea. In 2020, Trump exercised his constitutional authority and granted Flynn a pardon.

In the Balkans, Flynn is described as one of Republika Srpska’s main lobbyists, reportedly earning $100,000 a month for providing “strategic advice and analysis and helping establish contacts with decision-makers in Washington.”

Flynn, who has been labeled a “Christian nationalist,” also visited Banja Luka in March, and his lecture there was broadcast live by the pro-government RTRS television channel. Among other things, he accused the European Union of “arrogance” and indirectly supported the idea of Republika Srpska’s independence.

Responding to a question from Dodik about the threat of the Islamization of Europe and European state institutions, Flynn said that “Islam is not a religion, but a political philosophy.” Many interpreted this as a jab at Bosnian Muslims, who make up half of Bosnia and Herzegovina’s population.

Following in the footsteps of Gorbachev, Bush, and Blair

At the beginning of April, Dodik and his son Igor — the organizational secretary of the SNSD party — warmly welcomed Donald Trump Jr. to Banja Luka. Although he holds no government office, Igor is considered one of his father’s key advisers.

Donald Jr., for his part, serves as executive vice president of The Trump Organization while simultaneously acting as a “mouthpiece” for the MAGA movement. He also participates in election campaigns and helps shape the president’s team by promoting conservative figures and ideas. The media has discussed the possibility of his participation in future presidential elections.

In Republika Srpska, he was received with special honors fitting of a future head of state. Central Banja Luka was completely sealed off, armored vehicles were deployed, and large numbers of local police officers were mobilized. Igor Dodik said Trump Jr. had arrived in Banja Luka at his invitation, calling it the result of years of work with people who support “common-sense politics.” Dodik Sr. was among the key figures accompanying the American president’s son.

Three weeks later, the Bosnian Serb leader was honored at Judson University, a private Baptist educational institution in Illinois. There, Dodik received the institution’s “Leadership and Defense of Democracy” award in recognition of his commitment to national sovereignty, democratic principles, and courage in the face of complex political and global challenges.

Answering journalists’ questions, Dodik criticized previous U.S. administrations for mistakes in implementing the Dayton Accords and described Bosnia as an unstable country lacking sovereignty. He even compared himself to Trump, claiming that he, too, had suffered from politically motivated prosecution. Dodik named Russia, the United States, and China as his main partners.

What about partners and sovereignty?

In the near future, the main participants in the Balkan settlement process will have to agree on a candidate to replace Schmidt as High Representative, but it is expected that the next officeholder will not enjoy the same freedom of action that previous High Representatives did. For three decades, Washington was one of the principal supporters of an interventionist approach in the region, and with a green light from the United States, international administrators freely removed unwanted officials from office while imposing whatever laws they deemed necessary.

However, at a UN Security Council meeting on May 12, U.S. representative Tammy Bruce said that the future High Representative should have a “significantly more limited mandate.” Britain and France expressed support for the Office of the High Representative, while Russia once again called for its closure.

As Husnija Kamberović told The Insider, it is now quite difficult to find political forces, either in Bosnia and Herzegovina or internationally, capable of helping resolve the crisis. “One would have hoped that over the past 30 years the international community had done more to stabilize Bosnia and Herzegovina’s domestic institutions. But we can see that these institutions, undermined by corruption, have proved insufficiently accountable, while political leaders have been unable to cope with the challenges facing the country.” In his view, “a compromise must be found — otherwise there is a real threat of a new conflict, possibly even bloodier than the one in the 1990s.”

Many observers in the Balkans fear that today’s disputes among global powers could turn into a serious security problem, especially if the separatist bloc led by Dodik chooses the path of escalation. Still, King’s College international security expert Vuksanović believes that “talk of Bosnia and Herzegovina breaking apart would be an exaggeration.”

“Even Dodik understands that such a scenario would be extremely risky and difficult to achieve. Moreover, despite changes in U.S. policy, neither the Trump administration nor even Russia wants such an outcome,” he told The Insider.

On May 18, U.S. President Donald Trump announced that he was postponing new strikes against Iran at the request of the leaders of Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the UAE given that “serious negotiations” on a deal to end the conflict were underway. He also emphasized Iran’s inability to obtain nuclear weapons and Washington’s readiness to resume a full-scale military campaign if the deal fails. Trump later clarified that the talks are proceeding in an “orderly and constructive manner” and that there is therefore no need to rush the talks.

Since April 7, the parties have broadly maintained a ceasefire while simultaneously conducting negotiations to end the conflict. Furthermore, Trump notified Congress that he considers the war against Iran over.

The parties are broadly maintaining a ceasefire while simultaneously conducting negotiations to end the conflict

At the same time, all known peace initiatives have so far diverged on several key points:

• The fate of Iran’s accumulated enriched uranium stockpiles
• The operational status of Iran’s nuclear facilities
• Control over the Strait of Hormuz
• Payment of compensation for damages incurred
• Cessation of hostilities against Iran’s regional allies

Publicly available versions of the Iranian plan either directly contradict American proposals or defer discussion of these issues to an indefinite future date, demanding the following conditions:

• Retention of Iranian uranium enrichment capabilities
• Cessation of hostilities against Iranian allies on all fronts (including Lebanon)
• Lifting of the U.S. naval blockade and removal of American and UN sanctions
• Unfreezing of Iranian assets and compensation for war damages
• Withdrawal of all U.S. troops from regions bordering Iran

Trump has repeatedly stated that he does not intend to accept such terms, and on the key issue of handling enriched uranium stockpiles, he insists either on transfer to the U.S. or destruction under external supervision. Meanwhile, Iranian representatives have so far expressed a willingness to transfer only a portion of the stockpiles to a friendly country, and only temporarily.

Therefore, two options remain for achieving a peace deal with parameters acceptable to Trump: maintaining the blockade on Iranian oil exports in the expectation that economic difficulties will eventually force the leadership in Tehran to make concessions, or resuming hostilities.

How the Americans are enforcing the blockade

U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) announced the start of the blockade at 10:00 a.m. Eastern Time on April 13. According to the press release, the blockade applies to all vessels departing from Iranian ports and ports in adjacent waters, effectively shutting down traffic in the Persian Gulf and the Gulf of Oman.

The blockade involves two carrier strike groups led by the aircraft carriers USS Abraham Lincoln (CVN-72) and USS George H. W. Bush (CVN-77), as well as the 31st Marine Expeditionary Unit of the U.S. Marine Corps. The force totals more than 200 aircraft, 20 ships, and 15,000 personnel.

U.S. forces are enforcing the blockade through both vessel seizures and direct strikes against ships, but the actual control line lies east of the Strait of Hormuz, in the waters of the Gulf of Oman and the Arabian Sea, a measure taken due to the risk of attacks emanating from Iranian territory. This is precisely why U.S. Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth stated that there is no “blockade of the Strait of Hormuz,” since the strait can in theory no longer be freely navigated without the permission of the U.S. Navy.

According to CENTCOM, as of May 27, 2026, a total of 109 commercial vessels have been “redirected” since the blockade began, with four more ships “immobilized” by force. By early May, a total of 70 tankers had been reportedly prevented from entering or leaving Iranian ports. Those tankers’ combined carrying capacity was just over 166 million barrels, and the financial damage to Iran was estimated at more than $13 billion.

In reality, “shadow fleet” tankers disable or spoof their identification signals, making their detection on the open sea a fairly complex task. According to Vortexa estimates, more than 100 tankers and gas carriers have successfully breached the blockade since it began. At the same time, TankerTrackers reports that as of May 12, Iran had failed to export a single shipment of crude oil by sea (excluding petroleum products) since mid-April.

More than 20 tankers have accumulated near the terminal on Kharg Island (compared to four vessels before the blockade began). Some are likely being used as floating storage sites, as onshore storage capacity is nearing exhaustion. The port of Chabahar now holds 14 tankers (the pre-blockade average was five), eight of which are carrying oil previously intercepted and “redirected” by U.S. forces.

How Iranian forces are fighting the blockade

U.S. forces have effectively destroyed Iran’s navy, but the Iranian command still retains a “mosquito fleet” consisting of a large number of small, fast patrol boats. Together with mines, land-based launch systems, and drones, these assets maintain an effective blockade on commercial vessels attempting to independently transit the Strait of Hormuz.

However, patrol boats and drones cannot protect Iranian tankers themselves, meaning Iran’s blockade serves as a pressure tool against U.S. allies in the Persian Gulf and also puts pressure on global energy markets, while the American blockade exclusively targets Iran’s oil export sector. Iranian authorities have also declared their intention to monetize control over the Strait of Hormuz in one way or another and to make this issue part of any future negotiations.

The maritime “guerrilla war” in the Strait of Hormuz — in which Iranian patrol boats patrol the waters, lay new minefields, and seize and attack vessels breaking the blockade, while U.S. forces attempt to stop them — has involved a collection of fairly significant combat incidents, each of which could potentially have ended the ceasefire.

In early May, the sides exchanged strikes, with attacks occurring against Qeshm Island and the port of Bandar Abbas. In late May, U.S. forces struck at boats laying mines and onshore launch sites, after which Iran attempted to attack an air base in Kuwait. Despite the ceasefire, since April 7 Iran has launched at least 320 drones and missiles at targets in neighboring countries and adjacent waters.

How the blockade is affecting Iran’s situation

The damage to Iran from the hostilities is estimated at $270 billion, comparable to the country’s pre-war annual GDP. By the end of 2026, its economy will likely have contracted by 10%. Oil export revenues at high global prices could have mitigated the losses, but the U.S. naval blockade is forcing Iran to stockpile oil in onshore tanks and tankers. Loading fell from 2.1 million barrels per day in April to just 640,000 barrels per day in May 2026.

Iran’s oil stockpiles in tankers outside the U.S. Navy’s control zone have dropped from 122 million barrels to 89 million barrels, and an increasing number of tankers are falling under U.S. sanctions, complicating deliveries to Chinese refineries. According to Kpler estimates, if the current situation persists, Iranian oil export revenues will fall to zero within 60-70 days even in the absence of a new military campaign.

If the naval blockade is maintained, Iran’s oil export revenues will drop to zero within 60-70 days

Economic difficulties are mounting inside Iran: annual inflation exceeds 50% (over 100% for food), the national currency is depreciating, and between 3.5 and 4.5 million Iranians have fallen below the poverty line. Nevertheless, the Iranian leadership maintains control of the country and, according to CIA estimates, has a resilience buffer of at least three to four months despite the blockade.

The Hormuz deadlock could drag on

Iranian forces have been maintaining a blockade of the Strait of Hormuz since March 2 (with a brief formal pause on April 17-18). Since April 13, the U.S. naval force has established its own blockade. The combined blockades are effectively restricting Gulf oil supplies to the global market — both Iranian oil and oil from third countries. Before hostilities began on Feb. 28, an average of 138 vessels transited the Strait of Hormuz each day. In the first half of May, that figure fell to approximately 10 vessels per day. Iranian oil exports have, by all known estimates, ceased entirely.

Iran refuses to stop obstructing maritime traffic through the strait as long as the American blockade continues, and Tehran plans to maintain control over the strait going forward. Meanwhile, Trump’s recent statements suggest that he is not prepared to lift his own blockade until a comprehensive agreement with Iran is reached and a return to the pre-war status quo is achieved.

The demining of the Strait of Hormuz that was announced by Trump has stalled: according to U.S. Defense Department estimates, the process will take six months and can only be begun after the conflict ends. An initiative to provide U.S. naval escorts for vessels from neutral countries also failed. Despite reports that U.S. forces have been quietly escorting commercial ships through the danger zone, CENTCOM has denied that this is happening.

Demining the Strait of Hormuz will take six months

Meanwhile, the war with Iran has become a domestic political problem for the Trump administration. The official cost of the operation has reached $25 billion, but a more realistic estimate (which includes the cost of lost weapons and damage to military facilities) amounts to $40-50 billion.

Over the brief duration of the conflict, U.S. forces have expended between 25% and 50% of their total stockpiles of precision-guided munitions and surface-to-air missiles. Replenishing these stocks will take the defense industry between 42 and 64 months.

The same applies to certain types of military equipment. For example, between 24 and 30 MQ-9 Reaper reconnaissance-strike drones have been lost (approximately 20% of the U.S. military’s total fleet), with a combined value of around $1 billion. At the same time, Iran is estimated to have retained up to 70% of its pre-war missile arsenal and mobile launch systems, and the country has regained access to 90% of its underground missile bases.

On April 28, the Wall Street Journal reported that Trump was preparing for a prolonged blockade of Iran, having assessed the options of resuming airstrikes and ending the war as riskier. However, if the Iranian regime’s resilience buffer is indeed three to four months, he will either need to lift the Iranian blockade or else find a way to deal with persistently high global oil prices — and high domestic gasoline prices — ahead of the U.S. midterm elections.

Moreover, there is no clarity on what a new military campaign would look like. “Decapitation strikes” against Iran’s leadership have likely radicalized the surviving regime by significantly strengthening the IRGC’s influence, making an agreement on American terms less likely to be reached.

Before the twelve-day bombing campaign against Iran in June 2025, Tehran was estimated to be 3-6 months away from acquiring a nuclear weapon. Intelligence assessments circulating in the media now put Iran at approximately 9-12 months away from acquiring its own nuclear weapon, even though the most recent joint U.S.-Israeli campaign primarily targeted facilities unrelated to the nuclear program. If no breakthroughs occur in negotiations over the fate of the nuclear program, what lies ahead is either a prolonged standoff in the form of mutual naval blockades with sporadic episodes of military escalation, or a new round of armed conflict. For now at least, a lasting peace appears to have no chance.